ROGER ANTHONY BROWN V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: April 16, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NOS.
1997-CA-000322-MR AND 1997-CA-001147-MR
ROGER ANTHONY BROWN
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GEOFFREY P. MORRIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 90-CR-967
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, Chief Judge; COMBS and GARDNER, Judges.
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE:
These appeals stem from orders entered by
the Jefferson Circuit Court denying appellant’s CR 60.03 motion
and amended motion.
The issue is whether the circuit court
abused its discretion by denying the motions.
There being no
abuse of discretion, we affirm.
In May 1990, appellant was indicted for assault in the
first degree, possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, and
as a persistent felony offender in the first degree (PFO 1).
In
June 1992 appellant entered a guilty plea pursuant to North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162
(1970), to an amended charge of assault under extreme emotional
disturbance and to the charges of possession of a handgun by a
convicted felon and PFO 1.
On July 22, 1992, appellant was
sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment.
On October 8, 1993, appellant filed a pro se CR
60.02(f) motion in which he alleged that the PFO 1 indictment was
void due to its failure to recite the essential elements of the
offense and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
Counsel was appointed and filed a supplemental memorandum in
which it was alleged that trial counsel was ineffective due to
her failure to investigate the case, to raise any issue as to his
mental competency, and to object to the composition of the grand
jury.
On January 30, 1995, the court denied the motion.
On appeal, a panel of this court affirmed the trial
court’s order.
Citing Gross v. Commonwealth, Ky., 648 S.W.2d 853
(1983), the panel noted that the “issues raised in appellant’s CR
60.02 motion in this case could have and should have been raised
in an RCr 11.42 motion.
Nevertheless, we shall address them and
our opinion shall be considered dispositive of any further RCr
11.42 claims.”
The panel then held that appellant did not
receive ineffective assistance because counsel raised the issue
of appellant’s competency and obtained an order for a psychiatric
evaluation.
Further, the panel also concluded that counsel was
not ineffective by failing to advise him as to the alleged
improper composition of the grand jury which indicted him.
On
August 27, 1997, the supreme court denied appellant’s motion for
discretionary review.
-2-
On January 15, 1997, while his motion for discretionary
review was pending, appellant filed a CR 60.03 motion and asked
for counsel to be appointed and for an evidentiary hearing.
In
the motion appellant claimed that his prior felony convictions,
which formed the basis of his PFO 1 conviction, were invalid and
that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to inform him
of this fact and to contest their validity.
The court denied all
of appellant’s requests for relief on January 15, 1997, and
Appeal No. 1997-CA-000322-MR followed.
Thereafter, on March 20, 1997, appellant sought to
amend his CR 60.03 motion and claim that his guilty plea was not
entered voluntarily and knowingly and that his prior convictions
relied upon in the PFO prosecution were not adequately
established.
On March 27, 1997, the circuit court also denied
appellant’s amended motion and Appeal No. 1997-CA-001147-MR
followed.
Appellant argues in both appeals that his prior felony
convictions which support his PFO 1 conviction are invalid and
that his counsel was ineffective because she failed to attack
them.
However, it is clear that appellant has waived his right
to raise this issue.
In Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d at 856, the
supreme court stated as follows:
The structure provided in Kentucky for
attacking the final judgment of a trial court
in a criminal case is not haphazard and
overlapping, but is organized and complete.
That structure is set out in the rules
-3-
related to direct appeals, in RCr 11.42, and
thereafter in CR 60.02. CR 60.02 is not
intended merely as an additional opportunity
to raise Boykin [v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89
S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969)] defenses.
It is for relief that is not available by
direct appeal and not available under RCr
11.42.
Moreover, CR 60.03 cannot be invoked as a separate
avenue of attack.
CR 60.03 states that “[r]ule 60.02 shall not
limit the power of any court to entertain an independent action
to relieve a person from a judgment, order or proceeding on
appropriate equitable grounds.
Relief shall not be granted in an
independent action if the relief sought has been denied in a
proceeding by motion under Rule 60.02 . . . .”
Indeed, as noted
in 7 Kurt A. Phillips, Jr., Kentucky Practice, CR 60.03 cmt.2
(5th ed. 1995):
The most common ground for an
independent action is fraud. It is not the
function of an independent action to
relitigate issues determined in an earlier
action. It is also not a remedy for
inadvertence or oversight by the losing party
in the original action.
. . . In fact relief under this Rule should
be granted only in unusual and exceptional
circumstances. (Footnotes omitted.)
Further, a criminal defendant such as appellant who is
charged with being a persistent felony offender is provided
specific opportunities to challenge the validity of any prior
convictions used as a basis for the PFO charge.
If the defendant
fails to properly question the validity of the prior convictions
at the appropriate time, the right to do so is waived.
-4-
Commonwealth v. Hodges, Ky., ___ S.W.2d ___, 45 K.L.S. 14, p. 24
(rendered December 17, 1998).
In reaching this conclusion the
Hodges court cited Graham v. Commonwealth, Ky., 952 S.W.2d 206
(1997), in which it stated that “Howard [v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
777 S.W.2d 888 (1989)] is still the applicable case law.
When a
defendant is charged with PFO, it is incumbent upon the defendant
to challenge the validity of the prior conviction within the PFO
proceeding.
If a defendant fails to do so, the validity of the
conviction is final and cannot be challenged in a subsequent RCr
11.42 proceeding.”
Graham, 952 S.W.2d at 208.
Here, appellant has filed repetitive motions attacking
his PFO I conviction in clear violation of the procedures
established in both Gross and Howard.
err by denying his CR 60.03 motions.
Thus, the court did not
This is especially true
since appellant did not timely object to the validity of his
prior felony convictions, but pled guilty to the PFO 1 charge.
Consequently, appellant admitted the validity of the prior felony
charges and PFO I charge and waived all defenses thereto except
that the indictment did not charge a public offense.
See Bush v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W.2d 46 (1986); Centers v. Commonwealth,
Ky. App., 799 S.W.2d 51 (1990).
Likewise, appellant cannot raise a claim as to
ineffective assistance in any other respect in this proceeding
because he was required to raise any such issue in his first
post-conviction motion.
See Gross v. Commonwealth, supra.
More
important, in its opinion affirming the circuit court’s denial of
-5-
appellant’s first post-conviction motion, this court stated that
its opinion “shall be considered dispositive of any further RCr
11.42 claims.”
Further, all the grounds asserted in support of
the alleged ineffective assistance claim herein could and should
have been raised in appellant’s first post-conviction motion.
is therefore clear that appellant is not entitled to CR 60.03
relief.
The court’s judgment is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Roger Anthony Brown
West Liberty, KY
A.B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Todd Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
-6-
It
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.