FRUIT OF THE LOOM V. NANCY KING; SPECIAL FUND; and WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD AND ROBERT L. WHITTAKER, ACTING DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL FUND NANCY KING; FRUIT OF THE LOOM; RICHARD H. CAMPBELL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; and WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: December 23, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 1998-CA-000562-WC
FRUIT OF THE LOOM
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-96-008538
NANCY KING; SPECIAL FUND; and
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
AND
NO.
1998-CA-000564-WC
ROBERT L. WHITTAKER, ACTING
DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL FUND
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-96-008538
NANCY KING; FRUIT OF THE LOOM;
RICHARD H. CAMPBELL, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE; and WORKERS’
COMPENSATION BOARD
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
APPELLEES
HUDDLESTON, McANULTY, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
APPELLEES
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
Fruit of the Loom (FOL) and the Special Fund
each appeal from a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board
(Board).
The Board affirmed an Opinion, Award and Order granting
Nancy King (King) total disability benefits due to a mini-trauma
injury to her upper extremities.
FOL argues that the award of
total disability is not supported by substantial evidence; the
evidence compels a finding of prior active disability due to
King’s bladder condition; the claim is barred by the statute of
limitations; and King failed to provide due and timely notice of
her injury.
The Special Fund maintains that liability should
have been apportioned fully to FOL and that the ALJ lacked
authority to adjust King’s life expectancy.
We find no merit in
any of these contentions, and therefore affirm.
King worked for FOL for 27 years.
years, she was a sewing machine operator.
For the first 18
For the next eight she
worked as an auditor, and she last worked again as a sewing
machine operator until March 6, 1995, when she quit.
There is no
question that King suffered from bladder problems after a
hysterectomy and that she was limited to lifting five pounds,
thus resulting in her shift from sewing machine operator to
auditor.
In fact, when she returned to her original job, the
bladder condition again brought her problems, and she eventually
even had her bladder removed.
However, it is equally clear from
the evidence that King suffers from bilateral tarsal tunnel
syndrome, bilateral ankle pain, and bilateral wrist tendinitis.
The administrative law judge (ALJ) found that King’s
repetitive motion/cumulative stress injury to her upper
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extremities manifested on February 10, 1995 and became disabling
on March 7, 1995, the day after she ceased working, and rendered
her 100% occupationally disabled.
He apportioned liability
equally between FOL and the Special Fund based on the opinion of
Dr. Jerold N. Friesen.
The ALJ determined that FOL received due
and timely notice of the injury and that because the condition
did not manifest until February 10, 1995, the filing of King’s
claim in December 1996 was not barred by the statute of
limitations.
He further upheld his finding of total disability
based on the whole-man theory, pointing out that King was totally
disabled by her upper extremity injury regardless of her bladder
condition.
The Board affirmed and so do we.
In reviewing a Board opinion, our duty is “to correct
the Board only where [we] perceive[] the Board has overlooked or
misconstrued controlling statutes or precedent, or committed an
error in assessing the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross
injustice.”
Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, Ky., 827 S.W.2d
685, 687-88 (1992).
The ALJ’s determination of total disability was based
on the medical opinions of Drs. Friesen and James Templin, King’s
length of employment, educational level, and lack of transferable
skills.
We agree with the Board that the ALJ’s finding is
supported by substantial evidence.
708 S.W.2d 641 (1986).
Special Fund v. Francis, Ky.,
Dr. Templin diagnosed bilateral tarsal
tunnel syndrome and bilateral wrist tendinitis due to workrelated activities.
He assessed a 2% functional impairment
rating and felt she should avoid prolonged walking and standing,
-3-
while limiting repetitive use of her arms and hands for pushing,
pulling, twisting, and carrying.
Dr. Friesen found bilateral
carpal tunnel syndrome, possible ulnar nerve compression,
osteoarthritis, possible collagen vascular disease, and possible
rheumatoid arthritis.
He believed her incapable of performing
repetitive-use activities of the hands such as sewing or keying.
He assessed a 23% functional impairment rating, with one-half due
to a preexisting generalized chronic inflammatory process.
These medical opinions, when viewed in conjunction with
King’s eighth grade education and lack of transferable skills,
certainly support a finding of total disability based solely on
King’s upper extremity condition.
Therefore, based on the whole
man theory, King’s disabling bladder condition is irrelevant.
Schneider v. Putnam, Ky., 579 S.W.2d 370 (1979).
Nor do we find merit in FOL’s arguments regarding
timely notice and statute of limitations.
KRS 342.185 requires
that notice of the accident be given to the employer as soon as
practicable after the happening thereof.
While King suffered
numerous instances of discomfort in her hands and wrists over the
years, the condition did not bother her to the point that it
prevented her from completing her job until February 10, 1995.
King notified FOL of the problem on that date.
Therefore, we
find no error on the ALJ’s part in finding that notice was due
and timely.
Similarly, the statute of limitations does not begin to
run on a cumulative trauma injury until the disabling reality of
the injury becomes manifest.
Randall Co./Randall Div. of
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Textron, Inc. v. Pendland, Ky. App., 770 S.W.2d 687 (1988).
Although King experienced pain in her hands and wrists as far
back as the 1970s, it was not until March 1995 that any definite
disability resulted from the mini traumas.
Accordingly, her
claim, filed in December 1996, was timely.
The Special Fund contends that apportioning any
liability to it was an error of law.
It urges that Haycraft v.
Corhart Refractories Co., Ky., 544 S.W.2d 222 (1976) governs the
method of apportionment when the injury is cumulative in nature
and the worker’s entire employment was with the same employer.
We agree with the Special Fund.
However, Haycraft states that in
such cases, the Special Fund is to be apportioned that amount of
disability that probably would exist regardless of the work, and
the employer is apportioned the remainder--the percentage
attributable to work.
In this case, the ALJ found persuasive Dr. Friesen’s
opinion that King’s injury and accompanying impairment were due
to the arousal or aggravation of a preexisting chronic
inflammatory process, whether that be an autoimmune disease or a
connective tissue disease.
This opinion was based on a positive
ANA test and a positive rheumatoid factor.
This is substantial
evidence upon which the ALJ was free to rely.
When applied to
the Haycraft formula, the evidence supports a finding that King
would probably have been disabled to some extent due to the
preexisting condition regardless of the work.
The ALJ found this
to be fifty percent, and we cannot substitute our judgment on
that finding.
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The Special Fund’s final argument is that the ALJ
lacked the authority to adjust King’s life expectancy.
It argues
that deducting 30.57 weeks--the period of time between King’s
forty-fourth birthday and March 7, 1995, the date her benefits
commenced--is not authorized by statute or regulation.
The
Special Fund contends that actuarially speaking, a person 44
years, 0 weeks old has the same life expectancy as someone 44
years, 30.57 weeks old.
The ALJ determined:
Per the life expectancy table set forth
in 803 KAR 25:036, plaintiff’s life
expectancy as of the date of the onset of her
total and permanent disability was 1,898.63
weeks (1,929.20 weeks, her life expectancy on
the day she turned 44 years of age, minus
30.57 weeks, the time which elapsed between
her birthday in August, 1994, and March 7,
1995).
The Board affirmed, finding no support in the regulations for the
Special Fund’s assertion that the tables mandate that the same
figure be utilized for the entire year at issue.
We find guidance in Stovall v. Great Flame Coal Co.,
Inc., Ky. App., 684 S.W.2d 3 (1984), which recognized the
importance of using the most accurate evidence to determine the
duration of lifetime benefits.
Furthermore, 803 KAR 25:036
states that it establishes guidelines for the ALJ to apportion
benefits between the Special Fund and an employer.
With these
two tenets in mind, we believe that the ALJ made the most
accurate finding of life expectancy for purposes of
apportionment.
Logic dictates that some thirty weeks into a
person’s forty-fourth year, her life expectancy is that much less
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than the day she turned forty-four.
Accordingly, we find no
error with the ALJ’s finding.
For the reasons stated above, the decision of the
Workers’ Compensation Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT/APPELLEE,
FRUIT OF THE LOOM:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, NANCY
KING:
Jeff V. Layson III
Bowling Green, Kentucky
Jackson W. Watts
Versailles, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT/APPELLEE,
SPECIAL FUND:
David W. Barr
Louisville, Kentucky
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