JOSEPHINE HUDSON, Administratrix of the Estate of Christopher Lee Pettit V. FRANKLIN COUNTY, KENTUCKY; FRANKLIN COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT; TED COLLINS, in his official capacity as Franklin County Sheriff; JOE THORNSBERRY, individually and in his official capacity as a Franklin County Deputy Sheriff; CITY OF FRANKFORT, KENTUCKY; FRANKFORT POLICE DEPARTMENT; TED EVANS, in his official capacity as Chief of the Frankfort Police Department; DALE ROBERTS, individually and in his official capacity with the Frankfort Police Department; PAUL REED; and TRENA REED
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January 22, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 1997-CA-000636-MR
JOSEPHINE HUDSON, Administratrix
of the Estate of Christopher Lee
Pettit
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROGER CRITTENDEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-000810
FRANKLIN COUNTY, KENTUCKY; FRANKLIN
COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT; TED
COLLINS, in his official capacity as
Franklin County Sheriff; JOE THORNSBERRY,
individually and in his official capacity
as a Franklin County Deputy Sheriff;
CITY OF FRANKFORT, KENTUCKY;
FRANKFORT POLICE DEPARTMENT;
TED EVANS, in his official capacity
as Chief of the Frankfort Police
Department; DALE ROBERTS, individually
and in his official capacity with the
Frankfort Police Department; PAUL REED;
and TRENA REED
AND
NO. 1997-CA-000697-MR
JOE THORNSBERRY, in his individual
and official capacities; TED COLLINS,
in his official capacity; FRANKLIN
COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; and
FRANKLIN COUNTY, KENTUCKY
v.
APPELLEES
CROSS-APPELLANTS
CROSS-APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROGER CRITTENDEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-000810
JOSEPHINE HUDSON, Administratrix
of the Estate of Christopher Lee
Pettit
CROSS-APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, JOHNSON, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
This is an appeal and a protective cross-appeal
from a summary judgment entered in favor of county and city
police officials in a wrongful death action alleging that the
police failed to warn or protect the decedent, who was an
informant who was later murdered by the person he implicated,
after the informant's identity was revealed.
Upon consideration
of appellant's arguments in light of the record herein and the
applicable law, we vacate and remand for further proceedings.
In September 1992, Franklin County Deputy Sheriff Joe
Thornsberry ("Thornsberry") and Frankfort Police Officer Dale
Roberts ("Roberts") were separately receiving information
concerning theft/burglary crimes in the Franklin County area.
Thornsberry and Roberts subsequently commenced a joint
investigation of those crimes.
On September 25, 1992, Thornsberry and Roberts
interviewed Christopher Pettit ("Pettit") at the City of
Frankfort Police Station regarding the crimes in question.
Pettit, who was seventeen years old at the time, voluntarily came
to the station and agreed to the interview.
The evidence was in
dispute as to whether Pettit was advised of his rights before
being questioned.
During the interview, Pettit provided detailed
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information implicating Paul Reed and his wife, Trena Reed, in
the series of thefts.
Pettit also admitted his involvement with
the Reeds in some of the crimes.
The deposition of Jonathan Cox
("Cox") estimated that Pettit was involved in approximately 250
burglaries with Paul Reed and Cox.
Roberts and Thornsberry
promised Pettit that in exchange for his testimony against Paul
Reed, no criminal charges would be brought against him.
During the interview, Pettit told the officers that he
was afraid of Paul Reed.
He apprised them of an incident in
which Paul Reed had threatened him with a gun and recounted
another incident in which Reed had actually shot at Pettit,
blowing a hole in his sweater.
Roberts used the information provided by Pettit to
obtain a search warrant for the Reed residence.
During the
search of Reed's residence, stolen property was found.
On October 20, 1992, Thornsberry filed a criminal
complaint against Paul Reed on a felony charge in connection with
a stolen truck.
The felony charge was subsequently dismissed, at
Roberts' and Thornsberry's request, when it became evident that
the name of the confidential informant (Pettit) would have to be
released to Reed's attorney during the preliminary hearing.
Electing not to reveal the identity of the informant,
Commonwealth Attorney Burton dismissed the charges against Paul
Reed, and decided to proceed directly by grand jury indictment.
In December 1992, Deputy Thornsberry testified before a
Franklin County grand jury regarding the crimes associated with
the theft of the truck.
On December 16, 1992, the grand jury
returned indictment nos. 92-CR-00199-1, 2, and 3 against Paul
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Reed, Trena Reed and Donald Bryant.
All three defendants were
represented by Frankfort attorney Max Smith.
On February 1, 1993, Attorney Smith filed a discovery
motion on behalf of the defendants.
The motion requested, inter
alia, disclosure of the names of informants, any agreements
reached between authorities and informants, and witness
statements.
On February 8, 1993, the Franklin Circuit Court
sustained Smith's motion and ordered Burton to provide the
requested information by February 28, 1993.
trial on June 14, 1993.
The case was set for
According to Commonwealth Attorney
Burton's deposition testimony, Pettit was slated to be a
significant witness at trial against the Reeds and Donald Bryant.
On June 8, 1993, Attorney Burton met with Thornsberry
and Roberts at Burton's office concerning the Reed case to
discuss the discovery documents that would be provided to
Attorney Smith.
Up until that time, Burton withheld the
investigative file containing Pettit's statement from defense
counsel.
At the meeting, Thornsberry, Roberts and Burton
discussed turning over Pettit's statement and there was a concern
that such disclosure raised a safety issue for Pettit.
Burton
testified that "[w]e had a conversation on that date [June 8th]
concerning notification of Chris Pettit and Steve Stosberg."
Burton then instructed Roberts and Thornsberry to locate Pettit
and bring him in so that Burton could prepare him for his trial
testimony against the Reeds.
Burton filed the entire investigative file, including
Pettit's statement, in the court record on June 8, 1993.
He
delivered a copy of the documents to Attorney Smith that same
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day.
Attorney Smith had the file delivered to the Reed residence
on June 8, 1993.
Upon receipt of the file, Trena Reed stated,
"[h]ere's the rat" referring to Pettit's statement.
Deposition testimony of several witnesses established
that on June 8, 1993, Paul and Trena Reed conspired to murder
Pettit for acting as an informant and to prevent him from
testifying against them at their upcoming criminal trial.
On
June 9, 1993, one day before Pettit's murder, James Reed, then
acting as a confidential informant for Frankfort Police
Department Detective Terry Harrod, called the Frankfort Police
Department and advised them that Paul Reed was planning to hurt
Pettit.
It is undisputed that no one from the Frankfort Police
Department ("FPD"), the Franklin County Sheriff's Office
("FCSO"), or the Franklin County Commonwealth Attorney's Office
ever notified or warned Pettit that his identity had been
disclosed to the Reeds as the informant against them.
Nor was
Pettit ever brought into Commonwealth Attorney Burton's office in
preparation for trial.
In late February or March 1993, Pettit left Frankfort
to stay with his relatives in Ohio.
He did not return to
Frankfort until approximately June 6, 1993.
Between June 6, 1993
and the date of his death, Pettit was staying at Oscar Maggart's
house.
According to the deposition testimony of Jonathan Cox,
in the early morning hours of June 10, 1993, Paul Reed and
Jonathan Cox picked up Pettit at Oscar Maggart's house under the
pretext of taking him to Ohio to spend some money.
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At some
point, after arriving in Ohio, Paul Reed instructed Pettit to
pull off the road as he wanted to show Pettit a house nearby that
could be burglarized.
Pettit exited the vehicle and began
walking with his back to Reed and the vehicle.
Paul Reed then
took a .22 caliber pistol and shot Pettit three (3) times.
Pettit then began running away, screaming as he ran.
Paul Reed
then followed Pettit and shot him five (5) more times.
used a knife to cut Pettit's throat.
Cox then
Pettit died that day from
multiple gunshot wounds to the head and stab wounds to the neck.
Subsequently, Paul Reed pled guilty to aggravated murder in Ohio.
He was sentenced to life in prison with parole eligibility after
twenty (20) years.
On June 9, 1995, appellant, the estate of Chris Pettit,
filed an action in the Franklin Circuit Court against the
following defendants:
the City of Frankfort; Franklin County;
the Franklin County Sheriff's Office; the Frankfort Police
Department; Ted Evans, in his official capacity as Chief of the
Frankfort Police Department; Dale Roberts, individually, and in
his official capacity as an officer of the Frankfort Police
Department; and Joe Thornsberry, individually, and in his
official capacity as a Franklin County Deputy Sheriff.
The
complaint alleged several causes of action related to the
disclosure of Pettit's identity and the failure of the various
police authorities to inform him of said disclosure and protect
him from any harm resulting from his cooperation with them as an
informant.
The causes of action alleged against the various
police authorities were based on common law negligence;
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negligence per se; violation of a statutory duty; negligent
supervision; and the tort of outrageous conduct.
After extensive discovery, the defendants moved for
summary judgment.
The court granted the motion, ruling that the
defendants owed no duty to Pettit under the "special
relationship" test enunciated in Fryman v. Harrison, Ky., 896
S.W.2d 908 (1995).
The court further ruled that Thornsberry
could not be held liable to appellant because he had resigned his
position as a Deputy Sheriff in March of 1993, some three months
before the disclosure of Pettit's identity.
the estate of Chris Pettit now appeals.
From that judgment,
Appellees, Franklin
County, Franklin County Sheriff's Department, Joe Thornsberry,
and Ted Collins filed a protective cross-appeal regarding the
constitutionality of KRS 421.500(4) and the failure to join
indispensable parties.
We shall first address appellant's argument that
appellees owed a common law duty to warn and/or protect Pettit.
Appellant maintains that when law enforcement officers use a
juvenile as an informant/witness in a criminal investigation,
there arises a reciprocal duty to protect and/or warn the
informant/witness when he has been placed in a position of
danger.
As support for this argument, appellant cites the
"universal duty to all" principle established in Grayson
Fraternal Order of Eagles, Aerie No. 3738, Inc. v. Claywell, Ky.,
736 S.W.2d 328 (1987).
Recently, the holding in Grayson was
narrowed by Commonwealth of Kentucky, Corrections Cabinet v.
Vester, Ky., 956 S.W.2d 204 (1997).
The Vester Court stated that
notwithstanding the "universal duty of care" principle enunciated
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in Grayson, "[p]ublic officials in an individual capacity or
otherwise, cannot be expected to protect every individual whether
known to them or not from any possible harm by third parties."
Vester, 956 S.W.2d at 206, citing Fryman v. Harrison, Ky., 896
S.W.2d 908, 909-910.
In Vester, three prisoners who escaped from the
Kentucky State Penitentiary in Eddyville, traveled to Tennessee,
some 50 miles from the prison, where they brutally murdered two
people.
The Administrators of the estates filed an action in the
Board of Claims, asserting that the negligence of the Corrections
Cabinet in allowing the perpetrators to escape from custody
caused the deaths of the victims.
The Vester Court further
quoted from Fryman:
To establish a negligence claim against a public official, the
complaint must allege a violation of a special duty owed to a
specific identifiable person, and not merely the breach of a
general duty owed to the public at large.
Vester, 956 S.W.2d at 206, quoting Fryman, 896 S.W.2d at 910.
The Court in Vester held that although the Corrections Cabinet
had a duty to prevent the escape of the inmates from the
penitentiary, it did not owe a duty to the victims to prevent
them from the harm caused by the escapees because they were not
readily identifiable as persons likely to be injured as a result
of the escape, nor did a "special relationship" exist between
them and the Cabinet.
As to what constitutes a "special
relationship" between a victim and a public official, the Vester
Court recognized that Fryman adopted the following test first
enunciated in Ashby v. City of Louisville, Ky. App., 841 S.W.2d
184 (1992):
-8-
a "special relationship" exists only when the
victim is in state custody or is otherwise
restrained by the state at the time in
question.
Vester, 956 S.W.2d at 206, citing Ashby, 841 S.W.2d at 190.
Upon reading Ashby and Fryman, we see that the "special
relationship" test is actually a two-prong test:
It must be demonstrated that "the victim was in state custody or
was otherwise restrained by the state at the time in question,
and that the violence or other offensive conduct was perpetrated
by a state actor."
Fryman, 896 S.W.2d at 910, quoting Ashby, 841 S.W.2d at 190.
In Fryman, the issue was whether a county jailer and
circuit clerk could be held liable when an inmate who was
mistakenly released assaulted the plaintiff.
The Court stated
that in the analysis of legal duty, "the major issue is the
question of foreseeability."
Fryman, 896 S.W.2d at 909.
The
Court found that injuries were not foreseeable and the victim was
not identifiable.
The Court then went on to apply the two-prong
"special relationship" test and found that said test had not been
met since the victim was never in state custody and the offender
was not a state actor.
In Ashby, a victim of domestic violence was murdered
when the police failed to arrest the defendant pursuant to a
court order mandating that the defendant be arrested for
violation of an emergency protective order relating to the
victim.
The Court stated:
[T]he general rule of thumb, in the absence of some "special
relationship," is that a municipality or a law enforcement agency
or official does not owe individual citizens a duty to protect
them from crime. Thus, courts generally will not consider the
"reasonableness" of actions taken to protect individual citizens
from crime.
-9-
Ashby, 841 S.W.2d at 189.
The Court then applied the two-prong
"special relationship" test and concluded that no duty was owed
to the victim.
Appellant contends that Ashby should be distinguished
from the instant case because Ashby involved claims arising under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, thus, the "special relationship" test was
articulated in the context of constitutional, as opposed to
common law, duties.
Upon reviewing Ashby, we see that the
plaintiff alleged a breach of the common law duty of care in
failing to protect the victim, as well as a breach of
constitutional duties under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Moreover, the
Court in Fryman specifically held that the requirement of a
"special relationship" between the victim and the public
official(s) "relates not only to actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, but to an ordinary tort case such as this one."
Fryman
at 910.
Appellant also asks that we distinguish Fryman and
Ashby because neither case involved a juvenile victim.
We would
note that Pettit was eighteen years of age at the time of his
murder, although he was seventeen years old in September 1992,
when he gave his statement to the police.
In any event, there is
no authority for making an exception to the "special
relationship" test where the victim was a juvenile informant.
In the case at bar, while the victim (Pettit) was
identifiable and there was evidence that the injury was
foreseeable, there was nevertheless no "special relationship"
between Pettit and the various police authorities pursuant to
strict constraints of the above-stated two-prong test.
-10-
Pettit
was not in state custody or otherwise restrained by the
authorities, nor was the offender a state actor.
Accordingly,
there was no duty of common law to warn or protect Pettit.
The next argument before us is that Officers Roberts
and Thornsberry had a statutory duty to warn Pettit of the
disclosure of his identity.
The statute which appellant
maintains created the duty is KRS 421.500(4) which provides as
follows:
Law enforcement officers and attorneys for the Commonwealth shall
provide information to victims and witnesses on how they may be
protected from intimidation, harassment, and retaliation as
defined in KRS 524.040, 524.045 and 524.055.
Appellees, Thornsberry, Ted Collins, the Franklin
County Sheriff's Department, and Franklin County, argue on crossappeal that KRS 421.500(4) is void because it is
unconstitutionally vague.
Appellees, Ted Evans, Dale Roberts,
City of Frankfort, and the Frankfort Police Department, likewise
argue that KRS 421.500(4) is void for vagueness.
In addition,
they argue that the statute does not apply to them because they
are or were employed by a municipality, not the Commonwealth.
A statute is impermissibly vague when it either forbids
or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague or indefinite
that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application.
Raines v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 731 S.W.2d 3 (1987).
In deciding whether
an act of the General Assembly is unconstitutional, there is a
presumption in favor of constitutionality.
Co. v. Holmes, Ky., 872 S.W.2d 446 (1994).
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Kentucky Harlan Coal
In reading KRS 421.500(4) in terms of the facts in the
present case, we cannot say that the statute is so vague or
indefinite that it cannot be determined what the legislature
intended by the statute.
As to the terms "victims" and
"witnesses," we believe those individuals would be clearly
identifiable by the law enforcement officers and attorneys for
the Commonwealth involved in the case.
Further, there is a
definition for "victim" set out in KRS 421.500(1).
As to the
term "law enforcement officer," the definition in KRS 15.310(3)
specifically includes city and county police officers:
"Law enforcement officer" means a member of a
lawfully organized police unit or police
force of county, city or metropolitan
government who is responsible for the
detection of crime and the enforcement of the
general criminal laws of the state, as well
as sheriffs, sworn deputy sheriffs, campus
security officers, law enforcement support
personnel, public airport authority security
officers, other public and federal peace
officers responsible for law enforcement, and
special local peace officers licensed
pursuant to KRS 61.360.
Further, the term "attorneys for the Commonwealth" would clearly
apply to Attorney Burton, as he was the Commonwealth Attorney for
Franklin County who was involved in the case.
Regarding what "information" is required to be provided
to victims and witnesses under the statute, the statute specifies
that it is information "on how they may be protected from
intimidation, harassment, and retaliation as defined in KRS
524.040, 524.045, and 524.055."
While no further guidance was
provided in the statute as to what constitutes "information," we
do not believe the statute is thereby impermissibly vague since
information as to how a particular victim or witness may be so
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protected would necessarily differ as to each victim and witness
depending on the known facts of each case.
In our view, in order
to serve its purpose (crime victim and witness protection), the
language of the statute could not be more specific.
Thus, in
some cases, ascertaining the duty owed under the statute
according to the facts may not be so clear.
However, in the
instant case, we believe that the police officials and the
Commonwealth Attorney had a minimum duty under the statute to
inform Pettit that his identity was being revealed to the Reeds
so that he could take measures to protect himself.
There was evidence that Officers Thornsberry and
Roberts knew Pettit was afraid of Reed and that Reed had once
shot at Pettit.
There was also evidence that the FPD was
informed that Reed was planning to hurt Pettit.
Finally,
Commonwealth Attorney Burton's deposition testimony established
that he, Thornsberry, and Roberts discussed their concern
regarding Pettit's safety in the event his identity was revealed.
They also discussed notifying Pettit.
However, Pettit was never
notified that his identity was being revealed.
Although there
was some evidence that Officer Thornsberry told Pettit to stay
away from Reed during the September 1992 interview, we do not
feel that absolved the police officials and the Commonwealth
Attorney of their duty to inform Pettit that his identity was
being revealed.
The next issue before us is the defense of sovereign
immunity asserted by Franklin County, FCSD, Ted Collins, and Joe
Thornsberry.
It is well settled that a county is a political
subdivision of the state and, as such, is entitled to the
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protective cloak of sovereign immunity from tort liability.
Upchurch v. Clinton County, Ky., 330 S.W.2d 3228 (1960).
Sovereign immunity can only be waived by express act of the
legislature.
340 (1997).
Withers v. University of Kentucky, Ky., 939 S.W.2d
Thus, Franklin County is immune from the suit.
As to Sheriff Ted Collins and the FCSD, KRS 70.040
provides:
The sheriff shall be liable for the acts or
omissions of his deputies; except that, the
office of sheriff, and not the individual
holder thereof, shall be liable under this
section. When a deputy sheriff omits to act
or acts in such a way as to render his
principal responsible, and the latter
discharges such responsibility, the deputy
shall be liable to the principal for all
damages and costs which are caused by the
deputy's act or omission.
The above stated statute appears to us to be an express waiver of
sovereign immunity.
Thus, the sheriff and the FCSD are not
immune from suit.
Joe Thornsberry, who was sued individually and in his
official capacity as a Franklin County Deputy Sheriff, is immune
from suit in his official capacity.
As to personal liability, it
has been held that "individuals cannot avoid personal liability
for tortious misconduct by cloaking themselves in sovereign
immunity."
Calvert Investments, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson
County Metropolitan Sewer District, Ky., 805 S.W.2d 133, 139
(1991).
Personal liability for a public officer's negligence
depends on whether the duties he was performing were ministerial
or discretionary in nature.
S.W.2d 488 (1977).
Thompson v. Huecker, Ky. App., 559
In our view, the duty that was to have been
performed under KRS 421.500(4) was ministerial in nature since
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the language of the statute is mandatory, not permissive, and
there is little room for discretion under the statute.
Accordingly, the defense of sovereign immunity was not available
to Thornsberry.
Thornsberry also contends he could not be held liable
for Pettit's murder because he resigned as a deputy on March 8,
1993, some three months prior to Pettit's murder.
In Sudderth v.
White, Ky. App., 621 S.W.2d 33 (1981), it was held that a deputy
jailer who went off-duty some hours before a detainee's suicide
could not be held liable for his negligence while on duty because
the deputy's responsibility ended when he went off-duty.
In the
present case, there was evidence that Thornsberry continued to
assist the police and the Commonwealth Attorney in the
prosecution of the case after he resigned.
Nonetheless, under
the reasoning of Sudderth, he would not owe a duty to Pettit
because he had no legal responsibility for Pettit after he
resigned.
The FCSD, however, would still have been responsible
for the case after Thornsberry resigned.
Finally, appellees argue on cross-appeal that the trial
court erred in failing to join indispensable parties under CR
19.01.
One of the persons appellees maintain should have been
joined was Commonwealth Attorney Max Burton.
We agree that
Burton was an indispensable party since it was he who actually
disclosed Pettit's identity and given the duty imposed on him by
KRS 421.500(4).
However, in his official capacity, he would be
shielded from liability on grounds of sovereign immunity as he
was employed by the state.
As to the other persons that
-15-
appellees sought to join, we do not deem them to be indispensable
parties under CR 19.01.
Summary judgment can only be used to terminate
litigation when, as a matter of law, it appears that it would be
impossible for the respondent to produce evidence at the trial
warranting a judgment in his favor and against the movant.
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807
S.W.2d 476 (1991).
There are many issues of fact that are yet to
be resolved in this case before liability can be imposed, and we
believe the trial court erred in entering summary judgment as a
matter of law on the basis of a lack of duty owed to Pettit.
Therefore, we vacate the judgment as to all appellees except
Thornsberry and Franklin County (not including the Franklin
County Sheriff’s Department) and remand for further proceedings.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, CONCURS.
JOHNSON, JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART, DISSENTS IN PART AND
FILES A SEPARATE OPINION.
JOHNSON, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN
PART.
I concur in part and respectfully dissent in part.
I
concur as to the holding on the cross-appeal that KRS 421.500(4)
is not unconstitutional.
I dissent on the cross-appeal as to the
trial court’s failure to join indispensable parties.
I believe
that allegations were properly pled against all of these parties
and that they were required to be joined as defendants.
As to the direct appeal, I would vacate the summary
judgment against all the appellees and remand for further
proceedings on the complaint.
I believe the case sub judice is
distinguishable from Vester, Fryman and Ashby based on Hudson’s
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claim of common law negligence and the fact that Pettit was a
foreseeable victim.
I do not believe that sovereign immunity is
available as a defense to any of the parties under Withers
because I believe KRS 421.500(4) and KRS 70.040 constitute
waivers of sovereign immunity.
This case presents an excellent
opportunity for the Supreme Court to clarify its previous
holdings in Vester, Fryman, Ashby and Winthers.
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BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEES: CITY OF FRANKFORT,
TED EVANS, FRANKFORT POLICE
DEPARTMENT AND DALE ROBERTS:
Thomas C. Lyons
Covington, Kentucky
J. Michael Brown
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS:
JOE THORNSBERRY, TED COLLINS,
FRANKLIN COUNTY SHERIFF'S
DEPARTMENT, AND FRANKLIN
COUNTY, KENTUCKY
C. Thomas Hectus
Louisville, Kentucky
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