LYDDIA CASEY v. ST. ELIZABETH MEDICAL CENTER
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RENDERED: December 17, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-000993-MR
LYDDIA CASEY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGLAS M. STEPHENS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-000113
ST. ELIZABETH MEDICAL CENTER
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, GARDNER AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
GARDNER, JUDGE:
Lyddia Casey (Casey) appeals from a summary
judgment of the Kenton Circuit Court in her action against Saint
Elizabeth Medical Center, Inc. (SEMC) to recover damages arising
from sexual harassment, retaliation, and disability
discrimination.
We affirm.
Casey was hired by SEMC in 1981, where she served as a
cook and later as a technician in the Supplies, Processing and
Distribution Department (SPD).
In 1986, Casey began working in
the Par Level Department (Par Level) stocking and delivering nonmedical supplies.
In or around 1989, it was determined that SPD
and Par Level were duplicating functions and that efficiency
could be improved if the departments were consolidated.
The
changes were implemented, which required Casey to undertake new
responsibilities in either the decontamination or dispatch units.
On November 4, 1991, Casey filed a written complaint
with SEMC’s Human Resources Department, wherein she set forth
seven instances of sexual harassment which she allegedly
experienced between May 1988 and June 1991.1
The matter was
investigated by Tom Horton (Horton), SEMC’s Vice President for
Human Resources, and Mike Arthur (Arthur), another Vice
President.
On November 20, 1991, they reported to Casey that
action had been taken to correct the alleged problems.
As part of the consolidation of SPD and Par Level,
Casey was required to begin training in November 1993 to work in
the decontamination unit.
Casey complained that working around
blood and other bodily fluids made her physically ill and
exacerbated what she described as a severe stress-related
illness.
Casey submitted a doctor’s statement which she argued
supported her contention that she was unable to work in the
decontamination unit, but SEMC determined that the statement did
not support Casey’s claim.
Casey was given the opportunity to
transfer to the dispatch unit, but stated that she might be late
to work because the early starting time interfered with her child
care arrangements.
1
Casey alleged that: 1) a co-worker put his arm on her
shoulder; 2) a co-worker put a paper towel down a female coworker’s shirt; 3) Playboy magazines were seen in the work area;
4) a male employee had a habit of dropping his pants to tuck in
his shirt; 5) she was called a “Par Level wench” by co-workers;
6) she found a note on her desk on which the pre-printed words
“Picked with Pride” were altered in handwriting to say “F---ed
with Pride,” and 7) her male supervisor told her to “bend over,
I’ll give you a ride,” after she asked for a ride on a cart.
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The parties were unable to resolve the problems
relating to Casey’s work assignments, and her employment was
terminated on December 15, 1993.
She then filed a grievance and
appeal with SEMC, which was denied on January 31, 1994.
On January 23, 1995, Casey filed the instant action in
Kenton Circuit Court.
She alleged therein the following: 1) that
SEMC created a hostile work environment which constituted sexual
harassment under Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 344; 2) that SEMC
retaliated against her for filing a sexual harassment complaint
with SEMC management2; and 3) that she had a disability which
prevented her from working in the decontamination unit and that
SEMC discriminated against her by terminating her.
SEMC then sought a summary judgment.
In granting the
motion, the trial court held that sexual harassment could not be
found because the wrongful conduct as alleged was not severe and
pervasive, and that Casey’s psychological well-being was not
harmed by the conduct.
It further found that much of the alleged
wrongful conduct was not sexual in nature.
As to the claim of
retaliation, the court found that no adverse action had been
taken against Casey and that there was no causal link between the
November 4, 1991 complaint to SEMC and the alleged retaliation.
Finally, the court found that Casey had not presented any medical
evidence to SEMC prior to her discharge from employment which
supported her claim of disability, and that a medical report
2
Fifteen instances of retaliatory conduct have been alleged,
ranging from an instance where Casey was given a verbal reprimand
for overstocking a closet to the failure of a supervisor to
remain at work after having ordered Casey to work overtime.
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obtained after her termination was not unequivocal.
SEMC’s
motion for summary judgment was granted, and this appeal
followed.
Casey first argues that the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment on the issue of sexual harassment/
hostile work environment.
She maintains that the court erred in
failing to consider the alleged acts of retaliation as part of
its sexual harassment/hostile work environment claim and the
retaliatory conduct claim are actually a single cause of action
which should have been treated as such. Having closely examined
the facts and the law, as well as the written and oral arguments
of counsel, we find no error on this issue.3
KRS Chapter 344 clearly addresses sexual harassment
claims and retaliatory conduct claims as separate causes of
action.
“Suits for sexual harassment in the workplace may be
brought under KRS 344.040.
This statute prohibits discrimination
‘against an individual with respect to compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of the
3
SEMC argues that we should apply the standard for summary
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 56, rather
than the less stringent standard set forth in Steelvest, Inc. v.
Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476 (1991). It
maintains that since Kentucky law in employment discrimination
cases mirror Title VII, and because Kentucky law is to be
interpreted in accordance with federal interpretation of Title
VII, we should apply the federal summary judgment standard rather
than the state summary judgment standard. We are award of no
basis in law for reaching the conclusion argued by SEMC. KRS
Chapter 344 was enacted by the Kentucky legislature, and actions
arising thereunder are addressed in Kentucky courts and under
Kentucky law. Steelvest, is binding precedent which we are
compelled to follow, and we will not take this opportunity to
disregard that mandate nor to apply extra-jurisdictional
standards found neither in Kentucky law nor in Kentucky civil
rules.
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individual’s . . . sex. . . .”
Hall v. Transit Authority of
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, Ky. App., 883 S.W.2d
886 (1994).
Conversely, KRS 344.280 provides the basis for a
retaliatory conduct claim, stating in relevant part that,
It shall be an unlawful practice for a person
. . . (1) To retaliate or discriminate in any
manner against a person because he has
opposed a practice declared unlawful by this
chapter, or because he has made a charge,
filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in any
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under
this chapter. . . .
KRS 344.450 provides that any person injured by an action in
violation of Chapter 344 may institute a civil cause of action to
recover actual damages sustained.
Thus, retaliatory conduct is a
separate and distinct claim from sexual harassment.
We cannot conclude that the trial court erred in its
disposition of either claim.
On the claim of sexual harassment,
the court properly examined whether the alleged conduct was
severe or pervasive, and whether Casey’s psychological well-being
was harmed by the conduct.
The United States Supreme Court has
addressed this standard in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510
U.S. 17, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993)4 stating that,
Conduct that is not severe or pervasive
enough to create an objectively hostile or
abusive work environment--an environment that
a reasonable person would find hostile or
abusive--is beyond Title VII’s purview.
Likewise, if the victim does not subjectively
perceive the environment to be abusive, the
4
Since Kentucky’s statute is similar to the federal statute,
the Kentucky Supreme Court, in Meyers v. Chapman Printing Co.,
Inc., Ky., 840 S.W.2d 814 (1992), held that KRS 344.040 “should
be interpreted consonant with federal interpretation.” Id., at
821.
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conduct has not actually altered the
conditions of the victim’s employment, and
there in no Title VII violation.
What precisely constitutes severe or pervasive conduct has been
addressed, for example, in Stacy v. Shoney’s Incorporated, 955 F.
Supp. 751 (E.D. Ky. 1997), wherein the court stated as follows:
The concept of sexual harassment is
designed to protect working women
from the kind of male attentions
that can make the workplace hellish
for women. . . . It is not
designed to purge the workplace of
vulgarity. Drawing the line is not
always easy. On the one side lie
sexual assaults; other physical
contact, whether amorous or
hostile, for which there is no
consent express or implied;
uninvited sexual solicitations;
intimidating words or acts; obscene
language or gestures; pornographic
pictures. On the other side lies
the occasional vulgar banter,
tinged with sexual innuendo, of
coarse or boorish workers.
Baskerville v. Culligan International Co., 50
F.3d 428, 430-431 (7th Cir. 1995), (citations
omitted).
In determining whether or not the
harassing conduct is ‘sufficiently severe or
pervasive’ to constitute actionable sexual
harassment, the court considered the
following factors:
(1) the frequency of the discriminatory
conduct;
(2) its severity;
(3) whether it is physically threatening
or humiliation, or a mere offensive
utterance; and
(4) whether it unreasonably interferes
with an employee’s work performance.
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. at
22-24, 114 S.Ct. at 371. The Court finds
that the conduct of [the defendant], while
immature, inappropriate, and boorish, does
not constitute offensive conduct actionable
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as harassment, especially in light of the
alleged actions of harassers sued in the
cases cited below, which various courts found
did not give rise to a claim of hostile
environment sexual harassment. See, e.g.,
Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611
(6th Cir. 1986) (Sixth Circuit did not find
actionable sexual harassment where (1) male
supervisor referred to a female manager as
‘whore,’ ‘cunt,’ ‘pussy,’ and ‘tits’ and
stated ‘all that bitch needs is a good lay,’
and (2) the Company forced her to sit with
female hourly employees during meetings,
forbid her taking clients to lunch, and
tolerated posters of scantily clad women in
work areas), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041, 107
S.Ct. 1983, 95 L.Ed.2d 823 (1987);
Baskerville v. Culligan Intern. Co., 50 F.3d
428 (7th Cir. 1995) (held the following did
not constitute sexual harassment: supervisor
called the plaintiff ‘pretty girl’, made
grunting sounds like ‘um-um’ when plaintiff
wore a leather skirt, stated ‘all pretty
girls run around naked’, and stated that
‘with so many pretty girls’, he ‘didn’t want
to lose control’), cited by Black v. Zering
Homes, Inc., 104 F.3d 822 (6th Cir. 1995)
(held comments directed to the plaintiff
including, ‘Nothing I like more in the
morning than sticky buns’, and “Hey weren’t
you there [at the biker bar] Saturday night
dancing on the tables?’, and references to
property parcels as ‘Hootersville’ and ‘Twin
Peaks’, did not give rise to a sexual
harassment claim); Koelsch v. Beltone Elec.
Co., 46 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 1995) (held
supervisor who stroked plaintiff’s leg on one
occasion, grabbed her buttocks on a separate
occasion, told her that he found her
attractive, and twice asked her out on dates,
did not commit acts which were actionable);.
. . .
Examining the facts at bar under the elements set forth
in Stacy and in light of the cited cases where boorish behavior
was found not to constitute sexual harassment, we find no basis
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for tampering with the trial court’s conclusion that Casey could
not prevail on this issue.5
Similarly, the facts as alleged by Casey, if taken as
true, do not rise to the level of retaliatory conduct necessary
to sustain a claim under Chapter 344.
As the trial court noted,
the retaliatory conduct must relate to “ultimate employment
decision.”
The United States 5th Circuit Court of Appeals has
stated as follows on this question.
Consistent with the retaliation
instruction, our court has stated that ‘Title
VII was designed to address ultimate
employment decisions, not to address every
decision made by employers that arguably
might have some tangential effect upon those
ultimate decisions.’ Dollis v. Rubin, 77
F.3d 777, 781-82 (5th Cir. 1995). ‘Ultimate
employment decisions’ include acts ‘such as
hiring, granting leave, discharging,
promoting, and compensating’. Id. at 782
(citing Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227, 233
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 892, 102
S.Ct. 388, 70 L.Ed.2d 206 (1981)).
Matthern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997).
The acts which Casey maintained were retaliatory simply
do not relate to ultimate employment decisions.
She does not
allege that her employment was terminated in retaliation for
filing the November 4, 1991 complaint.
Rather, she maintained
that fifteen separate harassing acts occurred as a result of the
filing of the complaint, and that those acts should be considered
along with the seven acts set forth in the complaint as part of
her overall claim of sexual harassment.
5
When viewed in their
Casey conceded at oral argument that sufficient evidence
did not exist on the sexual harassment claim to present the issue
to the jury.
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totality, and in light of Matthern’s requirement that they relate
to ultimate employment decisions, we cannot conclude that the
court erred in granting summary judgment on this issue.
See
generally Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky.,
807 S.W.2d 476 (1991).
Casey also briefly argues that the trial court erred in
concluding that the medical report of Dr. Bernales was not
unequivocal in its assessment of Casey’s alleged stress-related
illness and inability to work in the decontamination unit.
She
maintains that the report states in clear and unambiguous
language that she “would be adversely affected in her ability to
carry out job related activities,” and that accordingly her
termination on the basis of this disability ran afoul of KRS
Chapter 344.
This argument is misplaced in that the report of
Dr. Bernales was submitted several weeks after Case’s
termination.
It is uncontroverted that no medical evidence was
tendered to SEMC prior to Casey’s termination which supported
Casey’s claims of stress-related illness or an inability to work
in the decontamination unit.
KRS 344.040 provides that it is
unlawful to discharge an employee if the employee is a “qualified
individual with a disability. . . .”
See generally Blanton v.
Inco Alloys International, Inc., 108 F.3d 104 (6th Cir. 1997).
As Casey was not shown to be disabled, it follows that she could
not have been discharged as a result of disability.
Accordingly,
we find no error.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the summary
judgment of the Kenton Circuit Court.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Stephen T. McMurtry
Covington, Kentucky
Mark D. Guilfoyle
Covington, Kentucky
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