JOSEPH CANE HERBST v. CAROL ANNETT HALL HERBST
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RENDERED: February 19, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 1997-CA-002749-MR
JOSEPH CANE HERBST
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM J. WEHR, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 94-CI-806
CAROL ANNETT HALL HERBST
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, JOHNSON, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
Joseph Herbst (Joseph) appeals from an order of
the Campbell Circuit Court entered on October 16, 1997, regarding
child custody and child support.
After reviewing the record, the
applicable law, and the arguments of counsel, we affirm.
While Casey, the parties’ minor child, was born on
May 29, 1984, the parties did not marry until 1991.
marriage was dissolved in 1994.
Their
Initially, they agreed that
Casey would reside with each parent on a nearly equal basis and
that neither party would pay child support.
However, in June
1997, the appellee, Carol Hall Herbst (Carol), moved the trial
court to modify the parties’ joint custody arrangement and to
grant her sole custody of Casey and child support.
The Domestic Relations Commissioner held a hearing in
August 1997.
According to his report, the Commissioner heard
testimony from the parties and interviewed the child.
The
parties both lived in Campbell County shortly after they
divorced.
Casey attended school in Campbell County and spent
approximately equal time at each of the parties’ homes.
At the
time of the hearing, Joseph lived in Campbell County and Carol
lived in Kenton County.
The parties became concerned about
Casey’s performance in school, but could not agree on what steps
to take in addressing this problem.
Joseph wanted Casey to
reside with him during the week and to attend school in Campbell
County, while Carol wanted Casey to reside with her during the
week and to attend school in Kenton County.
Citing Stinnett v. Stinnett, Ky. App., 915 S.W.2d 323
(1996) and Mennemeyer v. Mennemeyer, Ky. App., 887 S.W.2d 555
(1994), the Commissioner concluded that Carol had failed to meet
her burden of showing that the joint custody should be modified.
In his report, he stated as follows:
The court may not modify a joint custody
award without first finding an inability or
bad faith refusal of one or both parties to
rationally participate in decisions
concerning their child’s upbringing. . . .
In Stinnett, the Court of Appeals noted that
“. . . obviously many disagreements between
joint custodians do not reach this level of
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non cooperation [sic] . . .” Stinnett at
324. The Master Commissioner believes this
disagreement about which school Casey should
attend for the 1997/1998 school year is just
such a disagreement.
Accordingly, he recommended that Carol’s motion to modify custody
be denied.
However, the Commissioner then recommended that Casey
reside with Carol on Monday through Friday during the upcoming
school year, attend school in Kenton County, reside with Joseph
on alternating weekends, and that the parties split summer
vacation and holiday time.
The Commissioner further recommended
that Joseph pay Carol child support in the amount of $95.00 per
week.
The trial court adopted all of the Commissioner’s
recommendations.
Joseph filed objections, which the trial court denied
in an order entered on September 11, 1997.
Joseph then filed a
motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied by order
entered on October 6, 1997.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, Joseph argues that the trial court erred by
ordering that Casey’s primary physical residence be with Carol
and by awarding child support to Carol.
Joseph claims that the
trial court did not properly apply the factors set out in
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.270.
In order to modify an award of joint custody, the trial
court must first find that there has been “an inability or bad
faith refusal of one or both parties to cooperate.”
887 S.W.2d at 557-558.
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Mennemeyer,
If joint custody is awarded and subsequently
becomes unworkable, a nonconsensual
modification of the original joint custody
decree should be made only after the court
conducts a de novo hearing pursuant to KRS
403.270 as if there had been no prior custody
determination. . . . Any court-ordered
modification must then be made in light of
the best interest of the child[] and based
upon the factors which are enumerated in KRS
403.270.
Id.
The trial court’s findings of fact in a domestic relations
case shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.
Kentucky
Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01; Reichle v. Reichle, Ky., 719
S.W.2d 442, 444 (1986).
There is no transcript, audio tape, or videotape in the
record of the August 1997 custody hearing.
Joseph, as the
appellant, had the responsibility of ensuring that any
untranscribed proceedings were transcribed and that the record
was properly prepared by the circuit court clerk.
See CR 75.01;
Seale v. Riley, Ky. App., 602 S.W.2d 441, 442-443 (1980); and
Ventors v. Watts, Ky. App., 686 S.W.2d 833, 834-835 (1985).
In
the absence of a record of the hearing, “we must assume the
record supports the factual determinations of the trial court."
Dillard v. Dillard, Ky. App., 859 S.W.2d 134, 137 (1993).
In the case sub judice, the trial court found that the
parties could not reach an agreement about where Casey should
attend school.
However, the trial court did not find that this
disagreement reached the threshold requirement to allow
modification of the joint custody award.
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In an attempt to clarify some confusion concerning the
Mennemeyer threshold requirement, this Court in Jacobs v.
Edelstein, Ky. App., 959 S.W.2d 781 (1998), recently stated as
follows:
Mennemeyer does not hold, and should not be
interpreted as holding, that the threshold
procedural requirement must be met before a
trial court may address issues, other than
those involving the nonvoluntary modification
of custody or primary physical possession
arrangements, which may arise in the context
of joint custody, such as disagreements
concerning a child's educational or religious
upbringing. Similarly, Mennemeyer does not
hold, and should not be interpreted as
holding, that whenever it is shown that joint
custodians cannot or in bad faith will not
cooperate in regard to some particular issue,
joint custody cannot continue regardless of
whether it would be in the child’s best
interest. Just as a trial court clearly need
not modify a sole custody decree whenever the
KRS 403.340(1) threshold requirement is met,
a trial court need not modify a joint custody
decree whenever the Mennemeyer threshold
procedural requirement is met if, after a
hearing, the court determines that
continuation of the joint custody decree
would be in the child’s best interest.
Id. at 784 (emphases added).
The trial court held that Carol had not met the
Mennemeyer threshold requirement to modify the parties’ joint
custody to an award of sole custody to her.
Jacobs supports the
trial court’s determination that it was empowered to address the
parties’ concerns about the child’s educational well-being.
Given the fact that the parties now live in different counties,
and disagree as to the school situation, the trial court’s
decision on the educational issue would be proper and necessarily
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impacts the issue of Casey’s primary residence.
Accordingly, the
trial court had the authority to settle disagreements even though
it does not modify joint custody.
Therefore, the trial court’s
order of October 16, 1997 is affirmed.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, CONCURS.
JOHNSON, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES A SEPARATE OPINION.
JOHNSON, JUDGE, DISSENTING.
I respectfully dissent.
The Majority has misapplied Jacobs v. Edelstein, Ky. App., 959
S.W.2d 781 (1998).
As quoted by the Majority, Jacobs states as
follows:
Mennemeyer does not hold, and should not be
interpreted as holding, that the threshold
procedural requirement must be met before a
trial court may address issues, other than
those involving the nonvoluntary modification
of custody or primary physical possession
arrangements, which may arise in the context
of joint custody, such as disagreements
concerning a child's educational or religious
upbringing.
Id. at 784.
The Majority has ignored the language in Jacobs that
states “other than those involving the nonvoluntary modification
of custody or primary physical possession arrangements” (emphasis
added).
In the case sub judice, the trial court changed the
primary physical possession arrangements relating to Casey
without making the required findings concerning whether the
child’s best interests would be served by this change.
403.270.
KRS
I would vacate the order and remand with directions to
make a determination as to the child’s best interests pursuant to
the factors set forth in KRS 403.270.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Hon. Darrell A. Cox
Covington, KY
Hon. Suzanne Cassidy
Covington, KY
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