DAVID MEADOR v. STEVE BERRY, WARDEN
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RENDERED:
April 10, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO.
97-CA-001652-MR
DAVID MEADOR
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM OLDHAM CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENNIS A. FRITZ, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-00202
v.
STEVE BERRY, WARDEN
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE:
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DYCHE, MILLER, and SCHRODER, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE.
David Meador brings this pro se appeal from a
June 17, 1997 order of the Oldham Circuit Court dismissing his
complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
We affirm.
Meador is an inmate at the Luther Luckett Correctional
Complex currently serving a ten-year sentence on a conviction for
second-degree rape (Ky. Rev. Stat. (KRS) 510.050), first-degree
sexual abuse (KRS 510.100), and second-degree sodomy (KRS
510.080).
On April 28, 1997, Meador requested authorization from
prison authorities for work release outside the prison.
At the
time, Meador had been assigned a medium security classification
based on the nature of the offenses for which he had been con-
victed.
On April 30 1997, Steve Berry, the prison warden, denied
Meador's request indicating that he would not permit a minimum
security work authorization because of the nature of Meador's
offenses.
On May 9, 1997, Meador filed a complaint in circuit
court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a violation of the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Berry filed an
answer denying any constitutional violations and requesting
dismissal of the action for failure to state a claim for relief.
Meador filed an extensive response to the answer and request for
dismissal.
On June 17 1997, the trial court issued an order
dismissing the complaint.1
On June 20, 1997, Meador filed a
motion to reconsider,2 which the circuit court denied.
This
appeal followed.
Meador argues that he was denied procedural due process
because he was summarily denied a minimum security classification
and an opportunity for work release outside of the prison.
He
contends that KRS 197.140 has created a protected liberty interest entitling him to a minimum security classification and the
ability to work outside the prison.
Meador asserts that because
he has already served at least one year of his sentence within
1
The circuit court actually treated the complaint as a
motion for declaratory judgment, but this does not significantly
affect the analysis of the substantive issues on appeal.
2
Although the Civil Rules do not provide for a motion to
reconsider, such a motion may be treated as a motion to alter,
amend or vacate under Ky. R. Civ. P. 59.05. Commonwealth v.
Newsome, Ky., 296 S.W.2d 704 (1956).
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the prison and has not violated any prison policies, he qualified
for work release under KRS 197.140.
Meador argues that he has a
constitutional liberty interest based on a reasonable expectation
in a minimum classification.
We disagree.
A protected liberty interest generally "may arise from
two sources
)
the Due Process Clause itself and the laws of the
states [citation omitted]."
Kentucky Department of Corrections
v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460, 109 S. Ct. 1904, 1908, 104 L. Ed.
2d 506 (1989), and Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589, 602 (7th
Cir. 1986).
Liberty interests may also be created through state
government policy statements or regulations.
631 F.2d 1287 (6th Cir. 1990).
Bills v. Henderson,
An inmate has no inherent consti-
tutional due process right to a particular security classification.
Beard v. Livesay, 798 F.2d 874 (6th Cir. 1986), and Moody
v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 85, 97 S. Ct. 274, 50 L. Ed. 2d 236 (1976).
In addition, an inmate has no constitutional right
emanating from the due process clause to work release.
Whitehorn
v. Harrelson, 758 F.2d 1416 (11th Cir. 1985), and Dominique v.
Weld, 880 F. Supp. 928 (D. Mass. 1995); cf. Greenholtz v. Inmates
of the Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S.
Ct. 2100, 60 L. Ed 2d 668 (1979) (holding there is no constitutional right to conditional release before expiration of valid
sentence).
Therefore, any liberty interest which could exist in
a particular security classification must be based on state law
or regulations.
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Meador's complaint implicates two state statutes:
KRS
197.065, which involves security classification, and KRS 197.140,
which deals with work release.
KRS 197.065 provides in relevant
part as follows:
(1) The commissioner shall classify all
prisoners and segregate the prisoners in all
of the state penal institutions and reformatories according to their past records, the
probability of their being rehabilitated, the
influence such prisoners might exert upon
fellow prisoners, and for any other purpose
that the commissioner, in his discretion, may
deem sufficient for the discipline of the
prisoners in any institution or reformatory,
and for the rehabilitation of any prisoners.
KRS 197.140 states in pertinent part as follows:
No prisoner who is serving a sentence for
rape, attempted rape or who has been convicted of robbery in the first degree, assault in the first degree, or who has been
sentenced to life imprisonment shall be
worked or released for work outside of the
walls of the prison until he has actually
served within the walls of the prison for at
least one (1) year of his sentence and has
been classified as minimum custody according
to the Department of Corrections
classification system. No prisoner who has
escaped or attempted to escape from an adult
correctional institution or local detention
center or jail within the past five (5) years
shall be worked or released for work outside
of the walls of the prison.
In the recent case of Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,
115 S. Ct. 2293, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1995), the Supreme Court
adjusted the approach to determining whether state law or
regulations created a due process liberty interest.
The Court
indicated that in order to establish a state-created liberty
interest, an inmate must demonstrate two factors:
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1) the
presence of state statutory or regulatory language creating
"specific substantive limitations," intended to circumscribe the
discretion of prison officials (Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238,
249-50, 103 S. Ct. 1741, 1747-48, 75 L. Ed. 2d 813 (1983)), and
2) the imposition of "atypical and significant hardship on the
inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life."
Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, 115 S. Ct. at 2300; see also Rimmer-Bey
v. Brown, 62 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that an inmate
must prove existence of both mandatory language in regulation and
atypical and significant hardship).
In Canterino v. Wilson, 869 F.2d 948 (6th Cir. 1989),
the Court addressed the issue of whether the Kentucky statutes on
classification and work release created a liberty interest.
The
Court held that neither KRS 197.065 nor KRS 197.140 created a
protected liberty interest because they did not contain
sufficient mandatory language with specific substantive
predicates that restricted the discretion of prison officials.
Cf. Belcher v. Kentucky Parole Board, Ky. App., 917 S.W.2d 584
(1996) (involving liberty interest in parole regulations).
Although Canterino involved prior versions of these two statutes,
prison officials continue to have ultimate authority and immense
discretion in determining security classification and in granting
work release under the current statutes.
Moreover, Meador has
failed to establish sufficient atypical or significant hardship
associated with his medium security classification and denial of
work release.
Finally, in Mahoney v. Carter, Ky., 938 S.W.2d 575
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(1997), the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the policies and
procedures promulgated by the Department of Corrections did not
create a liberty interest in a particular security classification
status.
As a result, Meador has not established that either
state statutes or prison regulations created a protected
constitutional liberty interest in relation to security
classification or work release.
Thus, the circuit court properly dismissed Meador's
civil rights complaint because he failed to show that prison
officials violated any federal constitutional rights by denying
his request for work release outside of the prison.
For the above-stated reasons, we affirm the order of
the Oldham Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
David Lynn Meador
LaGrange, Kentucky
No brief
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