MELBA IVY NEIDLINGER v. JERRY LYNN NEIDLINGER
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RENDERED: June 18, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NOS. 1996-CA-000114-MR,
1996-CA-001418-MR and 1996-CA-003233-MR
MELBA IVY NEIDLINGER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE RICHARD J. FITZGERALD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 93-FD-0816
JERRY LYNN NEIDLINGER
AND
APPELLEE
NO. 1996-CA-001471-MR
MELBA IVY NEIDLINGER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE RICHARD J. FITZGERALD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 93-FD-0816
JERRY LYNN NEIDLINGER
and DELORES PREGLIASCO
APPELLEES
OPINION AFFIRMING IN PART,
VACATING IN PART, AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, EMBERTON, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
This opinion covers four appeals from various
orders and judgments entered in this divorce action, relating to
custody, maintenance, temporary child support, division of
marital property and debt, and attorneys fees and sanctions.
Upon review of the arguments in appellant’s appeals in light of
the record herein and the applicable law, we vacate the award of
maintenance and remand for an increase therein.
As to the
remaining issues, we affirm.
Appellant, Melba “Mel” Neidlinger, and appellee, Jerry
Neidlinger, were married on February 20, 1976 in Kona, Hawaii.
At the time of the marriage, Jerry was a practicing dentist.
Mel
had worked full-time for five years in a dentist office and had
an associates degree in health education.
After the parties
married, they settled in Hawaii and began a dental practice.
Mel worked full-time in the dental office until they
adopted their only child, Jessica, born August 6, 1982.
After
that, Mel worked part-time in the office and was Jessica’s
primary caretaker.
Early in 1984, after having been in Hawaii
for eleven years, the parties sold their assets and dental
practice for $450,000 and moved to Danville, Kentucky.
Thereafter, the parties bought part of a medical building and
opened a dental practice in Danville in which Mel worked parttime.
The dental practice did not do as well as expected in
Danville.
Consequently, Jerry decided to pursue a second degree
so that he would be eligible to teach at the University of
Kentucky.
In 1989, Jerry began school in Chicago Monday through
Friday and would come home to Danville every weekend, when he
would see patients in his practice.
Jerry received a stipend of
$34,000 per year for the two years he was in Chicago.
During
this time, Mel stayed in Danville and took care of Jessica.
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In 1991, Jerry earned his degree.
separated for good in 1992.
The parties
In August 1992, the Danville dental
practice sold for about $93,000.
Some of the proceeds were used
to pay debts, and Mel took $25,000 of the proceeds and bought a
certificate of deposit.
A petition for legal separation was
filed by Mel on March 18, 1993.
Jerry subsequently moved to
Arkansas and then to South Carolina to work for the Veteran’s
Administration as a dentist, where he earned approximately
$83,000 a year.
Mel moved to Louisville to attend Sullivan
College where she obtained a two-year degree in interior design.
Throughout the time Jerry was in Chicago and when he
moved to Arkansas and South Carolina, Jerry supported two
households.
It is undisputed that Jerry gave Mel $3,800 a month
to support her and Jessica’s household until November 1993.
After that time, Jerry steadily reduced that amount to $700 a
month.
Until November 1993, Jerry also paid all the bills on the
marital residence in Danville (mortgage and utilities), which the
parties still owned.
On August 9, 1994, Mel filed a motion for pendente lite
child support and maintenance.
After a hearing on the matter,
Jerry was ordered to pay Mel $798 a month in temporary child
support and $700 a month in temporary maintenance.
The financial issues of the parties were tried on
July 23, 1995.
49.
At that time, Jerry was 51 years old and Mel was
During the course of the proceedings, Mel moved from
Louisville back to Danville with Jessica to live in the family
residence.
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The court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and decree on November 1, 1995.
found to be $83,000 a year.
Jerry’s gross income was
Mel was not employed.
The court
awarded Mel $400 a month in maintenance for three years.
The
parties stipulated that the value of the marital residence was
$220,000, and the court awarded the parties each one-half of the
proceeds when the house was sold.
As to the remaining property,
including the proceeds of the sale of the medical building
interest, the court divided it such that each party received
approximately $35,000 in assets.
As to debt, the court ordered
Jerry to pay $4,787 in credit card debt, while Mel was
responsible for $3,769 of the debt.
As to the debts Mel claimed
she incurred as a result of continuing to send Jessica to private
school despite the protestations of Jerry that they could no
longer afford it, the court found that said debt was “for living
expenses and for her unilateral decision regarding schooling for
Jessica post-separation.”
The court went on to conclude that
“she [Mel] was the beneficiary of most of the debt and shall be
responsible for payment of those ‘loans’.”
Also, because Jerry
had continued to pay the mortgage and utilities on the marital
home as well as pendente lite maintenance, the court granted
Jerry a credit for all pendente lite maintenance payments made
after Mel moved back into the marital home.
The court reasoned
that because the pendente lite maintenance had been awarded based
on Mel’s expenses for renting a house in Louisville, Mel no
longer had those expenses when she moved back into the marital
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residence on which Jerry had continued to pay the mortgage and
utilities.
After the decree was entered, Jerry moved the court to
designate the mortgage payment he was still paying as
maintenance.
He also moved for child support based on the fact
that the parties had agreed that Jessica would live with Jerry in
South Carolina.
Mel moved for attorney’s fees for the portion of
the case that had already been tried and for an advance of
attorney’s fees for the custody portion of the action.
On April 4, 1996, the court denied both of Mel’s
motions for attorney fees and Jerry’s motion for the court to
treat the mortgage payments as maintenance.
However, the court
adjudged that, when the marital residence was ultimately sold,
Jerry would be entitled to a credit for all the mortgage payments
made post-decree.
The court granted Jerry’s motion for child
support and ordered Mel to pay $131 a month.
The custody portion of the case was tried on August 15,
1996.
At that time, Jessica was 14 years of age.
After a full
hearing on the matter in which numerous witnesses testified,
including Jessica, who testified that she wanted to remain with
her father, the court awarded sole custody to Jerry, subject to
reasonable visitation by Mel.
From the various orders regarding
custody, child support, division of marital property,
maintenance, and attorneys fees, Mel now appeals.
We shall first address Mel’s pro se appeal regarding
the award of sole custody to Jerry.
Mel asserts nine assignments
of error, some of which are difficult to follow.
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She first
contends that the court was prejudiced by an agreed order, which
we cannot find in the record, and by Jerry’s response to a
contempt motion filed by Mel regarding visitation.
Upon
reviewing the custody proceedings and resulting order, we do not
see any indication that the court was prejudiced against Mel.
As
we shall discuss below, the court rendered a well-reasoned
decision which was supported by the evidence.
Mel next argues in her appeal of the custody order that
the court abused its discretion in not awarding her sufficient
assets to afford visitation of Jessica in South Carolina and to
buy a house of her own.
These arguments regarding the division
of marital property and other financial issues should have been
raised in the appeal of the November 5, 1995 order deciding these
issues and are not properly the subject of the custody appeal.
The next issue raised by Mel is that the trial court
erred in ordering only one day of trial and in refusing to reopen
the case to allow one other witness to testify on Mel’s behalf.
Every litigant is entitled to a fair hearing when brought into
court.
Burns v. Brewster, Ky., 338 S.W.2d 908 (1960); Bean v.
Campbell, 237 Ky. 498, 35 S.W.2d 862 (1931).
However, the trial
court has the discretion to determine the conduct of its trials.
Johnson v. May, 307 Ky. 399, 211 S.W.2d 135 (1948).
A motion to
reopen a case rests within the sound discretion of the trial
court.
Logan v. Logan, Ky., 432 S.W.2d 34 (1968).
At the
custody hearing, Mel called nine witnesses and she had the
opportunity to cross-examine Jerry’s witnesses.
One of Mel’s
intended witnesses, Gene Mosely, was not present because he
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apparently did not receive a subpoena, and the court refused to
allow the case to be reopened for Mosley’s testimony.
Upon
reviewing the custody proceedings, we believe Mel received a fair
hearing and we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in
denying Mel’s motion to reopen the case.
The remaining arguments of Mel in the custody appeal
challenge the factors relied on by the trial court in its
decision to award sole custody to Jerry.
A trial court’s
findings regarding custody will not be reversed unless they are
clearly erroneous.
(1993).
Basham v. Wilkins, Ky., 851 S.W.2d 491
Under KRS 403.270(2), the trial court must determine
custody according to the best interest of the child, considering
the following factors:
(a) The wishes of the child's parent or
parents, and any de facto custodian, as to
his custody;
(b) The wishes of the child as to his
custodian;
(c) The interaction and interrelationship
of the child with his parent or parents, his
siblings, and any other person who may
significantly affect the child's best
interests;
(d) The child's adjustment to his home,
school, and community;
(e) The mental and physical health of all
individuals involved;
(f) Information, records, and evidence of
domestic violence as defined in KRS 403.720;
. . . .
In the custody order, the court explicitly stated that
it considered the testimony of various witnesses, including Mel’s
expert, the parties, and Jessica.
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The court also relied on the
report of the court-appointed psychologist, Carol Friske, who
recommended that Jerry be awarded custody.
The court found that
both parties were fit to have custody, but could not cooperate to
effectuate joint custody.
In awarding custody to Jerry, the
court placed great weight on the evidence that Jessica and Mel
had a very hostile relationship.
Jessica testified that she
harbored a great deal of resentment and anger towards her mother
and that she desired to live with her father.
There was evidence
that on one occasion Jessica had assaulted Mel during an
argument.
The evidence further revealed that Jessica was in
therapy, and, at one point, had even been hospitalized because of
this behavior.
The court considered the wishes of Jessica and
also her positive adjustment to her home, school, and community
in South Carolina.
In Stafford v. Stafford, Ky. App., 618 S.W.2d 578
(1981), overruled on other grounds by Largent v. Largent, Ky.,
643 S.W.2d 261 (1982), this Court reversed an award of custody to
the mother where the two children, ages twelve (12) and sixteen
(16), expressed the desire to live with their father because of
their hostility and bitterness toward their mother.
The Court
adjudged that, under the circumstances, an award to the mother
would be a detriment to the mental and physical health of the
children.
Likewise, in the present case, we believe that the
court’s award of custody to Jerry was proper considering:
the
antagonistic relationship between Jessica and Mel, especially the
episode of domestic violence (see KRS 403.720 and KRS 403.270(f)
above); the mental health of Jessica and the fact that Jessica
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was in treatment as a result of her anger toward her mother;
Jessica’s wishes; and Jessica’s positive adjustment to her home,
school, and community in South Carolina.
Accordingly, we reject
Mel’s arguments that the court’s decision was based on improper
factors and affirm the award of custody to Jerry.
We now turn to Mel’s appeal of the November 5, 1995
order regarding the financial issues.
Mel first maintains that
the court abused its discretion in awarding her maintenance of
only $400 a month for three years.
Under KRS 403.200(1), a court
may award maintenance only if it finds that the spouse lacks
sufficient property to provide for her reasonable needs and is
unable to support herself through appropriate employment.
KRS
403.200(2) sets out the factors the court should consider in
determining the amount and period of maintenance:
(a) The financial resources of the party
seeking maintenance, including marital
property apportioned to him, and his ability
to meet his needs independently, including
the extent to which a provision for support
of a child living with the party includes a
sum for that party as custodian;
(b) The time necessary to acquire
sufficient education or training to enable
the party seeking maintenance to find
appropriate employment;
(c) The standard of living established
during the marriage;
(d) The duration of the marriage;
(e) The age, and the physical and emotional
condition of the spouse seeking maintenance;
and
(f) The ability of the spouse from whom
maintenance is sought to meet his needs while
meeting those of the spouse seeking
maintenance.
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The determination of whether to award maintenance and
the decision as to how much and for how long maintenance should
be awarded is highly within the discretion of the trial court and
will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion.
Beckner v. Beckner, Ky. App., 903 S.W.2d 528 (1995); Browning v.
Browning, Ky. App., 551 S.W.2d 823 (1977).
In reviewing the
evidence, we agree that Mel was entitled to maintenance.
At the
time of the divorce, Mel did not have sufficient property to meet
her reasonable needs and was unable to support herself through
appropriate employment.
The question is, was $400 a month for
three years inadequate considering the relevant factors in KRS
403.200(2)?
The parties were married for over 19 years and their
standard of living was relatively high at certain points.
However, it appears that it was artificially high since the
parties accumulated a considerable amount of consumer debt during
those years.
It is undisputed that Jerry was earning
approximately $83,000 a year working for the Veteran’s
Administration.
Mel was nearly 50 years of age and unemployed at
the time of the decree.
She had not been employed outside the
home for 18 years, since she worked part-time for Jerry.
She
did, however, work at home as the primary care giver for Jessica
while the parties were married.
She received her degree in
interior design prior to the divorce, as well as a real estate
license.
She also has a degree in health education and her work
experience in the dental field.
Mel testified at the hearing
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that she was optimistic about her job prospects.
Neither party
was awarded any income-producing property.
In our view, the court abused its discretion in
awarding Mel maintenance of only $400 a month for three years.
Although Mel will presumably eventually find employment, it will
doubtless be more difficult for her to advance in any job, given
her age and the fact that she has been out of the work force for
so long.
Further, she will never earn the kind of money that
Jerry earns.
The parties were married for almost 20 years and
Mel devoted much of that time to taking care of Jessica and
helping Jerry in his practice.
We simply do not believe that
$4800 a year for three years is adequate to meet Mel’s reasonable
needs, given Jerry’s income and the above facts.
Accordingly, we
reverse and remand for an increase in the award of maintenance to
Mel considering the above stated factors.
Mel’s next argument is that the court abused its
discretion in ordering her to pay child support without
reconsidering the maintenance award.
Under the child support
guidelines, KRS 403.212(2)(b), “gross income”, for purposes of
determining child support, specifically includes maintenance
payments.
Thus, contrary to Mel’s position, simply because a
non-custodial parent is reliant on a former spouse for
maintenance, does not absolve that parent of her obligation to
pay child support.
Pursuant to KRS 403.212(2)(d), the court
imputed approximately $1,200 a month in income to Mel in
determining the amount of the child support under the guidelines.
We do not see this as error.
In any event, to the extent that we
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are vacating the award of maintenance for an increase, Mel’s
argument is moot.
Mel’s next assignment of error is in regards to the
court’s division of marital property and debt.
Mel argues that
it was reversible error to fail to allocate the debt incurred by
Mel for the support of her and Jessica during the parties’
separation.
According to Mel, the $26,000 of debt was the result
of personal loans necessary for their support and to pay
Jessica’s private school tuition.
The court found that some of
the debt was the result of Mel’s unilateral decision to send
Jessica to private school, but that Mel was the primary
beneficiary of the funds.
Findings of fact as to the division of
marital property will not be reversed if they are supported by
substantial evidence.
(1978).
Adams v. Adams, Ky. App., 565 S.W.2d 169
There is no presumption that all debts incurred during
the marriage are marital.
895 (1979).
Bodie v. Bodie, Ky. App., 590 S.W.2d
In O’Neill v. O’Neill, Ky. App., 600 S.W.2d 493
(1980), the Court adjudged certain debts incurred by the husband
after the separation, for the children’s school, income taxes and
rent, to be non-marital.
In the present case, there was evidence
that Jerry did not approve of continuing to send Jessica to
private school because the parties could no longer afford it.
Thus, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in finding
the debt arising therefrom to be non-marital.
Similarly, as to
the debt of which Mel was the beneficiary, there was no error in
finding it to be non-marital since it was after the parties had
separated.
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Mel also complains that the court erred in allowing
Jerry a credit upon the sale of the marital residence for the
pendente lite maintenance paid after Mel moved back into the
house and for the mortgage payments made after the decree was
entered.
Mel contends that by getting a credit for the mortgage
payments and the pendente lite maintenance essentially allowed
Jerry to “double dip” from the sale proceeds of the house.
not agree.
We do
The pendente lite maintenance payments for which
Jerry received a credit were payments made before the decree, and
the court was justified in giving a credit by the fact that the
pendente lite maintenance was based on Mel’s expenses for living
in Louisville.
When she moved back to the marital residence in
Danville on which Jerry was still paying the mortgage and
utilities, her expenses were significantly reduced.
Conversely,
the mortgage payments for which Jerry received a credit were
those made after the decree.
We cannot say the court abused its
discretion in allowing Jerry a credit for those payments since
the court awarded each party one-half of the sale proceeds from
the house in the decree.
It would be unfair to then require
Jerry alone to make the mortgage payments after the decree and
not get a credit therefor at the time of the sale.
See Drake v.
Drake, Ky. App., 809 S.W.2d 710 (1991).
We shall next address the remaining appeal regarding
the court’s denial of Mel’s motions for attorney’s fees and
sanctions.
Mel’s first motion for attorney’s fees was for those
fees incurred in litigating the financial issues of the parties.
On appeal of the denial of that motion, Mel failed to name her
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attorney below, Gene Mosley, as a party to the appeal.
this issue is precluded from our review.
Thus,
See Carter v. Carter,
Ky., 382 S.W.2d 400 (1964).
Mel also appeals from the order denying her motion for
advance of attorneys fees for the custody portion of the case.
Under KRS 403.220, a court may award reasonable attorney’s fees
in a domestic action “for legal services rendered and costs
incurred prior to the commencement of the proceeding or after
entry of judgment.”
The allocation of court costs and attorney’s
fees under this statute is entirely within the discretion of the
trial court.
(1977).
Browning v. Browning, Ky. App., 551 S.W.2d 823
In the present case, Mel ultimately represented herself
on the custody matter and, thus, incurred no attorney’s fees.
Further, there is no authority for allowing a party an advance of
attorney’s fees.
KRS 403.220 clearly refers to legal services
that have already been rendered, not services that are to be
rendered in the future.
Accordingly, the court did not err in
refusing to order the advance of attorney’s fees for Mel.
The final issue for our review is Mel’s appeal of the
order denying her motion for a hearing regarding a reprimand or
sanctions against Jerry’s attorney, Delores Pregliasco.
Mel
alleged that Ms. Pregliasco made false statements of material
fact in her pleadings.
Upon reviewing the record, we believe the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to impose CR
11 sanctions against Jerry’s attorney and, thus, properly denied
the motion for a hearing thereon.
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See Pendleton v. Centre
College, Ky. App., 818 S.W.2d 616 (1990) and Clark Equipment Co.,
Inc. v. Bowman, Ky. App., 762 S.W.2d 417 (1988).
For the reasons stated above, we vacate the maintenance
award and remand for a recalculation of maintenance consistent
with this opinion.
As to the remaining issues, we affirm the
orders of the Jefferson Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT IN CASE
NOS. 1996-CA-000114, 1996-CA001418 and 1996-CA-001471:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Delores Pregliasco
Louisville, Kentucky
Bonnie M. Brown
Louisville, Kentucky
Melanie Straw-Boone
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT IN CASE
NO. 1996-CA-003233/REPLY BRIEF
IN CASE NO. 1996-CA-001471:
Melba I. Neidlinger, Pro Se
Louisville, Kentucky
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