ROBERT SCHNEIDER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 23, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-002687-MR
ROBERT SCHNEIDER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGLAS M. STEPHENS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-00372
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, GARDNER, AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE: Robert Schneider has appealed his conviction for
escape in the second degree (Kentucky Revised Statutes 520.020)
and for being a persistent felony offender in the first degree
(KRS 532.080).
Following a jury trial, Schneider was sentenced
to prison for a term of ten years.
In this appeal, Schneider
argues that his prosecution should have been dismissed due to the
Commonwealth’s failure to try him within the 180-day time limit
set forth in the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (IAD) (KRS
440.450)
We disagree and affirm Schneider’s conviction.
On November 14, 1996, Schneider escaped from a holding
cell in the Kenton County Building where he was being held in
anticipation of a parole revocation hearing.
arrest was issued the next day.
A warrant for his
Schneider fled to the state of
Ohio where he was arrested a few days later on charges arising
from events unrelated to his escape from custody in Kentucky.
On March 11, 1997, Schneider wrote to Donald Buring, the Kenton
County Commonwealth’s Attorney, and the Clerk of the Kenton
Circuit Court, and requested “a fast & speedy trial,” on the
escape charge.
letters.
He specifically referenced the IAD in his
Schneider received no response from either Kentucky
official.
On July 1, 1997, the warden of the institution where
Schneider was then incarcerated, forwarded to the appropriate
officials, the IAD forms which contained Schneider’s request for
a final disposition of the Kentucky escape charge, as well as
information with respect to Schneider’s status as an inmate in
the Ohio prison system.
The forms contained Schneider’s notation
that “[a] written request of all above was sent to the
prosecutor’s office and clerk of court on 3-11-97.”
On August 25, 1997, Schneider was arraigned in the
Kenton Circuit Court.
without objection.
A trial date of September 23, 1997 was set
On September 10, 1997, Schneider moved to
dismiss the indictment and argued that more than 180 days had
elapsed since he had initially mailed his request to the
appropriate Kentucky officials for a speedy trial under the IAD.
The Commonwealth insisted that the time limits contained in the
IAD were not triggered by Schneider’s March mailings.
It argued
that an inmate’s direct communication affects the statute’s
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speedy trial provision only under exceptional circumstances not
alleged to have occurred in Schneider’s motion, and that the 180day period for trying Schneider did not begin to run until July
1997, when the warden gave notice of Schneider’s desire to make
an IAD request.
An evidentiary hearing on the motion to dismiss was
conducted by the trial court on September 19, 1997.
Schneider
testified that he had notified prison officials in January 1997,
of his desire to demand a speedy trial under the IAD.
He stated
that he was informed by his “case worker” that until a detainer
was lodged against him, an IAD request could not be initiated on
his behalf.
Thus, Schneider testified that because his custodian
was unable to make the request for him, he wrote directly to the
Commonwealth’s Attorney and the Clerk of the Circuit Court in an
effort to obtain a speedy resolution of the charges he knew were
pending in Kentucky.
In its order denying Schneider’s motion to dismiss, the
trial court concluded that Schneider had not commenced the 180day period by his March 11, 1997 letter writing campaign because
[u]nder Article III [of the IAD], a
prisoner cannot directly notify the
jurisdiction where charges are pending
against him in order to have those charges
disposed of. Rather, he must make this
request through the warden of the institution
where he is incarcerated. See, Ellis v.
Commonwealth, 828 S.W.2d 360 (Ky. 1992);
K.R.S. 440.450, Article III (1) and (2).
. . .
Further, [Schneider] has failed to
demonstrate that his attempt to invoke the
time limitation was thwarted by public
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officials. See, Rhodes v. Commonwealth,
Ky.App., 622 S.W.2d 677 (1981).
After this ruling, Schneider was tried under the indictment and
convicted.
A final judgment sentencing Schneider to prison was
entered on October 10, 1997.
This appeal followed.
We must determine whether the trial court correctly
interpreted and applied Article III of the IAD in concluding that
Schneider’s direct communications to the appropriate Kentucky
officials were insufficient to commence the running of the 180day period within which he could be tried.
The speedy trial
provisions contained in Article III of the IAD are activated by a
defendant as follows:
(1) Whenever a person has entered upon a
term of imprisonment in a penal or
correctional institution of a party state,
and whenever during the continuance of the
term of imprisonment there is pending in any
other party state any untried indictment,
information or complaint on the basis of
which a detainer has been lodged against the
prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within
one hundred eighty (180) days after he shall
have caused to be delivered to the
prosecuting officer and the appropriate court
of the prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction
written notice of the place of his
imprisonment and his request for a final
disposition to be made of the indictment,
information or complaint: provided that for
good cause shown in open court, the prisoner
or his counsel being present, the court
having jurisdiction of the matter may grant
any necessary or reasonable continuance. The
request of the prisoner shall be accompanied
by a certificate of the appropriate official
having custody of the prisoner, stating the
term of commitment under which the prisoner
is being held, the time already served, the
time remaining to be served on the sentence,
the amount of good time earned, the time of
parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any
decisions of the state parole agency relating
to the prisoner.
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(2) The written notice and request for
final disposition referred to in paragraph
(1) hereof shall be given or sent by the
prisoner to the warden, secretary of
corrections or other official having custody
of him, who shall promptly forward it
together with the certificate to the
appropriate prosecuting official and court by
certified mail, return receipt requested.
The legal effect of a prisoner’s failure to follow the
statutory procedure and attempt to communicate directly with the
receiving state1 has already been addressed by our appellate
courts.
In 1981, this Court determined that a motion to dismiss
an indictment “was properly overruled,” where the prisoner sent a
request for a speedy trial directly to state officials, and where
there was no corroborating evidence that the inmate made an oral
request of his custodian to send the appropriate forms, or that
the custodian refused to process his request.2
More recently,
our Supreme Court held that a direct request, not accompanied “by
a certificate from the appropriate official having custody of the
prisoner detailing specific information about the prison term in
the sending state”3 was not “adequate to engage the time
limitations of K.R.S. 440.450.”4
1
“Receiving state” is defined in Article II of the IAD as
“the state in which trial is to be had on an indictment,
information or complaint pursuant to Article III or Article IV
hereof.”
2
Rhodes v. Commonwealth, supra, 622 S.W.2d at 678.
3
“Sending state” is the “state in which a prisoner is
incarcerated at the time that he initiates a request for final
disposition” under the IAD.
4
Ellis v. Commonwealth, supra, 828 S.W.2d at 360, 361.
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Schneider correctly states that both the Rhodes and
Ellis cases hold that under certain circumstances a direct
request will suffice to activate a prisoner’s rights under the
IAD.
Indeed, Rhodes states
that strict compliance with the UAD [IAD] may
not be required in a proper factual setting
if it appears that a prisoner has taken
diligent and reasonable efforts to invoke the
time requirements, but is prevented from full
compliance because of the failure of public
officials. . . . It is one thing for an
official having custody to refuse to process
a request and thus leave the prisoner to
communicate as best he can with the State
which has lodged a detainer for him. . . . It
is quite a different matter, however, when a
prisoner simply ignores the official having
custody of him and attempts to communicate
directly with the requesting State.5
Likewise, in Ellis, the Court recognized that “strict compliance
with the I.A.D. may not always be required where a prisoner has
diligently attempted to invoke the time limitation but is
thwarted by public officials.”6
Accordingly, Schneider insists that the trial court
erred in failing to conclude that his March 1997 communications
were the result of his “thwarted” attempt to follow the statutory
procedure.
Specifically, he contends that his direct request
should be sufficient to trigger the 180-day time limit because
”officials in Ohio, through no fault of their own, prevented
[him] from complying with the Interstate Detainers Agreement,
because of the failure of [the] Commonwealth to properly place a
5
Rhodes, supra, 622 S.W.2d at 678 (citing Pittman v. State,
Del.Supr., 301 A.2d 509 (1973)).
6
Ellis, supra, 828 S.W.2d at 361.
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detainer on him.”
Schneider complains that the Commonwealth
“failed to observe the rules” by “failing to issue a detainer.”
Schneider’s arguments in this regard evince a
misunderstanding of the purposes of the IAD and the remedies it
affords.
The IAD was enacted “to remedy the disadvantages and
hardships imposed upon prison[er]s attendant with the use of
detainers and to eliminate potential abuses of the detainer
system.”7
However, the method of clearing detainers provided by
the IAD is not applicable until a state “first lodges a detainer
with the participating jurisdiction where the prisoner is
incarcerated.8
The IAD does not, as Schneider would have this
Court hold, require Kentucky’s prosecuting authorities to file a
detainer against a prisoner in the first instance.
The purpose of the statute is not to ensure
the speedy disposition of every charge, or
even of those charges which potentially could
form the basis for a detainer being lodged.
Its purpose is to provide for the speedy
disposition only of such charges as have
actually resulted in a detainer being lodged
(emphasis original)9.
Thus, as there is no dispute that Kentucky officials
had not yet lodged a detainer against Schneider with Ohio
authorities when he directly communicated his demand for a speedy
trial, we hold that the trial court did not err in concluding
7
Yost v. Smith, Ky., 862 S.W.2d 852, 853 (1993).
8
Id. See also Rushin v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 931 S.W.2d
456, 459 (1996).
9
Rushin, supra, (citing Huddleston v. Jennings, Ky.App., 723
S.W.2d 381 (1986)). Although Huddleston concerned KRS 500.110,
the Court in Rushin held that “[g]iven the similarity of KRS
440.450 and KRS 500.110, the Huddleston reasoning would apply
equally to KRS 440.450.”
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that Schneider did not activate the 180-day limit in the IAD in
March 1997.10
Simply, since Schneider had not acquired any right
to proceed under the IAD at the time he made the demand, he
obviously could not have been “thwarted” by any public officials
in the pursuit of that right.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Kenton Circuit Court
is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Elizabeth Shaw
Richmond, KY
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Brian Judy
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
10
While the record does not reveal exactly when the detainer
was actually lodged against Schneider, it is apparent that that
event took place sometime after his March, 1997 letter to the
Kenton County Commonwealth’s Attorney, and before the warden’s
official request of July 1, 1997.
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