PATRICIA ROBERTSON V. SUMITOMO ELECTRIC WIRING SYSTEMS, INC.; HON. J. LANDON OVERFIELD, Administrative Law Judge; and WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: November 6, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-000577-WC
PATRICIA ROBERTSON
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-97-001127
v.
SUMITOMO ELECTRIC WIRING SYSTEMS, INC.;
HON. J. LANDON OVERFIELD, Administrative Law Judge;
and WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, EMBERTON, and GUIDUGLI, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE:
The appellant, Patricia Robertson (Robertson),
appeals from the opinion of the Workers’ Compensation Board (the
Board) which affirmed the order of the Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) dismissing her appeal from the Arbitrator’s determination.
Finding no error, we affirm the opinion of the Board.
On May 6, 1997, Robertson filed a claim for workers’
compensation benefits based upon an alleged work-related injury.
Her claim was assigned to an arbitrator for adjudication.
On
August 14, 1997, the arbitrator entered her Benefit Determination
in which she dismissed Robertson’s claim for failure to prove
that her injury was work-related and for failure to give notice
as soon as practicable after the alleged injury.
The Benefit
Determination was deemed to be filed with the Department of
Workers’ Compensation on August 17, 1997, in accordance with KAR
803 25:010§1(6).1
On September 18, 1997, Robertson appealed the
arbitrator’s determination by filing a request for a hearing
before an administrative law judge.
However, on October 17,
1997, the ALJ dismissed her appeal on the ground that she had
failed to file her request within the thirty-day time period
mandated by KRS 342.275(1).
Robertson appealed the ALJ’s order
to the Board, and, on February 17, 1998, it affirmed the ALJ’s
dismissal of her appeal.
This appeal followed.
Robertson contends on appeal that the statutory time
period for filing an appeal from an arbitrator’s determination is
unduly burdensome, arbitrary, and capricious.
She argues that
requiring appeals to be filed within 30-days from the filing of
the arbitrator’s determination prevents her claim from be decided
on its merits.
Robertson urges this court to either abolish the
statutory time limitation or to apply the doctrine of substantial
compliance.
KRS 342.275(1) provides:
Within thirty (30) days after the filing of
the benefit review determination with the
commissioner, any party may appeal that
determination by filing a request for hearing
before an administrative law judge.
Proceedings before the administrative law
1
KAR 803 25:010§1(6) states that the final orders of
arbitrators, administrative law judges, and the workers’
compensation board are deemed “filed” three days after the date
set forth on the final order or opinion.
-2-
judge shall be de novo but subject to
penalties for unreasonable proceedings under
KRS 342.310.
The language of KRS 342.275 is mandatory and does not
provide for
any exceptions to the thirty-day filing requirement.
Moreover, “[u]nless timely appeal is filed as set forth in KRS
342.275, the written determination of the arbitrator shall be a
final order . . . . “ KRS 342.270(5).
Strict compliance with the
thirty-day filing period is not only mandatory but necessary to
achieve efficient and expeditious disposition of claims.
We
cannot conclude that the thirty-day time period is burdensome,
arbitrary, or capricious.
Indeed, this is the same time period
that parties to civil or criminal litigation have in which to
file an appeal from the judgments of the courts in Kentucky.
The fact that this is a “new step” in Workers’ Compensation
practice does not serve as a justification or excuse for
noncompliance.
In this case, Robertson’s request for a hearing before
an administrative law judge was filed with the Department of
Workers’ Compensation on September 18, 1997 — filed outside the
thirty-day time period.
As her appeal was not timely, the
arbitrator’s determination became final, and the ALJ properly
dismissed her request.
The fact that her request was dated
September 9, 1997, does not render it timely.
KRS 342.275(1)
specifically states that the request must be filed within thirty
days of the arbitrator’s determination.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the opinion of the
Board upholding the ALJ’s dismissal of Robertson’s appeal.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Wesley G. Lile
Bowling Green, KY
D. Gaines Penn
W. Cravens Priest III
Bowling Green, KY
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