BILL G. RHOADS AND SALLY E. RHOADS v. PEOPLES BANK & TRUST COMPANY OF MADISON COUNTY
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RENDERED: April 23, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-002344-MR
BILL G. RHOADS AND
SALLY E. RHOADS
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE REBECCA M. OVERSTREET, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-0282
PEOPLES BANK & TRUST
COMPANY OF MADISON COUNTY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GARDNER, HUDDLESTON AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
GARDNER, JUDGE:
Bill and Sally Rhoads (the Rhoadses) appeal from
an order of the Fayette Circuit Court granting summary judgment
for Peoples Bank & Trust Company of Madison County (Peoples
Bank).
On appeal, they contend that the trial court erroneously
granted summary judgment, because several material factual
disputes existed regarding whether Peoples Bank was negligent as
a lender or breached any fiduciary duties.
After reviewing the
record below, this Court has found no error and affirms.
William and Doris Moore (the Moores) along with the
Rhoadses formed Chevy Chase Terrace Incorporated in the mid1980s.
The corporation purchased a seventy-two unit apartment
complex in Lexington known as the Chevy Chase Terrace Apartments.
The parties intended to convert the apartments into an assisted
living complex for elderly residents.
The Moores and the
Rhoadses each owned fifty percent of the stock in the
corporation.
In 1988, the Moores and the Rhoadses contacted Peoples
Bank about refinancing a previous loan taken out for the project.
Peoples Bank loaned $1,300,000 in September 1988.
The note was
signed by the corporation and by the Moores individually and the
Rhoadses individually.
The note was secured by a first mortgage
on the real property and the pledge of a $200,000 certificate of
deposit (CD) by the Rhoadses and a $200,000 CD by the Moores.
In
November 1990, Peoples Bank loaned an additional $150,000 at the
request of Mr. Moore.
and the individuals.
This note was executed by the corporation
The proceeds of the $150,000 loan were
disbursed in the following manner:
$34,941.79 for back taxes,
$972.50 for attorney fees and title insurance, $23.50 for
recording fees, $1,500 for loan commitment fees and $112,562.21
to the corporation.
The proceeds check to the corporation was
deposited into the corporation’s bank account at First Security
National Bank (First Security).
On the same day the deposit was
made, Mr. Moore wrote himself a check for $110,000 on the First
Security account allegedly for reimbursement for repairs to the
apartments that he had previously paid for.
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In 1995, the borrowers began to experience severe cash
flow problems.
Peoples Bank let the borrowers know that a
foreclosure action was going to be brought against the real
estate which secured the promissory note.
Attempts were made to
sell the property, and Peoples Bank lent an additional $15,000
for a loan application and market study.
came up for renewal.
In late 1995, the note
The Rhoadses, the Moores and Peoples Bank
discussed the matter at various meetings.
Peoples Bank
conditioned renewal upon the deposit of $50,000 into an escrow
account to cover future shortfalls.
Loan documents were
prepared, and the Rhoadses even signed the documents; however,
the Moores did not.
Peoples Bank proceeded with the foreclosure action, and
filed a complaint in circuit court in January 1996.
The action
was filed against the corporation, the Moores and the Rhoadses.
In March 1996, Peoples Bank moved the circuit court for a summary
judgment against the corporation and the Moores and for a default
or summary judgment against the Rhoadses as they had not filed a
response.
In July 1996, the Rhoadses filed an answer as well as
a cross-claim against the Moores, and a counterclaim against
Peoples Bank.
On July 24, 1996, the circuit court granted a
summary judgment for Peoples Bank against the Rhoadses, the
Moores and the corporation.
The Rhoadses filed a motion to
alter, amend or vacate the judgment.
The court on August 13,
1996, granted the Rhoadses motion and vacated its earlier
judgment.
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In June 1997, Peoples Bank again moved for summary
judgment against the Rhoadses and the other parties.
On July 21,
1997, the circuit court granted summary judgment for Peoples Bank
against the Rhoadses.
The court awarded Peoples Bank $354,662.73
on the August 1994 note plus interest, and $18,547.41 on the June
1995 note plus interest.
The Rhoadses subsequently moved the
court to alter, amend or vacate its July 21, 1997 judgment. The
court on August 20, 1997, pursuant to another order denied the
Rhoadses’ motion to alter, amend or vacate the earlier summary
judgment for Peoples Bank.
The Rhoadses subsequently moved the
circuit court to stay enforcement of the judgment, but this
motion was denied by the court.
The Rhoadses have brought this
appeal.
The Rhoadses argue to this Court that the record below
clearly reveals the existence of several material factual
disputes concerning whether Peoples Bank as the lender, was
negligent or breached any fiduciary duties.
They also maintain
that the existence of their claim in tandem with the general
preclusive nature of summary judgment would require the trial
court to consider both claims when deciding whether there was an
issue of material fact.
They maintain that Peoples Bank as the
lender owed a fiduciary duty to them as they had established a
special relationship with it and relied on it to monitor and keep
them apprised of the loan’s viability and the underlying real
estate.
They state in their brief that it is yet to be
determined whether a fiduciary relationship existed between them
and Peoples Bank and whether the bank breached a fiduciary duty.
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They further assert that Peoples Bank by not taking some action
in monitoring the disbursement of the November 1990 loan may have
become a party to the acts of Mr. Moore.
This Court has
concluded that even under the alleged facts set out by the
Rhoadses, they have failed to establish a valid legal claim
against Peoples Bank and therefore, the circuit court correctly
granted summary judgment for the bank.1
Summary judgment should only be used to terminate
litigation when as a matter of law, it appears that it would be
impossible for the respondent to produce evidence at trial
warranting a judgment in his or her favor against the movant.
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807
S.W.2d 476 (1991), quoting Paintsville Hospital Co. v. Rose, Ky.,
683 S.W.2d 255 (1985); Farmer v. Heard, Ky. App., 844 S.W.2d 425
(1992).
Summary judgment is properly granted only when there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the movant is
entitled to prevail as a matter of law.
Mullins v. Commonwealth
Life Ins. Co., Ky., 839 S.W.2d 245, 247 (1992); CR 56.03.
This Court has uncovered no legal authority to support
the Rhoadses contention that Peoples Bank breached any fiduciary
duty in the instant case.
In Bale v. Mammoth Cave Production
Credit Association, Ky., 652 S.W.2d 851 (1983), this Court and
later the Kentucky Supreme Court, was faced with a similar yet
1
Peoples Bank maintains that this Court should reject the
Rhoadses’ brief, because they have failed to show where their
issues were preserved pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Civil
Procedure (CR) 76.12(4)(c)(iv) and that they have cited to
depositions which have not been certified and included in the
record on appeal. We have decided to review the merits of the
case and have concluded that the Rhoadses’ arguments lack merit.
-5-
not identical factual scenario.
The lender in Bale according to
the borrowers, had misrepresented the financial affairs of
another party.
This party had borrowed money from the lender and
had also entered into business transactions with the complaining
borrowers, and the lender knew of these transactions.
The
borrowers also contended that the lender engaged in a course of
conduct after the loan was made to convince the borrowers that
their interests were being protected when in fact the lender was
not protecting their interests, but rather was inducing them to
refrain from taking independent action against the other party in
order to delay the date of the other party’s bankruptcy until the
lender’s second mortgage was no longer in jeopardy of being set
aside as a preferential transfer.
The Supreme Court in adopting
this Court’s opinion held that the conduct of the lender, if
true, did not afford the complaining borrowers an affirmative
defense to the lender’s action to enforce the notes that the
borrowers had entered into.
Id., at 855.
The Court noted that
such fraudulent conduct by the bank might provide the borrowers
with a counterclaim but not with an affirmative defense.
Id.
See also American Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. v. Hinkle, Ky. App.,
747 S.W.2d 620 (1988), (holding that the signor on a note whether
a co-signor or accommodation party, who could not prove a legally
cognizable defense, was liable for the amount due on the original
note even though the lender accepted eleven renewals by the other
signor alone and that the trial court should have directed a
verdict for the lender); cf. H.C. Witmer Co. v. Richardson, 271
Ky. 112, 111 S.W.2d 577 (1937).
-6-
In the instant case, the Rhoadses have asserted no
genuine issues of material fact arising from their answer or
counterclaim which would show a breach of fiduciary duty owed
them by Peoples Bank and entitle them to prevail at trial.
The
Rhoadses and the Moores both signed the note with Peoples Bank as
they were both active investors in the corporation.
While
apparent conflicts developed between the Rhoadses and the Moores,
and the corporation began experiencing serious cash flow
problems, the Rhoadses have shown no actions by Peoples Bank
which were fraudulent or which breached any fiduciary duty owed
them.
The bank was not obligated to keep them apprised of every
financial detail involving the Moores.
The record reflects in
fact that Peoples Bank tried to work with the Rhoadses and the
Moores in 1995 to avoid a foreclosure action by lending an
additional amount of money to allow them to look at options for
the property and by agreeing to refinance the note if both
borrowers would agree to each place $50,000 in an escrow account
to ensure future payments.
The Rhoadses apparently agreed to
this, but the Moores did not.
Further, regarding the 1990
$150,000 loan that Peoples Bank loaned the corporation at Mr.
Moore’s request, the Rhoadses again have shown no concrete
evidence of fraud, negligence or improprieties on the part of the
bank.
The $110,000 check that Moore wrote to himself out of this
loan to reimburse himself for earlier repair expenditures came
from a separate banking account at another institution.
The
Rhoadses have cited nothing to show that Peoples bank acted
improperly or could have controlled Mr. Moore’s subsequent
-7-
actions after he received the loan check from the bank.
Many of
the Rhoadses’ allegations appear to be against Mr. Moore who is
not a party to this appeal.
They have made other general
allegations but have not shown any concrete evidence to support
them.
The cases cited by the Rhoadses such as Henkin, Inc. v.
Berea Bank & Trust Co., Ky. App., 566 S.W.2d 420 (1978), are
fundamentally distinguishable.
See Bale v. Mammoth Cave Prod.
Credit Ass’n., 652 S.W.2d at 854.
In Henkin and the other cases
they have cited, a bank or similar parties clearly acted in ways
which harmed other parties to which they owed fiduciary duties
such as by acting on confidential information which benefitted
the actors and harmed the parties to which duties were owed.
The
Rhoadses simply have not shown such conduct or harm in the
instant case.
Even under the strict summary judgment standard
set out in Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc.,
supra, and taking the facts in the light most favorable to the
Rhoadses, they have simply not shown a viable claim on which they
could prevail at trial.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court affirms the
judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gary R. Matthews
Lexington, Kentucky
James T. Gilbert
Richmond, Kentucky
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