BRIAN DALE HALE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: December 18, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-003247-MR
BRIAN DALE HALE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS O. CASTLEN, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NOS. 96-CR-00172 & 97-CR-00297
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, DYCHE, AND GARDNER, JUDGES.
DYCHE, JUDGE:
This is an appeal by Brian Hale from an order of
the Daviess Circuit Court denying his petition pursuant to
Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 for postconviction relief.
We affirm.
On May 7, 1996, in Case No. 96-CR-00172, Hale was
indicted for first-degree burglary, KRS 511.020; second-degree
assault, KRS 508.020; first-degree wanton endangerment, KRS
508.060; and first-degree criminal mischief, KRS 512.020.
The
criminal conduct underlying this indictment occurred on April 6,
1996.
On August 5, 1997, in Case No. 97-CR-00297, Hale was
indicted for murder, KRS 507.020; first-degree assault, KRS
508.010; and first-degree wanton endangerment, KRS 508.060.
The
criminal conduct underlying this indictment occurred on July 2,
1997, when, while driving under the influence, Hale was involved
in a car crash, which caused the death of his daughter and
seriously injured the mother of the child.
On August 18, 1997, pursuant to an offer by the
Commonwealth on a plea of guilty, Hale filed motions to enter
guilty pleas on both indictments.
Under the plea bargain, Hale
agreed to plead guilty to all counts and, in return, the
Commonwealth offered to recommend concurrent sentences resulting
in a total of ten years to serve in Case No. 96-CR-00172 and
concurrent sentences resulting in a total of ten years to serve
in Case No. 97-CR-00297.
The sentences under each indictment,
however, were to be served consecutively, for a total of twenty
years.
The trial court accepted the plea agreement, and judgment
and sentence were entered in both cases on September 15, 1997.
On November 3, 1997, Hale filed a motion to set aside and vacate
his sentences pursuant to RCr 11.42.
trial court denied the motion.
Following a hearing, the
This appeal followed.
Hale argues that the trial court erred by denying his
motion to set aside the guilty plea; he asserts that the plea was
not made knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently.
Specifically,
appellant alleges that he was emotionally distraught over the
death of his daughter only six weeks prior to the plea and could
not possibly have understood the complexities and subtleties of
the charges pending against him.
In addition, appellant alleges
that his trial counsel smelled of alcohol on the day of the plea
and appeared to be under the influence.
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A guilty plea is valid if it represents a voluntary and
intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open
to the defendant.
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.
Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970).
The record must reflect that
the court questioned the accused and that he had a full
understanding of what a guilty plea implied and of its
consequences.
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S. Ct.
1709, 1712, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274, 279 (1969).
The validity of a
guilty plea must be determined by considering the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the plea -- not by "reference to some
magic incantation" recited at the time the plea is taken.
Kotas
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 565 S.W.2d 445, 447 (1978).
In the instant case, appellant signed a Motion to Enter
a Guilty Plea, Administrative Office of the Courts Form AOC-491.
This form specifically advised appellant of those constitutional
rights which would be waived upon a plea of guilty.
The form
further included a certificate of counsel wherein his trial
counsel attested that he had discussed this document with
appellant, and, to the best of his knowledge and belief,
appellant understood the documents and was entering his plea
freely, knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
Moreover, appellant signed the form only after being
advised by the trial court that by signing the forms he was
acknowledging that he had read the forms, understood the forms,
agreed with the forms, and wanted to plead guilty because he was
guilty.
Further, appellant’s counsel stated that he had
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discussed matters with appellant and believed he understood his
rights.
Prior to the trial court’s acceptance of the plea,
appellant acknowledged, in open court, that he had spoken with
his attorney; that he had all the time to confer privately with
his attorney that he felt was necessary; that he had no
complaints of any kind as to the representation afforded by his
attorney; and that he was fully satisfied with the services
provided by his attorney.
“Solemn declarations made in open
court carry a strong presumption of verity.”
Blackledge v.
Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74, 97 S. Ct. 1621, 1629, 52 L. Ed. 2d 136,
147 (1977).
It is clear from the record that appellant was accorded
due process throughout the course of entering his guilty plea,
and that he was properly made aware of his rights so as to make a
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary decision to plead guilty.
Boykin v. Alabama, supra; Commonwealth v. Crawford, Ky., 789
S.W.2d 779 (1990).
Hale’s second claim is that his trial counsel smelled
of alcohol on the day of the plea and appeared to be under the
influence.
In its order denying appellant’s motion, the trial
court stated that it “finds nothing to support [appellant’s]
claim.”
In reviewing a circuit court's decision on an RCr 11.42
motion, its findings of fact made after a hearing are binding
unless they are clearly erroneous.
Bell v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
395 S.W.2d 784, 785 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1020, 86 S.
Ct. 640, 15 L. Ed. 2d 535 (1966).
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See also Commonwealth v.
Payton, Ky., 945 S.W.2d 424, 425 (1997); CR 52.01.
We have
reviewed the tape of the plea hearing, and are unable to conclude
that the finding of the trial court was clearly erroneous.
The judgment of the Daviess Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Albert W. Barber, Jr.
Owensboro, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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