CRIT FORD v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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September 17, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-002180-MR
CRIT FORD
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KNOX CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS B. HOPPER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 1996-CR-75
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GARDNER, KNOPF, AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
The appellant, Crit Ford, was convicted on the
charge of first degree stalking and sentenced to one (1) year
imprisonment.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm the
conviction.
The charge of first degree stalking against Ford arose
from a series of events which occurred in July and August of
1996.
Ford and Brenda Caddell were living together with their
infant daughter in an apartment in Barbourville.
On July 21,
Officers Ken Williamson and Randy Clark of the Barbourville
Police Department responded to a domestic disturbance call at the
couple’s house.
The officers noticed red marks on Brenda’s neck
and blood trickling from behind her ear.
Brenda told Officer
Williamson that the trouble had started the previous night when
their infant daughter vomited.
She alleged that Ford became
upset and shoved the infant’s face into the vomit.
Brenda also
told Officer Williamson that Ford had become enraged after her
father called the house that morning.
She stated that Ford had
choked her and struck her on the side of her head while she was
attempting to put the infant in bed.
Based upon this report, Ford was arrested for assault.
Under the guise of calling his mother, Ford telephoned Brenda
from the jail.
Officer Williamson was present in the apartment
taking additional statements when the phone rang.
He listened on
the extension as Ford asked Brenda to drop the charges.
The officers also prepared an emergency protective
order (EPO) for Brenda based upon her allegations.
The EPO was
entered and served upon Ford while he was in jail.
The EPO
restrained Ford from any contact or communication with Brenda,
and required him to remain at least five hundred (500) feet away
from her and her family members at all times.
in effect until a hearing on July 25.
The EPO remained
On that date, Brenda went
to court and had the EPO replaced with a domestic violence order
(DVO) extending over a period of one (1) year.
On July 31, Ford went to the Knox County Hospital,
where Brenda worked as an admissions clerk.
and an envelope for Brenda.
Ford left flowers
Although the contents of the
envelope were excluded for lack of authentication, Ford testified
that the envelope contained legal papers concerning his
visitation rights with the child and a letter for Brenda.
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A
hospital employee testified that Ford had ample time and
opportunity to see Brenda’s work schedule.
Later, Ford called Brenda at work.
that Ford made threatening statements.
Brenda, but denied threatening her.
Brenda testified
Ford admitted calling
As Brenda was leaving work,
she and her sister observed Ford’s vehicle “circling” the parking
lot.
Brenda retreated to the hospital and called the police.
Brenda subsequently took out a warrant against Ford for violating
the EPO.
On August 1, Brenda and a co-worker observed Ford’s
vehicle twice pull into the hospital parking lot and leave.
Brenda again called the police.
A Knox County police dispatcher
driving in the vicinity of the hospital, after hearing the radio
call concerning Ford, observed Ford moving away from the hospital
at “a fast trot”.
Ford was arrested as he attempted to get into
his car just outside the hospital grounds.
Ford was indicted by the grand jury on the charge of
stalking in the first degree based upon his conduct on July 31
and August 1.
He was also charged in Knox District Court with
criminal contempt for violation of the DVO based upon his conduct
Ford was acquitted of the latter charge.1
on July 31.
Subsequently, Ford was convicted on the charge of first degree
stalking.
The jury fixed his sentence at one (1) year
1
The allegations regarding the July 24 incident involving
Ford’s daughter and his July 25 attack on Brenda were tried
separately in Knox District Court. Ford was acquitted on the
charge of abusing his daughter, but was convicted of fourthdegree assault on Brenda.
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imprisonment, which the trial court imposed.
Ford now appeals to
this Court.
Ford first argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove
that a protective order was in effect at the time alleged for the
offense.
Ford admits that this issue was not raised before the
trial court.
error.
He argues that it should be reviewed as palpable
RCr 10.26.
The circumstances surrounding the entry of the DVO are
confused.
The district court trial commissioner entered the EPO
on July 21, which specifically stated that the order would remain
in effect until the scheduled hearing on July 25.
held before the district court on that date.
A hearing was
However, it is not
clear whether the Knox District Court issued a separate DVO on
July 25, 1996.
Rather, the judge merely noted on the recording
log sheet that the terms of the EPO were to be continued for a
period of one (1) year.
Although the log sheet was not signed by
the district court judge, it was authenticated by the court
clerk.
Following the events at issue in this case, the Knox
District Court entered a separate DVO on August 8.
As a general rule, we agree with Ford that the DVO
itself is the best evidence that a protective order was in effect
during the time in which the stalking took place.
v. Willis, Ky., 719 S.W.2d 440 (1986).
Commonwealth
However, under the
circumstances of this case, we conclude that Ford conceded this
element of the offense of first degree stalking.
Ford admitted
during his direct examination that he was aware that there was an
order in effect on July 31 and August 1 which required him to
stay away from Brenda.
Moreover, Ford’s trial counsel admitted
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to both the trial court and the jury that the existence of a
protective order was not a contested issue.
In addition, Brenda
testified that she went to court on July 25 and had the terms of
the EPO continued for a full year in the form of a DVO.
The
Commonwealth also introduced the log sheet from July 25, 1996,
indicating that the terms of the EPO were extended for a period
of one (1) year.
Since Ford never challenged the sufficiency of
the Commonwealth’s evidence regarding the existence of the DVO,
we do not believe that the Commonwealth’s failure to introduce
the order itself rises to the level of palpable error.
Ford next argues that his conviction for first degree
stalking constituted double jeopardy because he had been
previously tried in district court for criminal contempt based
upon his violation of the DVO on July 31.
In a related, although
separate argument, Ford contends that the Commonwealth was
collaterally estopped from introducing evidence regarding his
conduct on July 31 because he had been previously acquitted of
intentionally violating the DVO on that date.
In his double jeopardy challenge, Ford argues that
criminal contempt for violation of the DVO is a lesser included
offense of first-degree stalking, thus barring his trial on the
stalking charge.
We disagree.
In Commonwealth v. Burge, Ky.,
947 S.W.2d 805 (1996), the Kentucky Supreme Court specifically
considered whether a prosecution on the charge of criminal
contempt for violation of a DVO can bar a subsequent criminal
prosecution for the same conduct.
The Court held that double
jeopardy does not occur when a person is charged with two (2)
crimes arising from the same course of conduct, as long as each
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offense requires proof of an additional element which the other
does not.
Id., at 811.
Non-summary criminal contempt is a crime for double
jeopardy purposes.
Id. at 812.
KRS 403.760 provides that
violation of the terms or conditions of a protective order after
service of the order shall constitute contempt of court.
“A
person is guilty of a violation of a protective order when he
intentionally violates the provisions of an order issued pursuant
to KRS 403.715 to 403.785 with which he has been served or has
been given notice”.
KRS 403.763(1).
A person is guilty of
stalking in the first degree:
(a) When he intentionally:
1. Stalks another person; and
2. Makes an explicit or implicit threat
with the intent to place that person in
reasonable fear of :
a. Sexual contact as defined in
KRS 510.010;
b. Serious physical injury; or
c. Death; and
(b) A protective order or other judicial
order as provided for in KRS Chapter 403 has
been issued by the court to protect the same
victim or victims and the defendant has been
served with the summons or order or has been
given actual notice.
KRS 508.140.
Criminal contempt requires both a violation of the
terms or conditions of a protective order issued by the court, as
well as a specific intent to violate the provisions of the
protective order in question.
In contrast, stalking in the first
degree requires a specific intent to stalk, but only actual
notice that a protective order is in effect.
Thus, the offenses
of stalking in the first degree and criminal contempt each
require an element of proof which the other does not.
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Therefore,
double jeopardy does not apply when a defendant is tried for both
offenses.
Ford also contends that since he was acquitted on the
charge of criminal contempt for violation of the DVO with regard
to the events on July 31, the Commonwealth was collaterally
estopped from using the same events as a basis for the first
degree stalking charge.
In Commonwealth v. Hillebrand, Ky., 536
S.W.2d 451 (1976), the Kentucky Supreme Court held that if an
issue of fact has been determined against the prosecution in the
trial of an offense, the prosecution cannot again litigate that
issue of fact upon a later trial of the same defendant for
another offense.
Id. at
453; citing, Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S.
436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970).
To ascertain whether
the issue was in fact determined on the previous trial, the court
on the subsequent trial is required to “examine the record of ...
the prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings,
evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether
a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue
other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from
consideration.”
Hillebrand, at 453. This holding is in accord
with KRS 505.040(2) and KRS 505.050(2), which contain identical
language barring a subsequent prosecution following an acquittal
in a former prosecution of a different offense.2
2
Both statutes bar a subsequent prosecution following an
acquittal in a former prosecution of a different offense where:
“The former prosecution was terminated by a final order or
judgment which has not subsequently been set aside and which
required a determination inconsistent with any fact necessary to
a conviction in the subsequent prosecution.”
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These statutes and the holding in Hillebrand, supra,
are also in accord with the United States Supreme Court's
post--Ashe decisions in Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342,
350-51, 107 L. Ed. 2d 708, 719, 110 S. Ct. 668 (1990) (holding
that the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate that the issue
whose relitigation he seeks to foreclose was "actually decided "
in the first proceeding), and Montana v. United States, 440 U.S.
147, 153, 59 L.Ed.2d 210, 216-17, 99 S.Ct. 970 (1979) (holding
that once an issue is "actually and necessarily determined " by a
court of competent jurisdiction, that issue is conclusive in a
subsequent action involving a party to the prior litigation).
If a fact was not "necessarily decided" in the former trial, the
possibility that it may have been decided does not preclude
re-examination of the issue.
United States v. Brackett, 113 F.3d
1396, 1398 (5th Cir.1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ____, 118 S.Ct.
341, 139 L.Ed.2d 265 (1997); United States v. Lee, 622 F.2d 787,
790 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 913 (1981).
The record of the district court proceedings involving
the contempt charge was certified to this Court as part of this
appeal.
In the criminal complaint, Brenda alleged that on July
31, 1996, Ford “violated a Domestic Violence Order issued by the
Knox District Court by coming to affiants’ place of employment
making inquiries about the affiant while the affiant was on her
job”.
The instruction to the jury in the criminal contempt
action asked the jury to determine whether, on July 31, 1996,
Ford “in violation of a domestic violence order entered in case
no. 96-D-214-001, was within 500 feet of Brenda Caddell.”
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The
jury in the criminal contempt proceeding apparently found
insufficient evidence that Ford violated the DVO on July 31 by
intentionally being within five hundred (500) feet of Brenda.
However, we find that the evidence was admissible to show a
course of conduct to prove stalking, even though the evidence by
itself was insufficient to convince a jury that Ford
intentionally violated the DVO.
Stalking is defined as “an intentional course of
conduct directed at a specific person or persons, which seriously
alarms, annoys, intimidates or harasses the person or persons;
which serves no legitimate purpose and which would cause a
reasonable person to suffer substantial mental distress.
KRS
508.130(1). “‘Course of conduct’ means a pattern composed of two
(2) or more acts, evidencing a continuity of purpose.”
508.130(2).
KRS
While the jury in the criminal contempt prosecution
necessarily determined that Ford did not intentionally violate
the DVO by going within 500 feet of Brenda, the jury did not
consider any of his other alleged conduct.
Ford admitted that he
went to the hospital on July 31 to leave papers and flowers for
Brenda, and that he called Brenda twice at work on that date.
Furthermore, Brenda testified that Ford threatened her during the
phone conversations.
Therefore, we conclude that the
Commonwealth was entitled to introduce evidence of Ford’s conduct
on July 31 as part of a pattern of conduct to prove stalking,
even though some of the same conduct had previously been found
insufficient to support a conviction for criminal contempt.
Ford next argues that the trial court erred in allowing
Brenda to testify regarding Ford’s prior acts of violence and
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intimidation against her.
Brenda testified as to the incidents
which occurred on July 25 and 26 leading up to Ford’s arrest.
In
addition, Brenda alleged that Ford threatened her with a shotgun
in March of 1996, and that he assaulted her during a
confrontation approximately one (1) month before his arrest.3
Even where prior bad acts of evidence is relevant and
otherwise admissible, KRE 404(c) further requires the
Commonwealth to provide “reasonable pretrial notice to the
defendant of its intention to offer such evidence.”
The
Commonwealth did not provide notice of its intent to introduce
this evidence until the morning of trial, just prior to the
seating of the jury.
The trial court overruled Ford’s objection
to the introduction of this evidence.
Ford contends that the
Commonwealth failed to provide sufficient pre-trial notice of its
intent to introduce evidence of prior bad acts.
"The intent of KRE 404(c) is to provide the accused
with an opportunity to challenge the admissibility of this
evidence through a motion in limine and to deal with reliability
and prejudice problems at trial."
Bowling v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
942 S.W.2d 293, 300 (1997); (quoting Robert G. Lawson,
The
Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, § 2.25 (3rd Ed.1993)).
However,
the rule allows the trial court to exercise discretion whether to
exclude such evidence based on lack of notice. All of the
testimony regarding the prior bad acts came from Brenda, who had
been previously disclosed as a witness for the Commonwealth.
3
The
Ford does not challenge the relevancy of this evidence to
establish a basis for Brenda’s fear of his conduct during the
time at issue.
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events which Brenda testified about involved only her and Ford.
Brenda was subject to cross examination regarding her
allegations, and Ford denied that they even took place. Although
we agree that the Commonwealth failed to present any valid reason
why it waited until the morning of trial to provide notice of its
intent, we cannot find that Ford suffered any prejudice as a
result.
Therefore, the error was harmless and does not justify
reversal of the conviction.
RCr 9.24.
Lastly, Ford argues that he was unfairly prejudiced by
the trial court’s ruling allowing Officer Williamson to testify
regarding prior acts of violence by Ford reported to him by
Brenda.
We find no error.
Brenda testified to these events and
was subject to cross examination concerning them.
When both the
person who made the out-of-court statement and the person to whom
the statement is made appear in court as witnesses, the hearsay
rule does not apply.
792 (1969).
Jett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 436 S.W.2d 788,
Therefore, the trial court did not err in allowing
Officer Williamson’s testimony.
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction by the Knox
Circuit Court is affirmed.
Gardner, Judge, Concurs.
McAnulty, Judge, Dissents.
McANULTY, JUDGE, DISSENTING: Respectively, I dissent.
KRE 404(c) provides:
Notice requirement. In a criminal case, if
the prosecution intends to introduce evidence
pursuant to subdivision (b) of this rule as a
part of its case in chief, it shall give
reasonable pretrial notice to the defendant
of its intention to offer such evidence.
Upon failure of the prosecution to give such
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notice the court may exclude the evidence
offered under subdivision (b) or for good
cause shown may excuse the failure to give
such notice and grant the defendant a
continuance or such other remedy as is
necessary to avoid unfair prejudice caused by
such failure. (Emphasis supplied)
“Notice” on the morning of trial is not notice allowing
a defendant to properly prepare to rebut evidence against him.
The denial of defendant’s motion for continuance and
the countenance of the prosecution’s dilatory conduct combined to
unfairly prejudice this defendant.
We would not hesitate to find an abuse of discretion if
the trial court arraigned a defendant in the morning and tried
him later that afternoon, the day after issuance of an
indictment.
Here, the unindicted acts were communicated on the
morning of trial clearly depriving this defendant of any
opportunity to properly prepare to defend.
Gray v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 843 S.W.2d 895 (1992).
Therefore, I would vacate this judgment and remand to
the trial court for a new trial.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
Irvin J. Halblieb
Louisville, Kentucky
A.B. Chandler, III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Christopher M. Brown
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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