PATRICIA TYREE v. PATTIE A. CLAY HOSPITAL; SPECIAL FUND; DONALD G. SMITH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: August 21, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 97-CA-1301-WC
PATRICIA TYREE
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW
OF A DECISION OF
THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
WC-96-005515
v.
PATTIE A. CLAY HOSPITAL;
SPECIAL FUND; DONALD G. SMITH,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
* * *
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, KNOX, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
KNOX, JUDGE:
Appellant takes this appeal from the decision of
the Workers' Compensation Board (Board) denying appellant's claim
for benefits.
The Board, with one member dissenting, affirmed
the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that
appellant's claim was not filed within the two-year limitations
period provided by KRS 342.185.
Appellant began work as a licensed practical nurse with
Pattie A. Clay Hospital in 1964.
She worked at the hospital for
thirty-three (33) years until her retirement in 1997.
The ALJ found that, in 1964 or early 1965, while
lifting a patient, appellant suffered a herniated disk.
The ALJ
found that appellant reported her injury to her supervisor, but
did not file a workers' compensation claim.
She sought
treatment, and was placed on bed rest for two (2) weeks.
During
her years of employment with the hospital, she continued to
experience back pain with radiation into her legs.
In September 1990, appellant sought treatment from Dr.
William Brooks and Dr. Richard Motara.
Dr. Brooks performed
diagnostic studies and determined that appellant had a herniated
disk, as well as other spinal abnormalities.
However, he imposed
no job restrictions and recommended no job change at that time,
nor did he notify appellant's employer to change her work duties.
Appellant continued working until February 1996, when Dr. Brooks
recommended that she seek medical retirement.
At that time, Dr.
Brooks restricted appellant from repetitive lifting, bending,
stooping, climbing, and squatting, and advised appellant not to
sit, stand, or walk for more than twenty (20) minutes without
changing position.
Dr. Joseph Zerga and Dr. Donald Primm performed
independent medical evaluations on appellant in late 1996.
Both
physicians testified that the plaintiff had an active and/or
arousal of a pre-existing back condition due to her work.
2
Both
physicians testified that they believed appellant's condition was
the same in 1990 and 1991 as it was in 1996.
The ALJ found that plaintiff had proven the workrelatedness of her back problems and that, based upon her
testimony that she notified her superiors when she injured her
back in 1964, she had given timely notice to her employer.
However, the ALJ concluded that, based upon the
testimony of Dr. Brooks, Dr. Zerga, and Dr. Primm that appellant
had similar diagnoses and would have had similar restrictions in
1990 to 1991 as would have been imposed in 1996,1 her condition
manifested itself into disabling reality in 1990 or 1991, and her
claim was therefore barred by the statute of limitations.
ruling, the ALJ relied upon Brockway v. Rockwell
In so
Int'l, Ky.
App., 907 S.W.2d 166 (1995) and Randall Co./ Randall Div. of
Textron, Inc. v. Pendland, Ky. App., 770 S.W.2d 687 (1989).
In affirming the ALJ's decision, the Board appears to
have differed to the extent that the ALJ relied upon "cumulative
trauma" cases.
Rather, the Board relied upon Coslow v. General
Elec. Co., Ky., 877 S.W.2d 611 (1994) in concluding that the
statute of limitations began to run from the date of her initial
injury in 1964 or 1965.
Thus, the Board took the position that
appellant's claim was a "date of the accident" claim, rather than
a manifestation into disabling reality claim.
Even so, the Board
ruled that, even if appellant's claim was a "cumulative trauma"
1
We note that while Dr. Brooks testified as such, the fact
remains that he placed appellant on no restrictions whatsoever in
1990-91.
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claim, the ALJ's conclusion that the disability manifestation
date would have been no later than 1991 was supported by the
evidence, particularly in view of Dr. Brooks's, Dr. Zerga's, and
Dr. Primm's testimony that the same restrictions would have been
imposed upon appellant in 1990 and 1991 as were imposed in 1996.
Appellant argues that the statute of limitations for
filing her claim did not begin to run until February 1996, when
Dr. Brooks recommended that she seek medical retirement.
She
argues that, since Dr. Brooks's medical records contain no
reference that "disabling reality had manifested itself" any
earlier, contrary to the ALJ and the Board's conclusion, she
would not have had notice to file her claim as early as 1991.
Appellant, embracing the "cumulative trauma" theory, and relying
upon Dr. Brooks's testimony, takes the position that her
condition manifested itself into disabling reality in 1996, when
Dr. Brooks first recommended that she take medical retirement.
The claimant in a workers' compensation claim has the
burden of proof and risk of persuasion, and if unsuccessful, the
question on appeal is whether the evidence is so overwhelming
upon consideration of the record as a whole as to compel a
finding in claimant's favor.
See Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum,
Ky. App., 673 S.W.2d 735 (1984); Snawder v. Stice, Ky. App., 576
S.W.2d 276 (1979).
Compelling evidence is that which is so
overwhelming that no reasonable person could reach the same
conclusion reached by the finder of fact.
Barnes, Ky. App., 691 S.W.2d 224 (1985).
4
REO Mechanical v.
If the ALJ's decision
is supported by substantial evidence of record, it must be
upheld.
Special Fund v. Francis, Ky., 708 S.W.2d 641 (1986).
Here, we believe that the evidence in this case compels
a conclusion that this is a "cumulative trauma" case, and that
appellant's condition did not manifest itself into disabling
reality until 1996, when Dr. Brooks recommended that appellant
take medical retirement.
As stated in Randall Co./Randall Div.
of Textron, Inc. v. Pendland, Ky. App., 770 S.W.2d 687, 688
(1989):
Although Pendland began experiencing
significant pain possibly six months prior to
quitting work on January 14, 1983, there was
no definite disability as a result of her
mini-traumas until that date. If we held
that in an injury case of this type the claim
had to be made within two years of the
initial trauma, we might be considering the
first time she performed her thumb maneuver
26 years ago, or it might be the first time
she aggravated her degenerative arthritis,
but in neither case would we know that a
compensable injury had occurred. We
therefore conclude that in cases where the
injury is the result of many mini-traumas,
the date for giving notice and the date for
clocking a statute of limitations begins when
the disabling reality of the injuries becomes
manifest.
The record reflects evidence that appellant indeed
initially hurt her back in 1964.
However, she continued to work
in her employment for a period in excess of thirty (30) years
from that date.
The medical testimony reflects that over the
period of her employment, her back condition grew progressively
worse as she exercised her duties, which involved lifting and
other kinds of physical exertion.
5
We believe that the ALJ
correctly perceived this case as a "cumulative trauma" case.
However, we also believe that the evidence compels a conclusion
that appellant's condition did not manifest itself into disabling
reality until Dr. Brooks recommended that she take medical
retirement.
While the ALJ relied upon the testimonies of Dr.
Brooks, Dr. Zerga, and Dr. Primm that the same restrictions would
have been placed upon appellant in 1990 and 1991 when she sought
Dr. Brooks's advice, we believe that the fact that she was not
then placed on restrictions, but rather, experienced a momentary
absence from work, is not a sufficient basis upon which to
conclude that her condition manifested itself into disabling
reality in 1990 or 1991.
Rather, we believe that the evidence
compels a conclusion that, since she was not placed upon
restrictions and continued to work until she saw Dr. Brooks in
1996, her condition did not manifest itself into disabling
reality until Dr. Brooks placed her on restrictions and
recommended her retirement.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of
the Board, and remand this matter to the ALJ for findings on the
merits of appellant's claim.
MILLER, JUDGE, CONCURS.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, DISSENTING.
I respectfully dissent.
Although I believe there is evidence which supports the
conclusion of the majority, I also believe there is sufficient
evidence to support the conclusion of the Administrative Law
6
Judge (ALJ) and the majority of the Workers’ Compensation Board.
As such, I fear that the majority is substituting its opinion for
that of the ALJ in this matter.
Although I am sympathetic to the
arguments of appellant, I believe there was a sufficient basis
upon which the ALJ concluded that her condition manifested itself
into disabling reality in 1990 or 1991, and would thus affirm.
7
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR PATTIE A. CLAY
HOSPITAL:
Robert F. Ristaneo
Lexington, Kentucky
Roberta K. Kiser
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR SPECIAL FUND:
Joel D. Zakem
Louisville, Kentucky
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