THOMAS BLACK V. STEVE BERRY
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RENDERED: October 2, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
No.
1997-CA-001625-MR
THOMAS BLACK
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM OLDHAM CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENNIS A. FRITZ, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-0161
V.
STEVE BERRY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
ABRAMSON, GARDNER and GUIDUGLI, JUDGES.
GARDNER, JUDGE.
Thomas Black (Black) appeals pro se from an order
of the Oldham Circuit Court entered on June 23, 1997, dismissing
for failure to state a claim in his petition for declaratory
judgment brought pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 418.040
We affirm.
Black currently is an inmate at the Kentucky State
Penitentiary at Eddyville.
While an inmate at Luther Luckett
Correctional Complex, he was found guilty on two separate occasions
in November 1996 and January 1997 of violating Corrections Policies
and Procedures (CPP), Category IV-21, which prohibits pursuing or
developing
a
relationship
that
activity with a non-inmate.
guilty
of
pursuing
officer.
Based
a
on
is
to
correctional
More specifically, Black was found
relationship
the
unrelated
November
with
a
female
1996
incident,
corrections
the
prison
Adjustment Committee (the Committee)imposed a penalty of forty-five
days in disciplinary segregation and forfeiture of sixty days good
time.
Based on the December 1996 incident, the Committee imposed
a penalty of ninety days disciplinary segregation, forfeiture of
one hundred twenty days good time, and restriction of telephone
privileges for one hundred eighty days.
Upon administrative
appeal, Steve Berry, the warden, concurred with the Adjustment
Committee's decision.
In April 1997, Black filed a petition for declaratory
judgment
in
circuit
court
challenging
the
November
1996
disciplinary action, and later in a supplemental filing added a
challenge to the January 1997 disciplinary action.
In June 1997,
Berry filed a response to the petition for declaratory judgment and
asked the circuit court to dismiss the action. Incorporated in the
response were several attachments including an affidavit by the
Committee chairperson describing the Committee's actions involving
the two disciplinary hearings, the investigation reports, and the
disciplinary hearing forms associated with the two incidents.
June
1997,
the
circuit
court
issued
petition for failure to state a claim.
an
order
dismissing
In
the
This appeal followed.
As an initial matter, we note that while the trial court
dismissed the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief
-2-
may be granted, when parties file exhibits and affidavits in
support of their positions, as was done here, and these documents
are not excluded by the trial court, we shall treat the request for
dismissal and the circuit court order dismissing as a summary
judgment.
Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 12.02; Moss v.
Robertson, Ky. App., 712 S.W.2d 351 (1986); Cabinet for Human
Resources v. Women's Health Services, Inc., Ky. App., 878 S.W.2d
806 (1994).
We may affirm the order dismissing on grounds other
than those stated by the circuit court.
See Haddad v. Louisville
Gas and Electric Company, Ky., 449 S.W.2d 916, 919 (1969); Old
Republic Insurance Company v. Ashley, Ky. App., 722 S.W.2d 55, 58
(1986) (appellate court may affirm judgment if record on appeal
discloses any ground on which the decision could properly have been
made).
As the court noted in Smith v. O'Dea, Ky. App., 939 S.W.2d
353 (1997), inmate declaratory judgment suits challenging prison
disciplinary proceedings invoke the court's authority as a body
reviewing
the
administrative
agency's
action.
Under
these
circumstances, the Smith court recognized a modified standard for
summary
judgment.
"[W]e
believe
summary
judgment
for
the
Corrections Department is proper if and only if the inmate's
petition and any supporting materials, construed in light of the
entire agency record (including, if submitted, administrators’
affidavits describing the context of their acts or decisions), does
not raise specific, genuine issues of material fact sufficient to
overcome the presumption of agency propriety, and the Department is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
-3-
Id. at 356.
With this
standard in mind, we review the specific circumstances of this
case.
In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 41
L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974), the Supreme Court held that prison inmates
may not be deprived of statutory good time without a meaningful
opportunity to challenge the deprivation.
The Court held that
although inmates are not entitled to the full panoply of procedural
safeguards, the due process clause protects an inmate's statecreated liberty interest in good-time credits, and therefore they
are entitled to certain minimum requirements of procedural due
process.
The Court held that prison officials must provide the
following:
1) advance written notice of the disciplinary charges;
2) the opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary
evidence when consistent with institutional safety and correctional
goals; 3) a written statement of the evidence relied upon and the
reasons for the disciplinary action; and 4) an impartial decisionmaking tribunal. Id. 418 U.S. at 563-67, 94 S. Ct. at 2978-82.
See
also Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 465 n.3, 103 S. Ct. 864, 868
n.3, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1983).
While Wolff outlines certain minimal procedures required
by
due
process,
in
Superintendent,
Massachusetts
Correctional
Institution, Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 105 S. Ct. 2768, 86 L.
Ed. 2d 356 (1985), the Court articulated the quantum of evidence
required to support a decision in a prison disciplinary proceeding.
The Court held that due process requires that a disciplinary
committee's decision to revoke good-time credits must be supported
-4-
by "some evidence in the record."
Id. at 454, 105 S. Ct. at 2773.
In applying this lesser degree of evidence, the Supreme Court
indicated that courts should refrain from second guessing the
administrative decision.
Ascertaining whether this standard is
satisfied does not require examination of
the entire record, independent assessment
of the credibility of witnesses, or
weighing of the evidence. Instead, the
relevant question is whether there is any
evidence in the record that could support
the
conclusion
reached
by
the
disciplinary board.
Id. at 455-56, 105 S. Ct. at 2774 (citations omitted).
evidence”
standard
of
review
set
out
in
The “some
Superintendent,
Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill, supra, has
been adopted as the appropriate standard under Section 2 of the
Kentucky Constitution as well.
Smith v. O'Dea, supra.
Black's primary complaint concerns the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the Committee's findings of guilt. He contends
that even applying the "some evidence" standard of review, the
Committee's decisions in the two incidents at issue were not
supported by sufficient evidence.
With respect to the November
1996 incident, the record reveals that prison officials conducted
an internal investigation in October 1996, concerning a possible
relationship between Black and a female corrections officer.
On
October 25, 1996, the investigators intercepted a letter written by
Black prior to his giving it to another inmate because they
suspected it actually was intended for a female guard.
The
investigators placed special powder on the letter, which could be
-5-
detected with the use of a blacklight, in order to allow them to
determine
who
had
handled
it.
Shortly
thereafter,
the
investigators did discover the detection powder on the suspected
female guard's body and clothing, and inside her personal duffel
bag.
With respect to the December 1996 incident, the record
indicates that prison officials monitored and recorded a personal
telephone conversation between Black and a female determined to be
the same female guard involved in the earlier incident.
Black argues the evidence available to the Committee in
both instances was not sufficiently reliable to establish that he
was involved in an improper relationship with a female corrections
officer.
First, he maintains there was no evidence that the
detection powder found on the female guard and her belongings was
the same powder placed on his letter.
Second, he argues there was
inadequate proof that the female he was talking with on the
telephone was the same female guard involved in the prior incident.
Black, however, misconceives the quantum of evidence
necessary to support prison disciplinary action.
As the Court
indicated in Superintendent, Massachusetts Correction Institution,
Walpole v. Hill, fundamental fairness guaranteed by the due process
clause does not require courts to invalidate prison disciplinary
decisions that have some basis in fact.
Ct. at 2774.
472 U.S. at 456, 105 S.
The Court stated, "The Federal Constitution does not
require evidence that logically precludes any conclusion but the
one reached by the disciplinary board.
Instead, due process in
this context requires only that there be some evidence to support
-6-
the findings made in the disciplinary hearing."
Ct. at 2775.
Id. at 457, 105 S.
The evidence of the detection powder not only on the
female guard's person but also on other items of her belongings
clearly was sufficient evidence to support the Committee's decision
of a rules violation.
Similarly, the Committee listened to the
recording of the intercepted telephone conversation involving Black
and determined he was speaking with the same female guard involved
in the earlier incident even after she had been transferred to
another prison facility.
This was sufficient evidence to find
Black guilty of an improper relationship.
This Court will not
second guess the prison officials' decisions in these instances.
Black also alleges that the statement of reasons provided
by the Committee in the disciplinary report form for the decision
with reference to the December 1996 incident was inadequate under
Wolff v. McDonald, supra.
He also asserts that the disciplinary
report failed to identify fully each item of evidence relied upon
by the Committee.
See King v. Wells, 760 F. 2d 89 (6th Cir 1985).
But see Brown v. Frey, 807 F.2d 1407 (8th Cir. 1986)(rejecting
approach applied in King).
First, Black confuses the procedural
requirement established in Wolff with the quantum of evidence
requirement
of
Superintendent,
Institution, Walpole v. Hill.
Massachusetts
While these two requirements are
linked, they remain distinct elements.
committee
is
required
to
Correctional
give
a
A prison disciplinary
written
statement
of
the
evidentiary basis for its decision to administer discipline so that
a reviewing court can determine whether the evidence before the
-7-
committee was adequate to support its findings concerning the
nature and gravity of the prisoner's conduct.
Wolff, 418 U.S. at
564-65, 94 S. Ct. at 2978-79; Hudson v. Edmonson, 848 F.2d 682,
685-86 (6th Cir. 1988).
protect
inmates
The function of the written findings is to
against
collateral
consequences
based
on
a
misunderstanding of the nature of the original proceedings and to
ensure that prison administrators act fairly.
Gilhaus v. Wilson,
Ky. App., 734 S.W.2d 808, 810 (1987); Brown v. Frey, 807 F.2d 1407
(8th Cir. 1986). The written statement, however, may be brief, and
courts must give prison officials wide discretion in enforcing
prison discipline.
Id.; Smith v. O'Dea, 939 S.W.2d at 357.
In the present case, the disciplinary report states the
Committee listened to the tape recording of the telephone call
involving Black and the female guard.
Committee
considered
the
The report also states the
investigation
report
describing
the
circumstances surrounding the monitoring and recording of the
telephone
call.
The
disciplinary
report
clearly
provides
a
sufficient statement of the evidence relied upon and the reasons
for the Committee's action.
In conclusion, the disciplinary actions by the prison
authorities in both November 1996 and January 1997 were supported
by some evidence in the record.
Additionally, the disciplinary
report provided a sufficient statement of reasons to allow judicial
review of the decision.
As a result, Berry was entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law.
-8-
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the
Oldham Circuit Court.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
Thomas Black, Pro Se
Eddyville, Kentucky
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