ROY KENNETH ROBERTS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: September 3, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
ORDERED NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
BY KENTUCKY SUPREME COURT: August 16, 2000 (1999-SC-000928)
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-001202-MR
ROY KENNETH ROBERTS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS G. PAISLEY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 1996-CR-001168
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
VACATING IN PART, and REMANDING FOR RESENTENCING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: EMBERTON, KNOPF, AND KNOX, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
Roberts appeals from a May 6, 1997, judgment of
the Fayette Circuit Court convicting him pursuant to his guilty
plea of two (2) counts of third-degree rape (KRS 510.060) and
sentencing him to two (2) consecutive five-year terms of
imprisonment.
Roberts raises as an issue on appeal what notice
must a defendant receive of his or her presentence investigative
report prior to the final sentencing hearing.
maintains that it should be more than none.
Roy K. Roberts
In addition to his
complaint about the lack of presentencing notice, Roberts claims
that the trial court erred by denying his pretrial motions to
suppress his confession and for a continuance, and by failing to
uphold his purported right to the assistance of counsel at a
presentencing interview with a representative of the
Commonwealth’s Sex Offender Treatment Program (SOTP).
Agreeing
with Roberts that the lack of notice of the presentence
investigation reports (PSI reports) deprived him of a meaningful
opportunity to challenge the accuracy of those reports, we vacate
his sentence and remand for additional proceedings.
We are not
persuaded, however, that Roberts is entitled to any additional
relief.
In December 1996, the Fayette County Grand Jury
indicted Roberts on twelve (12) counts of rape in the first
degree.
The grand jury charged that between July and October of
1996 Roberts had, on twelve (12) occasions, forcibly engaged a
minor female in sexual intercourse.
Subsequently, Roberts was
indicted on thirteen (13) counts of sodomy in the first degree
against the same person.
These indictments were consolidated,
and trial was set for February 10, 1997.
The charges against
Roberts stemmed from allegations by the purported victim, who
filed an initial complaint with the Lexington Fayette Urban
County Division of Police at the end of October 1996.
She
charged that during the preceding three (3) or four (4) months
Roberts had repeatedly raped her in her home.
Upon the filing of the complaint, police officer Tracy
Basehart was assigned to investigate.
Officer Basehart arranged
to meet with Roberts on the evening of October 29, 1996.
During
the course of this interview with officer Basehart, Roberts
confessed that he had engaged in sex with the complaining witness
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on about twelve (12) occasions.
focus of Roberts’s appeal.
This confession is the principal
He claims that he confessed without
having understood his constitutional right to remain silent and
thus that the confession should be deemed inadmissible as
evidence against him.
At the suppression hearing on this issue, Officer
Basehart testified that upon Roberts’s arrival at the police
station she had informed him of the young woman’s allegations and
had asked if he would consent to be questioned.
Roberts had
agreed, whereupon Officer Basehart took him to an interrogation
room, read him his Miranda rights,1 had him sign a form
indicating waiver of those rights, and began to question him
concerning the alleged encounters with the complainant.
Initially, Officer Basehart said, Roberts denied having had any
improper contact with the alleged victim, but after talking for
about 45 minutes he admitted that once a week for nearly three
(3) months he and the complainant had engaged in sexual
intercourse.
The officer thereupon obtained a tape recorder,
and, she testified, Roberts repeated his confession on tape.
The
beginning of this recording was played during the suppression
hearing.
On the tape, Officer Basehart asks Roberts if she had
earlier read to him his rights.
He replies, “Yes, ma’am.”2
Roberts testified, however, that the officer had not
apprised him of his constitutional rights until after he had
1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed.
2d 694 (1966).
2
This introductory portion of the tape is all that was
introduced at the suppression hearing.
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first confessed and had agreed to repeat his confession on tape.
He also claimed that the officer’s manner had been threatening
and overbearing and that lack of sleep, together with a
prescription cold medication, had left him incapable of
understanding the events of that evening.
When asked on cross-
examination to account for his statement on the tape to the
effect that Officer Basehart had explained his rights, Roberts
claimed to have answered without thinking, overwhelmed by anxiety
and confused by all that was happening around him.
He was also
asked during cross-examination whether he had understood during
his interview with Officer Basehart that he had a right to
counsel.
He replied that he had felt that counsel was
unnecessary because he was innocent, but that he knew he could
have had an attorney if he had needed one.
The trial court found Officer Basehart’s account of the
interview the more credible.
It noted that the questioning had
not been unduly long, belying Roberts’s claim of duress, and it
emphasized the signed waiver card and Roberts’s ready,
unconstrained, and unconfused acknowledgment on the tape that he
had been apprised of his rights, an acknowledgment Roberts had
not convincingly disclaimed.
Taken together, the court believed,
these facts contradicted Roberts’s assertion that he had
misunderstood the nature of his interview with Officer Basehart.
Accordingly, the trial court denied Roberts’s motion to suppress
his confession.
On appeal, Roberts disputes the trial court’s findings,
and contends, furthermore, that, even given those findings, the
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evidence presented at the suppression hearing was insufficient to
support the court’s conclusion.
In particular, he argues that
because Officer Basehart did not inquire minutely into Roberts’s
competency to waive his rights or into his understanding of that
waiver, neither the officer’s testimony, the signed waiver card,
Roberts’s taped acknowledgment that his rights had been
satisfactorily explained, nor any of these together, is
sufficient to establish a voluntary waiver under Miranda v.
Arizona.
There being ample evidence in the record to support the
trial court’s factual findings, the only question before us is
the legal one concerning the sufficiency of the evidence so
found.
This Court reviews such questions of law de novo.
Uninsured Employers’ Fund v. Garland, Ky., 805 S.W.2d 116 (1991).
To determine whether a criminal defendant has
“voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently” waived his rights to
remain silent in the face of custodial police interrogation, the
Court must look to the “totality of the circumstances surrounding
the interrogation.”
First, the relinquishment of the right must
have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a
free and deliberate choice, rather than coercion or deception.
Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness both
of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences
of the decision to abandon it.
421, 106 S. Ct.
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,
1135, ____, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410, 421 (1986).
Furthermore, the focus must remain upon pressure to confess
exerted by the police, and not upon pressure arising from any
other source.
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S. Ct.
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515, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1986).
The Court need not delve into a
suspect’s motivations that were not apparent to the police.
Id.
at 166-71, 107 S. Ct. at ____, 93 L. Ed. 2d at 484-87; See also,
Commonwealth v. Cooper, Ky., 899 S.W.2d 75 (1995); Britt v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 512 S.W.2d 496 (1974).
To summarize, under Miranda and its progeny, and under
Commonwealth v. Cooper, a defendant’s inculpatory statement made
during a custodial interview may be used as evidence against him
if and only if the statement and the circumstances in which it
was made indicate: (1) that the statement was knowing and
intelligent because the police properly advised him of his fifthamendment right not to incriminate himself, including an express
warning that the statement might be used against him; and (2)
that the statement was voluntary because the police did not
elicit it improperly, by means, for example, of intimidation,
coercion, or deception.
We agree with the trial court that
Roberts’s confession and the circumstances surrounding it satisfy
these criteria of admissibility.
Like the respondent in Colorado v. Connelly, supra,
Roberts bases his claim primarily on an alleged breach by Officer
Basehart of her purported duty to inquire into his frame of mind
and to ensure that he was ready and well able to make such an
important decision.
Relying upon Walker v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
561 S.W.2d 656 (1978), and Jones v. Commonwealth, Ky., 560 S.W.2d
810 (1977), Roberts contends that Officer Basehart should have
inquired into such factors as his age, intelligence, linguistic
ability and sanity.
However, Walker and Jones merely note
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certain factors which can be pertinent to the question of whether
a confession was obtained by police misconduct.
The police are
not obliged to investigate those factors where there is no
apparent reason for the inquiry.
The trial court found that Officer Basehart advised
Roberts of his rights to remain silent and to have an attorney,
and she warned him that his statement could be used as evidence
against him.
Indeed, Officer Basehart twice advised Roberts of
his rights, the second time in preparation for taping his
statement when Roberts must have realized that the reason for the
taping was to prepare potential evidence.
Roberts does not
seriously contend that there was any active police misconduct in
this case.
Roberts’s impression that by asserting his right to
counsel he would make himself appear guilty was unfortunate (if
he truly believed that), but there is no suggestion that the
police were the source of this impression.
In short, nothing in
the circumstances of this case suggests that Officer Basehart
overreached Roberts.
Therefore, as found by the trial court, his
confession was constitutionally valid and admissible.
Roberts next complains that the trial court abused its
discretion by denying his motion for a continuance.
That motion
was introduced the day following the denial of his suppression
motion and three (3) days before the scheduled trial date.
Counsel claimed that he and Roberts had been surprised by the
introduction of Roberts’s signed waiver card at the suppression
hearing and so needed additional time to reappraise their
defense.
He also claimed that the adverse ruling on the motion
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to suppress had left Roberts so depressed that he was able
neither to participate in his defense nor to understand the
ramifications of a guilty plea.
This latter claim was not
substantiated by any medical evidence, and it was contradicted by
Roberts’s ordinary demeanor in court and by counsel’s assertion
that the suppression hearing had enabled Roberts to understand
“for the first time” just how serious were the charges and the
evidence against him.
The trial court denied the motion
summarily.
As the Commonwealth notes, RCr 9.04 provides that the
granting of a continuance is in the sound discretion of the trial
court.
In making its decision, the trial court is to consider
such factors as
length of delay; previous continuances;
inconvenience to litigants, witnesses,
counsel and the court; whether the delay is
purposeful or is caused by the accused;
availability of other competent counsel;
complexity of the case; and whether denying
the continuance will lead to identifiable
prejudice.
Snodgrass v. Commonwealth, Ky., 814 S.W.2d 579, 581
(1991)(citation omitted).
Relief is available on appeal from a
ruling on a motion for a continuance only if the trial court
abused its discretion.
335 (1995).
Dishman v. Commonwealth, Ky., 906 S.W.2d
We are not persuaded that the trial court abused its
discretion in this case.
Although Roberts would probably have been satisfied
with a brief postponement, and although the case had not been
unduly delayed prior to this motion, Roberts’s case was not
overly complicated.
Even the allegedly new evidence against him,
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while it did make the Commonwealth’s case somewhat stronger, did
not change the basic issues or make the case less
straightforward.
Indeed, Roberts failed to specify during the
hearing on the motion any new avenues of investigation he needed
to pursue as a result of the “new” evidence.
On appeal he has
suggested no reason to think that had a continuance been granted
he would have chosen to go to trial on 25 counts of first-degree
rape and sodomy, or that the result would otherwise have been
different in any way.
Furthermore, Roberts failed to produce any
evidence to corroborate his claim of extreme emotional distress.
There being no clear evidence of prejudice to Roberts in the
denial of his request for a continuance, the trial court could
give considerable weight to the obvious inconvenience to itself
and the Commonwealth that even a brief delay would entail.
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 953 S.W.2d 924 (1997).
Foley
We conclude,
therefore, that Roberts’s guilty plea is not invalidated by the
trial court’s denial of his ninth-hour request for a continuance.
Having concluded that Roberts’s guilty plea and the
conviction based on it were valid, we turn to the sentencing
phase of the proceedings.
Roberts maintains that he was denied
fundamental fairness and the assistance of counsel during
sentencing.
He insists, in particular, that he was entitled to
the presence of counsel during a court-ordered presentencing
interview with a therapist in the SOTP.
He maintains as well
that he was denied a fair and reasonable opportunity to challenge
the report’s contents because he was not provided with a copy of
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the therapist’s report until the sentencing hearing convened.
We
shall address Roberts’s contentions in the order presented.
Following Roberts’s guilty plea, the trial court
ordered that sentencing be postponed until the Office of
Probation and Parole could prepare a presentence investigation
report (PSI).
Because Roberts had been found guilty of a
qualifying sex offense, his PSI process was required to include
an interview with a therapist from the SOTP.
KRS 532.050(4).
Defense counsel informed the SOTP therapist that Roberts wanted
his attorney to be present at the interview, and apparently
efforts were made to arrange a mutually convenient meeting.
After some delay, however, and the parties’ inability to agree on
a time for the meeting, the therapist met with Roberts alone.
Roberts answered some of the therapist’s questions, but refused
to answer others and repeatedly said that upon counsel’s advice
he would not answer in counsel’s absence.
In due course, the
therapist filed his report with the trial court.
Therein he
mentions, but does not discuss, Roberts’s assertion of his
purported right to counsel and concludes that Roberts’s “lack of
willingness to discuss his behavior” was a significant indication
that Roberts posed a high risk of offending again.
Because of
this asserted risk, the therapist recommended that Roberts not be
probated and that he be sentenced to imprisonment for at least
five (5) years.
Neither Roberts nor his attorney was notified of this
SOTP report (or of the rest of the PSI) until Roberts’s
sentencing hearing was convened.
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A copy of the report was given
to counsel at that time, and counsel immediately moved to
postpone the hearing in order that he and Roberts might have an
opportunity to review it and raise objections.
agreed to a two-hour delay.
The trial court
Thereafter counsel moved again for a
continuance and complained that two (2) hours had been
insufficient for a thorough review and had provided no
opportunity to marshal countervailing evidence.
Counsel also
objected to the SOTP report as violative of Roberts’s
constitutional rights and moved to have it stricken.
Not only
had Roberts been denied his right to the assistance of counsel,
he argued, but the therapist’s report, by misinterpreting
Roberts’s refusal to answer questions, had, in effect, led to the
recommendation that Roberts be punished for asserting that right.
The trial court summarily denied both motions.
On appeal, Roberts maintains, first, that under the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
he was entitled to the presence of counsel at the SOTP interview.
He also maintains that he was denied a reasonable opportunity to
examine and controvert the SOTP report, as was his right under
KRS 532.045 and both the federal and state constitutions.
Finally, he maintains that he was unfairly denied his
constitutional right to confront the therapist who prepared the
SOTP report.
We are not persuaded by Roberts’s unsupported
claims of a right to counsel’s assistance at the SOTP interview
or of a right to confront the therapist at the sentencing
hearing.
As explained below, however, we agree with Roberts that
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he was denied a reasonable opportunity to respond to the PSI
report, including the summary of his SOTP interview.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides in part that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defense.”
This provision has been interpreted as
a guarantee of access to counsel at all post-indictment “critical
stages” of a felony prosecution, United States v. Ash, 413 U.S.
300, 93 S. Ct. 2568, 37 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1973); Kirby v. Illinois,
406 U.S. 682, 92 S. Ct. 1877, 32 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1972), and as
intended to promote the fairness and reliability of criminal
proceedings by ensuring that the accused has assistance in coping
with the procedural demands of the court system and in meeting
the efforts of a professional prosecutor.
The sixth-amendment
right to counsel arises, therefore, if and only if: (1) the
accused is confronted by the procedural system, by a governmental
adversary, or by both, and (2) a subsequent trial or other
proceeding is unlikely to cure “‘a one-sided confrontation
between prosecuting authorities and the uncounseled defendant.’”
United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104, 1118 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(quoting from United States v. Ash, supra).
The right to counsel
has been extended to critical stages of the sentencing phase of
criminal proceedings.
Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S. Ct.
254, 19 L. Ed. 2d 336 (1967).
However, whether a post-
conviction, presentencing interview with a probation officer,
psychologist, or other professional is such a “critical stage”
has not been addressed either by the United States Supreme Court
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or by the appellate courts of Kentucky.
Thus far, the federal
Courts of Appeals have either reserved the constitutional
question or have decided that the right to counsel does not apply
to such presentence interviews.
United States v. Benlian, 63
F.3d 824 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that a presentence interview
with a probation officer is not a critical stage and collecting
cases on the issue); and cf. United States v. Byers, supra,
(holding that the constitutional right to counsel did not apply
to a court-ordered, pre-trial psychiatric examination where the
defendant had previously declared his intention to present an
insanity defense).
As noted by the Court in United States v.
Jackson, 886 F.2d 838, 844 (7th Cir. 1982), “[w]hether a
pre[sentence] interview . . . is a critical stage of criminal
proceedings depends upon the nature of the [interviewer’s] role
in sentence determination.”
Although the above authority is not binding, it
persuades us nevertheless that Roberts did not enjoy a
constitutional right to counsel’s assistance at the presentence
interview with the SOTP therapist.
First, the interview did not
oblige Roberts to make any decisions requiring legal expertise.
Although the sex offender treatment program’s requirement that
participants admit having done “wrong,”
implicates, to some
extent, a defendant’s fifth-amendment privilege against self
incrimination (see Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct.
1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981) (holding that in limited
circumstances the fifth-amendment privilege can apply to
psychiatric interviews); see also
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Turner v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
914 S.W.2d 343 (1996) (discussing the question), Roberts makes no
claim that his interview responses either were or could have been
used to incriminate him.
See Razor v. Commonwealth, Ky. App.,
960 S.W.2d 472 (1997) (upholding this aspect of the sex offender
treatment program and citing Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420,
104 S. Ct. 1136, 79 L. Ed. 2d 409 (1984), which held that states
may, without running afoul of the Fifth Amendment, condition
probation on a convict’s completion of such a program).
He
therefore had no need of counsel’s advice on that question,3 nor
does he advance any other reason to think that counsel’s advice
during the interview was crucial.
Second, the SOTP therapist can not accurately be
characterized as Roberts’s prosecutorial adversary.
Even were we
to adopt a jaundiced view of the Commonwealth’s purported desire
to provide Roberts with therapy and a skeptical view with regard
to its ability to do so, we still would not regard the SOTP
therapist as an agent of the prosecution.
A defendant’s guilt
having been determined, it becomes the duty of the trial court
under KRS 532.050 and KRS 533.010 to impose an appropriate,
individualized sentence.
The trial court must consider
alternatives to imprisonment, if such alternatives are not
foreclosed and are otherwise suggested by the defendant’s
circumstances, and must relate the severity of the punishment to
the seriousness of the offense.
To carry out this duty, the
3
Even if the fifth-amendment right against selfincrimination did apply to this interview, pre-interview access
to counsel, which Roberts enjoyed, is apt to satisfy the related
requirements of the Sixth Amendment. Godfrey v. Kemp, 836 F.2d
1557 (11th Cir. 1988).
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court requires information about the defendant.
To the extent
that such information leads the court to impose a harsher rather
than a more lenient sentence, the information-gathering process
bears a resemblance to the prosecutorial phase of the
proceedings, where the state assumes an accusatorial stance and
attempts to prove the facts necessary either to establish guilt
or to limit the court’s sentencing discretion.
Despite this
potential resemblance to prosecution, the final sentencing of a
defendant is not accusatorial and does not make the court the
defendant’s adversary.
The court’s presentence investigation of
the defendant’s history, character, and circumstances is not
necessarily directed against the defendant, and its aim is not to
establish grounds for punishment or to establish the boundaries
of the court’s sentencing discretion, but to ensure that that
discretion may be exercised responsibly.
Because a probation
officer’s presentence interview with a defendant is in the
service of the court and is not prosecutorial, and because the
officer’s sentencing recommendations are in no way binding on the
court, the federal Courts of Appeals that have addressed the
issue have uniformly held that such a presentence probationofficer interview is not a “critical stage” in the prosecution
and so does not implicate the sixth-amendment right to counsel.
United States v. Benlian, supra.
A presentence therapist or psychologist interview, like
the one to which Roberts objects, is similarly non-prosecutorial.
Unlike the probation-officer interview, moreover, where counsel’s
participation can readily be accommodated, see United States v.
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Herrera-Figueroa, 918 F.2d 1430 (9th Cir. 1990) (announcing a
circuit rule that upon request probation officers must permit
counsel to participate in presentence interviews), a defendant’s
interview with a therapist or psychologist is apt to be rendered
far less meaningful than it might otherwise be if it is carried
out in the atmosphere of opposition or defensiveness counsel’s
presence may create.
Cf. Byers, supra (noting that the candor
required for a meaningful pre-trial psychological exam is likely
to be undermined by the presence of counsel).
The state, of
course, may not abuse this access to an uncounseled defendant,
Estelle, supra, and United States v. Cortes, 922 F.2d 123 (2nd
Cir. 1990), but where, as here, no abuse is alleged, the
defendant’s right to counsel is not violated.
As explained in Byers, supra, an important
consideration in determining whether a particular encounter with
the state constitutes a “critical stage” of a defendant’s
prosecution is a subsequent opportunity to compensate for
counsel’s absence.
Roberts’s assertion of a right to counsel at
the SOTP interview would raise a more difficult question were he
not entitled to counsel’s assistance in reviewing the PSI report
and in making objections to any errors or misrepresentations it
contains.
KRS 532.050(6)4 provides for such assistance:
Before imposing sentence, the court shall
advise the defendant or his counsel of the
factual contents and conclusions of any
presentence investigation or psychiatric
examinations and afford a fair opportunity
and a reasonable period of time, if the
4
Formerly KRS 532.050(5).
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defendant so requests, to controvert them.
The court shall provide the defendant’s
counsel a copy of the presentence
investigation report. It shall not be
necessary to disclose the sources of
confidential information.
Indeed, although the Constitution does not mandate
particular procedures, to protect a defendant’s fundamental right
not to be sentenced on the basis of material misinformation, the
principles of due process do require that the defendant be
accorded a meaningful opportunity “to challenge the accuracy of
presentence reports or other information developed for the
edification of the sentencing judge.”
United States v.
Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1507 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing Roberts v.
United States, 445 U.S. 552, 100 S. Ct. 1358, 63 L. Ed. 2d 622
(1980)).
KRS 532.050(6) is intended to fulfill this
constitutional guarantee of due process (see also KRS 532.045(8)
and RCr 11.02), and as long as that guarantee is fulfilled,
counsel’s participation in presentence interviews is not
constitutionally required.
Byers, supra.
Roberts maintains,
however, that he was denied due process by not receiving adequate
notice of the PSI report, especially of the therapist’s portion
thereof.
He also maintains that he was denied his sixth-
amendment right to confront accusers because he was not allowed
to confront and cross-examine the therapist.
We are not persuaded that Roberts was entitled to
cross-examine the therapist.
Final sentencing need not be fully
trial-like, and in particular the sixth-amendment’s confrontation
guarantee does not extend to sentencing hearings.
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As long as the
defendant is afforded a fair opportunity to present mitigating
information and to challenge alleged inaccuracies in the PSI, the
evidence considered and its manner of presentation is left
largely to the trial court’s discretion.
Williams v. New York,
337 U.S. 241, 69 S. Ct. 1079, 93 L. Ed. 1337 (1949); United
States v. Silverman, supra; United States v. Petitto, 767 F.2d
607 (9th Cir. 1985); KRS 532.050; Edmonson v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
725 S.W.2d 595 (1987).
We agree with Roberts, however, that he was not given
adequate notice of the PSI and SOTP reports to ensure that he had
a meaningful opportunity to review and controvert them.5
fact, Roberts was given no advance notice.
In
As we have already
observed, he was presented with the reports at the commencement
of the sentencing hearing and, upon his request for a continuance
to prepare a response, the trial court postponed sentencing for
5
The dissent distinguishes strictly between the PSI report
and the SOTP report and suggests that the opportunity to review
one is unrelated to the opportunity to review the other. To be
sure, these reports generally are separate, prepared by different
people, and are only two of several different reports that
sometimes contribute to a defendant’s presentence evaluation.
That entire evaluation, however, the PSI in a broad sense,
comprises all the reports written in any given case. Generally,
as happened here, the entire evaluation is given to the defendant
to review at one time. The fact that one component of that
evaluation might, by itself, be reviewed in a short period does
not imply that that component can be as easily reviewed in the
context of the full PSI evaluation. We are persuaded, therefore,
that the dissent’s point, while it may have some bearing on how
adequate review of the various PSI reports could be afforded,
does not address the problem as defendants actually encounter it.
Roberts’s claim that he was afforded an inadequate period to
review the SOTP portion of his PSI simply cannot be understood as
anything but a claim that he was afforded an inadequate period to
review the entire presentencing evaluation.
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only about two (2) hours.
We believe that this brief period was
an inadequate amount of time for meaningful review.
In Kentucky’s criminal justice system, as in the
federal system, PSI and related reports are used
not only in determining the initial sentence,
but also by prison officials in classifying
defendant’s inmate status, and by parole
officers in making parole decisions. . . .
Thus inaccurate statements in the report may
affect the defendant’s sentence, the
conditions of his confinement, and the date
and terms of his parole.
United States v. Petitto, 767 F.2d at 610-11.
Thoroughly
challenged PSI reports, therefore, and well-documented sentencing
proceedings, not only serve defendants’ interest in just
sentences, but also promote administrative efficiency by
increasing the reliability of the final reports and by informing
prison and parole officials of the scope of any inquiry already
made into alleged inaccuracies.
The current federal sentencing
regime requires “that if a defendant alleges any factual
inaccuracy in the presentence report, the court shall make
factual findings regarding the disputed issue or determine that
no factual finding is necessary because the contested information
will not affect the sentence.”
United States v. Johnson, 935
F.2d 47, 50-51 (4th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).
Such written
findings serve two purposes:
[they] protect[] a defendant’s due process
rights by insuring his sentence is based on
accurate information and [they] “provide[] a
clear record of the disposition and
resolution of controverted facts in the
presentence report.” United States v.
Eschweiler, 782 F.2d 1385,1387 (7th Cir.
1986). This latter purpose is intended to
assist “both appellate courts in their review
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of sentencing hearings and administrative
agencies that use the report in their own
decisionmaking procedures.” Id. (footnote
omitted).
United States v. Villasenor, 977 F.2d 331, 338-39 (7th Cir.
1992).
Kentucky’s sentencing rules are not as detailed as the
federal sentencing guidelines.
Neither KRS 532.050 nor RCr
11.02, for example, specifically requires that trial courts enter
written findings regarding disputes over the accuracy of the PSI,
and they do not specify how far in advance of the sentencing
hearing the defendant or his counsel must be informed of the
PSI’s contents.
KRS 532.050(6) requires only that the defendant
be given a “fair opportunity and a reasonable period of time” to
controvert them.
Federal law, on the other hand, currently
requires at least 35 days’ notice.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)(6)(A).
The federal rules, of course, are not binding on our state
courts, but given the constitutional concerns we share with the
federal courts and our similar desire to encourage systemic
efficiency, we find the wide discrepancy between the federal
requirements and the negligible notice provided in this case
disturbing.
We conclude that the “reasonable period of time” to
controvert PSI’s mandated by KRS 532.050, as well as by the Due
Process Clause, requires at the very least that notice be given
before the day of the sentencing hearing.
Here, apparently, neither Roberts nor his counsel had
an opportunity to examine the PSI in advance of the sentencing
hearing.
They were, therefore, entitled, upon request, to have
the hearing postponed.
We do not address here how long the
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minimum “reasonable” review period might be, that question not
having been presented to the trial court.
We hold only that the
two (2) hours provided Roberts was insufficient.
In so holding, we are not unmindful that relief on
appeal, even from a violation of one’s right to due process, is
generally not available absent some judicially recognizable
prejudice, and that such prejudice is a function of the nature of
the right violated and the likelihood of tangible harm to the
defendant as a result of the violation.
United States v.
Coletta, 682 F.2d 828 (1982); RCr 9.24.
In claiming that Roberts
has not been prejudiced, the Commonwealth notes that he was able,
despite the short time allotted for review and consultation with
counsel, to raise several objections to the therapist’s report.
We are persuaded, however, that Roberts has been prejudiced and
is entitled to relief.
First, the interests involved are substantial, both
those of Roberts and those of the Commonwealth, and merit nongrudging protection.
Next, the injury to Roberts, though
procedural at this point rather than substantive, is sufficiently
concrete for judicial acknowledgment.
Roberts was unable even to
read the entire PSI report during the two-hour recess, so
inaccuracies could easily have gone undiscovered, and obviously
he had no opportunity to gather affidavits or other
countervailing evidence to bolster any objections he might have
raised.
See Johnson, supra.
He was thus denied a reasonable
opportunity to object to statements about and possibly against
himself that are apt to bear on the length of his sentence.
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This
is an immediate harm.
The potential for significant future harm,
furthermore, is apparent.
As it stands, the record does not make
clear whether or to what extent Roberts’s assertion of a right to
counsel at his SOTP interview contributed to the therapist’s
conclusion that Roberts posed a serious risk of reoffending.
It
is just this sort of uncertainty that is apt to complicate the
later decisions of prison and parole officials.
Avoiding this
uncertainty at the outset is well worthwhile.
In conclusion, we uphold the trial court’s decisions
denying Roberts’s motions to suppress his confession and to
continue his trial, and therefore affirm Roberts’s plea of guilty
to two counts of third-degree rape.
We also hold that Roberts
has not established a right to the assistance of counsel at his
presentence SOTP interview.
Such an interview is not, per se, a
critical stage of the prosecutorial process and so does not give
rise automatically to a right to counsel.
On the contrary,
presentence interviews are presumptively non-adversarial, being
designed generally only to provide assistance to the trial court
in the exercise of its sentencing discretion.
alleged no facts to overcome that presumption.
Roberts has
We believe,
however, that Roberts was denied a reasonable opportunity to
review and controvert the contents of his PSI and SOTP reports,
as was his right under KRS 532.050(6) and both the state and
federal constitutions.
Although we refrain from attempting to
specify what, at a minimum, a reasonable period for review would
be, we hold that the two-hour recess during the sentencing
hearing in this case was insufficient.
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Accordingly, we vacate
that portion of the Fayette Circuit Court’s May 6, 1997, judgment
sentencing Roberts to ten (10) years in prison and remand for
resentencing pursuant to procedures comporting with this opinion.
EMBERTON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
KNOX, JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART AND
FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
KNOX, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART:
I respectfully dissent only from so much of the majority opinion
as holds the trial court abused its discretion in failing to
afford Roberts a reasonable period of time within which to
controvert the contents of the PSI and SOTP reports.
Principally, Roberts does not appear to have even raised any
issue respecting the period of time afforded to review and
controvert the contents of the PSI report.
Rather, he only
argues that he was not given a reasonable period of time within
which to controvert the contents of the SOTP report.
I agree with the majority that the “fair opportunity”
and “reasonable period of time” language contained in KRS
532.050(6) must be applied in such a fashion as to assure due
process.
However, I do not believe the trial court, in this
instance and under these circumstances, failed to give Roberts a
reasonable period of time in which to controvert the contents of
the SOTP report.
The trial court did grant Roberts a period of
two (2) hours within which to review the six-page SOTP report.
While, under some circumstances, such a period of time might not
be reasonable, I believe under the facts sub judice it was.
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First, Roberts appears not to have fully cooperated with the SOTP
therapist during his interview.
Thus, the therapist’s
recommendations were based, in part, upon Roberts’s refusal to
provide complete information.
Second, as conceded by the
majority, Roberts has failed to articulate what portions of the
SOTP report he would have controverted.
As such, he has failed
to demonstrate in what manner he was prejudiced by the trial
court’s unwillingness to extend any additional time than that
which it did permit.
Under this state of conditions, I do not
believe Roberts has demonstrated that the trial judge committed
an abuse of discretion, as I perceive an adequate time was
extended for review of the six-page SOTP report.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
J. Gregg Clendenin, Jr.
Frankfort, Kentucky
A.B. Chandler III
Attorney General
R. Evelyn Freer
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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