LILLIAN L. RENTSCHLER v. TIMOTHY S. LEWIS
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RENDERED:
October 30, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-002738-MR
LILLIAN L. RENTSCHLER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN P. RYAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-005441
v.
TIMOTHY S. LEWIS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE; GUIDUGLI AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Appellant, Lillian L. Rentschler (Rentschler),
appeals from a judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court entered
October 3, 1997, pursuant to a jury verdict dismissing her
complaint against appellee, Timothy S. Lewis (Lewis).
Rentschler’s complaint alleged that Lewis had negligently
operated his motor vehicle thus causing a collision which
allegedly caused her bodily injuries, as well as, physical and
mental pain, which resulted in lost earning capacity and medical
expenses.
Having thoroughly reviewed this matter, we affirm.
On October 4, 1994, Rentschler and Lewis were involved
in an automobile accident in a parking lot adjacent to
Shelbyville Road in Louisville, Kentucky.
Appellant filed her
complaint alleging that appellee had negligently operated his
motor vehicle on that day causing the accident.
Lewis filed an
answer and counterclaim alleging that Rentschler had actually
caused the accident due to her negligence and carelessness.
The
case proceeded to trial before a jury on September 30 and October
1, 1997.
The jury returned a verdict that neither party had
failed to comply with any duty owed to the other party which was
a substantial factor in causing this accident.
As such, the
Jefferson Circuit Court entered a judgment dismissing both
parties’ claims.
On appeal, Rentschler alleges the trial court
erred when it failed to permit evidence that Lewis’ license to
operate a motor vehicle had been suspended and consequently
failed to instruct the jury pursuant to KRS 186.640 that Lewis
was, therefore, deemed prima facie negligent in causing or
contributing to the cause of the accident.
During the deposition of Lewis on September 19, 1997,
it was discovered that Lewis had been convicted of driving under
the influence on August 1, 1993.
As a result of said conviction,
Lewis’ driver’s license was suspended until he completed an
alcohol evaluation and treatment.
Lewis served two weeks on home
incarceration and paid his fines but did not complete the alcohol
evaluation or treatment as required at that time.
However, on
the day of the accident Lewis had a Kentucky driver’s license in
his possession and testified in his deposition that on that date
(October 4, 1994) he knew that “[he] did have a valid driver’s
license.”
As a result of this information, Lewis filed a motion
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to exclude any evidence relating to the previous driving under
the influence conviction or possible driving on a suspended
driver’s license allegation.
Each party filed a memorandum in
support of his/her position and the trial court addressed the
matter in a pre-trial hearing on the morning of the trial, prior
to the jury being called.
Initially the trial court ruled that Rentschler could
not present evidence of the prior driving under the influence
charge, but could address the issue of the license suspension
under KRS 186.640.
However, before appellant had called any
witnesses relative to the suspended license issue, the trial
court reversed its prior ruling.
Relying on Tipton v. Estill Ice
Co., Ky., 132 S.W.2d 347 (1939), Judge Ryan held that he would
not permit evidence relating to Lewis’ license suspension.
Quoting from Tipton the trial judge stated, “However, we do
unhesitatingly hold that it was not competent for the Legislature
to make the mere failure to secure [an] operator’s license prima
facie evidence that the driver involved in an accident was
negligent in causing or contributing to such accident.”
Tipton,
132 S.W.2d at 350.
Rentschler preserved the alleged error by both
objecting to the trial court’s ruling at that time and by
submitting a specific written jury instruction on the issue at
the conclusion of the evidence.
Before we discuss the parties’ arguments on appeal, it
is essential to understand how the suspended license issue
developed in this case.
Lewis was convicted of D.U.I. on
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August 1, 1993.
His license was suspended for some time,
although neither the length of the suspension nor his driving
record was made part of this record.
On the date of the
accident, October 4, 1994, Lewis had in his possession a Kentucky
driver’s license,1 and indicated that he thought he had a valid
Kentucky driver’s license.
Subsequent to the accident, Lewis was
stopped by police in October 1996 and it was then discovered
through a computer check of his license that Lewis’ license was
suspended.
He was charged with driving on a suspended license
and Lewis admitted that charge and he received an additional
license suspension at that time.
It is unclear from the record
or from Lewis’ deposition whether or not his license was
suspended on October 4, 1994, the date of the accident.
It
should also be noted that there was no department of
transportation certified driving record introduced into the
record.
On appeal, Rentschler contends that the trial court erred by
not permitting her to introduce evidence that Lewis was operating
his vehicle at the time of the accident while his operator’s
license was suspended.
KRS 186.640, which became effective
October 1, 1942, provides as follows:
Any driver involved in any accident resulting
in any damage whatever to person or to
property who is ineligible to procure an
operator’s license, or being eligible
therefor has failed to procure a license, or
whose license has been canceled, suspended or
revoked prior to the time of the accident,
shall be deemed prima facie negligent in
1
The police accident report indicates that Lewis had a
Kentucky license on that date.
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causing or contributing to cause the
accident.
In response to this statute appellee relies upon Tipton, supra.
In Tipton, the then highest court of Kentucky upheld the denial
of a jury instruction based upon Ky. St. § 2739m-62 (the
precursor to KRS 186.640).
The Court held that the Legislature
did not have the authority to make the mere failure to secure a
driver’s license to be prima facie evidence that a driver was
negligent in causing or contributing to an accident.
The Tipton
Court went on to hold that it is indeed “competent for
legislative bodies to prescribe by their enactments that a
certain state of facts shall constitute a presumption of the
principal fact... .”
Tipton, 132 S.W.2d at 350.
However, the
Court further stated that the Legislature’s right to create such
presumptions is “qualified to this extent-that the prescribed
facts for creating the prima facie presumption shall have a
natural and rational evidentiary relation to, and logical
tendency to prove, the principal fact.”
Id. at 350.
The Court
then concluded that it was “quite obvious” in the case before it
that the driver’s failure to produce an operator’s license had no
such “natural and rational evidentiary relationship to - or a
logical tendency to prove the principal fact.”
Id. at 350.
Although in this case the allegations are that Lewis’ driver’s
license was suspended, we believe the Tipton analysis is still
applicable.
There is no more of a logical, rational or natural
connection or nexus between the prescribed fact and the presumed
fact in this case than there was in Tipton.
The relevant issue
is whether or not Lewis exercised ordinary care in the operation
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of his vehicle on the day in question and whether or not he
failed to comply with the duties he owed Rentschler or other
vehicles on the roadway at the time of the accident.
Unless the
alleged statutory violation was some “causal connection” with the
claimed injury a statute cannot constitute negligence imposing
liability.
Moore v. Hart, Ky., 188 S.W.2d 861 (1916).
In Ross
v. Jones, Ky., 316 S.W.2d 845 (1958), the Court held that where
the facts show no casual connection between the statutory
violation and the injures alleged “such violation is irrelevant
and plays no part in the determination of liability.”
Ross, 711
S.W.2d at 847.
In this case appellant alleges that Lewis should be
held prima facie negligent pursuant to KRS 186.640.
cites no cases to support her position.2
However she
Appellant also failed
to provide proof in the record that Lewis’ driver’s license was
actually suspended on the day of the accident.
In contrast, the
evidence showed that Lewis had a license in his possession on
that day, presented the license to the police officer
investigating the accident, and the police listed the driver’s
license number on the police report.
Lewis also stated he had
automobile insurance which he believed indicated he must have a
valid license in order to obtain.
Appellant did not present any
actual proof that Lewis’ license was suspended nor did she
protect the record by an avowal of the contested evidence.
2
It should be noted that appellant cites several cases in
her reply brief. These cases deal with violation of Kentucky
statutes which constitutes negligence per se but are not
controlling on the issue before this Court.
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The second issue raised by Rentschler is that the trial
court erred by not instructing the jury pursuant to KRS 186.640.
Again, it must be noted that there was no proof that Lewis was
subject to the provisions of said statute and thus her second
argument must necessarily fail.
There was nothing in the record
which would justify an instruction under KRS 186.640 being given.
Of course, there was nothing in the record due to the trial
court’s ruling on the original motion to exclude which we
previously addressed.
Having determined that Tipton is controlling as to the
issue before this Court and that the trial court properly ruled
in this matter, the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Robert W. Grant
Louisville, KY
Henry A. Triplett
Louisville, KY
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