JESSE JULIUS JONES v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: November 13, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-001885-MR
JESSE JULIUS JONES
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ELLEN B. EWING, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 85-CR-001318
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: BUCKINGHAM, KNOX, and SCHRODER, JUDGES.
KNOX, JUDGE.
Jesse Julius Jones (Jones) appeals pro se from an
order of the Jefferson Circuit Court entered on July 17, 1997,
denying his motion to vacate, set aside or correct judgment
brought pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr)
11.42.
We affirm.
In May 1985, Jones and Robert Martin entered the
Kentucky Pawn Shop in Louisville, Kentucky.
At the time, there
were two employees in the shop, Steven Lewis and Irwin Cohen.
After Lewis showed Jones and Martin several items of jewelry, one
of the suspects walked over to Cohen and threw him to the ground.
At about the same time, the other suspect walked behind Lewis and
placed into his back what Lewis stated felt like a gun.
The
suspect behind Lewis then told him to lie down on the floor.
One
of the suspects proceeded to break the glass out of several
jewelry cases and take some of the contents.
The suspects also
handcuffed Lewis and Cohen and told them that if they moved, they
would kill them.
After Jones and Martin left the shop, Lewis and
Cohen went to the store next door and reported the incident.
Shortly thereafter, the police received information
that a person named Charles Coleman had sold some of the jewelry
taken in the robbery.
The police interviewed Coleman, who told
them that he had driven the car to the pawn shop but that Jesse
Jones and Rob Martin had committed the robbery.
The police also
received information from Jones’ former girlfriend that Jones had
several items of jewelry that he stated he had obtained in a
robbery of a pawn shop.
A subsequent search of Coleman’s
apartment also uncovered several pieces of jewelry taken in the
robbery of the pawn shop.
In August 1985, the Jefferson County Grand Jury
indicted Jones and Martin on one count of complicity to commit
first-degree robbery (KRS 515.020 and 502.020), and Coleman on
one count of facilitation of first-degree robbery (KRS 515.020
and 506.080).
On December 16, 1986, Jones entered a guilty plea
to first-degree robbery under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S.
25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970), pursuant to a plea
agreement.
Under the plea agreement, the Commonwealth
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recommended the minimum sentence of ten years.
After Jones
waived the right to a presentence investigation report, the trial
court sentenced him to serve ten years in prison.1
In February 1997, Jones filed an RCr 11.42 motion to
vacate the judgment.
Jones alleged that his guilty plea to
first-degree robbery was invalid because he received ineffective
assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and Section 11 of the Kentucky
Constitution.
More specifically, he contended that counsel
failed properly to investigate the facts of the case and the law
applicable to the charge.
Jones alleged that counsel failed to
advise him about the necessary elements of first-degree robbery.
He maintained that if he had known that use of a deadly weapon or
the threat of immediate physical force were required to establish
first-degree robbery, he would not have pled guilty to that
offense.
While Jones does not deny having participated in the
incident, he alleges that no deadly weapon was involved, so he
was guilty only of second-degree robbery.
The trial court
summarily denied the motion without a hearing.
This appeal
followed.
Jones’ motion is based on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
A guilty plea may be rendered invalid if
the defendant received constitutionally ineffective assistance of
counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446
U.S.
335, 344, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1980); Shelton v.
1
Martin and Coleman also pled guilty with Martin receiving
ten years on the first-degree robbery charge and Coleman
receiving five years probated on the facilitation charge.
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Commonwealth, Ky. App., 928 S.W.2d 817 (1996).
In order to
establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a person must
satisfy a two-part test showing that counsel's performance was
deficient and the deficiency resulted in actual prejudice
affecting the outcome.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); accord Gall v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W.2d 37 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S.
1010, 106 S. Ct. 3311, 92 L. Ed. 2d 724 (1986).
Where an
appellant challenges a guilty plea based on ineffective counsel,
he must show both that counsel made serious errors outside the
wide range of professionally competent assistance, McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763
(1970), and that the deficient performance so seriously affected
the outcome of the plea process that, but for the errors of
counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the defendant
would not have pleaded guilty, but would have insisted on going
to trial.
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88
L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985);
accord Sparks v. Commonwealth, Ky. App.,
721 S.W.2d 726, 727-28 (1986).
A "reasonable probability" is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of
the proceeding.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Jones first contends that counsel was ineffective for
failing to perform an adequate investigation of the facts
surrounding the robbery.
He maintains that because no deadly
weapon or gun was used and there was no use or threat of physical
force, had he known that the use of a deadly weapon or physical
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force was an element of the offense, he would not have pled
guilty to first-degree robbery.
In discussing the prejudice prong, the Court in Hill
stated that counsel’s ineffective performance must have affected
the outcome of the plea process.
Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.
The
prejudice inquiry closely resembles the type of review for
ineffective-assistance complaints involving trials.
For example, where the alleged error of
counsel is a failure to investigate or
discover potentially exculpatory evidence,
the determination whether the error
”prejudiced” the defendant by causing him to
plead guilty rather than go to trial will
depend on the likelihood that discovery of
the evidence would have led counsel to change
his recommendation as to the plea. This
assessment, in turn, will depend in large
part on a prediction whether the evidence
likely would have changed the outcome of a
trial. Similarly, where the alleged error of
counsel is a failure to advise the defendant
of a potential affirmative defense to the
crime charged, the resolution of the
“prejudice” inquiry will depend largely on
whether the affirmative defense likely would
have succeeded at trial.
Id. (Citation omitted).
Jones relies on Williams v. Commonwealth, Ky., 721
S.W.2d 710 (1986), to support his claim.
He asserts that
counsel’s failure to advise him of the Williams decision
constituted deficient performance and that if he had been advised
of the decision, he would not have pled guilty to first-degree
robbery.
In Williams, the court reversed the defendant’s trial
conviction on first-degree robbery based on insufficient
evidence.
Williams robbed a convenience store by threatening the
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night clerk by reaching toward his back pant’s pocket and stating
to the clerk, “Do you want your life?”
The night clerk believed
that Williams may have had “a weapon or something.”
Id. at 711.
The court held that a mere bulge in Williams’ pocket along with
the clerk’s belief that Williams might have something in his
pocket was insufficient to establish first-degree robbery, as
opposed to second-degree robbery.
“Without an instrument’s ever
being seen, an intimidating threat albeit coupled with a menacing
gesture cannot suffice to meet the standard necessary for a
first-degree robbery conviction.”
Id. at 712.
The court
indicated that a pocket bulge was not sufficient to create a jury
issue on whether a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument was
involved.
Nevertheless, the court in Williams distinguished the
earlier case of Travis v. Commonwealth, Ky., 457 S.W.2d 481
(1970).
In Travis, the victim testified that the defendant
pressed a sharp object against his back and threatened him.
Although the victim never saw the object, the court upheld the
conviction on first-degree robbery.
[W]e have held that within the context of
[the first-degree robbery statute] “any
object that is intended by its user to
convince the victim that it is a pistol or
other deadly weapon and does so convince him
is one.” Merritt v. Commonwealth, Ky., 386
S.W.2d 727, 729 (1965). Whatever the sharp
instrument was, it was intended to and did
convince Combs that it was a knife. Hence
the rationale of Merritt applies.
Id. at 482-83.
Jones refers to testimony by a police detective before
the grand jury in support of his position that Williams is
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determinative2.
At that time, the detective stated that “one of
the subjects put what was possibly a gun into the back of one of
the clerks and the second subject grabbed the second clerk in the
store.” (Emphasis added).
Jones argues that under Williams, the
clerk had to actually see the deadly weapon or gun and the
policeman’s testimony indicated the clerk did not see a gun.
Jones’ conclusion that application of the Williams
decision to the facts of his case would necessarily preclude a
first-degree robbery conviction is incorrect.
Williams did not
state that the victim must actually see the deadly weapon in
order to support a first-degree robbery conviction.
The Williams
court carefully distinguished the Travis opinion where the clerk
did not see the knife, but had felt something that made him
believe the defendant had a knife.
The court specifically
emphasized the clerk’s failure to identify the bulge in the
defendant’s pocket.
In the current case, the record indicates that Lewis,
the clerk, felt an object that he believed was a gun, and during
the robbery, the suspects threatened to kill both of the clerks.
In addition, one suspect threw Cohen to the ground and both
2
The Commonwealth argues that Jones’ reliance on Williams is
misplaced because it was modified by the subsequent decision of
Lambert v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 835 S.W.2d 299 (1992), and
even if counsel had informed Jones of Williams, he would have had
to inform him of Lambert. However, the deficient performance
prong of the Strickland test is based on the circumstances at the
time without “the distorting effects of hindsight.” Strickland,
466 U.S. at 689.
See also McQueen v. Commonwealth, Ky., 949
S.W.2d 70, 71, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 2536, 138
L. Ed. 2d 1035 (1997). Lambert was decided after Jones entered
his guilty plea, so defense counsel could not have been aware of
this decision.
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clerks were handcuffed by the robbers.
That situation is more
similar to the facts in Travis, than those in Williams.
Thus,
defense counsel did not render deficient performance for failing
to advise Jones that the facts could not support a robbery
conviction.
Even assuming that defense counsel was deficient for
not discussing the Williams decision with Jones, he cannot
establish actual prejudice because of counsel’s error.
Had Jones
gone to trial, the facts were sufficient to support a conviction
for first-degree robbery even under Williams.
Jones received the
minimum ten-year sentence on first-degree robbery.
having participated in the robbery.
Jones admits
As a result, he cannot show:
(1) that had he known about the Williams decision, the result of
a trial would have been different; (2) that there is a reasonable
probability that he would have gone to trial rather than plead
guilty; or, (3) that the guilty plea proceeding was fundamentally
unfair.
In conclusion, Jones has failed to establish either
prong of the Strickland/Hill standard, and therefore, his guilty
plea is not invalid based on ineffective assistance of counsel.
Finally, Jones contends that his guilty plea is invalid
because Kentucky courts cannot accept a plea under North Carolina
v. Alford, supra.
This argument is wholly without merit.
Alford
pleas have been recognized in Kentucky state courts for over
twenty years and were authorized at the time of Jones’ guilty
plea.
See, e.g., Kruse v. Commonwealth, Ky., 704 S.W.2d 192, 196
n.1 (1985);
Corbett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 717 S.W.2d 831, 832
(1986).
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For the above-stated reasons, we affirm the order of
the Jefferson Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jessie Julius Jones, Pro Se
Wheelwright, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Joseph R. Johnson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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