JOHN FRANKLIN GREY v. KAY ELLEN GREY
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RENDERED: February 19, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1996-CA-002244-MR
JOHN FRANKLIN GREY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS WINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-5055
v.
KAY ELLEN GREY
APPELLEE
AND
NO. 1996-CA-002346-MR (CROSS)
KAY ELLEN GREY
v.
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
CROSS-APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS WINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-5055
JOHN FRANKLIN GREY
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
AND
NO. 1997-CA-001264-MR
KAY ELLEN GREY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS WINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-5055
v.
JOHN FRANKLIN GREY
APPELLEE
AND
NO. 1997-CA-001524-MR (CROSS)
JOHN FRANKLIN GREY
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
CROSS-APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS WINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-5055
v.
KAY ELLEN GREY
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE; COMBS AND GARDNER, JUDGES.
GARDNER, JUDGE: John Franklin Grey (hereinafter referred to as
Lin) and Kay Ellen Grey (Kay) each appeal and/or cross-appeal
from findings of fact, conclusion of law, and order of the
Jefferson Circuit Court rendered on April 3, 1996, as well as
from an order of March 31, 1997.
We affirm.
Lin and Kay were married in Texas on August 24, 1974.
Two children were born of the marriage, Kelly Erin Grey (Kelly)
and Lauren Kayle Grey (Lauren).
1992.
The parties were divorced in
A separation agreement was incorporated into the decree of
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divorce.
At the time of this proceeding, Lin lived in California
and Kay lived in Kentucky with the children.
On September 7, 1995, Lin filed a complaint in
Jefferson Circuit Court seeking to terminate his obligation to
pay maintenance based on his allegation that Kay was cohabitating
with Rick Willis (Rick).
Lin directed the court’s attention to
the separation agreement, which provided that the maintenance
obligation “[s]hall cease upon the first happening of the
following events: . . . (2) the remarriage or cohabitation (as
below defined) of Wife. . . .”
Cohabitation was defined in the
agreement as “actually residing in a marriage-like relationship
with an adult, non-relative male” for more than forty-five days.
On September 25, 1995, Kay filed an answer and counterpetition alleging that Lin’s maintenance and child support
obligation was in arrears.
on February 2, 1996.
A hearing on the matter was conducted
Upon taking proof, on April 3, 1996, the
court issued findings that Kay was cohabitating as defined by the
separation agreement, and ordered that Lin’s maintenance
obligation ceased on September 7, 1995, the date of the filing of
the complaint.
The court also ordered that Lin was disallowed
from claiming a 50% abatement in his child support obligation for
periods during the summer when the children visited him, and
further found him to owe $2,650 in child support arrearage.
Finally, Lin was ordered to pay Kay’s attorney fees in the amount
of $5,408.83.
On February 8, 1996, Kay filed a motion in California
seeking an increase in child support and an award of the
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dependency exemption for the two minor children.
The motion was
abated at Lin’s request since all other proceedings were
occurring in Kentucky, and Kay filed the motion in Jefferson
Circuit Court on May 16, 1996.
The domestic relations
commissioner conducted a hearing on the motion on July 30, 1996,
and thereafter rendered recommendations which were adopted by the
court.
Thereafter, other motions were filed and hearings were
conducted, including motions by each party seeking to hold the
other in contempt.
Ultimately, the court issued an order on
March 31, 1997, wherein in relevant part it increased Lin’s child
support obligation and ordered that the tax exemption be divided
equally in accordance with the terms of the separation agreement.
Lin has now appealed from the April 3, 1996 order, and Kay has
cross-appealed.
Kay has appealed from the March 31, 1997 order,
and Lin has cross-appealed.
Collectively, the parties have
presented more than one dozen claims of error for which they seek
relief.
We will address them seriatim, beginning first with
Lin’s claims of error arising from the April 3, 1996, order
followed by Kay’s cross-appeal.
Lin first argues that the circuit court committed
reversible error in terminating his maintenance obligation as of
the date he filed the complaint (September 7, 1995), as opposed
to the date occurring forty-five days after Kay began
cohabitating.
He notes that the separation agreement provides
that the obligation shall cease forty-five days after
cohabitation begins, and argues that since the court found the
cohabitation to commence in late July 1994, the date of
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termination should have occurred no later than September 15,
1994.
We find no error on this issue.
Lin directs our
attention to Cook v. Cook, Ky., 798 S.W.2d 955 (1990), which he
argues holds that cohabitation automatically terminates a
maintenance obligation under the terms of a separation
agreement.1
Cook actually states as follows:
“[h]ere the issue
is not whether a change of circumstances has occurred but whether
there has been ‘cohabitation’ which would automatically terminate
maintenance under the terms of the contract.”
S.W.2d at 957.
Cook v. Cook, 798
The Kentucky Supreme Court found that no
cohabitation had occurred, and accordingly concluded that the
maintenance obligation was not terminated.
We cannot rely on
this as a basis for tampering with the order now before us.
Kay
correctly notes that the decree of divorce, which incorporates
the separation agreement, may be modified solely by court action.
Lin has not overcome the strong presumption that the circuit
court’s ruling on this issue was correct, City of Louisville v.
Allen, Ky., 385 S.W.2d 179 (1964), overruled in part by Nolan v.
Spears, Ky., 432 S.W.2d 425 (1968), and accordingly we find no
error.
Lin’s second argument takes issue with the court’s
denial of his request to partially abate his child support
obligation during the children’s summer visitation.
The
separation agreement provided that in the event Lin exercised his
1
Lin later states in his reply brief at page five that
“[t]he Court in Cook addressed this issue in dicta.”
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right to summer visitation, one-half of the child support
obligation during that period would be abated.
The court found
that the visitation period for the children was two months each
summer, but that the children stayed with Lin only fifty days in
1994 (twenty days with Lauren and thirty days with Kelly), and
thirty-seven days in 1996 (twenty-two days with Lauren and
fifteen days with Kelly).
Lin abated $825 for each summer.
The
court opined that such an abatement was neither equitable nor
within the spirit of the agreement.
As such, it ruled that Lin
was not entitled to the abatement.
We are aware of no basis upon
which we may conclude that this ruling was clearly erroneous.
The agreement provided for a partial abatement if the children
stayed with Lin for the “summer visitation.”
construed this to mean the entire summer.
The circuit court
Since the children
visited with Lin for only a portion of each summer, we cannot
conclude that the trial court erred in denying the abatement.
Lin’s third argument, i.e., that no child support
arrearage existed, is premised on a finding that he was entitled
to an abatement of child support in 1994 and 1995.
Having found
no error on the abatement issue, we hold that this argument is
moot.
Lin also argues that the circuit court erred in
awarding Kay attorney fees.
Specifically, he maintains that
attorney fees are allowable under Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS)
403.220 only if the action is brought under Chapter 403.
Since,
he maintains, only a portion of his claim related to Chapter 403,
he argues that the court had no authority to award Kay attorney
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fees.
We disagree.
The allocation of court costs and an award
of attorney’s fees are entirely within the discretion of the
trial court.
Wilhoit v. Wilhoit, Ky., 521 S.W.2d 512 (1975).
Clearly, a substantial portion of Lin’s action related to Chapter
403, and accordingly the circuit court was vested with the
discretion to award a fee.
No showing has been made that the
court abused this discretion, and we therefore find no error.
On her cross-appeal of the April 3, 1996 order, Kay
first argues that the parties entered into an oral modification
of the cohabitation portion of the separation agreement whereby
Lin agreed to continue paying maintenance after Kay’s
cohabitation with Rick began.
She maintains that Lin entered
into the agreement because she agreed not to seek additional
child support in California, and that the agreement is evidenced
by the fact that Lin continued to make maintenance payments for
some period of time after Kay’s cohabitation began.
Upon
considering this issue, the circuit court found that Kay failed
to prove that the modification existed with reasonable certainty
as required by Arnold v. Arnold, Ky. App., 825 S.W.2d 621 (1992).
As Lin properly notes, such a conclusion may not be set aside
unless it is clearly erroneous.
supra.
City of Louisville v. Allen,
We do not believe that the court’s finding was clearly
erroneous.
On one hand, Kay argues that Lin was required to make
maintenance payments until a final order was entered in his
action to modify those payments. On the other hand, she argues
that his continuing payments evidence his participation in an
oral modification of the separation agreement.
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While we cannot
examine the matter de novo to make our own conclusions on these
questions, we can determine that the record does not show the
circuit court to be clearly erroneous on the question of whether
an oral modification existed.
As such, we must affirm on this
issue.
Kay also argues that even if the parties had not agreed
that maintenance would continue, the circuit court erred in
finding that Kay was cohabitating in a marriage-like relationship
as defined by the separation agreement.
She directs our
attention to a number of ways in which her relationship with Rick
is not “marriage-like,” and maintains that since the relationship
was something other than marriage-like, the circuit court was
compelled to deny Lin’s request to terminate his maintenance
obligation.
We have closely examined this argument and find it
to be specious.
It is uncontroverted that Kay and Rick have been
living together for an extended period of time in a house owned
by Rick, that the relationship is emotionally and sexually
intimate, and that Kay’s children and Rick’s child reside with
the couple.
It is further uncontroverted that Kay wishes to get
married, that they share the use of credit, have jointly
purchased a boat, and have attended counseling to help them
adjust to a household combining two families.
There can be no
disagreement among reasonable minds but that the arrangement is
properly described as marriage-like cohabitation.
The circuit
court did not err in so finding.
Alternatively, Kay argues that if the arrangement is
properly described as marriage-like cohabitation, Lin should have
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been required to continue the maintenance payments through April
1996, the date of the judgment.
not persuasive.
Kay’s argument on this issue is
Contrary to her assertion, the court did not act
to retroactively modify maintenance, but to ascertain the date of
its termination.
It determined that maintenance should be
terminated concurrently with the court taking jurisdiction of
Lin’s claim by the filing of the complaint.
We find no error.
We will next address the claims of error arising from
the March 31, 1997 order wherein the court accepted the
commissioner’s calculation of Lin’s income, and addressed a tax
exemption issue, attorney fees, and unreimbursed medical
expenses.
Kay, as appellant, first argues that the court
committed reversible error in its calculation of child support.
Lin’s income is in excess of $15,000 per month.
The child
support table set forth in KRS 403.212 does not provide a fixed
monthly child support obligation for income above this amount.
Rather, it allows for the court to exercise discretion in such
circumstances.
The circuit court, in accepting the
commissioner’s recommendation, adopted a formula of adding
additional child support above the $15,000 per month income level
at the rate of 6.6% per $100 of earned income.
It chose this
percentage since the same percent exists in the child support
table at levels below $15,000 per month.
Kay maintains that the court should have taken into
account the actual needs of the children rather than simply
relying on a mathematical formula.
She points to expenses such
as cheerleading, modeling, photography, and tutoring which she
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maintains justify additional child support above the level
awarded by the court.
We have closely examined this issue and
cannot conclude that the circuit court erred in its determination
of the appropriate level of child support.
KRS 403.212(5) states
that, “[t]he court may use its judicial discretion in determining
child support in circumstances where combined adjusted parental
gross income exceeds the uppermost levels of the guideline
table.”
Clearly, for Kay to prevail on her claim of error, she
must show that the circuit court abused its discretion.
Louisville v. Allen, supra.
City of
She has not made such a showing.
While one could offer alternative forms of calculation which
include the needs or desires of the custodial parent, there
exists in the law a rational basis for the methodology adopted by
Accordingly, we find no error.2
the court.
Next, Kay argues that the court improperly allocated
the income tax dependency exemptions equally between herself and
Lin.
She maintains that because of Lin’s high income, he loses
some of the benefit of the exemption allocated to him.
Kay
argues that she should receive both exemptions, because her lower
income level would allow for full use of the exemptions and would
free up more money for the benefit of the children.
Were we
reviewing the matter de novo rather than examining the record for
errors of law, in all likelihood we would find Kay’s argument
2
Kay offers as a separate argument her contention that even
if the court’s mathematical formula is proper, it erred in
failing to deviate upward based on the “special disabilities” of
one child and “exceptional talents” of the other. Again, we
cannot find that Kay has shown the court to have abused its
discretion on this issue. KRS 403.212(5).
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persuasive.
However, the separation agreement provides in clear
and unambiguous terms that the parties shall split the
deductions, and the trial court has discretion in making this
allocation.
Pegler v. Pegler, Ky. App., 895 S.W.2d 580 (1995).
Thus, even though the overall benefit of the parties’ finances
may be marginally increased if Kay is allowed to use both
exemptions, the parties agreed to share the exemptions and the
circuit court did not err by relying on said agreement.
Last, Kay argues that the modification of child support
should have become effective when she filed her request for
modification in California rather than when the request was
subsequently filed in Kentucky.
She maintains that had Lin not
sought a stay of the proceedings in California, she would not
have been compelled to re-file in Kentucky.
As such, she argues
that she is entitled to receive increased child support payments
starting from the time of filing in California.
Kay chose to file in California even though all other
issues were pending in Kentucky.
Accordingly, it cannot
reasonably be argued that Lin is responsible for any delay in the
modification of child support.
KRS 403.213(1) states that,
“[t]he provisions of any decree respecting child support may be
modified only as to installments accruing subsequent to the
filing of the motion for modification. . . .”
Just as we found
that the circuit court properly terminated Lin’s maintenance
obligation on the date of the filing of the complaint, so must we
find no error in the circuit court ordering the modified child
support to become effective on the date of Kay’s filing.
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In his cross-appeal, Lin first argues that the circuit
court improperly considered “non-continuing” elements of income
in determining child support.
Specifically, he notes that he
received bonuses of approximately $12,000 in 1994, 1995 and 1996,
and that it was his uncontroverted testimony that the court erred
in including those bonuses to calculate his income for purposes
of establishing child support.
We find no error on this issue.
The “continuing”
requirement to which Lin directs our attention relates not to
specific sources or types of income, but rather to the change in
circumstances.
As we noted in Kay’s last claim of error, KRS
403.213(1) provides in relevant part that,
The provisions of any decree respecting child
support may be modified only as to
installments accruing subsequent to the
filing of the motion for modification and
only upon a showing of a material change in
circumstances that is substantial and
continuing.
As it is clear that Lin’s circumstances had in fact changed, we
find no error in the modification of support nor the manner in
which it was calculated.
The final issue raised by Lin is his claim that the
circuit court erred in modifying the parties’ agreement with
respect to unreimbursed medical expenses.
He maintains that the
court was without authority to alter the parties’ prior agreement
to split said expenses 50/50.
We disagree.
While Lin is correct
that the parties had agreed to such a split, the court implicitly
found that this agreement was unconscionable due to the great
disparity in the parties’ incomes.
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As such, the court was
justified in altering the terms of the agreement.
KRS
403.180(2); Shraberg v. Shraberg, Ky., 939 S.W.2d 330 (1997).
For the foregoing reasons, this Court affirms the
findings of fact, conclusions of law, April 3, 1996 order, and
the March 31, 1997 order of the Jefferson Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Wendi M. Swinson
Louisville, Kentucky
Diana L. Skaggs
Louisville, Kentucky
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