WILLARD D. GROSS v. LAURA GROSS; FRED IRTZ; PNC BANK, formerly CITIZENS FIDELITY BANK
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RENDERED:
August 13, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 1997-CA-002037-MR
and
CROSS-APPEAL NO. 1997-CA-002132-MR
WILLARD D. GROSS
v.
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEALS FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARY C. NOBLE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 91-CI-00158
LAURA GROSS; FRED IRTZ;
PNC BANK, formerly CITIZENS
FIDELITY BANK
APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, HUDDLESTON, and KNOPF, Judges.
HUDDLESTON, Judge: Willard D. Gross appeals from a Fayette Circuit
Court order holding that he failed to meet his burden of proving
that five $100,000.00 certificates of deposit (CDs) had been given
to him as gifts by his father prior to the latter’s death.
Laura
Gross has cross-appealed for the purpose of protecting the record
as to the trial court’s rulings relating to her dower interest in
the CDs in the event Willard should prevail on appeal.
Laura Gross is the widow of Caleb
died in June 1991 at age ninety.
P. Gross (C.P.).
C.P.
Prior to his fifty-four year
marriage to Laura, C.P. had previously been married, and had three
children from that marriage:
Willard Gross (Willard); Eugene C.
Gross
(Eugene);
and
daughter
Lillian
Frances Gross is Willard’s wife.
Gross
Geghali
(Eileen).
The trial court proceedings as
they relate to Bank One, formerly Citizens Fidelity Bank, were
bifurcated from the issues on appeal.
In its opinion and order of October 2, 1996, the circuit
court throughly stated the relevant facts in this case, which we
adopt:
The facts of the case are that Laura Gross was married
to C.P. Gross for about 54 ½ years.
old.
She is now 90 years
C.P. Gross was previously divorced and had three
children, two boys and a girl, from that marriage.
After
Laura and C.P. married, they raised the boys and the
daughter stayed with her mother.
At the time of their
marriage, and for two or three years thereafter, Laura
taught school and C.P. worked in the mines.
They then
entered into an agreement with C.P.’s brother to establish
a business in Bell County, Kentucky, known as the Bell
County Country Club. The Country Club provided a place for
people to drink, use slot machines and had private cabins
for private parties.
This was a successful business which
they ran until after World War II when Bell County voted
to go dry.
At that time, the Grosses turned the running of the
business over to other family members and moved to Garrard
County where they bought a farm.
At some time subsequent
to moving to Garrard County, they bought 50 acres of land
in Fayette County on which is now the current site of South
-2-
Park Shopping Center.
They built a liquor store and ran
the liquor store there for a number of years.
In the
liquor store business, Laura did most of the day-to-day
operation
although
Mr.
Gross
did
order
the
liquor.
However, he spent considerable time continuing to work the
farm in Garrard County which they owned for a few years
after they also had the liquor store business.
At some time subsequent, Mr. Gross sold the property
where the liquor store sat, some 50 acres, for $850,000.00.
A considerable portion of this apparently went to taxes and
other expenses, but by testimony, he gave Laura Gross
$100,000.00 from the sale and told her she could put it in
her name in a Certificate of Deposit.
He kept the rest of
it, placing $500,000.00 in individual Certificates of
Deposit of $100,000.00 each, in various banks.
Over the
next few years, he and Laura essentially lived off of the
interest income from these Certificates of Deposit and
other property.
In early 1990, C.P. Gross was apparently ailing, and
Willard Gross began to assist him more by taking him to the
doctor, on short trips, and with his financial affairs.
On or about January 3, 1990, C.P. gave Willard a general
power of attorney to conduct business for him.
At some
point between then and November of 1990, Willard came into
possession of the five CD’s [sic] for $100,000.00 each.
In November of 1990, using the power of attorney, Willard
-3-
transferred the CD’s [sic] out of his father’s name and
into his name solely.
Willard claims that his father gave him the CDs for
a number of reasons, but primarily because he didn’t want
Laura Gross to have access to them; he felt that Willard
deserved them because of some business advice he had given
C.P. and which Willard claims helped C.P. save the South
Park property;
and because C.P. and Willard were very
close to one another.
Willard claims that C.P. gave him
the CD’s [sic] with no strings attached to be Willard’s
property free and clear.
However, by Willard’s own testimony, the CDs were
delivered to him from his father on January 3, 1990, but
at that date, his father did not take the legal steps
necessary to transfer the CDs over into Willard’s name.
Willard further testified that his father fully understood
what would be necessary to transfer a CD from one person
to another, C.P. having considerable business experience
and having a number of CDs over the years.
Between that January 3rd date and November, Willard
did cause his name to be placed on three of the CDs as a
joint owner with his father.
Those three CD’s [sic] in
joint names, and two that remained in C.P. Gross’ name
alone, were kept in that form until November. The interest
from the CDs was paid directly into C.P.’s account by the
banks at the direction of Willard.
That apparently was
done for a number of months until in November an interest
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check instead went to the home of C.P. and Laura Gross.
That
check
was
made
out
to
Willard
and
C.P.
Gross.
According to Laura, this was the first C.P. was aware that
Willard’s name appeared on any of the CDs.
Laura claims
that C.P. was very upset at that and that he went to the
bank and demanded that the bank reissue a check in his name
alone, which the bank apparently did.
After that, C.P., according to Laura, checked on his
other CDs and found out “that he didn’t have any”.
Laura
called Willard and told him that he needed to bring his
father’s CDs back to him.
Reportedly, Willard said that
he wasn’t going to and no one could make him.
Laura then
called Eugene Gross and [sic] Harlan, another son of C.P.
and brother of Willard, and complained to them that Willard
had stolen his dad’s CDs.
The next day, Eugene Gross came to Lexington from
Harlan to visit with Laura and C.P. and took C.P. to
Willard’s house, where by all accounts they had a nice
afternoon visit.
Willard’s wife, Frances, and Willard,
both testified that Willard asked C.P., in the presence of
Eugene, whether C.P. recalled “giving” the CDs to Willard,
and that C.P. replied “Yes, I certainly did.”
Either acting on his own intentions or under someone’s
influence, C.P. subsequently set about revoking the power
of attorney that he had given to Willard.
However, before
the power of attorney could be revoked, and notice given
to Willard.
Willard had exercised the power of attorney
-5-
to transfer the five $100,000.00 CDs over into his sole
name.
By this time both sides were talking to attorneys,
but Eugene and Willard were apparently still communicating
and still operating on of [sic] the joint purpose to keep
Laura Gross from receiving any of the funds.
Then in April of 1991, Laura Gross instigated a mental
inquest regarding C.P. because she claimed that he “didn’t
know anybody”, and that he would wander off and get lost.
A hearing was held and attorney Nancy Curtis was appointed
limited guardian to assist in management of C.P.’s financial affairs.
Laura Gross was appointed limited guardian
to handle his health concerns, which she did by obtaining
the services of Caretenders. Caretenders assisted with Mr.
C.P. Gross until he died shortly thereafter.
After his
death, the son Eugene was appointed executor of the estate.
There had been a prior will which left a reasonable
widow’s portion to Laura and made distributions to all of
C.P.’s children.
That will, however, was amended after
Willard Gross became closely involved in his father’s
affairs, and the new will significantly reduced Laura
Gross’ share of C.P.’s estate and completely disinherited
his daughter Eileen.
By this point in time, circumstances between Eugene
Gross and Willard Gross were becoming strained as Eugene
began to realize that Willard was fully intent upon keeping
the money from those CDs for himself. Willard had actually
cashed in some of the CDs at a loss because he took them
-6-
on early withdrawal and had to pay penalties.
When this
began happening, it became apparent to Eugene that Willard
was not going to share the money from the CDs with him or
other family members.
At about that point in time, this
suit was filed alleging that Willard obtained the CDs
through undue influence over his father and that the CDs
were never intended to be a gift to Willard alone.
Following a bench trial, the circuit court entered an
opinion and order holding, (1) that one-half of the $500,000.00
represented by the CDs, or $250,000.00, could not have been given
to Willard by C.P., as that amount constituted Laura’s dower
interest in C.P.’s estate, and any attempt by C.P. to convey that
interest to Willard created a fraud against Laura’s distributable
share of one-half of C.P.’s estate; and (2) that as to the
remaining one-half of the $500,000.00 represented by the CDs, or
$250.000.00, that Willard failed to meet his burden of proving by
clear and convincing evidence that the CDs were a gift to him
alone.1
Willard first argues that the circuit court erred in
holding that he had failed to meet his burden of proving that the
five CDs were valid gifts.
As a point of clarification, Willard
1
Throughout these proceedings the circuit court and
the parties have adopted the convention of referring to Laura’s
dower interest in these CDs as “one-half”, or $250,000.00. We
follow this convention; however, it is recognized that Laura’s
dower interest in C.P.’s estate is one-half of C.P.’s total
surplus estate, which would take into consideration assets other
than the CDs as well as the debts of the estate. See KRS
392.020. Hence, any reference to one-half of the CDs, or to
$250,000.00, is an approximation.
-7-
does not allege that the power of attorney he held from January
1990 until November 1990 gave him the power to gift the CDs to
himself or that he exercised the power of attorney to gift the CDs
to himself.
Rather, Willard’s fundamental position is that C.P.
made a valid inter vivos gift of the CDs to him.
The elements necessary to constitute a gift are: (1)
there must be a competent donor; (2) there must be an intention on
the part of the donor to make the gift; (3) there must be a
competent donee; (4) the gift must be complete, with nothing left
undone; (5) the property must be delivered and the delivery have
immediate effect; and, (6) the gift must be irrevocable.
Lyle v.
Snowden's Adm'x, 295 Ky. 505, 174 S.W.2d 691, 694 (1943);
Gernert
v. Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Louisville, 284 Ky. 575, 145
S.W.2d 522, 525 (1940).
Evidence of a gift inter vivos must be
clear, convincing and free from reasonable doubt, Hale v. Hale,
Ky., 224 S.W. 1078 (1920), and the burden of establishing the gift
rests on the party claiming it, Combs v. Roark's Adm'r, Ky. 299
S.W. 576, 579 (1927);
(1959).
Knox v. Trimble, Ky., 324 S.W.2d 130, 132
A gift asserted to have been made by one since deceased
must be established by clear and satisfactory proof of every
element requisite to a gift.
167 S.W.2d 831, 834 (1942).
Aubrey’s Adm’x v. Kent et al., Ky.,
It follows that the burden of proof in
this case was upon Willard to prove each of the six elements of a
valid gift, inter vivos by clear and convincing evidence.2
2
In its October 2, 1996, opinion and order the
circuit court, without citation, stated that the administrator of
an estate, “when alleging that a gift has been made improperly
and should be brought back into the estate, must prove undue
(continued...)
-8-
The circuit court concluded that, “Willard Gross has not
met the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the
CDs were a gift to him alone, from his father C.P.”
The circuit
court’s opinion further suggests that Willard did not meet his
burden of proving that C.P. intended to gift him the CDs.
In this
regard, the circuit court said that:
If it is believed that C.P. told Willard to transfer
the CDs to himself by exercising power of attorney, then
perhaps that exercise is appropriate. On the other hand,
since there is no evidence that is precisely what he did,
although Willard says it is inferred by the fact that his
father was well aware that he had given him power of
2
(...continued)
influence, duress or fraud. This proof must be by clear and
convincing evidence and the burden of proof is on the beneficiary
who did not receive to prove that the beneficiary who did receive
obtained the gift, devise, etc. through these means.” As
illustrated by the foregoing authorities, under the facts of this
case, this is an incorrect statement of the law. (See Kitts v.
Kitts, Ky., 315 S.W.2d 617, 618 (1958), and citations therein,
concerning the burden of proof in an undue influence case.)
However, the trial court, upon considering Willard’s fiduciary
duties as C.P.’s attorney in fact, ultimately placed the burden
of proving the gift upon Willard by clear and convincing
evidence. While Willard’s status as C.P.’s attorney in fact
imposed fiduciary responsibilities, Willard has failed to
establish a valid inter vivos gift under the basic principles of
gift law. Since Willard has failed to meet this threshold
burden, it is unnecessary for us to address the issue as to how
Willard’s fiduciary duties as C.P.’s attorney in fact would bear
on the resolution of the dispute assuming, arguendo, that Willard
had proven all elements of a valid gift. However, we note that a
power of attorney is a form of agency, Moore v. Scott, Ky. App.,
759 S.W.2d 827, 828 (1988), an agent must act with the utmost
good faith toward his principal, Priestly v. Priestly, Ky., 949
S.W.2d 594, 598 (1997), and every agency is subject to the legal
limitation that it cannot be used for the benefit of the agent
himself, Johns v. Parsons, 215 S.W. 194, 195 (1919). In using
his power of attorney to facilitate “delivery” of the CDs in
conjunction with the alleged gift, Willard egregiously abused his
agency relationship with his father.
-9-
attorney and intended him to use the power of attorney in
any way he needed to.
As a matter of law, and absent any
other evidence, it is certainly too questionable to
accept at face value that C.P. Gross did intend to gift
all of his interest in the CDs to Willard alone.
been
C.P.
Gross’
habit
to
give
approximately
It had
equal
amounts in gift [sic] to all three of his children.
Also, there was no other evidence presented which would
indicate that he had any reason to slight Eugene and to
completely disinherit Eileen. While it is true that C.P.
gave Willard a power of attorney, if that had been the
method by which he meant to convey the CDs to Willard,
C.P. would have told Willard to act, immediately, rather
than leaving the situation unresolved till events became
complicated in November.
Willard did not exercise the
power in his behalf until it appeared C.P. was going to
revoke it, and other family members had learned that
Willard had it.
. . . . .
It is questionable whether Willard was indeed following
through on his father’s intentions when he transferred
the $500,000 in CDs to himself.
(Emphasis supplied).
We construe the foregoing as a finding of fact that
Willard did not meet his burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence that C.P. intended to give him the CDs as a gift.
Where
findings of fact made by a trial court are supported by substantial
evidence and are not clearly erroneous, they are binding on appeal.
-10-
Allen v. Arnett, Ky., 524 S.W.2d 748 (1972); CR 52.01.
The trial
court’s findings that Willard did not meet his burden of proving
that the CDs were gifted to him, and, more specifically, that
Willard failed to clearly and convincingly establish C.P.’s intent
to make a gift of the CDs to him is supported by substantial
evidence in the record.
Absent clear and convincing proof of
C.P.’s intent, it follows that Willard has failed to prove that the
CDs were a gift to him.
The five CDs represented the majority of C.P.’s estate.
Laura and C.P. had a fifty-four year marriage, and C.P. had a
history, when he made gifts, of sharing with his children equally.
While every person has the right to give his estate to whomever he
desires and his view of right and justice, not that of any other
person, controls, Calverad v. Reynolds, Ky., 136 S.W.2d 795, 798
(1940), the one claiming that a decedent has gifted him his estate
inter vivos must prove this clearly and convincingly.
Aubrey’s
Adm’x v. Kent et al., supra.
If
C.P.
intended
to
gift
the
CDs
to
Willard,
then
Willard, at the time the gift was made, did not undertake measures
to establish that as a clear and convincing fact.
The alleged
$500,000.00 gift was not made openly and in an unambiguous and
forthright manner, nor was it documented and witnessed in a manner
consistent with the gifting of such a significant sum of money.
Rather, the alleged gift was carried out secretly. The transaction
was kept from the other heirs, and the logistics of the alleged
gift were carried out, in part, by Willard in his capacity as
C.P.’s attorney in fact, rather than by the endorsement of C.P.
-11-
The final transfers of the CDs to Willard were effected in large
part immediately following the discovery by the other heirs that
Willard had made himself a co-payee of the CDs and had taken the
CDs into his personal custody.
revoked a short time later.
Willard’s power of attorney was
The foregoing facts mitigate strongly
against the clear and convincing establishment of a valid inter
vivos gift
Willard introduced various statements made by Eugene and
his wife allegedly corroborating his claim.
first of all, ambiguous.
The statements are,
Eugene conceded that he made statements
to the effect that C.P. “gave” Willard the CDs.
However, he
testified that these statements meant that C.P. had given the CDs
to Willard to hold for safe-keeping, not that the CDs were given to
Willard as a gift.
Moreover, at the time the statements were made,
Willard and Eugene were apparently working in concert to keep the
CDs from coming into Laura’s possession, and Eugene apparently made
statements in support of Willard to further this objective.
statements were later repudiated.
The
In summary, these statements,
when weighed against the remaining evidence, do not establish a
gift of the CDs by clear and convincing evidence.
Clear and convincing proof is proof of a probative and
substantial nature carrying the weight of evidence sufficient to
convince ordinarily prudent-minded people.
70 S.W.2d 5, 9 (1934).
Rowland v. Holt, Ky.,
The evidence offered by Willard in support
of his position does not meet this standard, and the circuit court
properly found that he had failed to meet his burden of proving
that the CDs were gifted to him.
-12-
Willard’s second argument is that the circuit court
violated his constitutional rights by denying him a jury trial
after he had demanded one.
In his answer to the original com-
plaint, Willard requested a jury trial pursuant to CR 38.02.
On
November 21, 1995, the circuit court issued an order setting the
case for a jury trial to be held on May 15, 1996.
On April 17,
1996, the court entered an order re-setting the case for a bench
trial to be held on May 20, 1996.
Willard did not object to the
setting of the matter for a bench trial in the weeks prior to the
commencement of the trial.
On the day of the trial, despite the
circuit court’s inquiry as to whether there were any other matters
to take up prior to commencing the trial, Willard did not object to
a bench trial.
A proper demand for trial by jury may not be withdrawn
without the consent of the parties.
CR 38.04.
The trial of all
issues so demanded shall be by jury, unless (a) the parties or
their attorneys of record, by written stipulation filed with the
court or by an oral stipulation made in open court and entered in
the record, consent to trial by the court sitting without a jury,
or (b) the court upon motion or of its own initiative finds that a
right of trial by jury of some or all of the issues does not exist
under the Constitution or statutes of Kentucky.
CR 39.01.
The
record is silent as to any consent by Willard; however, it is
uncontested the record contains no specific waiver
by Willard,
oral or written, to his prior request for a jury trial.
Despite his initial, proper, demand for a jury trial, we
conclude that Willard waived his right to a jury trial.
-13-
The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Fed.R.Civ.P.) relevant to this
issue prescribe rules substantially identical to the aforementioned
Kentucky Civil Rules.
See Fed.R.Civ.P. 38 and 39.
Hence, we are
persuaded by the Sixth Circuit case, Sewell v. Jefferson County
Fiscal
Court,
863
F.2d
461
(6th
Cir.
1988),
which
presented
essentially the identical issue for consideration under the federal
rules.
In Sewell, the plaintiff-appellant, Sewell, filed a Civil
Rights Action in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Kentucky, and specifically requested a jury.
It was
undisputed that she had properly endorsed a request for a jury
trial on the complaint in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 38(b), which
is substantially similar to CR 38.02.
Following a pretrial conference the court entered an
order scheduling the case for a jury trial on all issues except
one.
During the final pretrial conference, counsel for Sewell
orally requested a continuance of the jury trial date.
The
district court granted the motion and removed the case from the
jury trial docket and continued the case for a bench trial before
the court.
The court’s written order stated that:
"IT IS ORDERED
that this case be remanded from the trial calendar of September 23,
1986, and is continued to JANUARY 22, 1987, at 10:00 A.M. for a
trial before the COURT." (Original emphasis.) Plaintiff's counsel
made no objection to the court's order reassigning the case for
trial before the court until the commencement of the trial.
On the day of the trial, after the parties had announced
that they were prepared to proceed, Sewell’s counsel requested the
-14-
court to summon the jury.
The court examined the aforementioned
order and noted that it stated that the trial was to be before the
court.
After a discussion with counsel for the parties, the court
concluded that Sewell had waived the right to trial by jury by
failing to timely object to the court's order removing the case
from the jury trial docket.
Sewell's claims.
The court proceeded to try all of
The court entered judgment for the defendants on
all counts.
The facts in the Sewell case are substantially the same
as in the case on appeal.
If anything, Sewell was more entitled to
a finding of no waiver in that she renewed her request for a jury
trial prior to the commencement of the bench trial, whereas Willard
did not.
Following is the 6th Circuit’s analysis of the issue
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which, again, are in
relevant part substantially identical to the Kentucky Rules of
Civil Procedure:
On appeal, Sewell has argued that the district court
erred by denying her fundamental constitutional right to
a trial by a jury.
See U.S. Const. amend. VII ("In suits
at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall
be preserved....");
Fed.R.Civ.P. 38(a)3 ("The right of
trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the
Constitution
inviolate.");
...
shall
be
preserved
to
the
parties
see also, Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301
3
CR 38.01 closely follows Fed.R.Civ.P. 38(a), with
references to the state constitution and statutes rather than
those of the Federal Government.
-15-
U.S. 389, 393, 57 S.Ct. 809, 811, 81 L.Ed. 1177 (1937);
Bellmore v. Mobil Oil Corp., 783 F.2d 300, 306 (2nd
Cir.1986).
Although
the
right
to
a
jury
trial
is
guaranteed by the Constitution, "like other constitutional rights, can be waived by the parties."
9 C.
Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §
2321, at 101 (1971);
39(a)5;
see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 38(d),4
United States v. Moore, 340 U.S. 616, 621, 71
S.Ct. 524, 526, 95 L.Ed. 582 (1951);
at 306.
Bellmore, 783 F.2d
The standard for determining whether there has
been a subsequent waiver of a jury trial, which had
previously been timely entered pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 38(a), is set forth in
Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 39(a): [footnote addressed to dissent
omitted]
The trial of all issues so demanded shall be
by jury, unless ... the parties or their attorneys
of record, by written stipulation or by an oral
stipulation made in open court and entered in the
record, consent to trial by the court sitting
without a jury . . . .
Fed.R.Civ.P. 39(a);
see also, 9 C. Wright & A.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2332, at 108-09
4
Fed.R.Civ.P. 38(d) is substantially similar to CR
38.04.
5
Fed.R.Civ.P. 39(a) is substantially similar to CR
39.01.
-16-
(1971);
compare
Fed.R.Civ.P. 38(d)6 ("A demand for
trial by jury made as herein provided may not be withdrawn without the consent of the parties."); 9 C. Wright
& A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2321, at
101-02 (1971).
The requirements of
Rule 39(a) have "been inter-
preted broadly so as to encompass orders entered by the
court and not objected to."
Lovelace v. Dall, 820 F.2d
223, 227 (7th Cir. 1987).
In the instant case, the
counsel for the plaintiff made an oral motion for a
continuance of the trial date during the final pretrial
conference on September 15, 1986.
The court granted the
motion orally, and then entered a written order on
September
17,
1986
which
stated
that
the
case
was
continued until January 22, 1987 "for a trial before the
court."
binding
The court's order of September 17, 1986 was
upon
all
parties,
see
Fed.R.Civ.P.
16(e);7
Ghandi v. Police Dep't of Detroit, 823 F.2d 959, 962 (6th
Cir.1987), cert. denied sub nom. Ghandi v. Fayed, 484
U.S. 1042, 108 S.Ct. 774, 98 L.Ed.2d 861 (1988); Daniels
v. Board of Educ. of Ravenna School Dist., 805 F.2d 203,
209 (6th Cir. 1986);
Court's
Order
accord Annot., Binding Effect of
Entered
After
Pretrial
Conference,
22
A.L.R.2d 599, 601-03 (1952), and constituted a "suffi-
6
Fed.R.Civ.P. 38(d) is substantially similar to CR
38.04.
7
Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(e) is substantially similar, in
relevant part, to CR 16(2).
-17-
cient entry in the record to satisfy the requirements of
Fed.R.Civ.P. 39(a)."
Fields Eng'g & Equip., Inc. v.
Cargill, Inc., 651 F.2d 589, 592 (8th Cir. 1981) (waiver
contained in the court's order);
see also Harden v.
Adams, 760 F.2d 1158, 1166 (11th Cir.) (waiver contained
in amended complaint and later orders of the court),
cert. denied sub nom. Grimmer v. Harden, 474 U.S. 1007,
106 S.Ct. 530, 88 L.Ed.2d 462 (1985);
Moser v. Texas
Trailer Corp., 623 F.2d 1006, 1011 (5th Cir. 1980)
(amended complaint which provided for trial "without a
jury" sufficient to waive jury trial); General Business
Servs., Inc. v. Fletcher, 435 F.2d 863, 864 (4th Cir.
1970) (order of court noting waiver of jury trial);
accord
Lovelace, 820 F.2d at 227 (pretrial minutes
stating that jury demand withdrawn and matter set for
bench trial; court decided there was no waiver based upon
other grounds).
The plaintiff, however, has urged this court to find
that the September 17, 1986 order was insufficient by
itself to evidence a waiver of Sewell's right to a jury
trial, charging that there was no record that the parties
to this controversy had ever discussed the issue.
It is
well established, however, that there is no requirement
that a written expression of waiver be accompanied by any
additional documentation.
See, e.g., Fields Eng'g &
Equip., Inc., 651 F.2d at 592 ("It is immaterial that the
pretrial conference itself was not on the record.
-18-
The
agreement to waive a jury . . . was recorded in the
pretrial order.");
trial
before
Fletcher, 435 F.2d at 864 (affirmed
court
where
appellant
claimed
that
he
thought court had agreed at pretrial conference to submit
issue of damages to jury, but pretrial order reflected
waiver of jury trial and the pretrial conference had not
been recorded);
Annot., Binding Effect of Court's Order
Entered After Pretrial Conference,
22 A.L.R.2d 599, 602
(1952) ("[P]arties may be bound by recitals in the
pretrial order or report on the theory that they are
stipulations.");
accord
Moser v. Texas Trailer Corp.,
623 F.2d 1006, 1010-11 (5th Cir. 1980) (appellant failed
to object to amended complaint waiving jury trial;
no
record that parties had discussed issue).
Furthermore, the fact that the plaintiff in the case
at bar made no objection to the language of the September
17, 1986 order for nearly four months provided additional
support for the district court's conclusion that there
had been a waiver of the jury trial.8 See United States
v. Missouri River Breaks Hunt Club, 641 F.2d 689, 693
(9th Cir. 1981) (judge's oral statement that parties had
waived
jury
trial
affirmed
in
light
of
appellant's
failure to have objected in the two months before bench
trial began); Southland Reship, Inc. v. Flegel, 534 F.2d
8
In this case the order setting the matter for a bench
trial was entered on April 17, 1996, and the trial was held on
May 20, 1996, so Willard had slightly over one month to object.
This does not distinguish Sewell from the case at bar.
-19-
639, 644 (5th Cir. 1976) (failure to have made any
objection for over a month after judge's oral ruling
regarding bench trial sufficient to affirm waiver of jury
trial); accord Harden, 760 F.2d at 1168 (no objection
made to amendment to the complaint or court's orders
indicating waiver of jury trial); Cf.
Ghandi, 823 F.2d
at 963 nn. 1 & 3 (failure to have moved to amend the
court's
order
of
September
17,
1986
pursuant
to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(e)); Daniels, 805 F.2d at 209 (same).
Plaintiff's disclaimer of knowledge that the
September 17, 1986 order had assigned the case for a
bench
trial
is
likewise
of
no
significance
because
inadvertence or mistaken impression is not sufficient to
relieve the party from the effects of an otherwise valid
waiver of a jury trial. See
Fletcher, 435 F.2d at 864;
Bush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 425 F.2d 393, 396 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied,
400 U.S. 833, 91 S.Ct. 64, 27 L.Ed.2d 64
(1970).
did
Nor
the
plaintiff's
objection
at
the
commencement of the bench trial serve to reinstate the
right to a trial by jury.
"Ordinarily, once a party
withdraws his demand for a jury trial, with the requisite
consent of the other parties, he may not change his
mind." Hanlon v. Providence College, 615 F.2d 535, 53839 (1st Cir. 1980);
see also
West v. Devitt, 311 F.2d
787, 788 (8th Cir. 1963) ("The mere fact that petitioner
had changed his mind would not of itself require the
court
to
set
aside
the
-20-
procedural
order
made.");
Fletcher, 435 F.2d at 864 (renewed demand for jury trial
made five days after pretrial order expressing waiver of
same did not preserve right); Annot., Withdrawal or
Disregard of Jury Trial in Civil Action, 64 A.L.R.2d 506,
517-19 (1959) ("The rule recognized in a number of cases
is that once a waiver of jury trial has matured, the
waiver may not be withdrawn at the insistence of one
party.");
9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure
§.S
2321,
at
104
&
n.
64
(1971);
accord
Bellmore, 783 F.2d at 307 ("[S]omething beyond the mere
inadvertence of counsel is required to relieve a party
from its waiver.") (applying Fed.R.Civ.P. 39(b))9 (quoting
Alvarado
v.
Santana-Lopez,
101
F.R.D.
367,
368
(S.D.N.Y. 1984)). The suggestion that the district court
erred in concluding that Sewell had waived the right to
trial by jury is accordingly without merit.
We agree with the analysis of the 6th Circuit, and,
applying the reasoning of Sewell to the case at bar, we conclude
that under the applicable Kentucky Civil Rules Willard waived his
right to a jury trial when he failed to object to the trial court’s
order setting the matter for a bench trial following the entry of
that order, and when he failed to object prior to the commencement
of the bench trial despite the trial court’s direct query to the
parties as to whether there were any other matters to be addressed
prior to the commencement of the trial.
9
Fed.R.Civ.P. 39(b) is the same as CR 39.02.
-21-
Finally, Laura filed a cross-appeal in this matter “to
protect the record in the event this case should be reversed on the
appeal of Willard D. Gross.”
Laura sought to ensure that in the
event of a reversal on Willard’s appeal, the portion of the circuit
court’s opinion and order relating to a finding of a fraud on
Laura’s dower rights would not likewise be set aside.
Willard did
not appeal this aspect of the circuit court’s order and Laura’s
cross-appeal
to
protect
unnecessary;
however,
the
record
inasmuch
as
appears
Willard’s
to
have
appeal
been
was
successful, we deem Laura’s cross-appeal to be moot.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT/
CROSS-APPELLEE:
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEES/
CROSS-APPELLANTS:
Jack Martin Goins
Paris, Kentucky
Thomas H. Burnett
Lexington, Kentucky
Robert C. Monk
Lexington, Kentucky
-22-
not
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