DOROTHY CLARK v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: December 18, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-002542-MR
DOROTHY CLARK
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN M. SHEWMAKER, SPECIAL JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-000010
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
consolidated with
NO.
1997-CA-002766-MR
DOROTHY CLARK
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN M. SHEWMAKER, SPECIAL JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-000010
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, GARDNER, AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
COMBS, JUDGE:
The appellant, Dorothy Clark, appeals from the
judgment of the Franklin Circuit Court convicting her of one
count of Bribery of a Public Servant, KRS 521.020.
Having
carefully examined the record on appeal, we find no error and
affirm her conviction.
On January 29, 1997, the Franklin County Grand Jury
indicted Clark, a deputy clerk of the Franklin Circuit Court, on
four counts of Bribery of a Public Servant (KRS 521.020) and one
count of Official Misconduct in the First Degree (KRS 522.020);
the charge of official misconduct was dismissed prior to trial.
In essence, the indictment alleged that in exchange for cash,
Clark had used her influence as a public servant to intercept and
to “fix” traffic citations issued to her nephew, Ricky Tipton, to
his daughter, Latisha Tipton, (Counts I-III) and to Lisa Cox (now
Hatton)1(Count IV).
Clark entered a plea of not guilty and, on
August 25, 1997, proceeded to trial on the four counts of bribery
of a public servant.
The jury found Clark not guilty of Counts
I-III (the charges relating to the citations issued to Ricky and
Latisha) but found her guilty of Count IV (the charge relating to
Lisa Hatton).
On October 10, 1997, the court entered final
judgment, sentencing Clark to six years’ imprisonment.
This
appeal followed.
The first issue raised by Clark on appeal is whether
the court erred in allowing Judge William Graham of the Franklin
Circuit Court to testify in violation of RCr 9.48.
She maintains
that the court abused its discretion in permitting the testimony
and that she was greatly prejudiced by this alleged error.
She
therefore requests that we set aside her conviction.
RCr 9.48 provides:
If either a defendant or the commonwealth
requests it, the judge may exclude from the
1
Appellant’s brief refers to “Lisa Cox”; appellee’s brief
calls her Lisa Hatton. This opinion refers to her by her current
name of “Hatton”.
-2-
hearing or trial any witness of the adverse
party not at the time under examination, so
that he may not hear the testimony of the
other witnesses. This provision shall not
apply to the parties to the proceeding.
Strict compliance with this rule is not mandatory.
Jacobs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 551 S.W.2d 223, 225 (1977),
construes RCr 9.48 as follows:
We have uniformly construed [RCr 9.48] as
giving to the trial judge broad discretion in
the matter of permitting or refusing to
permit the testimony of a witness who has
violated the rule of separation, and have
refused to intervene in such matters except
in cases where that discretion is found to
have been abused.
Invocation of the rule does not preclude the trial court from
making exceptions "thereto in the interest of justice" and
allowing a witness to testify.
S.W.2d 79, 81 (1967).
Ragland v. Commonwealth, Ky., 421
Thus, reversible error occurs in
disallowing testimony rather than in permitting it to proceed
where the rule is put into issue.
At trial, the Commonwealth called Judge Graham as a
rebuttal witness at the close of the case.
Judge Graham then
asked to approach the bench to make a disclosure to the court.
In a bench conference, Judge Graham informed the court that he
had heard some of the trial testimony the previous day on a
closed circuit television in his chambers; specifically, he
admitted to hearing portions of Clark’s testimony.
Defense
counsel objected to Judge Graham’s being allowed to testify on
grounds of RCr 9.48.
After a brief discussion, the court
overruled the objection and allowed Judge Graham to proceed.
In
reaching its decision, the court reasoned that Judge Graham had
-3-
not been put on notice so that he could avoid hearing testimony
in the case; nor had he been placed on the witness list since the
Commonwealth had not anticipated calling him as a witness.
The
court also noted that Judge Graham was being called as a rebuttal
witness —
a status which limited the scope of his testimony.
Upon close examination of the record, we cannot say
that the court abused its discretion in allowing Judge Graham to
testify.
During cross-examination, the Commonwealth questioned
Clark as to whether she had had any disciplinary problems during
her tenure as a deputy clerk; Clark responded that she had not.
Judge Graham was called as a witness to rebut her assertion.
He
testified that when he was a district court judge, he had placed
Clark on probation.
Judge Graham explained that another clerk
had found in Clark’s desk unprocessed traffic citations that had
been issued to one of her sons.
He stated that he had called her
into his office and reprimanded her and then placed her on
probation.
Upon a close examination of the record, we do not agree
that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Judge
Graham to testify.
His testimony was limited to the issue of
whether Clark had ever been disciplined or placed on probation in
the course of her employment — an issue as to which she had
already testified and as to which his testimony was offered in
rebuttal.
He did not offer any direct evidence concerning the
charge of bribery of a public servant.
Under these
circumstances, we find that the court properly exercised it
discretion under RCr 9.48 in allowing Judge Graham to testify.
-4-
Clark also argues that the trial court erred in denying
her motion for a directed verdict.
She maintains that there was
insufficient evidence to support her conviction.
We disagree.
The jury found Clark guilty of one count of bribery of
a public servant for accepting cash in exchange for using her
influence to "fix" a speeding ticket issued to Lisa Hatton (then
Cox).
KRS 521.020 provides in pertinent part:
(1) A person is guilty of bribery of a public
servant when:
(a) He offers, confers, or agrees to confer
any pecuniary benefit upon a public servant
with the intent to influence the public
servant's vote, opinion, judgment, exercise
of discretion, or other action in his
official capacity as a public servant; or
(b) While a public servant, he solicits,
accepts, or agrees to accept any pecuniary
benefit upon an agreement or understanding
that his vote, opinion, judgment, exercise of
discretion, or other action as a public
servant will thereby be influenced.
In Commonwealth v. Benham, Ky., 816 S.W.2d 187 (1991),
the Supreme Court set out the standard of appellate review for
motions for directed verdict:
On appellate review, the test of a directed
verdict is, if under the evidence as a whole,
it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury
to find guilt, only then the defendant is
entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.
Id. at 187.
Moreover, it is within the sole province of the jury
to determine the weight and credibility of conflicting evidence.
Brown v. Commonwealth, Ky., 558 S.W.2d 599 (1977).
In this case, the Commonwealth presented sufficient
evidence to support a reasonable inference that the appellant was
guilty of bribery of a public servant.
-5-
At trial, Ricky Tipton
testified that Lisa Hatton was a friend of his wife and that
while at their home one night, she complained that she had just
received a speeding ticket.
Ricky told her that his aunt
(Dorothy Clark) could "fix" her ticket for one hundred dollars.
He stated that Lisa subsequently gave him one hundred dollars,
which he gave to Clark to keep Lisa's ticket from showing on her
driving record.
Lisa also testified at trial.
She confirmed
that Ricky had told her that his aunt could help her with her
ticket as she did not want to be assessed points for the ticket.
Lisa stated that she gave Ricky one hundred dollars to give to
Clark.
Thereafter, she did not take any further action with
regard to the ticket and she never heard anything else about the
ticket.
Mary Ann Tipton, Ricky's wife, offered testimony
supporting both Ricky’s and Lisa's statements at trial.
In addition to the testimony of Ricky and Lisa, the
Commonwealth introduced the traffic citation issued to Lisa on
which Clark's initials were written as well as a receipt to Lisa
indicating that the citation had been paid.
However, the
paperwork on the disposition of the ticket was never sent to the
Department of Transportation; therefore, the ticket was never
placed on Lisa's driving record and she was not assessed any
points.
A directed verdict is appropriate only if there is no
more than a "mere scintilla" of evidence of fault.
supra.
Benham,
The Commonwealth presented evidence which could support a
reasonable inference that Clark had accepted money to use her
influence as a deputy clerk to "fix" Lisa Hatton's traffic
citation.
Clark was given the opportunity to test and to cross-6-
examine the evidence against her.
The jury had been made aware
of the fact that Ricky had pled guilty to a federal drug charge
and that he was currently facing criminal charges in Kentucky.
It was the jury’s role to evaluate the credibility of Ricky and
accordingly to weigh his testimony in light of his checkered
background.
Thus, the evidence against Clark amounted to more
than a “mere scintilla,” and it was not patently unreasonable for
the jury to find guilt on the part of Clark.
For the foregoing reasons, we are compelled to affirm
the judgment of the Franklin Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Robert L. Heleringer
Louisville, KY
A.B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Janet M. Graham
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.