SHELLEY BENNETT v. JANET BENNETT
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RENDERED: December 23, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-002175-MR
SHELLEY BENNETT
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARY C. NOBLE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 93-CI-003039
v.
JANET BENNETT
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, DYCHE AND GUIDUGLI, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Shelley E. Bennett (Shelley) appeals from an
August 20, 1997 Fayette Circuit Court order which required him to
be responsible for the entire deficiency amount owed to Janet
Bellamy Bennett (Janet), his ex-wife, after distribution was made
to her from a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) set up to
disburse to her the previously awarded sum of $59,793, which
represented her share of the value of Shelley’s medical practice.
Finding no merit in appellant’s argument on appeal, we affirm.
The parties to this appeal were married on February 8,
1980.
minor.
The parties have two children, one of whom is still a
Shelley filed his petition for dissolution of marriage on
September 17, 1993, in Fayette Circuit Court.1
a property agreement (the agreement) was filed.
On the same date
The agreement
was drafted by Shelley’s attorney and Janet was not represented
by counsel but acknowledged that she was fully informed of her
right to obtain separate counsel prior to the execution of the
agreement.
The agreement purported to resolve all issues
relating to the dissolution in an equitable and agreeable manner.
No additional action was taken in the case until
June 23,1994, when Shelley moved for a pretrial conference.
In
response Jane obtained counsel and filed a pre-trial memorandum
in which she requested the court “to set aside the property
settlement agreement and to set discovery deadlines to proceed
with this action.”
After discovery and a hearing, the trial
court entered an order on January 19, 1995, in which it found
“the agreement as to the division of personal property, division
of real property and waiver of maintenance by the Respondent
[Janet] are not unconscionable or manifestly unfair.”
However,
the trial court kept open the issues as to Shelley’s retirement
account and partnership assets, as well as, the issue of marital
debts.
After extensive discovery and continuous posturing by the
parties, the court entered its next order in this matter on
February 7, 1997.
That order incorporated the January 19, 1995
order and also awarded Shelley his IRA/401K account and the real
estate owned at the time of separation, finding that Janet had
been fully advised as to these assets when she signed the
1
Although each party lists a Morehead, Rowan County,
Kentucky address as his/her address, the dissolution was filed in
Fayette Circuit Court. Neither party raises this as an issue.
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agreement.
However, the court further found the value of the
medical practice ($161,342.00) had not been fully and adequately
disclosed to Janet prior to the execution of the agreement.
As
such, the trial court determined that Janet was entitled to an
interest in the medical practice, the amount to be determined at
a later date after additional proof as to her marital interest
was presented.
Subsequently, a decree of dissolution was finally
entered on April 2, 1997.
That order dissolved the marriage,
granted joint custody of the minor child to the parties, set
child support, incorporated the original agreement, awarded Janet
the sum of $59,793.00 as her share of the value of Shelley’s
medical practice, and ordered Shelley to pay $5,000 towards
Janet’s attorney’s fees.
The only issue remaining was the fact that Shelley had
no available liquid assets by which he could pay Janet the sums
awarded.
Therefore, the parties negotiated another agreement by
which Janet would receive a lump sum cash payment from Shelley’s
pension plan which had a value of approximately $200,000.
In
order to achieve this agreement, a QDRO was executed entitling
Janet to receive $64,876.74 from the doctor’s pension plan.
This
amount would cover her interest in the medical practice, attorney
fees and interest due and owing on said amounts.
The QDRO was
approved by the court and entered into the record on July 31,
1997.
However, instead of resolving and finalizing the
dissolution, this order led to yet another contested issue which
is the subject of this appeal.
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Within a week after the QDRO was entered, Janet filed a
motion to “enforce payment of the judgment and to alter, amend,
or vacate [the] QDRO and for [additional] attorneys fees.”
The
trial court found that the only method by which Shelley could
immediately pay Janet her share of the medical practice was from
the QDRO.
Therefore, Janet discovered that she faced significant
penalties and tax consequences if she immediately withdrew the
money from the QDRO.
In fact, it was learned that she would lose
approximately $20,000 to $25,000 of the $64,876.74.
This amount
represented approximately one-third (1/3) of the only amount she
was to receive from the dissolution.
Thereafter, the trial
court, having thoroughly reviewed the matter, entered its final
order on August 20, 1997.
In its order, the court kept the QDRO
in effect (reasoning that Janet would never recover any money
except from the pension fund) but further ordered Shelley to be
responsible for the entire dollar amount of the judgment
previously ordered plus interest.
Under this order Shelley would
be responsible for any deficiency resulting from penalties and
taxes if Janet exercised her rights under the QDRO.
From this
order Shelley appeals.
On appeal Shelley argues that Janet accepted the
payment from the QDRO as full satisfaction of the debt owed and
she is bound by that agreement and personally responsible for all
taxes and penalties associated with early withdrawal.
He also
contends that to hold him responsible for the entire amount is
inequitable and he will, in effect, be making a larger
distribution than was originally ordered.
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He argues that at a
minimum the parties should share the consequences of an immediate
withdrawal from the pension plan.
We do not agree with
appellant’s contentions.
First, it must be pointed out that the court did not
divide the pension plan.
Under the original property settlement
agreement entered on the day the petition was filed and which the
court deemed not unconscionable or manifestly unfair, Shelley
received the entire amount in the fund.
Second, the amount Janet
was awarded was her marital interest in the medical practice.
Shelley was ordered to pay the full amount to Janet.
As the
trial court stated at the August 15, 1997 hearing,
“[The judgment amount is] her part of the
estate...that’s her part of the marital
value, and she doesn’t have to pay any
penalties, she doesn’t have to pay any 10%,
and she doesn’t have to pay any income tax on
it either. That’s her share of the estate.
I don’t care where he gets the money, but
whatever her share of the estate is, if it
requires liquidation or whatever, that’s what
she’s supposed to get.”
Later, after learning of the potential loss to Janet due to the
tax consequences, the judge said this result “blindsided” her and
that she was not going to make Janet pay the penalty, but rather
that the loss was Shelley’s problem.
Appellant cites several cases from foreign
jurisdictions to support his contention.
However, we do not
believe that these cases do, in fact, support his position.
Berthiaume v. Berthiaume, 368 N.W.2d 328, 333 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985), held:
It is within the trial court’s discretion
to consider the tax consequences of a
property award. (Citations omitted).
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Given the evidence presented in the
instant case, the trial court’s determination
that a withdrawal from the trust will be
necessary and its consideration of the
potential tax consequences of the withdrawal
was not an abuse of its broad discretion.
In Dice v. Dice, 742 P.2d 205, 208 (Wyo. 1987), the appellate
court remanded for the trial court to consider the tax
consequences by stating:
Conversely, on remand, the court may want to
determine the cash-out value after
considering the penalty and income-tax
amounts and withdrawal costs, and accord a
present value of that computable amount as an
obligation for present payment by the
husband. We only determine that withdrawal
after tax cash value should be reflected in
divorce-decree division if an immediate cash
payment is required. In divorce settlement,
exercised discretion by the trial court
requires federal income-tax assessment.
(Citation omitted).
In Shaw v. Shaw, 117 N.C. App., 552, 554, 451 S.E.2d 648, 649
(1995), a case very similar to the one before this Court, the
court held:
The defendant had placed evidence before the
trial court that such a withdrawal would
result in the loss of employer contributions
or harsh tax consequences. The trial court
must consider these issues before requiring
the defendant to make the lump sum
distributive award payment. This case must be
remanded to the trial court for a
determination of whether the defendant has
assets, other than the thrift plan, from
which he can make the distributive award
payment. If he does not, the trial court
must either (1) provide for some other means
by which the defendant can pay $8,360.72 to
the plaintiff; or (2) determine the
consequences of withdrawing that amount from
the thrift plan and adjust the award from
defendant to plaintiff to offset the
consequences.
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Finally, in the case of In Re Marriage of Lee, 816 P.2d 1076,
1078 (Mont. 1991), the case was remanded to the trial court with
the following instructions:
We therefore remand to the District Court to
make an equitable distribution of the marital
estate specifically considering tax
consequences to both parties in making its
decision. Our ruling does not require the
District Court to adopt the property
distribution proposed by either party.
In each of the cases cited by appellant, the appellate
court indicated that the trial court must make a determination of
the tax consequences on the distribution of marital funds prior
to entering its order. In the case sub judice the trial court did
exactly what it was required to do.
The court, at first, was
unaware of the tax consequences when it entered the QDRO.
However, once the issue of the significant difference between the
ordered amount and the net proceeds was presented to the court,
it held a hearing and determined that Janet was to receive her
full share and Shelley would be responsible for the tax
consequences.
This decision was based upon full review of the
record which included what each party had received under the
original property settlement agreement and after numerous
hearings, memoranda and full disclosure of the parties’ assets
and liabilities.
The court indicated in its April 2, 1997 order
(granting Janet her share of the medical practice and attorney’s
fees) that there was a disparity in the income of the parties.
Considering that disparity in the parties’ income, the
division of property permitted by the agreement and the fact that
the trial court made a determination as to the effect of the tax
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consequences under the QDRO, we do not believe that the trial
court abused its discretion or that its order was clearly
erroneous.
Cherry v. Cherry, Ky., 634 S.W.2d 423 (1982); Perrine
v. Christine, Ky., 833 S.W.2d 825 (1992).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
COMBS, JUDGE, CONCURS.
DYCHE, JUDGE, DISSENTS.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
John Kevin West
Tonya S. Conner
Lexington, KY
Fred Fugazzi, Jr.
Mary E. Schoonover
Lexington, KY
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