DONALD R. GRIFFIS v. SANDRA B. GRIFFIS (NOW PHELPS)
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RENDERED: September 10, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1996-CA-002248-MR
DONALD R. GRIFFIS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARLAND W. HOWARD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 81-CI-01316
SANDRA B. GRIFFIS (NOW PHELPS)
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GARDNER, HUDDLESTON AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE: Donald R. Griffis (Donald) appeals from an order
of the Daviess Circuit Court entered on July 15, 1996, which
granted Sandra B. Griffis (now Phelps)(Sandra) an increase in
child support for their son, Sean.
We affirm.
Donald and Sandra were divorced by Decree of
Dissolution of Marriage entered on July 27, 1982.
Sandra was
awarded the care, custody, and control of Sean, who was eighteenmonths-old at the time.
Donald was ordered to pay child support
in the amount of $40.00 per week.
On January 19, 1993, Sandra
filed a motion to increase child support arguing that there had
been “changes of circumstances so substantial and continuing as
to make the terms [of the 1982 award] unconscionable.”
Sandra
alleged that Donald’s income was actually higher than the income
that was reflected on his income tax return and the child support
should be set based on his actual income.
The trial court denied
that motion and the case was appealed to this Court.
On September 15, 1995 this Court reversed the trial
court.
This Court noted that Sandra had not presented any
evidence that Donald was underemployed or that his income was
higher than he had reported, but that Donald had been receiving
cash gifts, not loans, from his parents in the four years
preceding the divorce that averaged $8,750.00 per year.
This
Court held that Sandra was “entitled to support based on
[Donald’s] income, including the money received from his
parents”, and remanded the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.
On February 27, 1996 the Domestic Relations
Commissioner (Commissioner) filed a report that recommended
findings of fact that Donald, as a non-certified dental
technician, could reasonably expect to earn a minimum of
$20,000.00 per year, and that he had received gifts from his
parents that averaged $729.00 per month.
The Commissioner
recommended that both Donald and Sandra have income imputed to
them, and that Donald’s child support be increased to
week.
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$81.00 per
On March 4, 1996, Donald filed exceptions to the
Commissioner’s report arguing that he was no longer receiving
gifts from his parents.
On March 18, 1996, the trial court
ordered that the February 27, 1996 recommendation of the
Commissioner be “confirmed in all respects, with the proviso that
[Donald] be allowed an opportunity at a hearing before the
Domestic Relations Commissioner to present evidence on the single
issue that [he] is no longer receiving gifts from his parents or
from any other source.”
On June 11, 1996, the Commissioner filed
a supplemental report recommending a finding that while testimony
indicated that Donald was not receiving gifts from his mother or
from any other source, “the evidence indicate[d] that [Donald]
continue[d] to live a life style that is beyond what he would
have the Commissioner believe that he [could] afford with his
reported income.”
The Commissioner continued with his
recommendation that child support be increased to $81.00 per
week.
On June 17, 1996, Donald filed exceptions to this
recommendation and the trial court conducted another hearing.
On
July 15, 1996, the trial court entered its final order and
judgment confirming the Commissioner’s recommendation and
increasing the child support to $81.00 per week.
This appeal
followed.
The record on appeal does not include transcripts of
evidence from the hearings before the Commissioner and the trial
court.
In lieu of a trial record, Donald attempts to present a
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narrative statement of the case in his brief.
Sandra, however,
correctly points out that pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil
Procedure (CR) 75.13(1), while a narrative statement may be
prepared by an appellant in the absence of a record, any such
statement “shall be served on the appellee,” for any objections
or amendments, and “shall be submitted to the trial court for
settlement and approval,” and as such shall be included in the
record on appeal.
by CR 75.13(1).
Donald failed to follow the procedure required
Therefore, the narrative statement presented by
Donald on appeal cannot be considered by this Court and
“[w]ithout a transcript of the proceedings, we must assume the
record supports the factual determinations of the trial court.”
Dillard v. Dillard, Ky.App., 859 S.W.2d 134, 137 (1993).
See
also Porter v. Harper, Ky., 477 S.W.2d 778, 779 (1972).
Donald claims the trial court abused its discretion by
imputing income to him in three ways: (1) for gifts that were no
longer being received; (2) for business income not received; and
(3) for being underemployed absent a showing that he was
purposely underemployed with an intent to interfere with his
support obligation.
The trial courts are given broad discretion in applying
the child support statutes at Kentucky Revised States (KRS)
403.212.
The Legislature has provided the trial courts with
certain guidelines and limitations, but it has also empowered the
trial court with the discretion to achieve just results.
See
Keplinger v. Keplinger, Ky.App., 839 S.W.2d 566, 568 (1992). This
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legislative scheme cannot address every possible situation that
can arise in divorced parents supporting their child.
However,
the statutes provide sufficient flexibility to allow the trial
courts to fashion appropriate orders.
847 S.W.2d 63, 64 (1993).
Downey v. Rogers, Ky.App.,
Furthermore, as this Court stated in
Keplinger, supra at 569, “[w]e believe that KRS 403.212(2)(a)
must be read as creating a presumption that future income will be
on a par with the worker’s most recent experience” (footnote
omitted).
The central issue in this case is determining
Donald’s actual income from the conflicting evidence that was
presented.
Thus, it was within the discretion of the trial court
to determine which evidence was credible and to make the
appropriate findings.
CR 52.01.
After the Commissioner had
already expressed doubts about the credibility of Donald’s
evidence in his June 11, 1996 recommended order, the trial court,
in its final judgment, stated:
“The [c]ourt agrees with the
Commissioner, after two lengthy hearings, that for purposes of
calculating child support that there be imputed additional income
to [Donald] based on unrebuttable evidence of his continued life
style which requires expenditures of large sums of money.”
There is no need for this Court to address the issues
raised by Donald concerning the gifts and his underemployment.
The final order indicates that the trial court made a
determination of Donald’s actual income based on his lifestyle
expenditures regardless of whether that income was coming from
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unreported gifts or income.
The trial court did not determine
Donald to be underemployed.
While Donald argues that there was no proof as to his
“lifestyle” and that the trial court engaged in “speculation”
without proof as to his income, in the absence of the record, we
must assume there was sufficient evidence to support the findings
of the trial court.
Dillard, supra.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Daviess Circuit Court
is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Hon. John M. McCarty
Hawesville, KY
Hon. Paul E. Bugay
Owensboro, KY
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