COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. ELMER BOYD STEWART
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RENDERED:
March 27, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 97-CA-1685-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ROCKCASTLE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM T. CAIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CR-16
V.
ELMER BOYD STEWART
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
* * * * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
DYCHE, MILLER, and SCHRODER, JUDGES.
DYCHE, JUDGE.
The Commonwealth appeals from an order of the
Rockcastle Circuit Court granting Elmer Stewart's motion to
suppress evidence related to an indictment for unlawful
possession of a controlled substance.
Finding the court erred,
we reverse and remand.
On March 13, 1996, several Kentucky State Police and
local police officers were conducting a routine road block check
at the junction of Coal Branch Road and Kentucky Highway 1004 in
Rockcastle County.
During the operation, the police stopped a
vehicle that was being driven by Barbara Fetters, and which also
contained Stewart as a passenger.
Fetters moved the vehicle onto
the side of the road to search for her automobile insurance card.
Shortly thereafter she exited the car in order to speak with one
of the officers, while Stewart remained in the car.
While
Fetters was speaking with one police officer, a second police
officer saw someone throw an item from the passenger side of the
vehicle onto the side of the road.
The item was retrieved by the
police and later identified as a bottle containing ninety-six
(96) Tylox pills.
The police asked Stewart to exit the vehicle
and he was searched.
This search uncovered a small quantity of
marijuana rolled up in a ten dollar bill taken from Stewart's
pants pocket.
Stewart was arrested and charged with several drug
offenses.
In April 1996, the Rockcastle County Grand Jury
indicted Stewart in Case No. 96-CR-16 on one felony count of
first-degree possession of a controlled substance (Tylox pills)
(KRS 218A.1415), and being a persistent felony offender in the
first degree (PFO I)(KRS 532.080).
At the time of the
indictment, Stewart was on probation for three felony convictions
in October 1994 involving trafficking in marijuana and unlawful
transaction with a minor.
Following the indictment in Case No.
96-CR-16, the Commonwealth filed a motion to revoke the two-year
probated sentence on the October 1994 convictions.
On September 13, 1996, the circuit court held an
evidentiary hearing on the motion to revoke probation. During the
hearing, the Commonwealth offered evidence that Stewart had
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violated several conditions of probation including the use of
illegal drugs shown by a positive test for benzodiazepene and
cocaine, failure to attend drug counseling, possession of
marijuana on March 13, 1996, and possession of the Tylox pills on
March 13, 1996.
At the hearing, Stewart moved to suppress the
evidence of his possession of the marijuana and Tylox pills
arguing the highway checkpoint was illegal under Michigan Dept.
of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, (1990)(involving sobriety
checkpoint operations).
See also Steinbeck v. Commonwealth, Ky.
App., 862 S.W.2d 912 (1993).
The trial judge stated that he
would take the motion to suppress under submission pending his
review of the Sitz opinion.
On January 31, 1997, the circuit
court issued an order revoking Stewart's probation on the 1994
convictions based on appellant's possession of marijuana.
On June 20, 1997, Stewart filed a motion to suppress
the evidence of the 96 Tylox pills, and a motion to dismiss the
indictment in Case No. 96-CR-16.
The motion to suppress stated
the basis for the request to suppress was "because the court
previously conducted a hearing in which said evidence was offered
and ruled said evidence inadmissiable [sic]."
Stewart also
stated in the motion that no Commonwealth witness at the
probation revocation hearing saw Stewart with the pills.
On June
25, 1997, the Commonwealth filed a written objection to the
motion to dismiss and moved for an evidentiary hearing on the
motion to suppress.
The Commonwealth disputed the appellant's
claim that the evidence of the pills had been found inadmissible
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previously.
On June 26, 1997, the trial court granted Stewart's
motion to suppress "for the reasons set forth in defendant's
motion."
The Commonwealth appealed this order.
The Commonwealth argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in granting Stewart's motion to suppress.
It asserts
that the trial court's order suppressing the evidence of the
Tylox pills is erroneous because it relies on the prior
revocation hearing, which also does not contain a suppression
order.
The Commonwealth also contends the trial court's action
granting the motion to suppress is unsupported by the record.
In the case at bar, the trial court did not hold an
evidentiary hearing on Stewart's motion to suppress.
generally RCr 9.78.
See
A review of the record reveals that the
trial court in fact did not rule the evidence of the Tylox pills
inadmissible at any time in the probation revocation proceedings.
At the probation revocation hearing, Stewart's attorney made oral
motions to exclude the evidence based on an illegal roadblock and
lack of competent testimony of possession.
However, the trial
court made no ruling on the motion to exclude based on
incompetent testimony, and it denied the motion to suppress on
the grounds of an illegal roadblock in its written order revoking
Stewart's probation.
Therefore, to the extent the trial court's
order granting the motion to suppress in Case No. 96-CR-16 is
based on a factual finding that the evidence of the Tylox pills
had been found inadmissible previously in the revocation hearing,
it is not supported by the record.
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In addition, although Stewart did not specifically
identify the legal principle supporting the motion to suppress in
either the original motion or in his appellate brief, Stewart
argues that the Commonwealth failed to connect him with the Tylox
pills in the probation revocation hearing, and therefore it
should not be given another opportunity to do so in the current
prosecution for drug possession.
Stewart's position appears to
be based on some form of res judicata or collateral estoppel.
Res judicata or claim preclusion bars a subsequent suit based on
the same cause of action involving the same parties or their
privies following a judgment on the merits.
See City of
Louisville v. Louisville Professional Firefighters Ass'n., Ky.,
813 S.W.2d 804, 806 (1991).
Res judicata bars entire claims or
causes of action that were or should have been brought in a prior
action.
City of Covington v. Board of Trustees, Ky., 903 S.W.2d
517, 521 (1995).
Meanwhile, collateral estoppel or issue
preclusion bars relitigation of an issue actually litigated.
Sedley v. City of West Buechel, Ky., 461 S.W.2d 556 (1971);
Napier v. Jones By And Through Reynolds, Ky. App., 925 S.W.2d
193, 195 (1996).
Collateral estoppel is viewed as a subdivision
of the doctrine of res judicata.
See Revenue Cabinet,
Commonwealth of Ky. v. Samani, Ky. App., 757 S.W.2d 199, 201
(1988).
Although res judicata and collateral estoppel are
related principles, there are significant differences.
The basic distinction between the doctrines
of res judicata and collateral estoppel,
. . . has frequently been emphasized. Thus,
under the doctrine of res judicata, a
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judgment "on the merits" in a prior suit
involving the same parties or their privies
bars a second suit on the same cause of
action. Under the doctrine of collateral
estoppel, on the other hand, such a judgment
precludes relitigation of issues actually
litigated and determined in the prior suit,
regardless of whether it was based on the
same cause of action as the second suit.
City of Louisville, 813 S.W.2d at 807 (quoting Lawlor v. National
Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326, (1955)); Donovan v.
Thames, 105 F.3d 291 (6th Cir. 1997).
In the case at bar, the causes of action of the two
criminal proceedings are procedurally and substantively
different.
Probation revocation involves compliance with the
conditions of probation, while criminal prosecution involves an
initial determination of guilt or innocence concerning a
statutorily defined act.
In addition, Stewart is attempting to
bar the subsequent criminal prosecution based on an issue raised
in the probation revocation hearing, even though his probation
was revoked on other grounds.
Therefore, res judicata is not
applicable to the current situation. See, e.g., Lucindo v.
Superior Court, 51 Cal.3d 335, 272 Cal.Rptr. 767, 795 P.2d 1223
(1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 920, (1991) (indicating that res
judicata is not applicable to situation involving attempt to bar
criminal prosecution based on finding in probation revocation
hearing).
Stewart's motion to suppress in effect attempts to use
collateral estoppel to prevent the Commonwealth from relitigating
the admissibility of the evidence of Stewart's possession of the
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Tylox pills in the criminal prosecution for drug possession.
However, a party attempting to apply collateral estoppel must
prove that the issue in question was actually and necessarily
litigated and determined, and that the losing party was given a
full and fair opportunity to contest it.
Board of Education of
Covington v. Gray, Ky. App., 806 S.W.2d 400, 402 (1991).
See
also Gregory v. Commonwealth, Ky., 610 S.W.2d 598, 600 (1980).
The record does not support a conclusion that Stewart
properly invoked collateral estoppel to support his motion to
suppress.
Stewart asserted in his motion to dismiss that the
Tylox pills had been ruled inadmissible by the trial court in the
proceedings involving the probation revocation, but the order
revoking probation explicitly indicates that the trial judge
rejected his contention that the roadblock was illegal and denied
his oral motion to suppress.
Additionally, Stewart suggests in
the written motion to suppress that the Tylox pills were not
admitted because the police officer who testified at the
revocation hearing did not actually see Stewart in possession of
the pills.
While Stewart moved to dismiss the probation
revocation motion at the hearing based on the lack of competent
testimony linking Stewart with the Tylox pills, the trial court
never made a ruling on that issue.
The trial judge made no oral
ruling at the probation revocation hearing and revoked Stewart's
probation based solely on his possession of marijuana.
Therefore, the issue of the admissibility of the Tylox pills was
never actually decided and this issue was not essential or
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necessary to the revocation determination.
See, e.g., People v.
Bone, 82 Ill.2d 282, 412 N.E.2d 444, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 839
(1980) (where trial judge did not make ultimate fact-finding on
issue in revocation hearing, state would not be barred from
subsequent criminal prosecution because of collateral estoppel);
State v. Donovan, 305 Or. 332, 751 P.2d 1109 (1988)(same);
Manning v. State, 870 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. 1994).
Consequently, the
motion to suppress could not be granted on the basis of
collateral estoppel related to the prior probation revocation
proceeding.1
Stewart contends that the trial court's order granting
the motion to suppress should be affirmed because the
Commonwealth failed to include a transcript of a suppression
hearing held on July 16, 1997.
A review of the record reveals a
clerical error in the order granting the motion to suppress. The
body of the order appears to indicate the trial judge signed the
order on July 20, 1997; however, the order was entered on the
record on June 26, 1997.
Although the Commonwealth requested in
its objection to the motion to dismiss that a hearing be held on
July 16, 1997, there is no evidence that such a hearing was
actually held.
1997.
The trial court issued no orders after June 26,
Consequently, Stewart's reliance on Ford v. Gilbert, Ky.,
397 S.W.2d 41 (1965), and Tucker v. Kilgore, Ky., 388 S.W.2d 112
1
We note that the prohibition against double jeopardy
also would not prevent a subsequent prosecution following a
probation revocation hearing involving the same factual
allegations in the criminal prosecution. See United States v.
Miller, 797 F.2d 336 (6th Cir. 1986).
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(1964), is misplaced.
Moreover, this appeal involves the June
26, 1997, order granting the motion to suppress.
Any subsequent
hearing or proceeding that did not affect that order is of little
substantive relevance.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Rockcastle
Circuit Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
Carl R. Clontz
Mt. Vernon, Kentucky
Michael D. Pratt
Special Asst. Attorney General
Somerset, Kentucky
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