MICHAEL B. JONES v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: June 18, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-002946-MR
MICHAEL B. JONES
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LOGAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TYLER L. GILL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-32
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GARDNER, JOHNSON, AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
GARDNER, JUDGE:
Michael Jones (Michael) appeals from his
judgment of conviction in Logan Circuit Court for third-degree
assault and resisting arrest.
On appeal, he argues that there
was insufficient evidence in the record to support his assault
conviction and that the trial court improperly instructed the
jury.
After reviewing the record below, this Court affirms.
Michael’s conviction stems from events occurring on
March 25, 1997.
Deputy Sheriff Travis Harris (Harris) received a
call regarding a car accident on Highway 178 in Logan County,
Kentucky.
Harris had an abandoned car removed from a culvert
beside the road and ran a license check which showed that the car
belonged to Brad Jones, Michael’s father.
Harris, along with Officer Joe Higgins (Higgins) of the
Russellville Police Department, went to Brad Jones’s residence to
further investigate the matter.
The officers approached the
residence, and Harris walked up the stairs to the house and
knocked on the door.
Michael came to a side door and talked to
Harris through an open door.
steps leading to the door.
Higgins waited at the bottom of the
Michael told the officers that he
knew nothing about the abandoned car.
Harris asked to speak with
Michael’s father, but Michael refused to wake his father.
After
some more discussion, Michael hit Harris in the face with the
back of his hands.
Harris fell back on the steps, into Higgins.
Higgins then told Michael that he was under arrest for assaulting
a police officer.
by the officers.
Michael went into the house as he was pursued
As the officers grabbed him, Michael struck
Higgins in the face.
The officers finally arrested Michael.
In April 1997, a grand jury indicted Michael on two
counts of third-degree assault and resisting arrest.
Michael
received a jury trial, and he was found guilty of one count of
third-degree assault and resisting arrest.
Michael received a
sentence of one year for the assault conviction and twelve months
for resisting arrest, said sentences to run concurrently.
Michael has now brought this appeal.
Michael argues that insufficient evidence exists in the
record below to support his conviction for third-degree assault.
He maintains that the Commonwealth introduced no evidence proving
-2-
that he used a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, and that
there was no evidence that Harris or Higgins suffered any
physical injury or serious physical injury.
Ample evidence was
presented in the trial court to support Michael’s conviction.
His arguments regarding a dangerous instrument, deadly weapon and
serious physical injury are misplaced.
Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 508.025(1) states,
A person is guilty of assault in the thirddegree when the actor:
(a) Recklessly, with a deadly weapon or
dangerous instrument, or intentionally causes
or attempts to cause physical injury to:
1. A state, county, city or federal peace
officer. . . .
The assault statutes do not contain a definition of physical
injury.
Covington v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 849 S.W.2d 560, 564
(1992).
KRS 500.080(13) defines physical injury as “substantial
physical pain or impairment of physical condition.”
Id.
This
Court has interpreted impairment of physical condition to mean
any injury.
Id.
By enacting KRS 508.025(1), the General
Assembly sought to protect those individuals who serve this
Commonwealth in law enforcement capacities.
Wyatt v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 738 S.W.2d 832, 834 (1987).
Pursuant to the clear words of KRS 508.025(1), the
Commonwealth need not show a dangerous instrument or deadly
weapon was used in order to prove that Michael intentionally
caused or attempted to cause physical injury to a state, county,
or city peace officer.
The instrument or weapon requirement only
applies in situations where a defendant acted recklessly.
-3-
The
Commonwealth presented ample evidence that Michael intentionally
caused or attempted to cause physical injury to Officers Harris
and Higgins.
He struck Harris in the face causing him to fall
back on the steps, ultimately bumping into Higgins.
later struck Higgins in the face.
He also
Even if the evidence was not
as strong to show a physical injury received by Harris, there was
plain evidence that Michael attempted to cause physical injury.
It was within the jury’s prerogative to hear the evidence and
decide whether Michael had engaged in the prohibited conduct.
We
decline to disturb the verdict.1
Michael in this case also argues that he was
substantially prejudiced by the trial court’s alleged failure to
instruct the jury regarding the use of a deadly weapon or
dangerous instrument.
This argument is misplaced because we have
already concluded that the Commonwealth did not have to prove
these elements under the theory it pursued at trial and on which
Michael was convicted.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court affirms the
judgment of the Logan Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
1
Michael in his reply brief argues that he was not indicted
under the provision of the statute for which he was convicted.
The indictment shows inartful drafting as it mixed the
alternative theories of reckless and intentional for third degree
assault; however, it apprised Michael of the charges against him,
and he cannot argue surprise especially since there was ample
evidence presented at trial to support the Commonwealth’s theory.
See Johnson v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 709 S.W.2d 838, 839
(1986). Further, he has not shown whether this issue was
preserved. In order for alleged defects in the indictment to be
considered on appeal, they must be preserved for appellate
review. Id.
-4-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jeffrey A. Reed
Bowling Green, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Shawn C. Goodpaster
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.