CHARLES COPELAND V. SPECIAL FUND, HON. MARK WEBSTER, Administrative Law Judge; and WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
November 20, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
No.
1998-CA-000141-WC
CHARLES COPELAND
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. 96-004462-WC
SPECIAL FUND, HON. MARK
WEBSTER, Administrative Law
Judge; and WORKERS'
COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * *
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, JOHNSON, and KNOPF, Judges.
KNOPF, JUDGE: The appellant, Charles Copeland, appeals a decision
by the Workers’ Compensation Board (Board) affirming an opinion
and order by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), denying his
motion to reopen a claim for retraining incentive benefits (RIB).
Copeland administratively preserved his challenge to the
constitutionality of KRS 342.125(2)(a) in the proceedings below.
This Court finds that the statute was constitutionally applied to
Copeland, and hence, affirm the Board.
Copeland is a fifty-one (51) year old coal miner who
worked in the coal industry for seventeen (17) years.
He last
worked for Wolf Creek Colleries on September 30, 1995.
a claim and received an award of RIB in 1991.
He filed
Following
additional exposure, he filed a motion to reopen in 1996.
The
reopening was only against the Special Fund because Wolf Creek
had settled its liability prior to the filing of the motion.
Copeland presented three (3) issues to the ALJ: (1)
whether KRS 342.125 is constitutional; (2) whether there has been
a progression of the disease on reopening; and (3) whether
Copeland would be entitled to any benefits under KRS 342.732(1).
The ALJ properly declined to address the constitutionality of the
statute, citing lack of jurisdiction to consider the issue.
Blue
Diamond Coal Co. v. Cornett, Ky., 189 S.W.2d 983 (1945).
Regarding the progression of the disease, the ALJ first found
that Copeland failed to show a progression of his previously
diagnosed occupational disease.
The ALJ further held that
Copeland failed to prove the development of respiratory
impairment due to pneumoconiosis.
The Board affirmed the ALJ’s
factual findings, and likewise declined to address the
constitutional issue.
Copeland now appeals, raising only the
constitutional issue.
Copeland argues that KRS 342.125(2)(a)1 violates the
equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution and
the Kentucky Constitution because the statute requires a higher
1
Copeland is challenging the constitutionality of the 1994
version of KRS 342.125(2)(a). The substantive provisions of the
subsection have been modified and are now located at KRS
342.125(5)(a).
-2-
level of proof upon reopening than is required on an initial
claim for benefits.
First, we note the ALJ’s finding that
Copeland would not be entitled to any benefits under KRS
324.732(1).
Copeland has not challenged this finding on appeal.
As a result, he has not established that the statutory scheme
subjected him to an arbitrary distinction.
Furthermore, we find Copeland’s constitutional argument
to be without merit.
The General Assembly may properly classify
in its legislation, provided the "objective is legitimate and the
classification is rationally related to that objective.”
Kentucky Harlan Coal Co. v. Holmes, Ky., 872 S.W.2d 446 (1994).
KRS 342.125(2)(a) requires a prima facie showing of both a
progression of the disease and either the development or the
progression of a respiratory impairment in order for a worker to
prevail on a motion to reopen a RIB award.
Campbell v.
Universal Mines, Ky., 963 S.W.2d 623, 625 (1998).
There is
nothing arbitrary in a statutory scheme which requires workers
who have previously received an award to prove that their
pulmonary impairment has increased.
The legislature’s purpose for providing RIB is to
encourage coal workers who have contracted pneumoconiosis to
leave the mining industry before they become disabled.
Co. v. Baker, Ky. App., 918 S.W.2d 236, 238 (1996).
Kem Coal
By contrast,
when a claimant seeks an increase in compensation because of a
change in occupational disability in a reopening proceeding, he
must prove that a significant change in occupational disability
-3-
has occurred, and that the disability is the result of the injury
or disease which was the subject of the original award.
Coal Co. v. Gossett, Ky., 819 S.W.2d 33, 36 (1991).
Peabody
To eliminate
the distinction between an initial claim and a reopening would
destroy finality of prior awards.
Therefore, this Court
concludes that the statutory scheme set out in KRS 342.125(2)(a)
is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
Accordingly, the opinion and order by the Workers’
Compensation Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jeffery Hinkle
Inez, Kentucky
Joel D. Zakem
Louisville, Kentucky
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