JERMAINE BROWN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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February 26, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-001288-MR
JERMAINE BROWN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM GRAVES CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN T. DAUGHADAY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 1996-CR-000033
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, KNOPF, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
Jermaine Brown appeals from an April 28, 1997,
judgment of the Graves Circuit Court convicting him, in accord
with a jury verdict, of criminal abuse in the first degree (KRS
508.100) and sentencing him to seven (7) years in prison.
Brown
was indicted along with his girlfriend, Allison Clark, for
allegedly having abused the couple’s six (6) week old son, Devon.
Brown complains on appeal that the trial court erred by
consolidating his and his co-defendant’s trials and by denying
his motions for a directed verdict of acquittal.
He also
complains that his trial was rendered unfair by the trial court’s
numerous admissions of improper evidence.
He claims, in
particular, to have been unduly prejudiced by the admission of
expert testimony concerning the so-called “shaken baby syndrome.”
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the Graves
Circuit Court.
Brown and his co-defendant Clark were jointly tried
from February 11 through February 13, 1997.
During rebuttal
following presentation of the defendants’ cases, the
Commonwealth, in an attempt to impeach Clark’s claim that her
relationship with Brown had been tranquil, elicited testimony
concerning Brown’s alleged mistreatment of Clark.
Brown argues
that this testimony, admissible in the case against Clark but
inadmissible in his case, provides compelling grounds to grant
him a new trial separate from his co-defendant.
He acknowledges
that he raised no objection to the Commonwealth’s pre-trial
motion for a consolidated proceeding, but he insists that the
joint trial proved to be so unfair as to entitle him to relief
pursuant to RCr 10.26, the substantial error rule.
We disagree.
At trial, Brown and Clark both denied having abused
their son, neither accused the other, and both attempted to show
that the serious injuries the child suffered could have resulted
from innocent causes.
These defenses are not incompatible,
Brown’s contrary assertion on appeal notwithstanding.
Nothing
demonstrates that fact more emphatically than Brown and Clark’s
utter lack of objection to the Commonwealth’s motion for a joint
trial.
Given Brown’s apparent strategic acquiescence in the
joint proceeding and in light of the policy favoring consolidated
trials of all alleged crimes arising from the same facts, there
was no error, much less a palpable one, in the trial court’s
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decision to try Brown and Clark together.
RCr 9.16; Foster v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 827 S.W.2d 670 (1992).
The evidentiary
question Brown raises does not change this analysis.
That
question does, however, merit discussion in its own right.
We
will address that question below, when we take up Brown’s other
claims that evidence was improperly admitted.
The trial court did not err by trying Brown and Clark
together, nor did it err by denying Brown’s motions for a
directed verdict of acquittal.
Brown points out that all the
evidence against him was circumstantial, and he contends that,
because the evidence does not compel an inference that he abused
Devon, his guilt is sufficiently in doubt to entitle him to
acquittal as a matter of law.
The law, however, does not require
that a defendant be found guilty beyond all doubt, but only
beyond a reasonable doubt.
As our Supreme Court has explained,
[o]n motion for directed
verdict, the trial court must draw
all fair and reasonable inferences
from the evidence in favor of the
Commonwealth. If the evidence is
sufficient to induce a reasonable
juror to believe beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant
is guilty, a directed verdict
should not be given. For the
purpose of ruling on the motion,
the trial court must assume that
the evidence for the Commonwealth
is true, but reserving to the jury
questions as to the credibility and
weight to be given to such
testimony.
On appellate review, the test of a
directed verdict is, if under the evidence as
a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for
a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant
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is entitled to a directed verdict of
acquittal. (Citation omitted.)
Commonwealth v. Benham, Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (1991).
To
establish a defendant’s guilt, the Commonwealth “must have more
than a mere scintilla of evidence and . . . it must be evidence
of substance.”
(1994).
Johnson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 885 S.W.2d 951, 953
On the other hand, circumstantial evidence is not, per
se, insubstantial.
Such evidence will support a conviction for
criminal abuse if it permits a reasonable inference that the
defendant is guilty.
Commonwealth v. Collins, Ky., 933 S.W.2d
811 (1996).
Criminal abuse in the first degree is defined at KRS
508.100 as follows:
A person is guilty of criminal abuse in the
first degree when he intentionally abuses
another person or permits another person of
whom he has actual custody to be abused and
thereby:
(a) Causes serious physical injury; or
(b) Places him in a situation that may cause
him serious physical injury; or
(c) Causes torture, cruel confinement or
cruel punishment;
to a person twelve (12) years of age or less,
or who is physically helpless or mentally
helpless.
The question before us, therefore, is whether, based upon “the
evidence as a whole,” it was “clearly unreasonable” for the jury
to find that Brown intentionally abused Devon or allowed him to
be abused.
We find that it was not.
The Commonwealth’s evidence showed that on the evening
of November 11, 1995, Clark had called 911 to request emergency
assistance with her six (6) week old baby.
The baby’s eyes, she
told the 911 operator, had rolled back in its head, its side had
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collapsed, and it seemed dead except for very intermittent
breathing.
Devon was rushed initially to the Pine Lake Medical
Hospital in Mayfield, Kentucky, and was eventually seen by three
(3) physicians: Dr. Gaw, who examined Devon in the hospital
emergency room; Dr. Ross, the intensive care pediatrician at
Kosair Children’s Hospital in Louisville; and Dr. Burrows, a
forensic pathologist who works for the Commonwealth.
All three
(3) doctors testified at trial, and each confirmed that the
baby’s serious injuries--broken ribs, cranial and retinal
bleeding, and seizures--are injuries that commonly occur when a
baby is subjected to a forcible whiplash motion such as violent
shaking.
Dr. Burrows testified that shaking is so often the
cause of such injuries that together they have come to be
referred to in the medical profession as “shaken baby syndrome.”
The jury also heard testimony from an acquaintance of
Brown and Clark, Steve Hicks, who visited the couple early in the
afternoon of November 11, 1995.
Hicks testified that he had
knocked on the door of Brown and Clark’s apartment that afternoon
and as he was waiting for a response he had heard from inside
dull slapping sounds, sounds like someone’s breath being forcibly
expelled, and what he was sure was the sound of Devon’s
suppressed crying or whimpering.
Before anyone responded to his
knock, Clark had driven up and after entering the apartment
through the rear door had opened the front door for him.
When he
entered the apartment Hicks saw Brown, who had apparently just
come from the shower, and he saw Devon lying on a changing table.
Later, Clark carried Devon into the living room where she, Brown,
and Hicks watched a video.
According to Hicks, Devon had
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appeared unusually dazed, listless, and unresponsive.
Hicks also
testified that, unlike her usual practice of leaving Devon
uncovered, during that visit Clark had kept Devon completely
wrapped in a blanket.
There was also testimony by Dr. Gaw that when Devon was
admitted to the Pine Lake Medical Hospital he was bruised on his
back, chest, and left ear and had a severe diaper rash.
Dr. Gaw
testified that when he first saw them that night, all of Devon’s
bruises were probably a day or two (2) old.
He described the
bruises on the baby’s chest as looking like finger prints.
The
two (2) large bruises on the baby’s back, he said, were probably
thumb marks.
Clark and Brown both denied having abused Devon and
sought to show that Devon’s injuries could have resulted from an
unfortunate conjunction of innocent causes, such as an enzyme
deficiency, a genetically based seizure disorder, a lung
infection, a car-seat buckle, a day-care swing-seat strap,
Brown’s having once accidentally dropped Devon after a bath,
Clark’s having laid the baby down too hard, Brown’s over zealous
and untrained application of CPR immediately before Clark’s 911
call, and the jolt that occurred when the EMT worker who carried
Devon to the ambulance leaped from the apartment’s stoop with
Devon in his arms.
The doctors all testified, however, that none
of these factors, either alone or in combination, was at all
likely to account for Devon’s injuries, which could only result
from the sort of violent shaking the doctors believed had
occurred or from some other severe trauma such as an automobile
accident.
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This was the evidence at the core of the Commonwealth’s
case.
Although this evidence is circumstantial, Devon’s serious
injuries and the doctors’ testimony concerning the probable cause
of those injuries permits a reasonable inference that Devon had
been abused.
Hicks’s testimony, furthermore, about the sounds he
heard emanating from Brown’s apartment when Brown was alone with
Devon and about Devon’s uncharacteristically lethargic demeanor
shortly thereafter; Dr. Gaw’s testimony that Devon’s bruises were
probably hand prints and were a day or two (2) old; and the
testimony by all the doctors that Brown’s and Clark’s accounts of
what happened to Devon were implausible is evidence permitting a
reasonable inference that Brown abused Devon in the first degree.
Anticipating this response to his directed verdict
argument, Brown also contends that the inference of his guilt was
unfairly bolstered by Dr. Burrows’s reference to the “shaken baby
syndrome.”
This reference, Brown claims, was unduly prejudicial
because it lent an unwarranted aura of scientific certainty to
the inference that Devon’s injuries resulted from child abuse.
Brown argues that “shaken baby syndrome” is no better established
as a medical diagnosis than is “child sexual abuse accommodation
syndrome,” (CSAAS) and so evidence of the former should have been
disallowed at trial as evidence of the latter has been.
See
Hellstrom v. Commonwealth, Ky., 825 S.W.2d 612 (1992) (observing,
at 614, that “[n]either the syndrome [CSAAS] nor the symptoms
that comprise the syndrome have recognized reliability in
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diagnosing child sexual abuse as a scientific entity.”).1
We
disagree.
We disagree first with Brown’s suggestion that the
meaning of the word “syndrome” is so varied within the scientific
community as to render the word inherently unsuitable for
evidentiary purposes.2
It is true, as Brown notes, that
different scientific disciplines use the word for different
purposes.
For example, “the behavioral syndromes [such as CSAAS]
were not devised to determine the truth of events leading up to
their manifestations but merely to identify emotional problems.”
State v. Lopez, 412 S.E.2d 390, 394 (S.C. 1991).
Accordingly,
evidence concerning the existence of such syndromes has been held
to be inadmissible as proof that a particular causative event
occurred.
Bussey v. Commonwealth, Ky., 697 S.W.2d 139 (1985).
Frequently, however, physical syndromes not only
characterize a disease or disorder but provide insight into the
cause of the condition as well.
Proof of such syndromes provides
a basis for legal inferences concerning events prior to the
1
Brown also complains that the Commonwealth failed to
establish a proper foundation for this testimony. He argues,
therefore, that there are procedural as well as substantive
grounds for deeming Dr. Burrows’s “shaken baby syndrome”
testimony improper. The procedural issue was not raised before
the trial court, however, neither at the pre-trial hearing when
objection was entered to the substance of such testimony, nor
during trial when Dr. Burrows’s qualifications as an expert and
her assertions regarding the scientific status of “shaken baby
syndrome” went unchallenged. Because the alleged procedural
error was not preserved at trial, we may not address it on
appeal. RCr 9.22; RCr 10.12.
2
A standard definition of “syndrome” is “[a] group of
symptoms that collectively characterize a disease or disorder.”
The American Heritage Dictionary, 3rd Edition (1992).
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syndrome’s manifestation.
admissible in court.
This sort of “syndrome” evidence is
State v. Lopez, supra.
We also disagree with Brown’s assertion that “shaken
baby syndrome,” like CSAA syndrome, merely names or characterizes
a particular constellation of injuries without providing genuine
insight into causation.
Although apparently this issue is one of
first impression in Kentucky, several of our sister states have
already addressed it and have unanimously found that evidence of
“shaken baby syndrome” is admissible.
Those states have observed
that the causative correlation between this set of injuries and
the type of child abuse that gives the syndrome its name is well
established.
See State v. Compton, 701 A.2d 468 (N.J. 1997)
(collecting cases); State v. McClary, 541 A.2d 96 (Conn. 1988);
State v. Lopez supra.
We may and do, therefore, take judicial
notice of the fact that “shaken baby syndrome” has been
adequately analyzed and recognized in the scientific literature
to permit testimony about it by a properly qualified expert.
Cf.
United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191 (8th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1062, 114 S.Ct. 734, 126 L.Ed.2d 697 (1994)
(taking judicial notice of the validity of certain DNA profiling
techniques).
The trial court did not err, therefore, by
admitting Dr. Burrows’s expert testimony to the effect that Devon
suffered from “shaken baby syndrome.”
There was thus no error with respect to the
Commonwealth’s core case.
Brown’s remaining contentions all
concern the trial court’s admission of allegedly improper
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evidence that was tangential to the core issues.
Our review of
these alleged errors, therefore, must be especially careful to
ask not only whether the trial court erred but also, if it did,
whether the error was sufficiently serious to entitle Brown to
relief.
RCr 9.24.
First, as discussed above, Brown complains that, during
rebuttal, evidence of his bad character and prior bad acts was
improperly admitted to impeach his co-defendant.
This situation
confronted the trial court with a difficult instance of the need
to balance the probative value of proffered evidence against its
potential to cause undue prejudice.
KRE 403.
We agree with
Brown that the trial court miscalculated the balance here and
abused its discretion.
We note that the joint trial was at the behest and
primarily for the convenience of the Commonwealth.
It goes
without saying, however, that the Commonwealth’s convenience
provides no justification for slighting a defendant’s right to a
fair trial.
In general, when the Commonwealth chooses a joint
proceeding it must (absent a showing of compelling need) forego
evidence otherwise admissible against one defendant if that
evidence is inadmissible with respect to another.
compromises are possible.
However,
Instead of foregoing the evidence
entirely, the Commonwealth may limit the proffered evidence in
such a way as to minimize its improper extraneous effect.
The
impeachment evidence introduced in this case should at least have
been so limited.
Although relevant, evidence that Clark and Brown’s
relationship had not been as placid as Clark claimed was not
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vital to the case against Clark.
That testimony was also broader
in scope—more critical of Brown—than it needed to be.
Both
rebuttal witnesses, Clark’s mother and Clark’s employer, could
have contradicted Clark in general terms without specifying
instances of Brown’s alleged abuse of Clark.
The trial court
erred by not limiting their testimony in this way so as to
safeguard Brown’s right to a fair trial.
We are persuaded, however, that this error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
As noted, this testimony did not bear
upon the core case against Brown.
inflammatory.
Nor was it sensational or
The record in no way suggests that the jury is
likely to have been misled by this testimony to convict Brown on
improper grounds.
Cf. Harman v. Commonwealth, Ky., 898 S.W.2d
486 (1995) (ruling that various evidentiary errors were harmless
in light of the otherwise compelling case against the defendant).
Brown also complains of what he characterizes as
improper opinion testimony.
Three (3) witnesses, Steve Hicks,
the friend who visited Clark and Brown at their apartment; Edrie
Hunt, a social worker; and Steve Perry, a Kentucky State Police
detective, all saw Devon either shortly before or shortly after
his admission to the hospital.
They all testified that Devon’s
condition suggested to them that Devon had possibly been abused.
Brown contends that none of these witnesses was qualified to
offer such an opinion.
Again, however, even if we agreed with
Brown that the testimony of these witnesses should have been more
limited than it was, we would not agree that Brown was therefore
entitled to relief from his conviction.
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Given the three (3)
doctors’ expert opinions that Devon almost certainly had been
abused, any error in the admission of Hicks, Hunt, and Perry’s
testimonies to that effect was harmless.
RCr 9.24.
To summarize, the trial court did not err by admitting
expert testimony regarding “shaken baby syndrome” as evidence of
the cause of Devon’s injuries.
Those injuries, the expert
testimony concerning their cause, and Brown’s virtually exclusive
opportunity to have abused Devon was sufficient evidence to
support Brown’s conviction.
Brown’s trial, moreover, was
fundamentally fair notwithstanding the possible erroneous
admission of testimony adversely characterizing Brown and
referring to Devon’s injuries as the result of child abuse.
For
these reasons, we affirm the April 28, 1997, judgment of the
Graves Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Susan J. Balliet
Louisville, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Amy F. Howard
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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