SHERILL HARSTON v. KENTUCKY STATE PAROLE BOARD
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RENDERED: September 11, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-002996-MR
SHERILL HARSTON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM L. GRAHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-01569
KENTUCKY STATE PAROLE BOARD
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, EMBERTON AND GUIDUGLI, JUDGES
EMBERTON, JUDGE This is an appeal from an order of the Franklin
Circuit Court dismissing Sherill Harston’s petition for a writ of
mandamus seeking, inter alia, an order declaring that he is
immediately eligible for parole consideration.
We affirm.
In December 1978 Harston was convicted of various
offenses and sentenced to 124 years imprisonment.
Harston first
appeared before the parole board in January 1985.
At the
conclusion of the hearing the parole board deferred Harston for
eight years.
In 1993 Harston was again before the board and
received a deferment of six years.
In August 1997 Harston filed
for reconsideration of the deferment.
The board denied the
request.
In October 1997 Harston filed a petition for a writ of
mandamus.
Harston maintained that he is entitled to an immediate
parole consideration because of alleged ex post facto violations.
More specifically he argued that his eight-year 1985 deferment
was impermissible because, at the time of his conviction, the
maximum deferment under the applicable Kentucky Parole Board
regulations was six years.
Harston also alleged that pursuant to
the reconsideration rules in effect in 1993 he should be eligible
for reconsideration every 30 months; however, Harston does not
raise this issue on appeal and we accordingly do not address it.
Prior to the appellee’s answer, the trial court, sua sponte
dismissed the petition and fined Harston $20.00 pursuant to KRS
454.405, holding that the petition was legally without merit.
This appeal followed.
The trial court, citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261,
105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L. Ed. 254 (1985), held that the claims
surrounding the 1985 deferment were barred by the statute of
limitations.1
Since this action was not filed pursuant to 42
1
Wilson, supra, established that the statute of limitations for 42
U.S.C. §. 1983 claims is governed by the forum state’s personal injury
statute of limitations. While the appellant’s petition was styled as
a writ of mandamus, the trial court, apparently, treated his filing as
a § 1983 claim. While never specifically approved, trial courts have
(continued...)
-2-
U.S.C. § 1983, the one-year statute of limitations under Wilson
may not apply.
Nevertheless, we agree with the trial court that
appellant’s claim is time barred. There is a five-year statute of
limitations applicable to an action for an injury to the rights
of a plaintiff, not arising on contract, and not otherwise
enumerated in KRS Chapter 413.
KRS 413.120(6).
Thus, at best,
appellant was entitled to a five-year period in which to commence
his action from the time his cause of action accrued.
Any cause of action relating to the Board’s 1985
deferment accrued in 1985.
A cause of action accrues when a
party “knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the
basis of his cause of action.”
273 (6th Cir 1984).
Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262,
The “exercise of reasonable diligence”
toward the discovery of such an injury is required on behalf of
individuals who wish to use it as the basis for a cause of
action. Id.
In evaluating an individual case, courts “look to
the event that should have alerted the typical lay person to
protect his or her rights.” Kuhle Bros., Inc. v. County of
Geauga, 103 F.3d 516, 520 (6th Cir. 1997). (quoting Dixon v.
Anderson, 928 F.2d 212, 215 (6th Cir. 1991)).
(...continued)
treated complaints against the parole board as an action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. See eg. Belcher v. Parole Bd., Ky. App., 917 S.W.2d
584 (1996). Under Kentucky law, the applicable statute of limitations
for a § 1983 claim is governed by KRS 413.140(1)(a). Collard v.
Kentucky Board of Nursing, 896 F.2d 179, 182 (6th Cir. 1990). The
statute establishes a one year statute of limitations for § 1983
claims.
-3-
Harston’s 1985 eight-year deferral is an event which
should have alerted the typical lay person of reasonable
diligence to make necessary inquiries to learn the status of his
rights.
Hence, Harston’s cause of action arose in 1985, and his
1997 petition relating to the 1985 deferment was time barred.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR
PRO SE BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Sherill Harston, Pro Se
Central City, Kentucky
Rebecca Baylous
Department of Corrections
Frankfort, Kentucky
-4-
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