JAMES W. COTTONGIM v. KATHY D. SANDERSON, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF RUBY K. COTTONGIM; MAX M. SMITH AND CARY KEMPER SMITH
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RENDERED: October 8, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
MODIFIED: December 17, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 1997-CA-002280-MR
NO. 1998-CA-000860-MR
JAMES W. COTTONGIM
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROGER L. CRITTENDEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 1992-CI-00536
v.
KATHY D. SANDERSON, ADMINISTRATRIX
OF THE ESTATE OF RUBY K. COTTONGIM;
MAX M. SMITH AND CARY KEMPER SMITH
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN APPEAL NO. 1997-CA-002280;
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART
AND REMANDING IN APPEAL NO. 1998-CA-000860
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, HUDDLESTON AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
These are consolidated appeals from a judgment
dividing marital property in a dissolution action, and from postjudgment orders finding the appellant in contempt, assessing
attorney’s fees and allowing garnishment of the appellant’s
assets to satisfy the judgment.
In the first appeal, we find
that the trial court properly characterized the deferred
compensation accounts as marital, and that it did not abuse its
discretion in equally dividing the marital property.
Hence, we
affirm.
In the second appeal, we find that the trial court’s
imposition of civil contempt sanctions was within its discretion,
and that the appellant failed to prove that certain funds were
exempt from garnishment.
However, we also find that the trial
court’s assessment of post-judgment attorney’s fees incurred in
the collection of the judgment may have included amounts which
were not properly attributable to the appellant’s conduct.
Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for a
reconsideration of the amount of attorney’s fees awarded.
The appellant, James W. Cottongim (James) and Ruby K.
Cottongim (Ruby) were married in 1975.
It was a second marriage
for both James and Ruby, and each had grown children by previous
marriages.
No children were born of their marriage. In April
1992, Ruby filed a petition for dissolution of marriage.
The
trial court granted a bifurcated decree dissolving the marriage
as of September 14, 1992, reserving the property division issues
for later adjudication.
Ruby died intestate on March 13, 1996.
Her daughter, Kathy D. Sanderson, was appointed as administratrix
of her estate.
The trial court substituted the estate as a party
to this action, and the action proceeded to a bench trial on the
property division issues.
Following that bench trial, the court below entered
findings of fact and conclusions of law on July 10, 1997, equally
dividing all the marital property between James and the estate.
The trial court subsequently denied James’s motion to alter,
amend or vacate the judgment pursuant to CR 59.05.
Shortly
thereafter, James filed a notice of appeal, seeking this Court’s
review of the property division issues.
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However, James did not file a supersedeas bond to
suspend enforcement of the judgment.
After accounting for
property in the possession of each party, the trial court
determined that James owed Ruby’s estate $114,277.48 to fully
carry out the equal division of the marital property.
The estate
then asked the trial court to appoint an auctioneer and a realtor
to sell the marital property to satisfy the judgment.
On
November 4, 1997, the trial court entered an order authorizing
the appointment of an auctioneer and realtor to sell the marital
property.
The trial court also authorized the estate to attach,
garnish or seize “all bank accounts, savings or checking
accounts, retirement or deferred compensation accounts” owned by
James to satisfy the judgment.
Eventually, the marital residence was sold, and the
judgment was partially satisfied through the sale or attachment
of other assets in James’s possession.
The estate requested that
the trial court award it attorney’s fees and costs incurred to
collect the judgment.
The estate also moved the trial court to
hold James in contempt for removal of fixtures from the house
prior to the sale.
The trial court granted both motions, and
ordered James to pay the estate $3,000.00 for attorney’s fees
incurred in the collection of the judgment, and $1,000.00 in
civil contempt fines, representing the replacement cost of the
fixtures removed from the house.
Finally, the estate moved the court to order a
garnishee to release funds which James had directed be withheld
for payment of taxes.
The trial court determined that James was
not entitled to have the amount withheld.
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Thereafter, James
filed a timely notice of appeal contesting these orders.
two (2) appeals were consolidated.
These
We will consider the issues
presented in the two (2) appeals separately.
Appeal No 1997-CA-002280-MR
The first appeal involves issues relating to the
division of marital property.
Most of the issues which James
raises relate to the treatment of the deferred compensation plans
accrued by James and Ruby during the marriage.
From our review
of the applicable law, we find that the trial court properly
characterized the deferred compensation plans as marital
property.
We further conclude that the trial court’s valuation
of Ruby’s plan was supported by substantial evidence.
Lastly,
although we agree with James that the trial court was not
required to equally divide the plans, we cannot find that the
trial court’s equal division of the plans constituted an abuse of
discretion.
I. DEFERRED COMPENSATION ISSUES
a.
Whether Section 457 plan assets may be considered marital
property under federal law.
During the marriage, both James and Ruby were employed
by the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
They each were vested in the
state retirement system, and made contributions to the deferred
compensation program available to state employees.
Ruby retired
in 1986; James continued to work until August, 1992. The trial
court found that both deferred compensation plans were marital
property, and divided them accordingly.
James argues that the
trial court erred by classifying his and Ruby’s deferred
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compensation plans as marital property.
He asserts that the
plans, which were established pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 457, are
exempt from consideration as marital property and cannot be
divided as such by the trial court.
Section 457 plans were created by the Revenue Act of
1978 so that governmental employees (and employees of certain
non-governmental organizations) may defer compensation for
retirement.
Deferrals made by employees to the plan are limited
to $7,500.00 per year.
Section 457 plan assets are held in trust
by the employer until they are paid out to plan participants.
Prior to 1996, § 457 plans could not offer loans to participants
since there are no individual plan accounts against which a loan
can be pledged or secured.
For the same reason, deferrals made
to a § 457 plan cannot be garnished or attached by the employee’s
creditors because the employee does not have an immediate
property right to those assets.
See generally, “Code Sec. 457
Deferred Compensation Plans for State and Local Governments and
Tax-Exempt Employers”, 1A Pension Plan Guide (CCH) ¶¶ 8000-8035
at 9911-9929-3 (Mar. 3, 1999).
An employee’s eligible contributions to a § 457 plan
are tax-exempt and become taxable only during the year in which
compensation or other income is paid to the plan participant.
457(a).
§
Among other things, an eligible state plan must provide
that:
(6)
. . .
(a) all amounts of compensation deferred
under the plan,
(b) all property and rights purchased
with such amounts, and
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(c) all income attributable to such
amounts, property or rights,
shall remain (until made available to the
participant or other beneficiary) solely the
property and rights of the employer (without
being restricted to the provision of benefits
under the plan), subject only to the claims
of the employer’s general creditors.
James argues that because plans established under § 457
are non-alienable, they also are not subject to division as
marital property.
In support of his position, he refers to
Elkins v. Elkins, Ky.
App., 854 S.W.2d 787 (1993), in which this
Court held that disability annuity payments under the Federal
Railroad Retirement Act were non-marital property and remained so
after receipt so long as payments could be traced into
identifiable assets.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court in
Elkins found that the non-alienability clause in 45 U.S.C. §
231m(a) pre-empted any contrary state law, including state law
relating to classification of marital and non-marital property.
James argues that the non-alienability clause in § 457(b)(6) is
substantially similar to the clause in the Railroad Retirement
Act and should be likewise interpreted.
We disagree.
First, the non-alienability clause in the
Railroad Retirement Act is significantly broader than the one in
§ 457(b)(6).
The version of 45 U.S.C. § 231m in effect at the
time Elkins was decided provided as follows:
Notwithstanding any other law of the United
States, or of any State, territory, or the
District of Columbia, no annuity or
supplemental annuity shall be assignable or
be subject to any tax or to garnishment,
attachment, or other legal process under any
circumstances whatsoever, nor shall the
payment thereof be anticipated . . .
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By its own terms, this statute expressly preempts all
contrary state laws.
Furthermore, the statute prohibits
attachment of annuity payments made under the Act.
Thus,
Congress intended to shield both the assets of the plan and all
benefits received under the plan from any type of attachment.
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 584, 59 L. Ed. 2d 1, 12,
99 S. Ct.
802 (1979).
In contrast, the non-alienability clause
in § 457((b)(6) merely prohibits attachment or garnishment of
deferrals held by the employer.
There is no indication that
Congress intended to prohibit attachment of payments made from §
457 plans.
Moreover, the nature of payments under § 457 is
substantially different from benefits paid under the Railroad
Retirement Act.
The basic component of railroad retirement
benefits is designed to provide old age insurance benefit or
disability insurance benefit in lieu of those provided under the
Social Security Act.
45 U.S.C. § 231b(a).
Like Social Security, and unlike most private
pension plans, railroad retirement benefits
are not contractual. Congress may alter, and
even eliminate, them at any time. [Footnote
omitted] This vulnerability to congressional
edict contrasts strongly with the protection
Congress has afforded recipients from
creditors, taxgatherers, and all those who
would “anticipate” the receipt of benefits
. . .
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 575-76, 59 L.Ed.2d at 7.
Unlike Social Security benefits or railroad retirement
benefits, § 457 plan benefits are simply deferrals of income.
Contributions to a § 457 plan are encouraged through favorable
tax treatment of deferrals.
Although assets held in an
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employee’s § 457 account may not be attached by the employee’s
creditors, the employee has a right to expect payment from the
plan when he or she retires.
In addition, the amount received
from a § 457 plan has a direct relation to the amount
contributed.
Considering the different natures of benefits under
the Railroad Retirement Act and benefits paid from a § 457 plan,
we do not agree with James that Congress intended to exempt
contributions to a § 457 plan from consideration as marital
property.
b.
Whether section 457 assets may be considered marital property
under state law.
James next argues that the trial court erred in
classifying the § 457 plans as marital property under KRS
403.190.
Again, we disagree.
All property acquired by either
spouse after the marriage and before a decree of legal separation
is presumed to be marital property, unless excluded by statute or
valid agreement.
KRS 403.190(3).
A vested pension plan is a
form of deferred compensation earned during the marriage, and
consequently, it is a marital asset and subject to division by
the court.
(1998).
Brosick v. Brosick, Ky.
App., 974 S.W.2d 498, 504
Although neither Ruby nor James directly contributed to
the other’s deferred compensation plan, each plan remains a
marital asset to the extent that it was accrued through
contributions of marital income.
Certain types of pension plans are specifically
exempted from classification as marital property, such as
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teacher’s pension plans.
KRS 161.700(2).1
The version of KRS
403.190(4) in effect in 1992 provided that if the retirement
benefits of one (1) spouse are excepted from classification as
marital property, then the retirement benefits of the other
spouse are also excepted.2
James contends that KRS 403.190(4)
prohibits consideration of both his and Ruby’s retirement
benefits, either in a division of marital property or as an
economic circumstance.
The basis for James’s argument is that the retirement
benefits are exempt from consideration as marital property.
However, as discussed above, there is no statutory exception for
the § 457 plan benefits earned by the parties during the
marriage.
Moreover, the mere fact that the trial court found
each party’s retirement benefits to be their own does not create
an exemption for the § 457 plans.
Accordingly, the trial court
properly included the deferred compensation plans in the
calculation of the marital estate.
c.
Valuation of section 457 plan.
Once the marital portion of retirement benefits has
been calculated and the non-employee spouse’s share of those
benefits determined, the trial court has two (2) options for
distributing the non-employee spouse’s share.
It may award
1
See also, Davis v. Davis, Ky. App., 777 S.W.2d 230
(1989); and West v. West, Ky. App., 736 S.W.2d 31 (1987)
(Specific statutory provision excluding military disability
benefits from consideration as marital property).
2
The 1996 amendment to KRS 403.190(4) limits the amount of
the other spouse’s exception to the level of exception of the
exempt spouse’s pension.
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either a deferred distribution, by means of a qualified domestic
relations order (QDRO), or an immediate offset of the share
against other assets in the marital estate.
Poe v. Poe, Ky.
App., 711 S.W.2d 849 (1986) (deferred distribution); Combs v.
Combs, Ky.
App., 622 S.W.2d 679 (1981) (present offset).
Throughout this litigation, the Department of Personnel has taken
the position that a deferred compensation plan established
pursuant to § 457 is not subject to a QDRO.
estate contested this interpretation.3
Neither Ruby nor her
Yet even if a statute
protects a retirement plan from garnishment, attachment or
assignment, in the absence of a specific statute, a court is
authorized to equitably divide the retirement plan as marital
property.
(1993).
Glidewell v. Glidewell, Ky.
App., 859 S.W.2d 675, 677
The trial court in this case undertook a present offset
of other marital assets against Ruby’s interest in James’s
deferred compensation plan.
James takes issue with the trial court’s valuation of
Ruby’s deferred compensation plan in two (2) aspects.
First, he
argues that the expert testimony offered by the estate at trial
was based upon improper evidence.
3
Both parties stipulated that
However, there is authority which conflicts with this
interpretation. In 1989, Congress amended 26 U.S.C. § 414(p) to
add a new subsection (11). That subsection provides that a
distribution or payment from a governmental plan shall be treated
as made pursuant to a QDRO if it is made pursuant to a domestic
relations order which creates an alternate payee’s right to
receive part or all of the benefits payable to a participant.
Pub. Law 101-784 § 784(a)(2). § 414(p)(11). The definition of
“governmental plan” in § 414(d) would seem to include a § 457
plan. Nonetheless, the question of when a QDRO will be
recognized in such cases remains unsettled. 1A Pension Plan
Guide (CCH) ¶ 8018 at 9926. Since the issue is not presented in
this case, we need not address it.
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the value of James’s § 457 plan was $179,325.31.
However, the
Department of Personnel could not place a lump sum value on
Ruby’s deferred compensation plan at the time of the decree of
dissolution because the annuity was already in pay status.
Prior to trial, the estate obtained a calculation of
the value of Ruby’s deferred compensation plan from Lance Schulz
of the Jefferson Pilot Insurance Company.
Schulz prepared a
memorandum calculating the present value of Ruby’s plan to be
$47,794.82 as of the date of the decree of dissolution.
However,
due to company policies, Schulz was unable to appear as a
witness.
At trial, the estate called William Tozer, a retired
actuary who most recently worked for Kentucky Central Insurance
Company, to testify concerning the value of Ruby’s § 457 plan.
Tozer testified that the estate provided the same
documentation to him as was used by Schulz.
He reviewed the
memorandum and agreed with Schulz’s valuation of Ruby’s deferred
compensation.
However, he did not independently re-calculate the
value of her plan.
The trial court did not allow admission of
the Schulz memorandum, but it did allow Tozer to testify
regarding the value of Ruby’s deferred compensation benefit.
James did not present any expert testimony on the value
of Ruby’s § 457 plan.
Rather, he testified himself that because
Ruby received $461.22 per month pursuant to a life annuity with
twenty (20) years guaranteed commencing September 1986, and her
life expectancy at that time was 23.3 years, then her deferred
compensation funds were worth $128,957.00 at the time she
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retired.
Subsequently, James amended his calculations to reduce
this amount to a present value of $83,050.004
James first argues that the trial court erroneously
accepted Tozer’s testimony because it was based upon assumptions
and calculations in the memorandum prepared by another actuary
who was not present to testify or be cross-examined.
error.
We find no
The estate argues that an expert can rely on some
inadmissible evidence when testifying to an otherwise admissible
opinion, if the information is of the type which the expert
customarily relies upon in the practice of his profession.
Buckler v. Commonwealth, Ky., 541 S.W.2d 935 (1976).
KRE 703(a).
See also,
However, there was no evidence that the Schultz
memorandum was the type of information upon which experts in the
field typically form conclusions.
Nonetheless, Tozer established his qualifications to
place a value on Ruby’s deferred compensation annuity.
In
addition, he testified that Schulz’s calculations were consistent
with his own conclusions, although he did not undertake to
independently recalculate the value from the underlying
information.
Under the circumstances, we agree that Tozer’s
testimony was competent to establish the value of Ruby’s deferred
compensation plan.
James’s second argument in this regard is that the
trial court erred in accepting Tozer’s testimony concerning the
4
This reduction for present value was based upon a bank’s
“balloon loan disclosure” sheet, which set out the amount
necessary to produce a payment of $461.22 per month for 23.3
years at a four percent (4%) interest rate.
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value of Ruby’s annuity as of September 1992.
Rather, he urges
that the trial court should have accepted his testimony
concerning the present value of Ruby’s expected payments from her
annuity as of the date of the dissolution decree.
He contends
that in so doing the trial court substantially undervalued Ruby’s
deferred compensation benefits to his detriment.
Both James and Ruby’s § 457 plans are defined
contribution plans, in that the benefits are paid out of their
voluntary contributions to the plans while they were working.
See, L. Graham & J. Keller, 15 Kentucky Practice Domestic
Relations Law, (2d ed., 1997), § 15.27, pp. 534-36.
However,
James and Ruby’s respective elections affect the total amount of
benefits received from each plan.
When Ruby retired in 1986, she
elected to receive payments from her deferred compensation
program as a single life annuity with twenty (20) years
guaranteed.
When James retired in 1992, the available interest
rate was substantially lower than in 1986.
Consequently, he
elected to receive a fixed benefit paid from his deferred
compensation account until the fund is exhausted.
Since marital assets must be valued as of the date of
the decree, the value of Ruby’s deferred compensation plan must
be calculated based upon her life expectancy in 1992.5
In
essence, James urges that because Ruby elected to receive
payments from her § 457 plan as an annuity with a guaranteed
amount and term of payment, then the value of her plan should be
5
James’s calculations are based upon Ruby’s life expectancy
in 1986, rather than in 1992.
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calculated as if it were a defined benefit plan.
See, L. Graham
& J. Keller, 15 Kentucky Practice Domestic Relations Law, §
15.30, pp.
542-45; See also, Duncan v. Duncan, Ky.
S.W.2d 231 (1987).
App., 724
Therefore, he bases his calculations upon the
value of Ruby’s anticipated benefits, reduced to present value as
of the date of the decree.
By contrast, Tozer calculated the
value of Ruby’s deferred compensation plan based upon the same
criteria used to calculate the amount of annuity in 1986, but
adjusted to reflect Ruby’s life expectancy in 1992.
The trial court acted within its discretion by
accepting Tozer’s valuation of Ruby’s § 457 plan.
There is no
support for James’s argument that Ruby’s plan should be valued on
a different basis than his plan.
A defined contribution plan
will not be converted into a defined benefit plan merely by the
participant’s election regarding a method of payment of benefits.
The manner in which the benefits were acquired, rather than the
manner in which the benefits are paid, determines the nature of
the plan.
Moreover, a trial court's valuation in a divorce action
will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clearly contrary to
the weight of the evidence.
Underwood v. Underwood, Ky. App.,
836 S.W.2d 439, 444 (1992).
As an appellate court, we must give
due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses.
CR 52.01; Chalupa v. Chalupa, Ky.
App., 830 S.W.2d 391, 393 (1992).
The calculation of the value
of a life annuity which has been partially paid out is a
particularly difficult undertaking.
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The trial court chose to
believe the expert witness’s conclusions over a lay witness’s
calculations.
We are not persuaded that Tozer relied upon
inappropriate criteria, or that he used an incorrect standard to
place a value on Ruby’s deferred compensation plan.
As a result,
we cannot find the trial court’s valuation of the plans to be
clearly erroneous.
d.
Equal division of section 457 plan.
James next asserts that the trial court failed to
divide the parties’ marital property in just proportions.
Much
of his argument relates to his assertion that the trial court
erred by including the deferred compensation plans in the marital
estate.
Since we have previously rejected this argument, we need
not address this contention further.
James also complains that
the trial court’s findings regarding Ruby’s contributions to the
marriage were not supported by substantial evidence.
Primarily,
however, James asserts that the trial court failed to consider
the economic circumstances of each spouse at the time “the
division of property was to become effective . . .” as required
by KRS 403.190(1)(d).
James contends that the court failed to
take into account Ruby’s death in 1996 when making the division
of property, and in particular, including the deferred
compensation plans in the calculation of the marital estate.
There is no presumption or requirement that marital
property be equally divided in a dissolution of marriage action.
Marital property must be distributed in accord with KRS 403.190.
Pursuant to this provision, the court must assign each spouse his
or her non-marital property and then divide the couple’s marital
property in “just proportions,” without regard to marital
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misconduct and in light of the following factors: each spouse’s
contribution to the acquisition of marital assets, including
homemaking duties; the value of each spouse’s non-marital
property; the duration of the marriage; and the economic
circumstances of each spouse at the time of distribution.
403.190(1)(a)-(d).
KRS
The standard of review of a division of
marital property is abuse of discretion.
Herron v. Herron, Ky.,
573 S.W.2d 342, 344 (1978); Russell v. Russell, Ky.
App., 878
S.W.2d 24, 25 (1994).
As noted by the trial court, James and Ruby were
married for seventeen (17) years.
Both parties worked and
supported each other until 1986, when Ruby retired and rendered
homemaker services until the dissolution of the marriage in 1992.
Although James takes issue with the trial court’s conclusion
regarding Ruby’s contribution to the marriage as a homemaker, we
note that Ruby began drawing benefits from her pension and from
her deferred compensation plans in 1986.
marital in nature.
This income was wholly
Furthermore, we agree with the trial court
that Ruby owned an equitable interest in the marital residence
which was not extinguished by her death.
Therefore, the main issue presented to this Court is
what effect Ruby’s death in 1996 (and the substitution of her
estate as a party) should have on the division of marital
property.
James argues that since Ruby died in 1996, she could
reap no economic benefit from any division of marital property at
the time the division of property became effective.
He points
out that Ruby has no need for an equal division to support
herself after the divorce through her retirement.
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Instead, James
asserts that the trial court should have given greater weight to
his economic circumstances at the time the division became
effective.
James also contends that the inclusion of his § 457
plan as marital property further skewed the property division
toward the estate because the trial court had to offset a
considerable amount of other marital property to equalize Ruby’s
interest in his deferred compensation plan.
Essentially, James asserts that the rationale behind
KRS 403.190(1)(d) is that property division should be utilized as
a means of providing future support for an economically dependent
spouse.
To a certain extent, we agree.
The statute specifically
mentions that the trial court should consider “the desirability
of awarding the family home or the right to live therein for
reasonable periods to the spouse having custody of any children.”
Thus, KRS 403.190(1) gives the trial court great flexibility and
authority to divide the marital property so as to accommodate the
needs of the parties upon dissolution.
The purpose of any deferred compensation plan is to
allow an individual to set aside present income to guarantee a
steady stream of future income during retirement.
The fact that
Ruby died prior to the division of marital property may be a
relevant factor in the trial court’s consideration of how to
divide these plans.
Likewise, the fact that a § 457 plan is not
subject to attachment, thereby necessitating a present offset of
other assets, is a legitimate consideration in determining how to
divide the marital property.
Furthermore, a trial court is not
required to divide all marital assets on the same basis.
Consequently, the trial court could have chosen to divide the
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deferred compensation plans using a lower percentage basis than
it used for the rest of the marital property.
However, there is no formula respecting the weight to
be given to the relevant factors which a court may consider.
Based upon the record as a whole, we find that the trial court
acted within its discretion by equally dividing all the marital
property.
As a practical matter, the five (5) year delay between
the entry of the dissolution decree and the division of property
was a source of prejudice both to James and to Ruby’s estate.
The marital assets must be valued as of 1992, even though the
circumstances in 1997 were much different.
We appreciate that
the effect of such a division may work some hardship upon James.
At the same time, we do not believe that the estate
should be deprived of Ruby’s interest in the marital property
simply because the property division is difficult.
Even if James
was not entirely at fault for the delay in bringing these issues
to trial, neither is he entitled to benefit from the delay or
from Ruby’s death.
If the property division issues had been
resolved sooner, then Ruby’s share of the marital property would
have passed to her estate upon her death.
We conclude that Ruby’s death in 1996, by itself, is
not a controlling factor in how the property should be divided.
A just division of marital property will not always require an
equal division of property.
However in the present case, we
cannot say that the equal division of the marital property was
unjust.
Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion.
II. PROPERTY DIVISION ISSUES.
a. Non-marital contribution in marital residence.
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James next turns his attention to the trial court’s
rulings on specific items of marital property.
He contends that
the trial court erred by refusing to give him credit for a
contribution of non-marital assets which he made toward the
purchase of the marital residence.
James presented evidence at
trial that there was an $8,500.00 deposit to Ruby’s checking
account three (3) days before they were married.
On the same
day, the parties made an $8,500.00 down payment on the marital
residence out of their joint checking account.
James alleges
that his $8,500.00 contribution to the purchase of the marital
residence was derived from the proceeds of a settlement from an
eye injury he suffered prior to the marriage.
The trial court
found that James failed to present substantial evidence to trace
these funds into the funds used to put a down payment on the
house.
Marital property is defined, in part, as "all property
acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage except:
. . . (b) Property acquired in exchange for property acquired
before the marriage or in exchange for property acquired by gift,
bequest, devise or descent."
KRS 403.190(2)(b).
Subsection (3)
of KRS 403.190 creates a presumption that all property acquired
during the marriage is marital property, but permits this
presumption to be overcome by proof that the property was
acquired in one of the ways specified in subsection (2) of the
statute.
Therefore, non-marital assets must be traced into
assets owned at the time of dissolution, although absolute
precision in tracing assets is not required.
Chenault, Ky., 799 S.W.2d 575, 579 (1990).
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Chenault v.
Although James presented evidence that an $8,500.00
deposit was made into Ruby’s checking account three (3) days
before the wedding, he did not present any evidence, other than
his own testimony, regarding the source of that deposit.
Indeed,
he was unable to present any documentation regarding the eye
injury settlement from which he alleges the funds came.
While
the trial court could have accepted James’s testimony, and drawn
a reasonable inference that the down payment on the marital
residence came from these funds, we cannot say the evidence was
so strong that the trial court was compelled to do so.
Consequently, the trial court’s finding that James failed to
adequately trace his non-marital contribution into the marital
residence is not clearly erroneous.
b.
Accounting for specific items of marital property.
James next contends that the estate failed to properly
account for items of marital and non-marital property which were
missing from the marital residence when he took possession of the
house in 1996.
He alleges that the trial court failed to make
findings concerning the missing property.
In addition, he
alleges that he was prejudiced by the inclusion of this missing
property in the value of the marital property to be divided.
However, the trial court specifically found that “there
is not sufficient evidence regarding the claim of numerous items
missing from the [marital] residence for this Court to make an
award.”
If James believed that this finding was insufficient,
then he should have requested that the trial court make specific
findings to account for each of these items of property.
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Because
he did not ask the trial court to do so, any error has been
waived.
c.
CR 52.01; Underwood v. Underwood, 836 S.W.2d at 445.
Method of division of marital property.
James’s final contention in the first appeal is that
the trial court’s manner of disposition of the marital property
was erroneous.
In the order entered July 10, 1997, the trial
court found that the parties had martial property totaling
$421,519.99.
The court directed each party to receive an equal
share of this total, or $210,759.99.
The court further stated:
“Each party is to receive his/her share [of the marital property]
to be accomplished either by: 1) the distribution of assets with
the remainder being paid to the party entitled or 2) the sale of
the assets at public auction with the remainder to be paid to the
party entitled by the other party less any amounts determined
mathematically from the Findings of Fact.”
James argues that this disposition was improper because
it makes him liable for a deficiency judgment in the event the
sale of real property does not bring an amount equal to the value
of the marital estate as determined by the trial court.
that such an outcome is a possibility.
We agree
However, we do not
believe that this issue is ripe for review at this time.
In any
case, this ground of error was not presented to the trial court,
and is therefore not preserved for review.
Appeal No.
1998-CA-000860
I. CONTEMPT ORDER.
James brings this appeal from three post-judgment
orders relating to the satisfaction of the judgment.
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The first
issue presented in this appeal involves the trial court’s finding
James in contempt for his removal of fixtures from the marital
residence prior to the judicial sale.
Following Ruby’s death in
1996, the trial court gave possession of the marital residence to
James.
Subsequently, the trial court ordered the marital
residence sold to satisfy the judgment for the estate.
The
master commissioner conducted a public auction selling the
marital residence on February 2, 1998.
The property sold for
$69,600.00, which after deduction of fees and taxes, resulted in
a net balance of $66,212.34 toward the outstanding judgment.
Shortly thereafter, the estate moved to hold James in contempt
because he removed an expensive crystal chandelier and a
Westminster doorbell installation from the residence.
James asserts that the trial court’s order of January
29, 1998, authorized him to “remove all personal items and
possessions of any type and any kind” from the property.
disagree.
We
The trial court’s authorization for James to remove
personalty from the residence did not thereby allow him to remove
fixtures.
There are three (3) factors which must be examined
when determining whether an article is a fixture: First,
annexation to realty, either actual or constructive; second,
adaptation or application to the use or purpose that the part of
the realty to which it is connected is appropriated; and, third,
the intention of the parties to make the article a permanent
accession to the freehold with title to the article in the one
owning the freehold.
Tarter v. Turpin, Ky., 291 S.W.2d 547, 548
(1956).
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Both the chandelier and the door chimes were physically
attached to the ceiling or wall of the marital residence.
Furthermore, the record shows that they were installed and
operating in the usual capacities (as a light fixture and
doorbell).
Finally, these items were not separately awarded in
the division of marital property.
Accordingly, we conclude that
the trial court and the parties intended the chandelier and the
doorbell chimes to pass to the owner of the realty.
James also argues that the trial court’s imposition of
a $1,000.00 fine exceeded the scope of civil contempt.
disagree with this assertion.
We
It has been long recognized that
courts have the inherent power to enforce their processes and
orders and so attain the ends of their creation and existence.
Crook v. Schumann, Ky., 292 Ky. 750, 167 S.W.2d 836, 840 (1942).
“(A) civil contempt occurs when a party fails to comply with a
court order for the benefit of the opposing party, while criminal
contempt is committed by conduct against the dignity and
authority of the court.”
Smith v. City of Loyall, Ky. App., 702
S.W.2d 838, 839 (1986)(citing, Tucker v. Commonwealth, 299 Ky.
820, 187 S.W.2d 291 (1945)).
A court's contempt powers exist to
permit the court to enforce its orders.
The contempt power is
used only to further another court order, it has no independent
existence.
Commonwealth ex rel. Morris v. Morris, Ky., 984
S.W.2d 840, 845 (1998).
Where a contempt proceeding is instituted by the
plaintiffs, is solely in aid of their rights, and the contempt
judgment is intended as a coercive measure to enforce the order
theretofore entered in their favor, the proceeding is civil in
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its nature.
Campbell v. Schroering, Ky.App., 763 S.W.2d 145,
148, n. 5 (1988) (citing, Allen v. Black Bus Lines, 291 Ky.
164 S.W.2d 483 (1942)).
278,
The enforcement of the court's orders
rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge.
Roper v.
Roper, Ky., 242 Ky. 658, 47 S.W.2d 517, 519 (1932).
Accordingly,
an order of civil contempt will only be reversed if it exceeds
the legitimate scope of civil contempt, or if it constitutes an
abuse of discretion.
Smith v. City of Loyall, 702 S.W.2d at
839.
Under the circumstances presented in this case, we
cannot find that the trial court either exceeded its authority or
abused its discretion by imposing civil contempt and requiring
James to pay the estate $1,000.00.
James knowingly removed
fixtures from the marital residence prior to the judicial sale
without a right to do so.
The estate established the value of
those fixtures and the fact that the residence sold for
substantially less than the commissioner’s appraisal.
The trial
court’s order that James pay the estate $1,000.00 was not a
punishment for his failure to abide by the court’s order, but
rather sought to make the estate whole.
Considering that the
imposition of civil contempt may serve both remedial and coercive
purposes, we conclude that the trial court acted within its
discretion by imposing civil contempt sanctions on James.
See,
White v. Sullivan, Ky. App., 667 S.W.2d 385, 387 (1983).
II. POST-JUDGMENT ATTORNEY’S FEES.
The second issue presented in this appeal involves the
trial court’s assessment of attorney’s fees against James.
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After
collection of its judgment, the estate moved the trial court to
assess James for attorney’s fees and costs which it expended to
collect the judgment.
In an order entered on March 6, 1998, the
trial court granted the motion and ordered James to pay the
estate $3,000.00.
James argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by ordering him to pay these costs.
The trial court awarded attorney’s fees to the estate
pursuant to KRS 403.220.
That statute authorizes a court, after
considering the financial resources of both parties, to order a
party to pay the other party a reasonable amount for the cost to
the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding.
The
amount of an award of attorney’s fees is committed to the sound
discretion of the trial court because that court is in the best
position to observe conduct and tactics which waste the court’s
and attorneys’ time.
Consequently, the trial court must be given
wide latitude to sanction or discourage such conduct.
Gentry v. Gentry, Ky., 798 S.W.2d 928, 938 (1990).
The trial
court found that James “continuously attempted to thwart [the
estate’s] various lawful collection efforts, notwithstanding
[James’s] failure to post a proper supersedeas [sic] bond.”
James strongly complains that the trial court’s order
entered on November 4, 1997, authorizing sale of the marital
residence and attachment or garnishment of his assets to satisfy
the judgment, was entered by the court ex parte.
KRS 425.501
authorizes a judgment creditor to obtain a garnishment order.
If
it appears from the facts shown by the supporting affidavit that
delay for a hearing would irreparably injure the judgment
-25-
creditor, the trial court is authorized to issue the order on an
ex parte basis.
KRS 425.308(1).
We are disturbed that the record does not contain an
affidavit by the estate or its attorney supporting the entry of
an ex parte order.
However, James does not directly raise this
issue on appeal, and it appears that subsequently he was given a
full opportunity to present his exceptions to the garnishment
order.
Nonetheless, we believe that the validity of this order
may directly affect the amount of attorney’s fees to which the
estate is entitled.
Therefore, we conclude that the trial court
may have abused its discretion in determining the amount of
attorney’s fees to award.
On remand, the trial court shall
reconsider the amount of its award of attorney’s fees to the
estate, considering in particular the expenses incurred by both
parties in response to the ex parte order.
III. DENIAL OF GARNISHMENT EXCEPTION.
Since James did not challenge the validity of the
garnishment order itself, enforcement of the garnishment order is
not at issue in this appeal.
The third issue presented in this
appeal involves the trial court’s order directing the garnishee
to pay withheld funds to the estate.
As noted above, the trial
court’s November 4, 1997, order authorized the estate to attach
or garnish any of James’s assets to collect the judgment.
Shortly after entry of that order, the estate discovered that
James had an individual retirement account (IRA) in the amount of
$17,306.69 at the brokerage firm of Raymond James and Associates,
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Inc., in St. Petersburg, Florida.
The trial court issued a
garnishment order attaching those assets.
At James’s request, Raymond James withheld $6,745.62
from the assets it tendered to the court in response to the
garnishment order.
Of that amount, $1,730.30 was for a ten
percent (10%) early withdrawal penalty, and was not contested by
the estate.
James directed that the remaining $5,015.32 be
withheld for taxes incurred as a result of the transfer.
In
response, the estate submitted a letter opinion by Thomas T.
Lewis, an attorney from Lexington specializing in tax law.
Lewis
was of the opinion that James would not incur a tax liability as
a result of the transfer, and therefore he was not entitled to
direct that the $5,015.32 be withheld from the garnishment.
The
trial court found this opinion to be convincing, and directed
that the amount be paid to the estate to satisfy the judgment.
We agree with James that a letter opinion by a tax
attorney was not a sufficient basis to find that James would not
incur a tax liability from the transfer of the assets.
The
letter was not given under oath, nor was Lewis subject to crossexamination on the basis for his opinion.
Furthermore, the
letter does not unequivocally state that James would not owe
taxes, only that “he may not incur an additional tax liability
due to the distribution of his IRA.”
(Emphasis added).
Consequently, we do not believe that this letter was competent or
sufficiently reliable evidence on which the trial court could
base a conclusion.
-27-
Nonetheless, we find that the trial court acted
properly in allowing attachment of the assets.
James was not
asserting a statutory exemption from garnishment, but rather, an
equitable exception.
Yet in either case, the party opposing
attachment of property has the burden to show that the property
is not subject to garnishment.
Lawson v. First Nat.Bank, 225 Ky.
58, 7 S.W.2d 495, 496 (1928); Daugherty v. Bell National Bank,
175 Ky. 513, 194 S. W. 545, 546 (1917).
James did not present
any evidence that he would actually incur a tax liability due to
the distribution of his IRA.
Therefore, even disregarding the
tax attorney’s opinion letter, James failed to establish that
these assets were not subject to garnishment
We agree that a trial court should take note of a
party’s tax liability resulting from a forced disposition of
assets pursuant to an order dividing marital property.
Otherwise, the tax liability may negate that party’s legitimate
share of other marital property.
833 S.W.2d 825 (1992).
See, Perrine v. Christine, Ky.,
In the present case, the trial court did
take proper notice of the tax ramifications of its garnishment
order.
Because James failed to prove that he was subject to a
tax liability from the forced distribution of his IRA, the trial
court acted within its authority by allowing garnishment of the
withheld funds.
IV. RULE 11 SANCTIONS.
Lastly, the estate filed a motion before this Court
requesting that we sanction James pursuant to CR 11 and CR
73.02(4) on the ground that his second appeal is totally lacking
-28-
in merit and was taken in bad faith.
Having found at least one
(1) of James’s grounds of error to have some potential merit, we
cannot reach this conclusion.
Moreover, appellate review of a
trial court’s discretionary rulings is a vital component of due
process, even though the scope of our review is limited.
Unless
the appellant’s grounds of error are so patently without merit as
to be totally frivolous and strongly to suggest that the appeal
was brought in bad faith, we do not regard the imposition of
sanctions to be appropriate.
V. CONCLUSION.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Franklin Circuit Court
entered on July 10, 1997, is affirmed.
The trial court’s orders
of March 5, 1998 (directing the garnishee to pay $5,072.00 to the
estate), and of March 6, 1998 (finding James in contempt and
ordering him to pay the estate $1,000.00) are affirmed.
The
trial court’s order of March 6, 1998, awarding attorney’s fees
and costs incurred during the collection of judgment, is
reversed, and this matter is remanded to the trial court with
directions to reconsider the amount of attorney’s fees awarded as
stated in this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Terry R. Beckner
Beckner & Spurlock
London, Kentucky
Cary Kemper Smith
Frankfort, Kentucky
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