GENERAL DRIVERS, WAREHOUSEMAN v. HONORABLE A. B. CHANDLER, III COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY and KENTUCKY REGISTRY OF ELECTION FINANCE
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
May 15, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 97-CA-1821-MR
GENERAL DRIVERS, WAREHOUSEMAN
& HELPERS LOCAL UNION NO. 89
and ROBERT M. WINSTEAD
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROGER CRITTENDEN, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 97-CI-000760
HONORABLE A. B. CHANDLER, III
AS ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY and
KENTUCKY REGISTRY OF ELECTION
FINANCE
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * *
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, KNOX and SCHRODER, Judges.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
This case arises from allegations of
wrongdoing arising from the 1995 gubernatorial election.
At
issue are the respective powers of the Kentucky Registry of
Election Finance (the Registry) and the Attorney General of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky (the Attorney General).
The Registry is an independent state agency charged with
administering, investigating, and enforcing campaign finance laws
as codified at KRS Chapters 121 and 121A.
Specifically, "all
policy and enforcement decisions concerning the regulation
of campaign finance shall be the ultimate responsibility of the
registry."
KRS 121.120(5).
KRS 121.120 also provides that the
Registry "shall" initiate and make investigations into complaints
of violations either on its own initiative or upon receipt of a
complaint and forward any violations of KRS 121 or 121A which
could form the basis for a civil or criminal action to the
Attorney General or the proper county or Commonwealth Attorney.
KRS 121.120(4)(m) and (n).
Under KRS 121.140, the Registry is
required to investigate all alleged violations of campaign
finance law either on its own initiative or upon receipt of a
sworn complaint.
KRS 121.140(1).
"If the registry concludes
that there is probable cause to believe that the campaign finance
law has been violated knowingly, it shall refer the violation to
the Attorney General or the appropriate Commonwealth's or county
attorney for prosecution."
KRS 121.140(5).
On April 10, 1996, the Registry and the Attorney General
entered into a Joint Investigation Agreement (the Agreement) to
establish a joint task force to investigate violations of
election and campaign finance laws.
The agreement stated that
investigations conducted by the media as well as the Registry
showed that violations of campaign finance and election statutes
may have occurred, and that coordination between the Registry and
Attorney General was "essential to prevent a substantial
duplication of expenses and efforts."
stated:
2
-2-
The Agreement specifically
1. The Task Force will be operated jointly
by the Office of the Attorney General and the
Kentucky Registry of Election Finance. All
matters in which there is deemed to be only a
civil violation of the campaign finance laws
will be referred to the Kentucky Registry of
Election Finance. All matters in which the
Kentucky Registry of Election Finance
determines that there is probable cause to
believe that a campaign finance statute has
been knowingly committed will be referred to
the Office of the Attorney General or the
appropriate prosecutor.
2. Both the Office of the Attorney General
and the Kentucky Registry of Election Finance
will commit investigatory, prosecutorial,
secretarial, and clerical resources to the
Task Force.
Although it is not clear from the record, apparently the
Registry became concerned about the role of the Attorney General
in conducting the joint investigation.
In a letter to the
Attorney General dated November 7, 1996, the Registry's Chairman
expressed his concern that "because of the Registry's statutory
responsibilities to ensure that election finance is adequately
policed and regulated, the board believes that we need to be a
full partner in this investigation, which includes being kept up
to date on the investigation's progress."
The letter further
provided:
Perhaps our area of greatest concern
revolves around the provisions of KRS
121.120(5). As you know, that statute
provides that the Registry shall have
ultimate responsibility for all "policy and
enforcement decisions concerning the
regulation of campaign finance." Our review
of the circumstances surrounding the adoption
in 1992 of the revisions to the statutes
regulating election finance has convinced us
that this language means what it says and
3
-3-
that "all issues" relating to election
finance must first come to the Registry for
review (KRS Chapters 121 and 121A). As you
know, in the past we have worked closely with
your office referring to it those cases
determined by the Registry to warrant
criminal prosecution. Currently, there are
six cases pending before your office on
criminal referral. In fact, as you probably
know, it has not been unusual for cases
referred to your office by the Registry to be
declined for prosecution. Therefore, I think
it safe to say that the Registry has not been
reluctant to refer criminal cases for
criminal prosecution when warranted.
We must, however, take issue with the
perception of some that your office is free
to seek an indictment on an election finance
matter without first referring the case to
the Registry for a probable cause
determination. KRS 121.120 explicitly
requires this step. I would therefore
request your commitment that any election
finance issues which you feel warrant
prosecution will first be referred to the
Registry for a probable cause determination
prior to your office's initiating any
criminal or civil actions. The General
Assembly has established a specific
administrative procedure for enforcement of
campaign finance statutes and has charged the
Registry with making probable cause
determinations. Therefore, it would not be
in anyone's best interest to bypass the
administrative procedure, especially if such
an action might ultimately invalidate the
criminal proceeding because an offender was
deprived of the opportunity to be heard at
the administrative level.
While the matter is not free from doubt, I
suggested in our meeting that the involvement
of some Registry officials in seeking any
Grand Jury subpoenas would probably foreclose
challenges to the subpoenas based on the
claim that only the Registry had the right to
utilize judicial process to investigate
election finance violations.
4
-4-
On April 14, 1997, without a probable cause determination
having been made by the Registry, the Attorney General filed a
motion with the trial court requesting that a special grand jury
be empaneled to aid in the criminal investigation of the 1995
state election.
The motion stated that the investigation was a
joint effort between the Registry and the Attorney General.
The
motion, in part, further stated:
CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY BY THE TEAMSTERS
The initial complaint in this
investigation contained allegations "of a
conspiracy between Danny Ross and the
Teamsters Union." At a point in time, Mr.
Ross was a staff member of then Lt. Governor
Paul Patton, left that position, and assumed
a position as an employee of the Teamsters
Union. Campaign materials consisting of yard
signs, wickets, and bumper stickers were
purchased and distributed to Teamsters Union
membership. These materials were in support
of the Paul Patton and Steven Henry campaign.
As a result of these facts and others, the
allegation has been raised that collusion
existed between the Patton/Henry campaign and
the Teamsters Union. The purpose and motive
behind any such collusion would be to subvert
applicable campaign spending and election
laws.
Investigative efforts in this area to date
have located extensive communications between
the parties involved. Interviews conducted
in the course of this investigation have
failed to adequately explain and resolve the
issue. Witnesses need to be subpoenaed and
sworn testimony obtained in order to
ascertain the true facts and circumstances
surrounding these allegations.
The trial court entered an order granting the Attorney General's
motion on April 4, 1997.
5
-5-
On May 9, 1997, appellants, General Drivers, Warehousemen &
Helpers Local Union No. 89 and Robert M. Winstead, one of the
union's members (collectively the Teamsters) filed a declaratory
judgment action with the trial court challenging the power of the
Attorney General to conduct an investigation of the Teamsters for
alleged campaign violations.
The complaint sought a temporary
injunction enjoining the Attorney General from investigating
and/or prosecuting the Teamsters and a declaratory judgment
holding that (1) the Registry has exclusive jurisdiction to
initiate investigations of violations of campaign finance laws
and determine whether there is probable cause that a knowing
violation has occurred; (2) the Registry cannot delegate its
authority to investigate and make probable cause determinations;
and (3) the Attorney General is acting outside his scope of
authority in investigating alleged violations of campaign finance
laws in the absence of a probable cause determination from the
Registry.
The Teamsters filed a separate motion for temporary
injunctive relief on May 9, 1997.
On June 2, 1997, the Attorney General and the Registry filed
separate motions to dismiss with the trial court.
Both appellees
argued that the Teamsters could not use the Declaratory Judgment
Act (KRS 418, et. seq.) to raise statutory and constitutional
arguments since "those claims can be determined in connection
with proceedings pending before [the Registry] or in pending
criminal proceedings."
6
-6-
The trial court entered an order dismissing the Teamsters'
action on June 25, 1997.
The trial court held that KRS 15.243(d)
authorized the Attorney General to initiate investigations into
alleged campaign finance violations, and that KRS Chapters 15 and
121 authorized the joint probe.
The trial court further held:
Under the Plaintiff's theory of the case,
the Registry must determine probable cause.
Even if this theory is correct, there is no
evidence to suggest that the Grand Jury is
going to return an indictment before the
Attorney General brings the case to the
Registry for a probable cause determination.
Until such an event happens, the Plaintiffs
have not stated a cause of action for which
relief may be granted by this Court. Even if
the Attorney General is acting outside his
authority in this case, the Plaintiffs have
not yet and may never be damaged by such
actions; therefore, unless an indictment is
issued, the Plaintiffs have no standing to
pursue this matter.
Further, since there is no case in
controversy, the Plaintiffs do not have the
proper standing to pursue Counts I-V of the
Complaint which deal with the
constitutionality of KRS 121, et seq. As
outlined in HealthAmerica Corp. of Kentucky
v. Humana Health Plan, Inc., Ky., 697 S.W.2d
946, 947 (1985), a party has standing when he
or she has a "judicially recognizable
interest in the subject matter, which is both
"present and substantial." Further, the
party must show that it has more than a "mere
expectancy" of receiving some benefit from
the arbitration of the suit. Winn v. First
Bank of Irvington, Ky.App., 581 S.W.2d 21, 23
(1978). Since there is no present and
justiciable controversy at this time, the
parties are not properly before this Court.
Therefore, this Court declines to reach the
constitutionality issues raised in Counts
I-V.
7
-7-
Subsequent to the trial court's order dismissing the
Teamsters' action, the Attorney General served a subpoena on one
of the Teamsters' employees directing her to appear before the
special grand jury.
On November 19, 1997, the Teamsters filed a
motion to quash the subpoena.
In the motion, the Teamsters made
the same arguments contained in the declaratory judgment action.
The Teamsters allege that the trial court erred in finding
that they lack standing to maintain the declaratory judgment
action.
We disagree.
In order for standing to exist, a party must show a legally
"recognizable interest in the subject matter of the suit."
Healthamerica Corp. of Ky. v. Humana Health Plan, Inc., Ky., 697
S.W.2d 946, 947 (1985).
Furthermore, the party's interest must
be determined to be present and substantial as opposed to a mere
expectancy.
HealthAmerica, 697 S.W.2d at 947.
Whether a party
has standing is to be decided on the facts of the case.
Plaza B.
V. v. Stephens, Ky., 913 S.W.2d 319, 322 (1996).
As the trial court and the appellees have pointed out, the
Teamsters argue that they may be harmed by the stigma of an
indictment if an indictment is the ultimate result of the
investigation.
We are unaware of any indictments which have
materialized from this action.
Secondly, as the trial court
pointed out, there was nothing in the evidence which suggests
that the Attorney General would pursue an indictment without
seeking a probable cause determination.
Given the tone of the
letter from the Registry to the Attorney General cited supra, it
8
-8-
seems highly unlikely that this would occur.
As of the time the
Teamsters filed their action, there had been no action directed
at the Teamsters.
Thus, we agree that the Teamsters lacked
standing to pursue this matter absent any concrete action taken
directly against them.
We are also unpersuaded by the cases cited by the Teamsters
in support of their argument.
The issue addressed by the Court
in Goodwin v. City of Louisville, Ky., 215 S.W.2d 557 (1948), was
whether direct judicial relief was available to question the
jurisdiction of an agency to act where the plaintiff has not yet
exhausted available judicial remedies.
Goodwin did not deal with
the issue of standing as the plaintiff had already been arrested
and was facing prosecution.
The same is true for Roberts v.
Noel, Ky., 296 S.W.2d 745 (1956), Crowder v. Schlitz Brewing Co.,
Ky., 175 S.W.2d 1003 (1943), Crowder v. Franklin County
Distilling Co., Ky., 178 S.W.2d 928 (1944), and Howard v. Howard,
Ky., 33 S.W.2d 635 (1930).
In all these cases, the parties
challenging the jurisdiction of the court already had actions
pending against them and the issue of standing was not raised.
Harrison's Sanitarium, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Department of
Health, Ky., 417 S.W.2d 137 (1967), is also distinguishable.
In
that case, the plaintiff, who was challenging the validity of
regulations pertaining to room sizes in nursing homes, faced
either criminal prosecution for failing to comply with the
regulations or having to pay unnecessary expenses to comply with
a regulation which may later become invalidated.
9
-9-
Unlike the
Teamsters, the plaintiffs in Harrison's would suffer regardless
of whether they complied with the regulation or ignored it.
Here, the Teamsters only allege that they may suffer if an
indictment is issued.
The Teamsters' reliance on Hancock v. Schroering, Ky., 481
S.W.2d 57 (1972) and Hammond v. Smith, Ky. App., 930 S.W.2d 408
(1996), is misguided.
In Hancock, the Court was able to hear the
case because the fact situation was such that a controversy would
never be present to allow for judicial review.
In Hammond, the
issue was whether a justiciable controversy existed, the question
of standing was not addressed.
As the question of whether a
party has satisfied the actual controversy requirement in order
to maintain a declaratory judgment action is separate from the
question of whether a party has standing to maintain its action,1
Hammond is not helpful to the Teamsters.
Furthermore, even if we were to find that the Teamsters had
standing to maintain their cause of action, we agree with the
Registry that the Teamsters have other avenues available through
which their concerns may be raised.
"The declaratory judgment
act cannot be invoked to determine an issue presented in another
pending suit."
Schick v. Schick, Ky., 240 S.W.2d 533 (1951).
As
noted in the facts, the Attorney General served a subpoena on one
of the Teamsters' employees after the Teamsters filed suit.
The
Teamsters can raise these exact claims in a motion to quash the
1
Associated Industries of Ky. v. Commonwealth, Ky., 912 S.W.2d 947, 951 (1995).
10
-10-
subpoena, thus eliminating the need for the declaratory judgment
action.
The fact that there was or may have been no alternative
available at the time the declaratory judgment action was
initiated makes no difference.
See Travis v. Pennyrile Rural
Electric Cooperative, 399 F.2d 726 (6th Cir. 1968).
Having considered the parties' arguments on appeal, the
order of the Franklin Circuit Court is affirmed.
SCHRODER, JUDGE, CONCURS.
KNOX, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES A SEPARATE OPINION.
KNOX, JUDGE, DISSENTING.
I respectfully dissent.
I
recognize that the declaratory judgment act does not ordinarily
apply to restrain enforcement of criminal laws.
However, given
the current posture of this case, I believe that the issues
raised by appellants' petition should be expeditiously decided.
The issue in this case relates to the authority of the
Attorney General and the Registry to conduct investigations into
violations of campaign finance laws.
Members of appellant Union
are announced targets of the special grand jury convened in
Franklin Circuit Court.
Since the members of appellant Union are
announced targets, I believe that the Teamsters have standing to
raise the question of the statutory authority of the Attorney
General to conduct the investigation.
The question here is not
whether the Teamsters have a right not to be investigated, but
rather, whether the entity that is carrying on the investigation
is authorized to do so.
11
-11-
I realize that the Teamsters have not yet been charged with
an offense.
But the issue in this case is whether they are being
investigated by an office with the statutory authority to do so.
I would rule that, as announced targets of the investigation, the
Teamsters have standing to question whether the investigation is
being conducted according to the applicable statutes.
While it is true that the Teamsters may raise these issues
in other proceedings, such as by way of motion to quash subpoenas
issued for their members, they appear to have attempted to have
done so without avail.
As stated in CR 57, the existence of
another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for
declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate.
While
taking no position that the Teamsters are entitled to the relief
they request, I believe that since they have not been successful
in having the issue they raise heard in the context of other
proceedings, they should be heard in this one.
I believe the
language in Hammond v. Smith, Ky. App., 930 S.W.2d 408, 409
(1996), citing KRS 418.080, is particularly applicable here:
"[The declaratory judgment statutes are] declared to be remedial;
their purpose is to make courts more serviceable to the people by
way of settling controversies, and affording relief from
uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, duties and
relations, and are to be liberally interpreted and administered."
More importantly, the trial court's opinion and order
contains language which appears to address the merits of the
issues raised by the Teamsters, even though the trial court
12
-12-
determined that they lacked standing to raise those issues.
I
believe the trial court's order furnishes added justification for
13
-13-
this Court to resolve the issues related to the Attorney
14
-14-
General's authority to investigate.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT, LOCAL UNION NO. 89:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE, A. B. CHANDLER, III,
ATTORNEY GENERAL:
Michael A. Valenti
Louisville, KY
Bryan Jones
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT, ROBERT WINSTEAD:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE, KENTUCKY REGISTRY OF
ELECTION FINANCE:
Scott C. Cox
Louisville, KY
Jon L. Fleishaker
Louisville, KY
15
-15-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.