BRIAN WOODCOCK V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: February 12, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-001907-MR
BRIAN WOODCOCK
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS R. LEWIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 91-CR-17
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, Chief Judge; GUIDUGLI and MILLER, Judges.
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE:
This is an appeal from an order entered by
the Warren Circuit Court denying appellant Brian Woodcock’s RCr
11.42 motion.
On appeal, appellant contends the court erred by
failing to find that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel at trial.
We disagree.
Hence, we affirm.
In January 1991 appellant was indicted for intentional
murder, knowingly receiving stolen property valued over $100, and
other offenses relating to the death of Earl Flora.
The
Commonwealth adduced evidence at trial that on October 25, 1990,
appellant wrecked a stolen car in a single vehicle collision
which occurred near Mr. Flora’s home.
Subsequently, Mr. Flora
was shot in the head while investigating the accident and died
during surgery the next day.
After a trial, the jury returned
verdicts finding appellant guilty of the offenses of wanton
murder and knowingly receiving stolen property.
The court
sentenced appellant to concurrent terms of life imprisonment and
two years.
On April 22, 1993, the supreme court affirmed
appellant’s convictions on direct appeal.
On December 2, 1993, appellant filed a pro-se RCr 11.42
motion.
Appointed counsel subsequently filed supplemental
pleadings.
Although appellant first sought an evidentiary
hearing, he later withdrew that request and asked the court to
rule on the motion based upon the record.
court denied the motion.
In July 1997, the
This appeal followed.
In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate both that his counsel’s
performance was deficient and that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Gall v. Commonwealth, 702
S.W.2d 37 (1985).
Further, “[t]he proper measure of attorney
performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
Moreover,
ineffectiveness of counsel is not demonstrated by the mere fact
that the defendant may be dissatisfied with the result of the
trial.
Indeed, as the Supreme Court stated in Strickland, 466
U.S. at 689, “[a] fair assessment of attorney performance
requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting
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effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of
counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from
counsel’s perspective at the time.”
Finally, we also note that
it is well settled that an RCr 11.42 proceeding may not be
utilized to seek review of alleged trial errors which should have
been raised on direct appeal.
Commonwealth v. Wine, Ky., 694
S.W.2d 689 (1985).
First, appellant contends that his trial counsel was
ineffective because he failed to timely request a change of
venue.
We disagree.
A change of venue is warranted if it is shown that “(1)
there has been prejudicial news coverage, (2) it occurred prior
to trial, and (3) the effect of such news coverage is reasonably
likely to prevent a fair trial.”
Brewster v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
568 S.W.2d 232, 235 (1978), citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S.
333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966).
Further, the supreme
court stated in Brewster, supra, that “the mere fact that jurors
may have heard, talked, or read about a case is not sufficient to
sustain a motion for a change of venue, absent a showing that
there is a reasonable likelihood that the accounts or
descriptions of the investigation and judicial proceedings have
prejudiced the defendant.”
Indeed, our supreme court in Bowling
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 942 S.W.2d 293 (1997), cert. denied, ___
U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 451, 139 L.Ed.2d 387 (1997), reiterated that,
when presented with a motion for a change of venue, a trial court
should determine whether the prospective jurors have been exposed
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to information which has caused them to prejudge the case.
Moreover, it is not the pretrial publicity which prejudices the
criminal defendant, but rather, the focus must be on the nature
of the press coverage.
Foley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 942 S.W.2d
876 (1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 234, 139
L.Ed.2d 165 (1997); cf. Jacobs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 870 S.W.2d
412 (1994).
Here, appellant argues that pretrial publicity negated
any possibility of his receiving a fair trial and that we should
imply that he was prejudiced based upon the totality of the
circumstances.
In support of his position, he cites newspaper
articles reporting that the victim was a veteran Warren County
constable, that over 400 persons attended his funeral, and that
appellant was the suspect.
Additionally, appellant points to
articles published the day before his trial about capital
punishment and his forthcoming trial.
However, appellant’s
motion for a change of venue was not filed until the day of trial
and he did not raise the issue of the court’s denial of a
continuance on direct appeal.
He now claims that trial counsel
was ineffective because he failed to request a change of venue at
an earlier stage of the proceedings.
The problem with appellant’s argument lies in the fact
that given the totality of the circumstances, the record does not
compel a finding that the court was required to move the trial
from Warren County.
Indeed, the record reflects that the members
of the jury panel were thoroughly questioned about their exposure
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to information about the case and while many stated that they had
heard about the shooting, not one prospective juror stated that
he or she had formed an opinion as to appellant’s culpability.
Moreover, the extensive voir dire conducted demonstrates that no
juror needed to be rehabilitated as is prohibited by Montgomery
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 819 S.W.2d 713 (1991).
See Foley, supra.
More important, appellant makes no argument that a partial jury
was seated.
We conclude, therefore, that a motion for a change
of venue would have been without merit and, thus, that trial
counsel was not ineffective because he failed to make such a
motion at an early stage of the proceedings.
Next, appellant contends that his trial counsel was
ineffective because he failed to investigate the case and to call
certain witnesses.
We disagree.
The Supreme Court addressed a trial counsel’s duty to
investigate in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, by stating that
“counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make
a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations
unnecessary.
In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision
not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness
in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference
to counsel’s judgments.”
Moreover, this court has held that the
failure to subpoena particular witnesses does not amount to
ineffective assistance in the absence of an allegation that the
absent witnesses’ testimony would have compelled an acquittal.
Robbins v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 719 S.W.2d 742 (1986).
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Further, a criminal defendant “is not guaranteed errorless
counsel, or counsel adjudged ineffective by hindsight, but
counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably
effective assistance.”
McQueen v. Commonwealth, Ky., 949 S.W.2d
70, 71 (1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S.___, 117 S.Ct. 2536, 138
L.Ed.2d 1035 (1997).
Appellant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective
because he failed to interview a psychologist, a psychiatrist,
and an individual who supplied him with narcotics as to his
substance abuse, failed to use a pharmacologist to testify as to
drug interactions, and failed to have a medical expert testify as
to the functioning of his liver and kidneys.
However, the record
shows that appellant’s attorney used other witnesses including
appellant, appellant’s parents, and his family physician, to
establish his substance abuse and the physical effects of the
drugs on his body.
Indeed, the Commonwealth never disputed the
severity of appellant’s substance abuse.
In short, based upon
our review of the record, we are satisfied that the performance
of appellant’s trial counsel was clearly reasonable and not
outside the wide range of acceptable professional assistance.
Thus, we conclude that appellant has failed to demonstrate that
his trial attorney’s performance was deficient and, hence, that
the first prong of the Strickland test has not been met.
This is
especially true since appellant has not identified how the
claimed errors of counsel in presenting his defense adversely
affected the outcome of the trial.
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Next, appellant contends that his trial counsel was
ineffective because he failed to strike a certain juror for
cause.
Again, we disagree.
RCr 9.36(1) states that a prospective juror should be
stricken for cause “[w]hen there is reasonable ground to believe
that a prospective juror cannot render a fair and impartial
verdict on the evidence . . . .”
Moreover, the trial court is
vested with discretion to determine whether bias should be
implied.
Watson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 433 S.W.2d 884 (1968).
Indeed, mere knowledge as to facts of the case or as to the
participants, standing alone, does not render a prospective juror
ineligible.
Rather, the test is whether the prospective juror
can conform his or her views to the requirements of the law and
render a fair and impartial verdict.
884 S.W.2d 668 (1994).
Mabe v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
Only recently, the supreme court noted
that “[d]isqualification of a juror is merited only when the
juror’s knowledge precludes impartiality.”
Bowling, 942 S.W.2d
at 300.
Here, appellant claims that his trial counsel was
ineffective because he did not make a motion to strike for cause
a juror who worked in the county judge/executive’s office.
True
enough, this juror stated that she knew the murder victim, his
son, and prospective witnesses.
Nevertheless, the juror
indicated during questioning that she was indeed capable of
rendering a verdict based solely upon the evidence and the
instructions, and the mere fact that she may have had “some
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acquaintance with or knowledge about the participants and their
possible testimony” or “heard a witness speak informally about a
case prior to trial” did not establish express or implied bias.
See Bowling, 942 S.W.2d at 299, citing Jones v. Commonwealth, Ky.
App., 737 S.W.2d 466 (1987); and Scruggs v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
566 S.W.2d 405 (1978).
Thus, appellant has failed to demonstrate
that his trial attorney’s failure to strike the juror complained
of for cause amounted to conduct outside the wide range of
acceptable professional assistance.
That being so, it follows
that the trial court did not err by failing to find that
appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel in this
vein.
Finally, appellant contends that the cumulative effect
of counsel’s conduct served to deprive him of a fair trial.
We
disagree.
Because appellant’s individual claims as to ineffective
assistance of counsel are without merit, it is obvious that
counsel’s conduct cannot be found to have had a cumulative effect
of depriving him of a fair trial.
See Sanborn v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 975 S.W.2d 905 (1998).
The court’s order is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Paul J. Neel, Jr.
Louisville, KY
A.B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Samuel J. Floyd, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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