ACCEPTANCE INSURANCE COMPANY; and DON'S AUTO II, INC. V. ANGELA R. KEENE; ROBERT RAY WILLIAMS; SHARON Y. LEACH; UNITED MARINE MECHANICS, INC., d/b/a UNITED AUTO SALES; COMPANY AND ANGELA R. KEENE V. MONROE GUARANTY INSURANCE COMPANY; and UNITED MARINE MECHANICS, INC., d/b/a UNITED AUTO SALES
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RENDERED: February 19, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-002887-MR
ACCEPTANCE INSURANCE COMPANY;
and DON'S AUTO II, INC.
V.
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ELLEN B. EWING, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-3023
ANGELA R. KEENE; ROBERT RAY
WILLIAMS; SHARON Y. LEACH;
UNITED MARINE MECHANICS, INC.,
d/b/a UNITED AUTO SALES;
and MONROE GUARANTY INSURANCE
COMPANY
AND
APPELLEES
NO. 1997-CA-002911-MR
ANGELA R. KEENE
V.
APPELLANTS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ELLEN B. EWING, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-3023
MONROE GUARANTY INSURANCE
COMPANY; and UNITED
MARINE MECHANICS, INC., d/b/a
UNITED AUTO SALES
OPINION AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * *
APPELLEES
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, Chief Judge; GUIDUGLI and MILLER, Judges.
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE:
These appeals stem from a summary judgment,
granted by the Jefferson Circuit Court, adjudging that appellee
Monroe Guaranty Insurance Company (Monroe) was not required to
provide liability insurance coverage respecting a motor vehicle
sold by appellee United Marine Mechanics, Inc. (United).
Appellant/appellee Angela Keene, and appellants Don’s Auto II,
Inc. (Don’s Auto) and Acceptance Insurance Company, contend on
appeal that the court erred by finding that United validly
transferred title to the vehicle before it was involved in a
collision, and by finding that Monroe therefore was not required
to provide liability insurance coverage to United respecting the
collision.
Alternatively, Keene contends that the supreme
court’s decision in Nantz v. Lexington Lincoln Mercury Subaru,
Ky., 947 S.W.2d 36 (1997), should be revisited and overruled.
disagree with each of appellants’ contentions.
We
Hence, we affirm.
The relevant factual background of this litigation is
well stated in the trial court’s opinion, as follows:
On January 11, 1995, Plaintiff Angela R.
Keene, allegedly sustained physical injuries
when an automobile operated by Defendant,
Robert Ray Williams (“Williams”) collided
with her automobile. Williams was operating
a 1997 [sic] Plymouth which he purchased from
James Utley (“Utley”), who was purportedly
acting as agent of Don’s Auto II, Inc.
(“Don’s Auto”). The general dispute under
which the motion for summary judgment was
brought deals with the legal ownership of the
automobile operated by Williams, for
determination of liability.
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Don’s Auto operates a used car lot
located on Preston Highway, in Louisville,
Jefferson County, Kentucky. David Binford is
the manager of Don’s Auto. James Utley had
worked at Don’s Auto up until November 1994;
however, there is a dispute as to whether he
conducted any work for Don’s Auto after that
date, and the duration and extent of that
work. Williams worked periodically for Don’s
Auto in or around the Fall of 1994.
On January 9, 1995, Dean Jaggers,
manager of United Auto, was approached by
Utley and Williams regarding the purchase of
the 1987 Plymouth. Utley allegedly
represented himself as a worker of Don’s
Auto, as did Williams. Utley purchased the
1987 Plymouth from United Auto for $450.00,
with the intent to place the car on the Don’s
Auto lot and have it sold.
A dealer-to-dealer transfer for the 1987
Plymouth was executed on January 10, 1995,
and the back of the title to the 1987
Plymouth was endorsed to Don’s Auto. A
dealer-to-dealer transfer does not require
the payment of a transfer tax or the filling
out of a vehicle transfer report.
Utley signed both Binford’s name and his
own name, on behalf of Don’s Auto, on all
documents relevant to the transfer of the
1987 Plymouth. Binford contends that he did
not give Utley permission to sign on his
behalf at the time of the said transaction.
Utley had been given permission to sign on
behalf of Binford, as agent of Don’s Auto in
the past.
Williams expressed that he wanted to buy
the 1987 Plymouth, and Utley and Williams
agreed that Williams, through his wife Tonya,
would purchase the 1987 Plymouth from Don’s
Auto and/or Utley. Williams took possession
of the vehicle on the evening of January 10,
1995, with Utley retaining possession of the
title. There is a dispute about the timing
of Williams’ payment(s) for the auto.
Williams contends that he made payments for
six or seven months; while Utley contends
that Williams either paid one or two payments
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for the purchase of the car. The accident
occurred on January 11, 1995, while Williams
was driving the 1987 Plymouth to his home
from Utley’s home, where he had been doing
some yard work for Utley.
On January 13, 1995, Utley filed a
Vehicle Acquisition Notice for the automobile
in question with the Jefferson County Clerk,
signing as General Manager of Don’s Auto. On
that same day, Utley signed and filed the
Second Re-assignment by Dealer section of the
Certificate of Title to the motor vehicle,
evidencing transfer of the vehicle from Don’s
Auto to Tonya Williams. Utley further
executed and filed with the Jefferson County
Clerk a Vehicle Transaction
Record/Application for Title/Registration
transferring title to the automobile from
Don’s Auto to Tonya Williams.
Plaintiff filed suit against Williams,
Sharon Y. Leach (driver of a second motor
vehicle which also struck the Plaintiff),
Acceptance Insurance Company (insurance
carrier of Don’s Auto) and Don’s Auto on
March 13, 1997. Plaintiff filed suit against
United Auto and Monroe on May 7, 1997.
Defendants, Monroe and United Auto, filed
their answer and cross-claim against
Acceptance Insurance Company, Don’s Auto,
Robert Ray Williams and Sharon Y. Leach, on
June 18, 1997.
Defendants, Monroe and United Auto, make
a motion for summary judgment, contending
that title to the 1987 Plymouth was
transferred from United to Don’s Auto and/or
Utley, prior to the accident, when United
completed and signed the assignment of title
section of the title certificate and
delivered it to Utley.
The court determined that United had validly transferred title to
the vehicle prior to the collision.
Hence, the court granted
United and its insurer, Monroe, a summary judgment.
followed.
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This appeal
First, appellants contend that United and Monroe failed
to meet their burden of establishing that they were entitled to a
summary judgment.
We disagree.
The record shows that United acquired the vehicle at
issue from Boyd E. Grimes, Jr. on December 27, 1994.
As required
by KRS 186A.215(1), Grimes executed the assignment of title and
odometer disclosure statement on the reverse side of his
certificate of title.
Moreover, it is undisputed that upon
acquiring the vehicle, United timely notified the county clerk
that it had acquired the vehicle’s title as required by KRS
186A.220(1).
United also obtained from Grimes the documents
required by KRS 186A.215 to effect the transfer as required by
KRS 186A.220(2), and the clerk subsequently provided United with
a certificate of registration for the vehicle.
At that point,
United put the vehicle on its lot for purposes of sale.
Under KRS 186A.220, a dealer such as United which
acquires a vehicle’s title in circumstances such as those
presented here may transfer the title to a purchaser by one of
two methods.
A dealer which sells the vehicle to another dealer
may transfer title merely by executing, in favor of the dealer
purchaser, one of the “reassignment by dealer” forms on the
certificate of title’s reverse side, and then delivering both the
certificate of title and the vehicle to that purchaser.
186A.220(4).
Nothing else is required.
KRS
On the other hand, if
the dealer sells the vehicle to a purchaser for the latter’s use,
the dealer must deliver not only a properly-assigned certificate
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of title, but also a properly-executed vehicle transaction
record.
KRS 186A.220(5).
Here, the record shows that United in good faith sold
and delivered the vehicle to another dealer (Don’s Auto), and
that it complied with its 186A.220(4) duty to transfer the
vehicle’s title by executing a “reassignment by dealer” form on
the reverse side of the certificate of title.
This was all
United was required to do in order to transfer the vehicle’s
title.
Obviously, therefore, unless some basis exists for
concluding, as asserted by appellants, that United knew or should
have known that the vehicle was actually being sold to Utley
and/or Smith individually rather than to Don’s Auto, the trial
court clearly did not err by granting a summary judgment in favor
of United and Monroe.
We find no basis for reaching such a
conclusion.
There is simply no evidence in the record to create an
issue of fact as to whether United and its employee either knew
in advance that Don’s Auto was not purchasing the vehicle, or
conspired with Utley to assist him in avoiding the payment of a
transfer tax on the vehicle.
On the contrary, the only evidence
adduced regarding the events shows that United’s employee acted
in good faith, based upon his understanding that Don’s Auto was
the vehicle’s purchaser.
Moreover, contrary to appellants’
argument, United had no duty to deliver to Don’s Auto the
dealer-to-dealer assignment form required by KRS 186A.220.
Instead, KRS 186A.220(2) clearly imposes the duty of obtaining
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the form upon the dealer acquiring the vehicle, rather than upon
the selling dealer.
Further, since Don’s Auto was a dealer
rather than a purchaser for use, United had no duty under KRS
186A.220(5) to provide a vehicle transaction record in order to
validly transfer title.
Finally, we find no merit in appellants’
argument that before United could treat the sales transaction as
a dealer-to-dealer transfer, it was obligated to first
independently verify that Don’s Auto, rather than Utley and/or
Williams, was acquiring the vehicle’s title.
To conclude
otherwise, we believe, would create havoc in the automobile
dealer industry, and would undermine the present statute’s intent
of facilitating the expeditious transfer of motor vehicle titles.
Further, to require such independent verification by dealers
would further be both impractical and entirely too burdensome.
Finally, we note that KRS 186A.220 clearly does not impose such a
burden, and we decline to do so by judicial fiat.
Appellant Keene’s remaining contention, regarding the
overruling of the court’s decision in Nantz, supra, is one which
addresses itself exclusively to the supreme court.
For the reasons stated, the court’s judgment is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR ACCEPTANCE
INSURANCE COMPANY; and
DON’S AUTO II, INC.:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR ANGELA R. KEENE:
James P. McCrocklin
Louisville, KY
Douglas W. Becker
Timothy G. Hatfield
Louisville, KY
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR ACCEPTANCE
INSURANCE COMPANY; and
DON’S AUTO II, INC.:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR UNITED MARINE MECHANICS,
d/b/a UNITED AUTO SALES; and
MONROE GUARANTY INSURANCE
COMPANY:
Timothy G. Hatfield
Louisville, KY
Robert E. Maclin, III
Lexington, KY
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