TAYLOR GROUP-CLASSIC COOKIES (Insured by ITT Hartford) V. TERESA RAYBURN; SPECIAL FUND; TAYLOR GROUP-CLASSIC COOKIES (Insured by Cincinnati Insurance Company); HON. J. LANDON OVERFIELD, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; and WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: November 13, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-000306-WC
TAYLOR GROUP-CLASSIC COOKIES
(Insured by ITT Hartford)
v.
PETITION FOR REVIEW
OF A DECISION OF
THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
WC-95-008987 & WC-90-032336
TERESA RAYBURN;
SPECIAL FUND;
TAYLOR GROUP-CLASSIC
COOKIES (Insured by
Cincinnati Insurance Company);
HON. J. LANDON OVERFIELD,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; and
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
AND:
APPELLEES
NO. 1998-CA-000558-WC
TERESA RAYBURN
v.
APPELLANT
CROSS-APPELLANT
CROSS-PETITION FOR REVIEW
OF A DECISION OF
THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
WC-95-008987 & WC-90-032336
TAYLOR GROUP-CLASSIC COOKIES
(Insured by ITT Hartford);
SPECIAL FUND;
TAYLOR GROUP-CLASSIC COOKIES
(Insured by Cincinnati Insurance Company);
HON. J. LANDON OVERFIELD,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; and
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
OPINION AND ORDER
1) AFFIRMING ON APPEAL
2) DISMISSING CROSS-APPEAL
CROSS-APPELLEES
* * * * *
BEFORE:
COMBS, EMBERTON and GUIDUGLI, Judges.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE:
The Taylor Group-Classic Cookies (The Taylor
Group) as insured by ITT Hartford (ITT) petitions for review of
an opinion of the Workers’ Compensation Board (Board) entered
January 12, 1998, affirming the opinion of the Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ), and an order overruling a petition for
reconsideration.
The sole issue raised in the petition is the
responsibility for medical payments as between the former insurer
of The Taylor Group, ITT, and a subsequent insurer, Cincinnati
Insurance Company (CIC).
The claimant, Teresa Rayburn (Rayburn),
cross-petitions for review of the ALJ’s decision, affirmed by the
Board, denying her claim for an award of permanent partial
disability (PPD) payments.
For the reasons set forth below, we
affirm the Board on the petition and dismiss the cross-petition
as untimely.
Rayburn was initially injured on the job at The Taylor
Group in December 1988, and underwent low back surgery with Dr.
James Russell in April 1989.
She entered into a settlement
agreement with ITT and the Special Fund for benefits based upon a
30% PPD, apportioned 50/50, which agreement was approved by the
ALJ.
Rayburn returned to work with only periodic flair-ups until
February 5, 1995, when she experienced pain radiating down her
right leg while lifting a box of Pepsi syrup.
Rayburn returned
to Dr. Russell for additional treatment, was treated
conservatively, and was released to return to work with
restrictions on July 31, 1995.
Rayburn was paid TTD benefits of
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$190.18 per week from February 5, 1995, through July 31, 1995, by
CIC, The Taylor Group’s insurer on February 5, 1995.
Rayburn moved to reopen her 1988 claim on September 5,
1995.
This motion was supported by only Rayburn’s affidavit
indicating the restrictions placed upon her by Dr. Russell.
affidavit or report of Dr. Russell was submitted.
No
The Chief ALJ
determined that Rayburn failed to establish a prima facie showing
of a worsening of her condition and denied the motion.
On
appeal, the Board affirmed in an opinion rendered March 8, 1996.
On July 16, 1996, Rayburn again moved to reopen her
1988 claim.
Rayburn filed an affidavit claiming she was unable
to return to work after the February 5, 1995 incident.
Rayburn
also submitted a vocational report from Eckman Freeman and
Associates and a medical report from Dr. Russell.
Dr. Russell’s
medical report authorized Rayburn to return to light duty work
with restrictions of no lifting over 25 pounds; no stooping,
bending or climbing; no moving of equipment or machinery; and
sedentary work only.
The Chief ALJ again denied the motion in an
order entered September 4, 1996.
The Chief ALJ determined that
Rayburn had again failed to present a prima facie case.
In his
opinion, the Chief ALJ stated:
While Plaintiff points to attempts to
obtain vocational placement and a list of
light duty restrictions from Dr. Russell, Dr.
Russell’s restrictions do not indicate that
they were imposed as a result of the 1988
work injury and the vocational efforts were
apparently undertaken by the insurance
carrier for an alleged 1995 injury.
That order was initially appealed by Rayburn, then withdrawn.
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On August 22, 1996, Rayburn filed a new claim for the
February 5, 1995 incident.
At this time ITT moved to reopen the
1988 injury claim to contest certain medical benefits arising out
of the 1995 incident.
hearing held.
Both motions were granted and thereafter a
The evidence presented at the administrative
hearing consisted of medical reports and deposition of Dr.
Russell and Rayburn’s testimony.
The ALJ found Rayburn’s low
back condition and need for restrictions and occupational
disability that accompanied her condition were caused by the 1988
injury.
The ALJ relied upon Dr. Russell’s testimony that the
February 5, 1995 incident was not a new injury but an
exacerbation of Rayburn’s condition caused by the 1988 injury.
The ALJ further determined that Rayburn had failed to prove she
had an occupational disability resulting from the February 5,
1995 incident.
Dr. Russell testified that the restrictions
recommended after the February 5, 1995 incident were essentially
the same as those he made in 1989.1
Accordingly, by opinion and
order entered August 8, 1997, the ALJ dismissed Rayburn’s injury
claim, and resolved the medical fee dispute initiated by ITT in
favor of Rayburn.
The ALJ ordered ITT to pay all medical
expenses incurred for the cure and relief of the effects of
Rayburn’s 1988 injury as exacerbated by the February 5, 1995
incident.
Both Rayburn’s and ITT’s petitions for reconsideration
were denied by the ALJ.
Thereafter, both Rayburn and ITT
1
Dr. Russell testified that he had placed restrictions on
Rayburn after the 1989 surgery, but did not put them in writing
pursuant to Rayburn’s request.
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appealed to the Board.
Rayburn appealed that portion of the
opinion finding that she had not suffered a compensable injury in
1995, and ITT appealed that portion of the opinion finding it
responsible for the contested medical expenses.
The Board
affirmed the decision of the ALJ by opinion rendered January 12,
1998.
ITT filed a timely petition to this Court within thirty
days as required by CR 76.25(2).
Thereafter on March 10, 1998, Rayburn submitted a
cross-petition for review to this Court requesting that,
If, as a result of deciding this appeal
[ITT’s], this court determines that Ms.
Rayburn did suffer a compensable injury on
February 5, 1995, Ms. Rayburn asks that this
court remand this case to the Administrative
Law Judge to determine an appropriate
disability award based on the February 5,
1995 injury.
On April 1, 1997, CIC responded with a motion to dismiss
Rayburn’s petition as improper and untimely.
By order entered
May 26, 1998 by a motion panel of this Court, the motion to
dismiss was denied.
That denial was however, “without prejudice
and subject to re-visit of the issue raised in the motion by the
merits panel, at the panel’s discretion.”
Citing Knott v. Crown
colony Farm, Inc., Ky., 865 S.W.2d 326, 328-9 (1993).
The standard of review before this Court is whether the
Board has overlooked or misconstrued controlling statutes or
precedent or committed error in assessing the evidence so
flagrant as to cause gross injustice.
Western Baptist Hosp. v.
Kelly, Ky., 827 S.W.2d 685 (1992).
In the medical fee dispute submitted to this Court by
ITT, the only question of law raised is “which carrier is
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responsible for the payment of medical benefits... .”
a timely response to ITT’s petition.
CIC filed
Both ITT and CIC rely on
Calloway County Fiscal Court v. Winchester, Ky. App., 557 S.W.2d
216 (1977), in support of their positions.
We agree that
Calloway County Fiscal Court, is controlling and supports the
conclusion reached by the ALJ.
In that case, the claimant, Winchester, was injured on
July 30, 1974, while employed by Calloway County Fiscal Court.
Winchester received TTD benefits and medical expenses from the
County’s insurance carrier until November 23, 1974, when he
returned to light duty work.
Winchester subsequently obtained
employment under the Comprehensive Employment Training Act (CETA)
which was insured by a different carrier.
Winchester then
sustained a further injury during that CETA employment.
This
Court affirmed the award of benefits for the second injury
against Calloway County, noting that the second injury had been
labeled by the fact finder as “an aggravation of the first
injury.”
We stated that the finding that the second injury was
an aggravation of the first was an implicit finding that the
second injury did not result in liability upon the subsequent
employer [CETA].
Here, although Dr. Russell did label the February 5,
1995 incident an injury, he also clearly testified that the
February incident was a temporary aggravation and exacerbation of
the underlying condition caused by the 1988 injury.
Dr. Russell
also testified he could not determine any additional increase in
Rayburn’s functional impairment as a result of the February 1995
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incident.
His restrictions on Rayburn’s return to work were
almost identical to those imposed after the 1989 surgery.
The
testimony of Dr. Russell is the only medical testimony in the
record.
His testimony is evidence of substance which cannot be
said to compel a different result on the issue of responsibility
for medical benefits.
Special Fund v. Francis, Ky., 708 S.W.2d
641 (1986).
Therefore, we affirm the opinion of the Workers’
Compensation Board entered January 12, 1998, affirming the ALJ’s
determination that ITT is responsible for the medical fees in
dispute.
CIC argues the cross-petition filed by Rayburn is an
untimely and improper appeal and requests dismissal of the crosspetition.
Although CR 76.25(9) permits a party to file a cross-
petition within 20 days following the filing of a petition by
another party, the relief requested by Rayburn is not dependent
upon or responsive to the medical fee dispute issue presented by
ITT’s petition.
In fact, no relief of any kind against ITT is
sought in Rayburn’s cross-petition.
The purpose of the cross-
petition is to obtain an award of income benefits from CIC.
CIC cites Department of Economic Security v. Sizemore,
Ky., 741 S.W.2d 733 (1971), for the proposition that a direct
appeal must be filed in a Workers’ Compensation case to preserve
a claim for review.
There, the employer appealed a decision of
the Board to the circuit court based on claimed errors relating
to the sufficiency of the medical proof.
Thereafter, the Special
Fund, beyond the limitation period for appealing directly from
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the Board’s decision, filed a cross-claim to the employer’s
appeal, claiming error in the weekly rate awarded the employee
against the Special fund.
The circuit court dismissed the
Special Fund’s cross-appeal as untimely filed. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the circuit court holding:
[W]e are of the opinion [the Special Fund]
has not properly preserved the error. The
Special Fund did not take a direct appeal
from the Board’s order to the circuit court.
Only the employer...appealed. The Special
Fund tendered a ‘Cross-Claim’ in the
employer’s appeal seeking to have the award
against it fixed at $6.41 per week instead of
$12.82 per week... . We think the lower
court properly dismissed the ‘Cross-Claim’ as
being an attempted appeal from the order of
the Board after the 20-day period prescribed
[for direct appeal]... . If the Board erred
in calculation, the Special Fund had recourse
by direct appeal to the circuit court. It
failed to do that. Its right to appeal in no
way depended on whether the employer
appealed.
Id. at 735.
We believe the cross-petition authorized by CR 76.25(9)
is one filed in response to a petition that would, if granted,
affect the rights of the Cross-Petitioner.
We believe this
interpretation is supported by the fact that the civil rules do
not permit the filing of a response to a cross-petition.
No
response is authorized because the rule contemplates the petition
and cross-petition will address the same issue(s).
If a cross-
petitioner (such as Rayburn) were allowed to assert claims for
relief against a party (CIC) other than the petitioner (ITT),
then the non-appealing party against whom claims for relief were
asserted in the cross-petition (CIC) would have to be given the
opportunity to respond.
The income benefit issued raised by
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Rayburn against CIC was not raised in ITT’s petition, and
therefore Rayburn had 30 days within which to appeal the decision
on that issue under CR 76.25:
....
(2) Time for Petition. Within 30 days of the
date upon which the Board enters its final
decision pursuant to KRS 342.285(3) any party
aggrieved by that decision may file a
petition for review by the Court of Appeals
and pay the filing fee required by CR
76.42(2)(a)(xi). Failure to file the
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petition within the time allowed shall
require dismissal of the petition. (Emphasis
Added).
The issue of CIC’s liability to Rayburn for income
benefits was subject to appeal for 30 days following entry of the
Board’s January 12, 1998, order.
Thereafter, this Court lost
jurisdiction to consider the issue of income benefits.
CR 76.25;
Rainwater v. Jasper & Jasper Mobile Homes, Ky. App., 810 S.W.2d
63 (1991); Staton v. Poly Weave Bag Co., Inc., Ky., 930 S.W.2d
397 (1996); Department of Economic Security, supra.
Accordingly, we order the cross-petition dismissed.
ALL CONCUR.
/s/ Daniel T. Guidugli
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
ENTERED:
November 13, 1998
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT, THE
TAYLOR GROUP-CLASSIC COOKIES
(As Insured by ITT Hartford)
IN NO. 98-0306:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, TERESA
RAYBURN:
Leslie Rosenbaum
Lexington, KY
Stephen D. Goodrum
Lexington, KY
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, SPECIAL
FUND:
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT, THE
TAYLOR GROUP-CLASSIC COOKIES
(As Insured by the Cincinnati
Ins. Co.) IN NO. 98-0306:
David W. Barr
Labor Cabinet
Louisville, KY
Stephanie D. Ross, Esq.
Lexington, KY
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