COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPEALS v. JAMES H. MCCLISTER
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RENDERED: December 18, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
NO.
1997-CA-003129-MR
and
1997-CA-003130-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLANT
APPEALS FROM RUSSELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDIE LOVELACE, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 97-CR-000110
v.
JAMES H. MCCLISTER
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, DYCHE, AND GARDNER, JUDGES.
DYCHE, JUDGE.
These are interlocutory appeals by the
Commonwealth of Kentucky (Commonwealth) from orders of the
Russell Circuit Court granting the motion of appellee, James
McClister, to suppress certain prior convictions for purposes of
enhancing the charges or penalties against him.
We affirm.
On July 8, 1997, McClister was indicted for, among
other things, operating a motor vehicle while his license was
suspended or revoked (OSL), third offense, a Class D Felony.
189A.090.
The incident leading to this indictment occurred on
KRS
April 8, 1997.
Prior to this, appellant had the following
relevant convictions:1
Influence (DUI);
(1) March 1993 - Driving Under the
(2) May 1994 - OSL; (3) August 1994 - OSL; (4)
December 1996 - OSL.
McClister, citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395
S.W.2d 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 274 (1969), moved the trial
court to suppress the prior convictions for purposes of enhancing
any penalties under this indictment.
Following hearings on the
matter, the trial court granted the motion and struck the
previous OSL convictions.
These appeals followed.
The Commonwealth first argues that the trial court
abused its discretion by basing its ruling on an unpublished
decision of this Court.
On June 14, 1996, this Court rendered an
opinion, to be published, in Eaken v. Commonwealth, No. 95-CA000511-MR.
In August 1997, the Supreme Court ordered the Eaken
decision de-published.
The de-publication of Eaken occurred
three months prior to the trial court’s decision in this case.
Opinions that are not to be published shall not be cited or used
as authority in any other case in any court of this state.
CR
76.28(4)(c). Regency Pheasant Run Ltd. v. Karem, Ky., 860 S.W.2d
755, 758 (1993).
It was inappropriate for the trial court to
base a ruling on an unpublished case.
not compel a reversal.
However, this alone does
An appellate court is “bound to affirm if
the trial court reached the correct result but, in doing so,
applied the wrong reasoning.”
S.W.2d 325, 326 (1985).
Friend v. Rees, Ky. App., 696
Accordingly, we will examine the issue
on the merits.
1
The dates refer to the dates of the violations.
-2-
Each of McClister’s prior OSL offenses was charged
under KRS 189A.090(2)(a) - OSL first offense.
is a Class B misdemeanor.
OSL first offense
A sentence of imprisonment is possible
for a Class B misdemeanor, but may not exceed ninety days.
532.090(2).
KRS
The district court documents for the prior
convictions filed into the record indicate that McClister pled
guilty and was fined $50.00 for each of his first two
convictions.
The documents relating to his third conviction
indicate a $50.00 fine and “10 days suspended 1 yr.”
The trial
court did not make findings relating to any actual imprisonment
relating to these convictions; however, there is no contention
that McClister was actually imprisoned as a result of his prior
OSL convictions.
On appeal, there is also no contention by the
Commonwealth that McClister was actually represented by counsel
in the course of any of the three prior convictions.2
Where no sentence of imprisonment is imposed, a
defendant charged with a misdemeanor has no Sixth Amendment right
to counsel.
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 99 S. Ct. 1158, 59
L. Ed. 2d 383 (1979).
“[A]n uncounseled conviction valid under
Scott may be relied upon to enhance the sentence for a subsequent
offense, even though that sentence entails imprisonment.”
Nichols v. U.S., 511 U.S. 738, 746-747, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1927,
128 L. Ed. 2d. 745, 754 (1994).
Thus, from a federal
constitutional perspective, though McClister was without counsel
when he pled guilty to his first three OSL charges, he in fact
2
The Commonwealth did, however, raise this challenge in
the suppression hearings.
-3-
had no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in those cases, and those
prior convictions, valid under Scott, may be relied upon to
Nichols, supra.3
enhance the current OSL charge to a felony.
Kentucky
authority, however, mandates a broader right
to counsel than the U.S. Constitution.
The Sixth Amendment
requires appointment of counsel only in those cases where the
defendant is actually incarcerated, Scott v. Illinois, supra,
whereas Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 3.05(2)
entitles a defendant to counsel if the crime he is charged with
is punishable by confinement.
First offense OSL, a Class B
misdemeanor, is punishable by up to ninety days’ imprisonment.
KRS 532.090(2).
McClister was therefore entitled to trial
counsel in each of his prior OSL proceedings.
This right may be
intelligently, competently, understandingly, and voluntarily
waived by the accused.
299 (1957).
Blevins v. Tartar, Ky., 306 S.W.2d 297,
However, the record does not show that McClister
waived his right to counsel.
Nichols recognized that States may prescribe broader
rights to counsel, noting, “many, if not a majority, of States
guarantee the right to counsel whenever imprisonment is
3
McClister argues that Nichols is distinguishable
because “in [Nichols] the previous conviction was merely used in
sentencing the defendant.” To the contrary, a defendant’s guilt
is determined under 189A.090(1) by proof that he operated a motor
vehicle while his license was revoked or suspended for a prior
OSL. The penalties are then delineated in 189A.090(2), the
severity of punishment increasing with the number of violations
of subsection one. Consequently, subsection two "is nothing more
than a sentencing statute, with provision for enhancing the
penalty for subsequent offenders." See Commonwealth v. Ramsey,
Ky., 920 S.W.2d 526, 528 (1996)(citation omitted)(explaining that
subsection four of KRS 189A.010 is “nothing more than a
sentencing statute” for subsequent DUI offenders).
-4-
authorized by statute, rather than actually imposed.”
Nichols v.
U.S., 511 U.S. at 748, 114 S. Ct. at 1928, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 755,
n. 12.
Pursuant to the framework of Nichols, if a defendant was
entitled to counsel in a prior misdemeanor conviction, and did
not have counsel or intelligently waive his right to counsel,
then the conviction may not be used to enhance a subsequent
offense.
Applying this principle to this case, McClister was
entitled to trial counsel in each of his three prior OSL cases,
RCr 3.05(2), but did not have counsel and did not waive his right
to counsel, and hence the prior convictions may not be used to
enhance his current OSL charge.
The order of the Russell Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Elizabeth Shaw
Richmond, Kentucky
William L. Daniel II
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-5-
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