COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION v. RANZEY E. BROWN; WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD; SPECIAL FUND; AND HON. JAMES L. KERR, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
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RENDERED:
January 22, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 1997-CA-002482-WC
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. 96-06356
v.
RANZEY E. BROWN;
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD;
SPECIAL FUND; AND
HON. JAMES L. KERR,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE:
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JOHNSON, MILLER, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE:
The Supreme Court of Kentucky (by Opinion No. 98-
SC-395-WC, entered September 24, 1998) reversed and remanded this
matter to the Court of Appeals for consideration upon the merits.
We affirm.
The facts are these: Co-appellee Ranzey E. Brown
(Brown) was employed by the Commonwealth of Kentucky, Department
of Transportation (DOT), and was a supervisor for a prisoner road
crew.
On February 22, 1996, it appears that he and a co-employee
engaged in a physical altercation at work.
Brown allegedly
suffered physical injuries therefrom and filed a claim for
workers' compensation benefits.
In April 1997, the administrative law judge (ALJ)
concluded that Brown's injuries were non-work related and
dismissed the claim.
Unsatisfied with the outcome, Brown brought
the matter before the Workers' Compensation Board (Board).
In
September 1997, the Board reversed the ALJ's decision and
concluded that Brown's injuries were, indeed, work related.
The
Board remanded the matter to the ALJ for a determination of the
“extent of duration of occupational disability, if any, as well
as the degree of pre-existing active disability, if any.”
DOT filed a Petition for Review in the Court of Appeals.
The
In
January 1988, this court entered a Show Cause Order as to why the
appeal should not be dismissed inasmuch as the Board's decision
was non-final.
By Order entered April 14, 1997, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the DOT's Petition for Review as interlocutory.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of
Appeals' dismissal and reversed and remanded the matter to the
Court of Appeals for consideration on the merits.
We now
undertake such consideration.
The DOT contends that the Board erred by concluding
that Brown's injuries were work related.
Specifically, the DOT
contends that the ALJ's decision should be reinstated because
Brown's injuries did not arise out of or in the course of
employment.
We are compelled to disagree.
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We find persuasive
and adopt herein the Board's ratiocination for its decision of
work relatedness:
In the case, sub judice, certainly the
traditional concept of work-relatedness is
not easily found. However, it was the
employment that brought the individuals
together and, even more importantly, brought
them in close proximity to the degree that an
annoying habit on the part of one apparently
disturbed another, thus resulting in the
assault and alleged injuries. Absent their
employment at the same place and in the same
proximity, this injury would not have
occurred. While not a true positional risk
case, the circumstances are very similar
since it was being at the place of employment
that allowed the assault to occur.
As such, we are of the opinion that the Board did not commit
reversible error by concluding that Brown's injuries were work
related.
See Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, Ky., 827 S.W.2d
685 (1992).
For the foregoing reasons, the Opinion of the Workers'
Compensation Board rendered September 5, 1997, is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE BROWN:
W. David Shearer, Jr.
Louisville, KY
C. William Swinford, Jr.
Lexington, KY
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE SP. FUND:
Benjamin C. Johnson
Louisville, KY
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