ANTHONY SMITH v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: December 4, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-002108-MR
ANTHONY SMITH
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDWIN SCHROERING, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CR-2759
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, GARDNER, AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction by
the Jefferson Circuit Court finding the appellant guilty of first
degree assault.
This Court concludes that the trial court
committed prejudicial error in allowing impeachment of the
appellant’s credibility by use of his prior juvenile
adjudications, and in excluding evidence of prior acts of
violence by the victim which were witnessed by the appellant.
Therefore, we vacate the conviction and remand for a new trial.
The appellant, Anthony Smith (Anthony) was convicted of
first degree assault following a jury trial in the Jefferson
Circuit Court.
The charge arose out of the shooting of Aubrey
Williams on September 22, 1996, in Louisville.
Although the
circumstances surrounding the shooting were disputed, both
Anthony and Williams testified at trial.
Anthony, who was age
fifteen (15) at the time of the shooting, testified that he had
sold cocaine for Williams for several years.
Anthony testified
that in September 1996, he failed to sell cocaine as instructed
by Williams.
On several occasions, Williams approached Anthony
and demanded his share of the sale proceeds.
that the fight was about drugs.
Williams denied
Rather, Williams stated that it
was over a gambling debt which Anthony owed.
On September 22, 1996, Williams and two (2) other
individuals came up to Anthony at the intersection of Amy Street
and Riverpark Drive and again demanded payment.
When Anthony
answered that he did not have the money, Williams pushed and
struck him several times.
Anthony denied fighting back, while
Williams stated that Anthony took a swing at him.
Anthony
admitted that he was armed at the time, and he further testified
that Williams had a gun in his waistband.
that he was unarmed.
Williams testified
In either case, no weapons were used in the
fight, and Anthony ran from the scene.
Anthony stated that
Williams threatened to kill him, while Williams denied making any
threats.
Upon arriving at home, Anthony told his mother, Joyce
Smith, (Joyce), and his seventeen (17) year old sister, Moneka
Smith, (Moneka), about the incident.
Joyce instructed her
children to get into her car so they could go to a relative’s
home.
While en route, and about fifteen (15) minutes after the
first confrontation, Joyce saw Williams riding his bicycle along
the 3400 block of Broadway.
Joyce and Moneka left the car and
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confronted Williams, demanding to know why Williams had beaten
Anthony.
Anthony initially stayed in the car, but during the
altercation, he left the car and stood behind his mother and
sister.
Joyce offered to pay her son’s debt.
exchanged, and Moneka punched Williams.
Words were
Anthony testified that
he saw Williams reach for a gun and that he feared for his
mother’s safety.
At that point, Anthony retrieved his own gun
from his pocket, and shot Williams one (1) time in the hip.
Anthony and Joyce were both indicted for assault in the
first degree.
Since the felony involved the use of a firearm and
Anthony was over the age of fourteen (14) years, he was
transferred to circuit court for trial as an adult.
635.020(4).
KRS
Following a trial, the trial court instructed the
jury on the charges of first degree assault, second degree
assault (intentional), and assault under extreme emotional
disturbance for Joyce.
For Anthony, the trial court instructed
the jury on the charges of first degree assault, second degree
assault (intentional), second degree assault (wanton), assault
under extreme emotional disturbance, and fourth degree assault.
The jury acquitted Joyce on all charges, and convicted Anthony of
first degree assault.
thirteen (13) years.
The jury fixed Anthony’s sentence at
However, after entry of the jury verdict,
the parties announced to the court that they had entered into an
agreement and stipulation in which the recommended sentence was
to be eleven (11) years.
sentence.
The trial court imposed the recommended
This appeal followed.
Anthony first argues that the trial court erred in
allowing the Commonwealth to introduce evidence about his prior
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juvenile adjudications.
During the course of Anthony’s cross-
examination, the Commonwealth sought to impeach his credibility
by questioning him concerning his juvenile record.
Anthony’s
counsel objected, stating that these matters involved juvenile
adjudications, not convictions.
The trial court disagreed,
concluding that since KRS 635.020(4) requires a juvenile charged
with a felony involving a firearm be transferred to circuit court
for trial as an adult offender, then the defendant should be
treated as an adult for all purposes.
Hence, the trial court
concluded that Anthony could be impeached using his prior felony
convictions in the same manner that an adult could be impeached.
The Commonwealth then asked Anthony if he had pleaded guilty to a
felony in juvenile court.
Anthony answered “yes.”
Immediately
thereafter, the trial court admonished the jury that the evidence
of Anthony’s prior convictions could only be used to determine
his credibility and not as evidence of guilt.
Anthony argues that the trial court erred in allowing
the Commonwealth to question him regarding his juvenile record.
We first note the trial court’s reasoning concerning the nature
of a transfer pursuant to KRS 635.020(4) has been rejected by the
Kentucky Supreme Court in Britt v. Commonwealth, Ky., 965 S.W.2d
147 (1998).
KRS 635.020(4) is merely a mechanism for
transferring juveniles charged with a felony involving a firearm
to circuit court without making the required findings under KRS
640.010.
Juveniles transferred to circuit court remain subject
to the provisions of Chapter 640.
Id. at 150.
Yet even if a juvenile transferred to circuit court
were treated as an adult for all purposes, the transfer would not
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affect the status, or the admissibility of prior juvenile
adjudications.
Thus, the ultimate question remains whether a
defendant, either an adult or a juvenile tried as an adult, may
be impeached as to his credibility through evidence of his prior
juvenile adjudications.
This question is an issue of first
impression in Kentucky.
Kentucky Rule of Evidence [KRE] 609(a), which governs
impeachment using prior convictions, provides as follows:
For the purpose of reflecting upon the
credibility of a witness, evidence that the
witness has been convicted of a crime shall
be admitted if elicited from the witness or
established by public record if denied by the
witness, but only if the crime was punishable
by death or imprisonment for one (1) year or
more under the law under which the witness
was convicted. The identity of the crime
upon which conviction was based may not be
disclosed upon cross-examination unless the
witness has denied the existence of the
conviction. However, a witness against whom
a conviction is admitted under this provision
may choose to disclose the identity of the
crime upon which the conviction is based.
KRE 609(a) rule is consistent with the common law rule
that a witness may be asked if he has been previously convicted
of a felony.
If his answer is "Yes," that is the end of it and
the court shall thereupon admonish the jury that the admission by
the witness of his prior conviction of a felony may be considered
only as it affects his credibility as a witness, if it does so.
If the witness answers "No" to this question, he may then be
impeached by the Commonwealth by the use of all prior
convictions.
After impeachment, the proper admonition shall be
given by the court.
Commonwealth v. Richardson, Ky., 674 S.W.2d
515, 517-18 (1984).
KRE 609 differs in several respects from the
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federal rule (FRE 609).
In particular, KRE 609 allows a trial
court to admit a conviction more than ten (10) years old if the
court determines that the probative value of such conviction
outweighs its prejudicial effect.
875 S.W.2d 518, 528 (1994).
McGinnis v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
In addition, KRE 609, unlike the
federal rule, does not address the admissibility of prior
juvenile adjudications.
Nevertheless, cases from other jurisdictions are
instructive in interpreting KRE 609.
The United States Supreme
Court addressed a similar issue to that presented in the present
case. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347, 94 S. Ct.
1105 (1974).
The defendant in that case, Davis, sought to
impeach the credibility of a prosecution witness (Green) by cross
examination directed at possible bias deriving from Green’s
probationary status as a juvenile delinquent.
Alaska law
prohibited admission of juvenile adjudications except during the
sentencing phase.
Consequently, the trial court prohibited Davis
from questioning Green concerning his juvenile record.
The United States Supreme Court concluded that the
Confrontation Clause requires that a defendant conduct meaningful
cross-examination to determine possible bias by a witness.
“[T]o
make any such inquiry effective, defense counsel should have been
permitted to expose to the jury those facts from which jurors, as
the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw
inferences relating to the reliability of witnesses.”
318, 39 L. Ed. 2d at 355.
Id. at
In further discussing the interests of
the state in protecting the privacy of juvenile adjudications,
the Supreme Court explained:
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The State’s policy interest in protecting the
confidentiality of a juvenile offender’s
record cannot require yielding of so vital a
constitutional right as the effective crossexamination for bias of an adverse witness.
The State could have protected Green from
exposure of his juvenile adjudication in
these circumstances by refraining from using
him to make out its case; the State cannot,
consistent with the right of confrontation,
require the petitioner to bear the full
burden of vindicating the State’s interest in
the secrecy of juvenile criminal records.
Id. at 320, 39 L. Ed. 2d at 356.
However, in concurring in the holding that Davis had
been denied his right of confrontation, Justice Stewart noted:
In joining the Court’s opinion, I would
emphasize that the Court neither holds nor
suggests that the Constitution confers a
right in every case to impeach the general
credibility of a witness through crossexamination about his past delinquency
adjudications or criminal convictions.
Id. at 321, 39 L. Ed. 2d at 356.
Hence, the rule set out in Davis is limited to
situations where the attack on the credibility of a juvenile
witness, through cross-examination about his past delinquency
adjudications, is for the purpose of showing bias or prejudice
and not to situations where the sole purpose of the attack is to
impeach the general credibility of the witness.
626 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Tenn., 1981);
593, 596 (Wyoming, 1984).
State v. Butler,
See also, Amin v. State, 686 P.2d
Other jurisdictions follow this
general rule that a juvenile court adjudication may not be used
solely to impeach the general credibility of a witness.
See,
“Impeachment of Witness by Juvenile Records”, 68 A.L.R.3d 1112,
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1120 (1975).
See also,
Corbett v. Bordenkircher, 615 F.2d 722,
727 (6th Cir., 1980).
Furthermore, an accused’s right to confront and crossexamine witnesses is different from the state’s interest in
questioning a defendant about his juvenile record.
An accused’s
right to cross-examine a witness may outweigh a state’s interest
in preserving a juvenile offender’s anonymity.
415 U.S. at 320, 39 L. Ed. 2d at 356.
Davis v. Alaska,
A witness’ credibility is
always at issue and relevant evidence which affects credibility
should not be excluded.
718, 721 (1997).
Commonwealth v. Maddox, Ky., 955 S.W.2d
However, the Sixth Amendment right of
confrontation extends only to an accused, not to the prosecution.
Therefore, the prosecution’s cross-examination may be limited by
the state’s policy preserving a juvenile offender’s anonymity.
Of those states which have directly addressed the
specific question before this Court, the majority hold that a
defendant’s general credibility may not be impeached by use of
his prior juvenile adjudications.
People v. Kerns, 229
Ill.App.3d 938, 595 N.E.2d 207, 172 Ill.Dec. 144 (Ill.App.4th
Dist., 1992);
Lavinder v. Commonwealth, 395 S.E.2d 211 (Va.App.,
1990); People v. Jackson, 177 Cal.App. 3d 708, 222 Cal.Rptr.
470
(1986); Commonwealth v. Young, 22 Mass.App.Ct. 237, 493 N.E.2d
213 (Mass.App., 1986); State v. Robinson, 449 So.2d 74 (La.App.,
1984); Moore v. State, 333 So.2d 165 (Ala.
v. State, 336 So.2d 633 (Fla.
App., 1976); Jackson
App., 1976).
Several of these states have adopted versions of FRE
609(d), which specifically prohibit admission of juvenile
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adjudications to impeach the credibility of a defendant except
under certain circumstances.
People v. Massie, 137 Ill. App.3d
723, 92 Ill.Dec. 358, 484 N.E.2d 1213 (Ill.App.2d Dist., 1985);
Amin v. State, supra; State v. Butler, supra.
KRE 609 does not
contain a section dealing with juvenile adjudications. However,
all of jurisdictions following the majority rule do so based, at
least in part, upon the public policy considerations underlying
confidentiality of juvenile records.
New York has adopted a contrary rule, allowing use of
prior juvenile adjudications to impeach the credibility of a
defendant where “the prior crimes demonstrate dishonesty and
untrustworthiness.”
People v. Mercado, 117 A.D.2d 627, 628, 497
N.Y.S.2d 957 (1986).
See also,
572 N.Y.S.2d 336 (1991).
People v. Rivas, 175 A.D.2d 186,
New York preserves the materiality
requirement found in the general rule.
By contrast, North
Carolina allows the prosecution to impeach a juvenile defendant
with reference to his prior adjudications of guilt of conduct
which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted
conviction of a crime.
220 S.Ed.2d 630 (1975).
State v. Tuttle, 28 N.C.App. 198, 200,
North Carolina apparently does not
impose a materiality requirement on admission of prior juvenile
adjudications.
This Court believes that the better rule is that
followed by the majority of jurisdictions.
Like the majority of
states, Kentucky has traditionally treated juvenile matters
differently than adult offenses.
The state is considered to be
acting as parens patriae rather than as a prosecuting authority.
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It has been a principal theory of juvenile law that an individual
should not be stigmatized with a criminal record for acts
committed during minority.
Jefferson County Dept. for Human
Services v. Carter, Ky., 795 S.W.2d 59, 61 (1990).
Consequently,
the confidentiality of juvenile court records must be maintained
except where release is specifically authorized.
KRS 610.340.
In addition, a disposition under the Juvenile Code is
not to be treated as a conviction.
KRS 635.040.
Moreover, the
Juvenile Code does not distinguish between felonies, misdemeanor
or violations for purposes of dispositions.
A.E. v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 860 S.W.2d 790, 793 (1993).
Therefore,
there is no basis to treat Anthony’s prior juvenile court
adjudications as “convictions” during the guilt phase of the
trial.
We agree that Anthony’s juvenile record is admissible
during the sentencing phase.
Sanders v. Commonwealth, Ky., 844
S.W.2d 391, 394-95 (1992); Schooler v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 628
S.W.2d 885, 886 (1981).
Likewise, the records of any criminal
proceedings against Anthony where he was tried as an adult are
admissible.
KRS 635.120.
Juvenile court records may also be
released to the extent authorized by KRS 610.340.
Furthermore, a
witness may be cross-examined concerning his juvenile
adjudications, to the extent that those proceedings are relevant
to show bias or lack of trustworthiness on the part of the
witness.
Davis v. Alaska, supra.
However, we hold that the
Commonwealth’s may not impeach the general credibility of a
juvenile defendant during the guilt phase of a trial by use of
his prior juvenile convictions.
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The Commonwealth contends that if its use of Anthony’s
prior adjudications for impeachment purposes was improper, then
it should be considered harmless error because he suffered no
prejudice as a result.
The Commonwealth notes that Anthony had
already testified that he sold drugs forty (40) to fifty (50)
times over a two (2) year period.
As a result, the Commonwealth
argues that any error from the introduction of evidence of
Anthony’s prior juvenile adjudications was harmless because it
was not so overwhelming as to affect Anthony’s substantial
rights.
RCr 9.24
We disagree.
Even though Anthony had previously
testified about his involvement with drugs and the fact that he
had carried a gun, the Commonwealth specifically sought to
impeach his credibility by introducing his prior juvenile
adjudications.
Anthony’s credibility was central to his defense
of self-protection and protection of others.
Consequently, we
find that there exists a reasonable probability that absent the
introduction of the evidence the result would have been
different.
(1995).
Renfro v. Commonwealth, Ky., 893 S.W.2d 795, 797
Therefore, the introduction of evidence of Anthony’s
prior juvenile adjudications was not harmless error.
Anthony also objects to the reference to his prior
juvenile arrests during the cross-examination of his mother.
The
Commonwealth asked Joyce if she knew that Anthony carried a gun.
After she answered no, the Commonwealth asked her if she was
aware Anthony had been arrested for possession of a firearm one
(1) month prior to the shooting.
Over the objection of Anthony’s
counsel, the trial court permitted the Commonwealth to ask the
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question.
Joyce responded by stating that she was aware of the
arrest and that she went to court with Anthony.
The Commonwealth
next asked Joyce if she was aware that her son had possessed
crack cocaine.1
Joyce answered that she became aware that he did
when he was arrested for it.
The Commonwealth asserts that its questioning of Joyce
about Anthony’s prior arrests was relevant to rebut her stated
lack of knowledge about Anthony’s involvement with guns and
drugs.
To a certain extent, this Court agrees.
However, this
Court also believes that the probative value of these questions
was outweighed by their unfairly prejudicial effect to Anthony.
The questions were primarily calculated to bring in evidence of
Anthony’s bad character, and thus should have been excluded under
KRE 404(b).
Nevertheless, we decline to find that the questions
constituted reversible error in the context of this case.
Anthony had previously testified regarding his participation in
drug transactions and that he had previously carried a gun.
Unlike the previous issue involving introduction of Anthony’s
prior juvenile adjudications, the Commonwealth’s limited
questioning in this area did not present any additional evidence
of which the jury was not already aware.
Consequently, any error
in allowing the questioning of Joyce on these matters was
harmless.
1
The Commonwealth initially asked Joyce if she was aware
that her son was in juvenile court for possession of crack
cocaine. The trial judge sustained both defendants’ objections
and instructed the jury to disregard the question. The trial
court further denied the motion for a mistrial made by Anthony’s
counsel.
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Anthony next argues that the trial court erred in
excluding his testimony about prior acts of violence which he saw
Williams commit.
During trial, Anthony sought to introduce
evidence of four (4) particular acts of violence committed by
Williams in his presence.
The trial court excluded the evidence,
and Anthony testified about the incidents on avowal.2
The trial
court maintained that if Anthony’s reason for confronting
Williams was because he was going to tell him that he did not
have any money for the drugs, then the evidence concerning
Anthony’s knowledge that Williams had previously shot people for
not paying for drugs would be admissible.
However, the trial
court concluded that since Anthony testified that his mother had
offered to pay Williams what Anthony owed, then Williams’ prior
acts were not relevant because in that event there would be no
reason to fear Williams’ reaction.
Before the jury, Anthony was
only permitted to answer general questions relating to whether
Williams had previously displayed or had possession of a firearm.
Anthony contends that the trial court erred in
excluding his testimony about the four (4) prior incidents. This
Court agrees that a defendant may not introduce specific
instances of violent conduct to prove the character of the victim
2
On avowal, Anthony testified that he witnessed an argument
between Williams and an individual named “Ernie” in February
1996. Anthony stated that the argument arose from the fact that
Williams owed Ernie money over a drug deal. During the course of
the argument, Williams fired a gun at Ernie. During another
argument between Williams and Ernie, in March 1996, Anthony
testified that he saw Williams shoot Ernie in the leg.
Anthony next testified concerning an incident during the
summer of 1996, when Williams, after consuming drugs, produced a
handgun and began firing it in the air. Lastly, in July 1996,
Anthony saw Williams hit an addict with a pistol during an
argument about money.
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or predisposition toward violence. KRE 404(a);
Commonwealth, Ky., 652 S.W.2d 78 (1983).
Thompson v.
The Commonwealth
maintains that the four (4) instances of violence were not
material to Anthony’s defense and that they were remote in time
from the altercation on September 22, 1996.
Consequently, the
Commonwealth asserts that Anthony’s proffered testimony did not
have a reasonable relationship to his claim of self-defense.
Baze v. Commonwealth, Ky., 953 S.W.2d 914, 921-22 (1997); citing,
Carnes v. Commonwealth, Ky., 453 S.W.2d 595 (1970).
However, a defendant can introduce evidence of
particular violent acts of an alleged victim, evidence of threats
by the victim, and evidence of hearsay statements about such acts
or threats, all of which tends to show the defendant had a
justifiable fear of the victim at the time of their encounter.
Wilson v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 880 S.W.2d 877, 878 (1994);
quoting, Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, §
2.15 at pg. 70 (3rd ed. 1993).
After reviewing Anthony’s
proffered testimony on avowal, this Court finds that the evidence
was improperly excluded.
The self-protection defense is set out in KRS 503.050,
which states as in pertinent part:
(1) The use of physical force by a defendant
upon another person is justifiable when the
defendant believes that such force is
necessary to protect himself against the use
or imminent use of unlawful physical force by
the other person.
(2) The use of deadly physical forces by a
defendant upon another person is justifiable
under subsection (1) only when the defendant
believes that such force is necessary to
protect himself against death, [or] serious
physical injury...
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The use of deadly physical force to protect another
person is justifiable when “under the circumstances as they
actually exist, the person whom he seeks to protect would have
been justified under KRS 503.050.”
KRS 503.070(2)(b).
The trial court interpreted Anthony’s self-defense
theory narrowly, and specifically limited his testimony to
situations which were directly analogous to what occurred on
September 22, 1996.
However, in doing so, the trial court failed
to consider the context of Anthony’s theory.
According to
Anthony, the confrontation between Williams and Joyce occurred as
a result of the earlier altercation between Anthony and Williams.
We certainly agree with the trial judge that a victim
should not be put on trial.
However, where self-defense is an
issue, the victim’s conduct may be considered in determining the
reasonableness of the defendant’s fear.
Commonwealth, Ky., 875 S.W.2d 518 (1994).
See, McGinnis v.
Furthermore, where the
evidence of prior violent acts are remote in time or is of
marginal relevance to the self-protection defense, then the trial
court may exclude such evidence. Shannon v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
767 S.W.2d 548, 553 (1988).
Yet in the present case, the four (4) incidents which
Anthony testified about were directly relevant to his selfprotection defense.
Each of the four (4) instances involved a
specific act of violence involving William’s use of a firearm.
Three (3) of the four (4) acts involved Williams use or
threatened use of a firearm against another individual during an
argument over drug money.
Furthermore, those events occurred
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between seven (7) months and two (2) months prior to the shooting
at issue in the present case.
Under the circumstances, the prior
incidents were not so remote in time as to diminish their
relevance.
In addition, this Court cannot agree with the
Commonwealth that Anthony was not prejudiced because he was
permitted to testify generally that Williams had previously
displayed a firearm.
For his protection of others defense to be
applicable, Anthony’s fear of Williams must have been objectively
reasonable based upon the circumstances as they actually existed.
KRS 503.070(2)(b).
The evidence proffered by Anthony tended to
lend credibility to his belief in the need for self-defense.
As
a result, it was relevant to consider the reasonableness of his
fear.
By restricting details about the prior incidents, the
trial court impermissibly limited Anthony’s presentation of a
crucial part of his defense.
While the jury might have chosen to
view those prior events as having limited relevance, we find that
the trial court erred in excluding Anthony’s testimony about
them.
Brock v. Commonwealth, Ky., 947 S.W.2d 24, 27 (1997).
Anthony next raises a pair of issues concerning the
instructions on self-defense and defense of others.
At the close
of proof, Anthony’s counsel filed proposed instructions setting
out separate instructions for the defenses of self-protection and
protection of others.
The trial court adopted the Commonwealth’s
proposed instruction which combined the two (2) defenses as
follows:
NO. 6 - SELF PROTECTION
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Even though the Defendant might
otherwise be guilty of intentional Assault
under Instruction No. 1 and/or Instruction #
2, if at the time the Defendant shot Aubrey
Williams he believed that Aubrey Williams was
about to use physical force upon him, he was
privileged to use such physical force against
Aubrey Williams as he believed to be
necessary to protect himself or others
against it, but including the right to use
deadly physical force in so doing only if he
believed it to be necessary in order to
protect himself from death or serious
physical injury at the hands or Aubrey
Williams, subject to these qualifications:
If you further believe from the evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant
was mistaken in his belief that it was
necessary to use physical force against
Aubrey Williams in self-protection, or in his
belief in the degree of force necessary to
protect himself, or others
AND
A. That when he shot Aubrey Williams,
he failed to perceive a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that he was mistaken in
that belief, and that his failure to perceive
that risk constituted a gross deviation from
the standard of care that a reasonable person
would have observed in the same situation,
then:
(1) If you would otherwise find the
defendant guilty of either intentional FirstDegree Assault under Instruction No. 1, or
intentional Second-Degree Assault under
Instruction 2, you will instead find him
guilty of Fourth Degree Assault under
Instruction No. 5;
OR
B. That when he shot Aubrey Williams,
he was aware of and consciously disregarded a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that he
was mistaken in that belief, and that his
disregard of that risk constituted a gross
deviation from the standard of [care] that a
reasonable person would have observed in the
same situation, then:
(1) If you would otherwise find the
Defendant guilty of intentional First-Degree
Assault under Instruction No. 1, you will
instead find him guilty of wanton SecondDegree Assault Under Instruction No. 3;
OR
(2) If you would otherwise find the
defendant guilty of intentional Second-Degree
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Assault under Instruction No. 2, you will
instead find him guilty of Fourth-Degree
Assault under Instruction No 5.
Provided, however, that if you believe
from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt
that the Defendant was the initial aggressor
at 34th & Broadway in the use of physical
force, the defense of self-protection is not
available to him.
Anthony argues that the trial court erred in accepting
the Commonwealth’s proposed instruction.
He contends that the
trial judge should have instructed the jury separately on the
defenses of self-protection and protection of others.
Anthony
urges that the trial court’s combined instruction deprived him of
his right to present his theories of the case to the jury.
This Court previously discussed the elements for
establishing justification based on self-defense and for
protection of others.
As noted above, self-defense and
protection of others differ where the defendant uses deadly
force.
The defendant is justified in using deadly force in self-
defense when the defendant believes that such force is necessary
to protect himself against death, or serious physical injury.
KRS 503.050(2).
By contrast, the use of deadly physical force in
the protection of another is justifiable only when, under the
circumstances as they actually exist, the person whom he seeks to
protect would have been justified in using deadly physical force.
KRS 503.070(2).
By combining the self-protection and protection of
others instructions, the trial court blurred the distinction
between the two (2) defenses.
worked to Anthony’s benefit.
However, any error in so doing
The trial court’s instruction only
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required him to prove the need for self-protection and protection
of his family under the circumstances as he reasonably believed
them to be.
Consequently, this Court finds no reversible error
in this regard.
Anthony next contends that the trial court failed to
determine whether the two (2) situations between himself and
Williams constituted a single continuing encounter, or were
separate and distinct transactions.
He argues that the initial
aggressor qualification in the self-protection/protection of
others instruction improperly separated the two (2)
confrontations.
Anthony further asserts that the first incident
at the intersection of Amy Street and Riverpark Drive, and the
second incident at 34th and Broadway, were part of a single
continuing encounter.
Since Williams was the initial aggressor
at the first incident, Anthony argues that the shooting was
merely a continuation of the fight started by Williams.
Therefore, he concludes that the trial court erred in providing
the initial aggressor instruction.
The leading case on when to give an initial aggressor
instruction is Stepp v. Commonwealth, Ky., 608 S.W.2d 371 (1980).
In Stepp, the defendant and the victim were engaged in a heated
argument while at work.
After telling the defendant that he
would be back, the victim returned to his truck and departed.
About fifteen (15) minutes later, the victim returned with a
shotgun sticking out of the window of his truck.
As the trucks
slowly approached each other, the defendant deflected the shotgun
with one hand and shot the victim in the back of his head,
causing the victim’s death.
Id. at 372-73.
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The defendant objected to the giving of an initial
aggressor instruction, arguing that the two (2) situations were
separate encounters and that the victim, not he, was the
aggressor in the second encounter.
The Kentucky Supreme Court
noted that KRS 503.060(3) limits the self defense and protection
of others justifications in circumstances where the defendant was
the initial aggressor.
Where the defendant was the initial
aggressor, use of physical force upon the other person under that
circumstance is justified when, (a) his initial physical force
was non-deadly and the force returned by the other is such that
he believes himself to be in imminent danger of death or serious
physical injury; or (b) he withdraws from the encounter and
effectively communicates to the other person his intent to do so
and the latter nevertheless continues or threatens the use of
unlawful physical force.
Id. at 374.
The Supreme Court further explained that the answer to
this issue requires the determination as to whether the second
encounter
was separate and distinct from the first encounter or
whether it was a continuance of the former.
There is no exact formula to apply in
determining whether the second encounter was
a continuance of the first or whether the
second encounter was distinct from the first.
The criterion is whether movant, in good
faith, believed it was necessary to exercise
extreme force in saving his own life. It is
not every assertion of such belief that is
adequate to support a plea of self-defense.
It is the whole circumstances which surround
the incident that must be considered by the
trial judge in deciding whether an
instruction on self-defense is proper or
whether an instruction on self-defense with
limitations is proper. We have held that
before such qualifying instructions are
proper there must of course be evidence to
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justify it. In other words, the trial judge
must find as a matter of law that there is
sufficient evidence to justify such
limitations before instructing the jury.
Id. at 374.
Based upon the facts presented in that case, the
Supreme Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to
require the trial judge to find as a matter of law that there
were two (2) separate encounters.
Consequently, the Supreme
Court found that the inclusion of the initial aggressor
qualification was prejudicially erroneous.
In contrast, Anthony, rather than the prosecution, is
arguing that the second encounter was a continuation of the
first.
The trial judge in this case found that the two (2)
incidents between Anthony and Williams were separate and distinct
transactions.
The trial judge concluded that the first
confrontation had ended when Anthony fled the scene.
The second
incident was the result of Joyce confronting Williams about the
first incident.
Based upon the evidence, this finding was not
clearly erroneous as a matter of law.
Although the two (2) encounters were close in time and
related in subject matter, they were separate and distinct
transactions.
In the first confrontation, Williams was clearly
the initial aggressor.
However, in the second confrontation, an
issue of fact exists concerning which person was the initial
aggressor.
Joyce and Moneka began the argument with Williams.
Furthermore, Moneka punched Williams.
However, Anthony testified
that he saw Williams reaching for a gun.
possessing a gun.
Williams denied even
Under the circumstances, there was sufficient
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evidence to present to the jury the question of who was the
initial aggressor during the second encounter.
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction by the
Jefferson Circuit Court is vacated, and this matter is remanded
for a new trial in accord with the foregoing opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
A.B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Keith E. Kamenish
Louisville, Kentucky
R. Evelyn Freer
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Shawn Goodpaster
Frankfort, Kentucky
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