KENTUCKY COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS on Behalf of SOLOMON BOGALE and DANITA BOGALE v. EASTERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY
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RENDERED: February 12, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-002600-MR
KENTUCKY COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS on Behalf of
SOLOMON BOGALE and
DANITA BOGALE
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM MADISON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM T. JENNINGS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-000328
EASTERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, JOHNSON, and KNOX, Judges.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE.
Kentucky Commission on Human Rights (the
Commission) appeals on behalf of Solomon and Danita Bogale (the
Bogales) from an order of the Madison Circuit Court which
dismissed with prejudice the complaint filed by the Commission on
behalf of the Bogales against Eastern Kentucky University (the
University), Dr. Thomas Myers (Myers), and Harry Moberly, Jr.
(Moberly) (hereafter referred to collectively as “the University”
unless otherwise noted).
We affirm.
The Bogales, an interracial married couple, were
residing in University housing with their two children when a
domestic violence incident occurred in their apartment in 1995.
University police forwarded a report concerning this incident to
Myers, the University’s vice-president of student affairs, and
Myers referred the matter to Moberly, the director of student
judicial affairs.
Moberly conducted a hearing concerning the
incident in June 1995, after which time he evicted Solomon Bogale
from University housing but took no action against Danita Bogale.
Solomon Bogale appealed Moberly’s decision to Myers,
but Myers upheld Moberly’s decision and gave Solomon Bogale ten
days in which to vacate University housing.
Not desiring to
disrupt their family, the Bogales and their children vacated
University housing on June 28, 1995.
The Bogales filed a
complaint with the Commission against the University, Myers, and
Moberly in September 1995, in which they alleged that they were
discriminated against due to their interracial marriage.
After a period of investigation, the Commission sent a
letter to Giles Black (apparently the University’s counsel) on
August 15, 1996, stating its finding of probable cause concerning
a violation of KRS 344.3601 by the University.
The probable
cause letter provided that the parties had a right to have this
claim decided in an administrative hearing under KRS 344.640 or
in a civil action under KRS 344.670 and further provided that
1
KRS 344.360 prohibits unlawful housing practices such as
discrimination due to race, color, religion, sex, or familial
status.
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“[t]he person making the election [of forums] is required to give
written notice of such election to the Commission.”
On August 26, 1996, Black wrote a letter to the
Commission which stated that the University “respectfully
request[s] that the matter be disposed of in the proceeding
pursuant to KRS 344.670 [the civil action].”
Copies of this
letter were sent to the Commission, the Commission’s staff
attorney assigned to the case, Myers, and Moberly, but not to the
Bogales.
Despite the letter from Black to the Commission, the
next action taken was an order issued by the Commission in
January 1997 which selected a hearing panel to adjudge the
Bogales’ complaint.
Black responded to the order selecting a
hearing panel by writing a letter to the Commission which stated
that he “had requested by letter of August 26, 1996 . . . that
the matter be disposed of in a judicial proceeding” and requested
that the Commission rescind its order setting a hearing panel so
that the matter could be disposed of pursuant to KRS 344.670.
This letter was sent to the Commission and its staff attorney, as
well as to Moberly and Myers, but not to the Bogales.
The Commission’s new managing attorney then discussed
the matter with Black, the result of which was Black’s tendering
an order rescinding the order setting a hearing panel to the
Commission for its approval.
Black’s tendered order was approved
by the Commission in March 1997.
On April 24, 1997, the Commission filed suit on behalf
of the Bogales in the Madison Circuit Court.
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The University
responded with a motion to dismiss based upon its belief that the
Commission’s suit was untimely under KRS 344.670.
That statute
provides in pertinent part that if an election for a judicial
determination is made pursuant to KRS 344.635, the Commission is
required to commence an action in the circuit court within thirty
days after the election is made.
As the letter from Black to the
Commission requesting proceedings under KRS 344.670 was dated
August 26, 1996, the University argued that the Commission filed
suit on behalf of the Bogales well after the thirty-day time
period had expired.
The trial court granted the University’s
motion and dismissed the complaint filed by the Commission on
behalf of the Bogales with prejudice.
The Commission then filed
the appeal sub judice on the Bogales’ behalf.
The Commission’s first argument is that the University
failed to properly elect a judicial forum pursuant to KRS
344.635, which provides in pertinent part as follows:
When a discriminatory housing charge is filed
under KRS 344.625, a complainant, a
respondent, or the aggrieved person on whose
behalf the complaint is filed, may elect to
have the claims asserted in that charge
decided in a civil action under KRS 344.670,
in lieu of an administrative hearing before
the commission under KRS 344.640.
. . . .
(2)
The person making the election shall
give written notice of doing so to the
commission and to all other complainants
and respondents to whom the charge
relates.
(Emphasis added.)
The crux of the Commission’s argument is that
the University did not execute a valid election to pursue a civil
action under KRS 344.670 because the University failed to give
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written notice of its election to the Bogales as required by the
statute.
The University does not deny that it failed to give
written notice of its election of a civil action directly to the
Bogales; however, the University notes that the probable cause
letter sent by the Commission to the University stated that the
party making an election need only notify the Commission.
There is no question that the University failed to give
written notice to the Bogales of its election to have the claim
asserted in a civil action under KRS 344.670, and there is no
question that the letter from the Commission advised the
University that the person making the election need only notify
the Commission.
The issue, however, is whether the University’s
failure to comply with KRS 344.635 and give notice to the Bogales
excuses the Commission’s failure to file the civil action in the
trial court within the thirty-day time period.
concluded that it did not, and we agree.
The trial court
As the election letter
from the University asserted the right to have the action brought
pursuant to KRS 344.670, and as such action must be brought by
the Commission (although on behalf of the Bogales), we conclude
that notice to the Commission but not the Bogales was sufficient
to invoke the commencement of the thirty-day period in which to
file the action, especially in light of the Bogales’ independent
right of action under KRS 344.650.
The Commission’s next argument is that, even if the
complaint was not timely filed under KRS 344.670, it was timely
filed under KRS 344.650, which provides in relevant part that:
(1)
An aggrieved person may file a civil
action in an appropriate Circuit Court
-5-
not later than two (2) years after the
occurrence or the termination of an
alleged discriminatory housing practice,
. . . to obtain appropriate relief with
respect to the discriminatory housing
practice or breach.
(2)
The computation of the two (2) year
period shall not include any time during
which an administrative proceeding under
this chapter is pending with respect to
a complaint or charge of an alleged
discriminatory housing practice.
The Commission admits that it is not the “aggrieved person,” but
it notes that the first paragraph of its complaint states that
the action was filed pursuant to KRS 344.670 and KRS 344.650 and
further notes that the Bogales are referred to as the plaintiffs
in the complaint.
It contends that jurisdiction under
KRS 344.650 does not depend upon who is representing the
aggrieved party.
On the other hand, the University argues that
KRS 344.650 plainly applies only to actions brought by an
“aggrieved person” and not to actions brought by the Commission
on behalf of aggrieved persons.
The trial court agreed with the
University and ruled that the Commission was not an aggrieved
person entitled to file an action under the statute.
The trial
court further noted, however, that the complaint would have been
timely filed under the statute if it had been filed by the
Bogales rather than by the Commission.
We agree with the trial court and conclude that
KRS 344.650 does not provide the Commission with an independent
cause of action since the Commission, by its own admission, is
not an aggrieved person.
In short, KRS 344.650 and KRS 344.670
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outline separate and discrete methods for filing actions in
circuit court and do not provide interchangeable avenues of
relief.
Finally, the Commission contends that the trial court
erred in dismissing its complaint with prejudice.
It argues that
the two-year limitations period set forth in KRS 344.650 has not
run and that the Bogales could still file an action pursuant to
that statute and be well within the two-year period as of the
date of their brief.
The University acknowledges that the
statute of limitations is tolled while the Commission continues
to proceed in the case.
We agree that the trial court properly dismissed the
Commission’s complaint with prejudice.
We construe that ruling
to mean that the Commission may not refile this action as the
thirty-day limitation period had expired.
We do not construe the
ruling to mean that the Bogales are prohibited from filing a
separate action pursuant to KRS 344.650, however, provided the
two-year limitation period allowed by that statute has not
expired.
The judgment of the Madison Circuit Court is affirmed.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Richard Gregory Munson
Ky. Comm’n on Human Rights
Louisville, KY
Stephen L. Barker
Katherine M. Coleman
Lexington, KY
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANTS:
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Alteata McWilliams (formerly
Bowman)
Ky. Comm’n on Human Rights
Louisville, KY
Edmund J. Benson
Lexington, KY
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