BILLY JOE STEWART and TAMMY BOWLING BADGETT v. SOUTHEASTERN GROUP, INC. d/b/a BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD; Estate of JAMES E. COOPER; BETTY COOMER COOPER; and WESTFIELD COMPANIES
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RENDERED:
July 23, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-002908-MR
BILLY JOE STEWART and
TAMMY BOWLING BADGETT
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM BOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE C. DAVID HAGERMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 94-CI-00292
v.
SOUTHEASTERN GROUP, INC. d/b/a
BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD;
Estate of JAMES E. COOPER;
BETTY COOMER COOPER; and
WESTFIELD COMPANIES
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, DYCHE, and McANULTY, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE:
The appellants, Billy Joe Stewart and Tammy
Bowling Badgett, appeal from the judgment of the Boyd Circuit
Court.
They argue that the court erred in failing to allow the
jury the opportunity to consider the issue of punitive damages.
Finding no error, we affirm.
On October 16, 1992, the appellants were injured in an
automobile accident involving James E. Cooper (Cooper).
Stewart
was driving on Winchester Avenue in Ashland, Kentucky, when
Cooper failed to yield the right-of-way and pulled in front of
him, resulting a collision of the two vehicles; Badgett was a
passenger in the car driven by Stewart.
Cooper was arrested at
the scene of the accident and was charged with Driving Under the
Influence, First Offense, to which he ultimately pleaded guilty.
Subsequently, on April 5, 1994, the appellants filed an action
against Cooper to recover both compensatory and punitive damages
based upon the injuries they sustained in the accident.
Cooper died prior to trial, and upon motion of the
appellants pursuant to CR 25.01, the court entered an order
substituting Cooper’s estate as a defendant in April, 1997.
court set a trial date of October 6, 1997.
The
The estate filed a
motion in limine on October 3, 1997, arguing that the appellants
could not recover punitive damages since Cooper was now deceased.
On the day of the trial, the court held a hearing in chambers on
the parties’ motions in limine.
Pertinent to this appeal, the
court held that the appellants could not recover punitive damages
from the estate based upon Cooper’s alleged negligence.
The
court reasoned that the dual purposes underlying punitive damages
— punishment of the tortfeasor for his actions and deterrence as
to future misconduct — could not be served by punishing the heirs
of Cooper’s estate, wholly innocent parties with respect to the
alleged malfeasance of Cooper.
The case proceeded to trial on the issue of damages.
Prior to trial, the parties had stipulated that Cooper was solely
responsible for the car accident, but they disagreed as to the
extent of his liability for the appellants’ injuries.
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The estate
argued that the appellants had contributed to their injuries by
their own negligent failure to wear seatbelts at the time of the
accident.
The jury returned a verdict awarding $27,885.75 to
Stewart and $15,337.58 to Badgett in compensatory damages.
Additionally, the jury apportioned liability:
20% to the appellants.
80% to Cooper and
The court entered final judgment on
October 16, 1997, and this appeal followed.
This case presents an issue of first impression in
Kentucky:
whether a plaintiff may recover punitive damages
against the estate of a deceased tortfeasor.
The legislatures
and courts of approximately thirty-three other states have
addressed this very issue.
The majority rule is that punitive
damages may not be recovered from the estate of a deceased
tortfeasor based upon the rationale that:
[I]f the wrongdoer is no longer living, he
cannot be punished by any earthly court or
judgment, nor is there any necessity to do
anything to deter him from committing any
further wrong, and therefore the only
possible reason for awarding exemplary
damages for the wrong done by him has ceased
to exist. Accordingly, these courts have
ruled that the representatives of a deceased
person such as an executor or administrator
are not liable for exemplary or punitive
damages in an action begun or continued
against such representative for a tort
committed by the deceased person.
30 ALR 4th 707, Survival of Punitive Damages Claim §2 at 710
(1984).
The courts in the jurisdictions which have permitted
recovery of punitive or exemplary damages from the estate of a
deceased tortfeasor have generally cited the purposes of punitive
damages as consisting of more than simply punishment and
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deterrence.
In Texas, where the courts have upheld the recovery
of punitive damages against a tortfeasor’s estate, they have held
that punitive damages not only punish and deter wrongdoers, but
that they also provide a vehicle for victims to recover
reimbursement for inconvenience, for attorneys’ fees, and for
losses too remote to be considered compensation.
Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1984).
rationale,
Hofer v.
Following the same
West Virginia courts have viewed punitive damages as
a means of providing an extra cushion of compensation to victims
of reckless and wanton conduct.
299 S.E.2d 8 (1982).
Perry v. Melton, 171 W.Va. 397,
Additionally, some jurisdictions allow the
imposition of punitive damages against the tortfeasor’s estate in
order to set an example to deter others from engaging in similar
conduct.
See generally, Tillett v. Lippert, 275 Mont. 1, 909
P.2d 1158 (1996); Penberthy v. Price, 281 Ill. App. 3d 16, 666
N.E.2d 352 (1996).
“The concept of permitting punitive damages in addition
to compensatory damages is one of longstanding in Kentucky.”
Horton v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., Ky., 690 S.W.2d 382, 388
(1985).
The term punitive damages means “damages, other than
compensatory and nominal damages, awarded against a person to
punish and to discourage him and others from similar conduct in
the future.”
(Emphasis added).
KRS 411.184(1)(f).
In civil
law, they amount to a “penalty for the violation of the rights of
another.”
Bisset v. Goss, Ky., 481 S.W.2d 71, 73 (1972).
The
focus is more on the egregious nature of the offense in societal
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terms rather than the impact on the individual plaintiff
suffering the injury:
"The theory of exemplary, punitive, or
vindictive damages, or ‘smart money,’ as they
are sometimes called, involves a blending of
the interests of society in general with
those of the aggrieved individual in
particular. According to the more generally
accepted doctrine, such damages are allowed
not because of any special merit in the
injured party’s case, but are awarded by way
of punishment to the offender, and as a
deterrent, warning, or example to defendant
and others, or even, it has been said as an
expression of the indignation of the jury."
Bisset, supra at 74 (citing 25 C.J.S. Damages §117 (1), p. 1107).
Thus, it is clear that both the legislature and the
courts in this jurisdiction justify the imposition of punitive
damages on the grounds that they serve to punish the wrongdoer
and to deter others.
The doctrine of punitive damages serves the
“useful purposes of expressing society’s disapproval of
intolerable conduct and deterring such conduct where no other
remedy would suffice.”
Horton, 690 S.W.2d at 390 (quoting Mallor
and Roberts, Punitive Damages Toward a Principled Approach, 31
Hastings L.J. 639, 641 (1980)).
While punitive damages
inevitably constitute extra compensation for the victim, the
emphasis shifts from the victim to the flagrant conduct of the
perpetrator; they
are awarded in addition to compensatory
damages for “conduct that is outrageous, because of the
defendant’s evil motive or his reckless indifference to the
rights of others.”
Id. at 389 (quoting Restatement of Torts §
908(2)(1979)).
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Mindful of the policy purposes underlying punitive
damages in this jurisdiction, we are persuaded to join the
majority of states in this country in holding that punitive
damages are not recoverable against the estate of a deceased
tortfeasor.
“[T]he purposes of punishment and deterrence are not
accomplished by enabling recovery of punitive damages from the
estate of deceased tortfeasors.”
Jamarillo v. Providence
Washington Insurance Company, 117 N.M. 337, 871 P.2d 1343, 1352
(1994).
To make the estate of a tortfeasor liable for punitive
damages would visit undeserved punishment upon a decedent’s heirs
— as well as upon creditors of the estate.
A decedent’s family
would be deprived of whatever financial support that they might
derive from the tortfeasor’s estate.
“With the wrongdoer dead,
there is no one to punish, and to punish the innocent ignores our
basic philosophy of justice.”
Lohr v. Byrd, 522 So.2d 845, 847
(Fla. 1988).
As to the deterrent effect of an award of punitive
damages against a tortfeasor’s estate, the Supreme Court of
Alaska provided some guidance in Doe v. Colligan, 753 P.2d 144,
146 (Alaska 1988):
The concomitant goal of general deterrence
depends significantly upon the punishment
function of an award of punitive damages.
Since the deceased tortfeasor cannot be
punished, the general deterrent effect
becomes speculative at best and thus, in our
view, falls short of furnishing a justifiable
ground for an award of punitive damages
against the tortfeasor’s estate.
It is true that KRS 411.184, the statute which codifies
the imposition of punitive damages in this jurisdiction, does not
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specifically preclude the recovery of punitive damages against a
tortfeasor’s estate.
However, the legislature has specifically
stated in KRS 411.184(1)(f) that the policy purpose justifying an
award of punitive damages is that of punishment and deterrence.
Thus, the policy purpose of punitive damages would be wholly
distorted by allowing recovery under the circumstances in this
case, resulting in financial injury or deprivation to the
decedent’s family members, who had no connection with or
responsibility for his wrongful act.
Such an award would neither
achieve nor advance policy purpose clearly articulated by our own
punitive damages statute.
We emphasize that our holding in this case is narrowly
tailored to pertain solely to recovery of punitive damages from
the estate of a tortfeasor as opposed to a living tortfeasor.
In
no way does it restrict or govern a victim’s right to seek
recovery of punitive damages from a living tortfeasor.
KRS
411.140 provides that “[n]o right of action for personal injury
or for injury to real or personal property shall cease or die
with the person injuring or injured” with a few limited
exceptions.
In the case before us, the appellants’ action
survived Cooper’s death, and they were allowed to proceed against
his estate to recover compensation for their injuries.
If Cooper
had not died during litigation, they could have sought punitive
damages from him as well.
The well-established jural right of a
plaintiff to seek punitive damages from a tortfeasor for
negligent conduct remains unchanged.
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However, we hold that
punitive damages may not be recovered from the estate of a
deceased tortfeasor.
We find that the circuit court did not err in refusing
to instruct the jury on the issue of punitive damages. Therefore,
we affirm the judgment of the Boyd Circuit Court.
McANULTY, JUDGE, CONCURS.
DYCHE, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES A SEPARATE OPINION.
DYCHE, JUDGE, DISSENTING: For the reasons ably
expressed in the majority opinion, I would reverse the trial
court and allow the claim for punitive damages to proceed.
The
policy of deterring other people from such conduct could then be
served, as well as the plaintiffs being more adequately
compensated for their damages.
As it now stands in this state, a
person injured by a tortfeasor can never be made totally whole,
because attorney fees are not a recoverable cost.
The allowance
of punitive damages in proper cases would be a step toward
remediation of that problem.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
James D. Keffer
Michael J. Curtis
Ashland, KY
William P. Emrick
Ashland, KY
Robert F. Duncan
Lexington, KY
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