STEPHAWN LEONARD v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
October 9, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
No. 1997-CA-001152-MR
STEPHAWN LEONARD
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GEOFFREY P. MORRIS,JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-000041
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * *
BEFORE: GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE; GUIDUGLI and SCHRODER, Judges.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Stephawn Leonard (Leonard) appeals from the
final judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court sentencing him to
eleven years imprisonment for two counts of first-degree robbery.
We affirm.
On November 24, 1996, Hugh Elkin (Hugh) was helping his
cousin, Nikola Alford (Nikola), move some items of personal
property out of Nikola’s mother’s home located at 117 East Orsmby
in Louisville.
They had brought many of the items out into the
front yard and front porch to organize them before loading them
onto several trucks.
were missing.
Around 7:00 p.m. they noticed Nikola’s keys
Believing the keys had been misplaced, they
obtained flashlights to look in the yard and around the porch.
When Hugh walked up the steps to the porch, appellant
emerged wearing a black leather jacket and ski mask.
Leonard
pointed a gun at Hugh’s head and said, “Give me your wallet or I
will shoot you.”
Hugh yelled to Nikola to run, but Nikola did
not realize what was happening and approached the porch.
When
Leonard turned the gun onto Nikola, Hugh ran into the house and
yelled to his aunt to call the police.
Outside, Leonard held the
gun on Nikola saying, “I’m not playing with you bitch.
your fucking money, bitch.
I’ll shoot you.
Leonard then smacked Nikola with the gun.
Give me
Give me your money.”
As Nikola’s hand rose
to her face to protect herself, she inadvertently pulled on the
ski mask Leonard was wearing.
Nikola was able to view Leonard’s
facial features clearly before her attacker shoved her into some
bushes and ran away.
Shortly thereafter, the police arrived and began
searching the neighborhood for Leonard from the description give
by Nikola.
Within minutes, police apprehended Leonard who was
identified by both Hugh and Nikola.
Nikola’s keys were in
Leonard’s possession when he was arrested.
The gun Leonard
brandished was found in the yard of an abandoned house across the
street.
The gun turned out to be an inoperable BB gun.
Leonard was indicted on January 18, 1997, for two
counts of robbery, first degree.
-2-
The Commonwealth filed an in
limine motion requesting the trial court declare the gun used by
Leonard to be a deadly weapon as a matter of law, but the court
reserved ruling until after the Commonwealth presented its proof
at trial.
Trial was held March 27, 28 and 31, 1997.
At the
conclusion of proof, the court ruled the gun used by Leonard was
a deadly weapon as a matter of law, and instructed the jury
accordingly.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on both
counts of robbery in the first degree. Leonard waived jury
sentencing and accepted the Commonwealth’s offer of eleven years.
Leonard then filed a motion for judgment n.o.v. and for a new
trial which were denied.
On May 2, 1997, the trial court entered
the final judgment of conviction and sentence from which Leonard
brings this appeal.
Leonard claims three separate assignments of error by
the trial court.
First, he claims the trial court erred in
ruling the inoperable BB gun was a deadly weapon, arguing the
jury should have been allowed to determine whether or not it was
a deadly weapon.
Second, Leonard argues he was entitled to jury
instructions on lesser included offenses.
Third, Leonard asserts
the trial judge “coerced” a jury verdict when he instructed the
jury pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 9.57.
Clearly, under the facts presented, the trial court was
correct in holding as a matter of law that the inoperable BB gun
was a deadly weapon.
It has long been the rule that “any object
that is intended by its user to convince the victim that it is a
pistol or other deadly weapon and does so convince him is one.”
-3-
Merritt v. Commonwealth, Ky., 386 S.W.2d 727, 729 (1965).
This
rule applies even if the weapon is possibly a toy as in Merrit,
supra, or inoperable as was the case in Commonwealth v. Sanders,
Ky., 736 S.W.2d 338, 340 (1987).
This rule was recently
reiterated by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Swain v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 887 S.W.2d 346 (1994).
The rule requires
determining the subjective perception of the victim of the crime.
We believe as long as that perception is reasonable under the
circumstances, as here, the rule applies.
Leonard’s second assignment of error is that he was
entitled to jury instructions on the lesser included offenses of
robbery second degree, menacing, terroristic threatening, wanton
endangerment second degree, or theft of mislaid or lost property.
We disagree.
Because the gun had been determined to be a deadly
weapon, an instruction on robbery second degree would not have
been appropriate.
680 (1977).
Mishler v. Commonwealth, Ky., 556 S.W.2d 676,
To be entitled to instructions on the other lesser
included offenses asserted by Leonard, the evidence as a whole
would have had to create a reasonable doubt whether Leonard was
guilty of the higher degree.
S.W.2d 75 (1977).
Luttrell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 554
Here, the testimony of the victims was that
Leonard had pointed a gun at both of them, demanded money and
threatened to shoot.
The testimony supported an instruction on
first-degree robbery only.
Leonard’s claim that he was entitled to an instruction
for theft of lost or mislaid property for taking Nikola’s keys is
-4-
not supported by law.
The trial court correctly pointed out that
Leonard was not entitled to an instruction for additional
offenses which the Commonwealth could have charged, but in its
discretion did not charge against Leonard.
The trial court
properly declined to instruct the jury on any offense other than
first-degree robbery.
Leonard’s final claim of error is that the trial court
“coerced” the jury into a verdict.
After the jury in this case
had been deliberating for four hours, a note was sent to the
judge which read: “Judge Morris, we are unable to reach a
decision.”
When the jurors were brought before the court, the
judge questioned the foreman whether further deliberations might
result in a verdict or whether they would be unable to reach any
decision.
useful.
The foreman indicated continued deliberations might be
Thereafter the trial court charged the jury as required
by RCr 9.57, almost word for word out of the rule.
This is the
procedure required by RCr 9.57 and the Kentucky Supreme Court.
Commonwealth v. Mitchell, Ky., 943 S.W.2d 625, 628 (1997).
The
fact that the jury in this case returned a verdict 30 minutes
after being instructed to resume deliberations is not, in our
minds, so short a time as to indicate the jury did anything other
than their civic duty.
The judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
-5-
Bruce P. Hackett
Daniel T. Goyette
Jefferson District Public
Defender
Louisville, KY
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Amy F. Howard
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
-6-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.