KENNETH SEWELL v. JAMES C. RANKIN; LINDA F. FRANK; LUTITIA PAPAILLER; KENTUCKY PAROLE BOARD
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RENDERED:
February 13, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO.
97-CA-1920-MR
KENNETH SEWELL
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOYLE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN M. SHEWMAKER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-0279
v.
JAMES C. RANKIN; LINDA F.
FRANK; LUTITIA PAPAILLER;
KENTUCKY PAROLE BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
ABRAMSON, KNOPF AND MILLER, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE.
Kenneth Sewell appeals pro se from an order
dismissing his petition for declaratory judgment.
Sewell argues
that his constitutional rights were violated when the Kentucky
Parole Board (Board) rescinded a previous recommendation that he
be released on parole.
After reviewing the record and the
applicable law, we affirm the decision of Boyle Circuit Court.
Sewell is an inmate serving an eighteen-year sentence
for marijuana cultivation, marijuana trafficking, persistent
felony offender second degree, and use and investment of drugrelated income.
At Sewell’s request, in December 1996 the Board
voted to meet with him ten months before his regularly scheduled
hearing date to consider him for the "Intensive Supervision
Program."
After a hearing in January 1997, the Board recommended
him for parole under this program.
However, after receiving
additional information, the Board set another hearing for February 1997.
At the conclusion of the second hearing, the Board
rescinded its earlier recommendation of parole and deferred
Sewell for 72 months.
Sewell requested the Board to reconsider its decision.
The Board denied his request by letter dated June 19, 1997.
On
June 13, 1997, Sewell filed a petition for declaratory judgment
in Boyle Circuit Court.
He claimed that the Board and the
individual defendants violated his constitutional right against
cruel and unusual punishment, denied him due process, acted
arbitrarily, and made procedural errors when it rescinded the
recommendation of parole.
moved to dismiss.
The defendants filed a response and
Sewell filed a reply.
By order entered July
23, 1997, the circuit court held that the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law and dismissed the action.
This appeal followed.
On appeal Sewell again argues that the Board violated
his rights under the United States and Kentucky Constitutions by
rescinding its previous recommendation of parole.
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The Board
responds that Sewell received all the process to which he was
entitled and that the Board acted within its powers.
We agree.
The circuit court dismissed Sewell's action summarily,
finding the Board entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
review its decision under the summary judgment standard.
We
See,
Smith v. O'Dea, Ky. App., 939 S.W.2d 353, 355 n.1 (1997).
Summary judgment for the Board is proper only if Sewell's petition and any supporting materials, construed in light of the
entire agency record, do not raise specific, genuine issues of
material fact sufficient to overcome the presumption of agency
propriety and the Board is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.
Ky. R. Civ. P. 56; Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service
Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476 (1991); Smith v. O'Dea, supra.
Sewell's allegations raise no issues of material fact,
and the Board was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
When
determining a prisoner's parole eligibility, the Board must
consider the pertinent information regarding the prisoner and
have him appear for interview and hearing.
KRS 439.340(2).
The
Board has adopted administrative regulations with respect to the
eligibility of prisoners for parole and the conduct of parole
hearings, pursuant to KRS 439.340(3).
1:030-1:050.
501 Ky. Admin. Regs. (KAR)
Under the regulatory definitions, parole recommen-
dation means that an inmate may be released if the inmate has an
approved parole plan and he has signed his parole certificate;
parole rescission means a decision to rescind an inmate's parole
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recommendation before actual release; and parole means the
release of an inmate.
501 KAR 1:030 §1 (9), (11), (10).
"The
Board may rescind a parole recommendation any time prior to the
release of an inmate on parole."
501 KAR 1:030 §5 (2).
In Kentucky, parole is a matter of legislative grace.
Neither the applicable statutes nor regulations create a liberty
interest.
The Board is not required to give inmates the same due
process required to convict and confine.
At most, Sewell has a
legitimate interest in a decision rendered in conformity with the
established procedure and policies, based upon consideration of
the relevant criteria.
Belcher v. Kentucky Parole Board, Ky.
App., 917 S.W.2d 584, 587 (1996).
The fact that the Board first
recommended Sewell for parole and then later rescinded that
decision does not change the analysis.
See Jago v. VanCuren, 454
U.S. 14, 21, 102 S. Ct. 31, 36, 70 L. Ed.2d 13 (1981) (holding
that because Ohio law creates no liberty interest in parole, an
inmate recommended for parole was not entitled to a hearing
regarding rescission of parole recommendation).
The record contains only those parts of the administrative proceedings by the Board that the parties were able to
obtain and chose to include.
From that record, it appears the
Board recommended Sewell for parole after the first hearing,
obtained additional information relevant to his parole plan, held
a second hearing, and then decided to rescind the parole recommendation before he was actually released.
-4-
Sewell has not
alleged that the Board conducted the first parole hearing improperly, nor has he shown that the Board violated any statute or
regulation.
Under the applicable statutes, regulations, and
Jago, supra, the Board could have rescinded the parole recommendation without a second hearing.
The Board's decision was
rendered in conformity with the established procedure and policies, and did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
Belcher, supra.
of law.
The Board was entitled to judgment as a matter
Steelvest, supra, and Smith v. O'Dea, supra.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the circuit
court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Kenneth Sewell, Pro se
Burgin, Kentucky
Keith Hardison
Frankfort, Kentucky
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