MORRIS MOORE v. AARON LEE GAUZE
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RENDERED: August 14, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
No.
97-CA-1512-MR
MORRIS MOORE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MARTIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES A. KNIGHT, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-141
v.
AARON LEE GAUZE
and DARRIEL YOUNG
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * *
BEFORE:
ABRAMSON, DYCHE and KNOX, Judges.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE:
The single issue advanced in this appeal is
whether the trial judge abused his discretion in imposing the
sanction of dismissal for failure to obey an order compelling a
response to specific interrogatories and requests for production
of documents.
In support of his contention that the judgment
dismissing his case must be reversed, Appellant Morris Moore
("Moore") argues that a dismissal for discovery violations must
be predicated upon a finding of bad faith or willfulness, neither
of which is present in this case.
Having reviewed the record and
applicable law, we affirm.
On June 13, 1996, Moore filed a pro se complaint
seeking the recovery of damages allegedly incurred when Martin
County Sheriff Darriel Young ("Young") and Deputy Sheriff Aaron
Lee Gauze ("Gauze") used excessive force in arresting him.
He
alleged in that complaint that he was seeking damages for past
and future medical expenses, past and future lost wages, past and
future pain and suffering, past and future mental anguish, and
permanent physical impairment.
In an effort to evaluate Moore's
claims and the extent of his injuries and damages, counsel for
Young and Gauze served Moore with interrogatories and requests
for production of documents on August 13, 1996.
Although Moore
attempted to respond to some of the interrogatories, a review of
the record demonstrates that his answers were substantially
incomplete, providing little information required for an
evaluation of his claims.
The record also discloses that by
letter dated October 25, 1996, counsel for Young and Gauze
confirmed a telephone conversation in which Moore was given an
additional thirty days to supply the missing information without
a motion to compel being filed.
On November 15, 1996, Moore informed counsel that he
would need an additional 60 to 90 days to produce his medical
records.
Despite the fact that no information other than Moore's
income tax returns for the years 1991 through 1995 was provided
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within the thirty days, counsel for Young and Gauze did not seek
a motion compelling compliance with the discovery requests until
February 13, 1997, more than six months after the original
discovery requests had been served.
By order dated March 27,
1997, the trial judge directed Moore to respond in detail within
thirty days to interrogatories numbered 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 and to
requests for production of documents numbered 2, 3, 4, and 5, as
well as requiring him to execute the medical release
authorization and social security authorization request no later
than March 30, 1997.
Moore did execute the requested
authorizations, but he failed to comply with the remainder of the
trial court's order.
Thereafter, on April 16, 1997, counsel for Young and
Gauze moved to dismiss Moore's complaint under the authority of
CR 37.02(2) for failure to comply with the order of March 27,
1997.
After a hearing on May 23, 1997, the trial judge dismissed
Moore's complaint on May 30, 1997, precipitating this appeal.
Moore now argues in this forum that because of his limited legal
knowledge any failure to comply with the discovery requests or
the trial court's order should be deemed to be merely negligent
and not willful.
We disagree.
The record provides ample support for the sanction
imposed by the trial judge.
Clearly evident from documents of
record is the fact that counsel for Young and Gauze afforded
Moore considerable latitude due to the fact that he was not
represented by an attorney.
Moore clearly had the right to elect
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to proceed pro se; however, having done so, it was nevertheless
incumbent upon him to adhere to the ordinary course of
litigation, including providing counsel with basic information
essential to an evaluation of the merits of his claim.
This is
especially true in light of the fact that the requested
information was peculiarly within Moore's knowledge and control.
For example, some of the information Moore refused to provide
concerned his employment history, his previous medical records,
and bills related to the medical treatment allegedly incurred in
connection with this claim.
As noted by the Court in Greathouse
v. American National Bank and Trust Company, Ky. App., 796 S.W.2d
868, 870 (1990), dismissal is not an abuse of discretion if a
party has the ability to comply with a discovery order and does
not.
We are convinced that Moore had the ability to provide the
requested information and simply did not do so, even after
counsel voluntarily extended the time for providing it and after
being specifically directed by the trial judge to do so.
In our
opinion, the failure to comply with the discovery order under
these circumstances constitutes bad faith as contemplated by the
holding in Nowicke v. Central Bank & Trust Company, Ky. App., 551
S.W.2d 809, 810 (1977):
The United States Supreme Court has on
several occasions interpreted Fed.R.Civ. P.
37 on which our own Kentucky CR 37.02 is
based. While indicating that the imposition
of the severest sanctions available under
Rule 37 must be "...tempered by the careful
exercise of judicial discretion to assure
that its imposition is merited...", it has
also stated "effective discovery is
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exceedingly vital..." and the severest
sanctions should be imposed where the
evidence indicates a willful failure to
comply with the discovery procedure. In Re
Professional Hockey Antitrust Litigation,
D.C. 63 F.R.D. 641.
(Emphasis added.)
We are persuaded that the dismissal of Moore's
complaint was not an exercise of unbridled discretion as
condemned in Nowicke; it was a valid exercise of the trial
judge's authority to control the course of litigation by invoking
a sanction provided in CR 37.02.
Because the record fully
supports the conclusion that Moore simply chose not to comply
with discovery and a valid court order, there is no basis for
holding that imposition of the sanction of dismissal constituted
an abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Martin Circuit Court
is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Lawrence R. Webster
Pikeville, Kentucky
Jane Durkin Samuel
Carolyn C. Zerga
Lexington, Kentucky
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