ALONZO ROYLES, JR., AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF LOIS M. ROYLES; ALONZO ROYLES, SR.; AND JILL HALL V. CITY OF LOUISVILLE; CITY OF LOUISVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT; AND ELVIS D. COLBERT
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RENDERED:
October 30, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-001145-MR
ALONZO ROYLES, JR.,
AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
ESTATE OF LOIS M. ROYLES;
ALONZO ROYLES, SR.; AND
JILL HALL
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ERNEST A. JASMIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-002731
CITY OF LOUISVILLE;
CITY OF LOUISVILLE
POLICE DEPARTMENT; AND
ELVIS D. COLBERT
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * *
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE; GUIDUGLI and SCHRODER, Judges.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Appellants, Alonzo Royles, Jr., as
administrator of the estate of Lois M. Royles, Alonzo
Royles, Sr., and Jill Hall, appeal from an order of the Jefferson
Circuit Court entered March 25, 1997, which granted a directed
verdict in favor of appellees, Elvis D. Colbert, the City of
Louisville, and the City of Louisville Police Department.
We
affirm.
On October 2, 1994, a four-door Buick was stolen by a
group of teenagers.
The owner of the car reported it stolen.
After the theft, it appears that the Buick’s license plate was
removed and the license plate of another car was placed in the
rear window.
On October 3, 1994, four teenagers were driving the
car around Louisville with music blaring.
On that same afternoon, Officer Elvis D. Colbert
(Officer Colbert) was on patrol with his partner, Detective Gina
Anthony (Det. Anthony), in a marked city police cruiser.
Colbert was driving.
the loud music.
Officer
The Buick caught their attention because of
Officer Colbert began to follow the Buick with
the intent of stopping it to warn the driver about the loud
music.
Officer Colbert followed the Buick two blocks south on
28th Street.
When the Buick turned onto Garland Street, Officer
Colbert was stopped by a red light.
the light changed.
He turned onto Garland after
At this time there were two vehicles between
Officer Colbert and the Buick.
Officer Colbert activated the
cruiser’s lights and the two cars moved, allowing him to move up
He sounded his siren at 29th and Garland to
behind the Buick.
attract the Buick’s attention.
When he sounded the siren, the
two occupants of the Buick’s back seat turned around and saw the
police cruiser.
One of them tapped the driver on the shoulder.
The Buick came to a stop at 32nd and Garland.
Officer Colbert pulled up behind the Buick, exited the
police cruiser, and began to walk towards the Buick.
As he
walked toward the Buick, Officer Colbert observed that the
steering column of the Buick was broken.
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When Officer Colbert
was 3 to 4 feet away from the rear driver’s side door the Buick
sped off, running the stop sign at 32nd and Garland.
Officer Colbert ran back to his cruiser, told Det.
Anthony about the broken steering column and asked her to call in
the plate number of the Buick as a “rolling stolen.”
Officer
Colbert then took off after the Buick with his lights flashing.
As they approached the intersection of Garland and 34th Street,
Det. Anthony activated the cruiser’s siren because she saw that
the Buick was going to run through the intersection.
At the intersection of Garland and 34th Street the
Buick ran a red light and turned north onto 34th Street, almost
colliding with two cars.
When Officer Colbert reached the
intersection he stopped at the red light long enough for traffic
to see him and then turned north onto 34th Street.
At this point
the dispatcher informed Officer Colbert that the car registered
to the license plate called in had not been reported stolen, but
that the license plate belonged to a two-door Buick, not a fourdoor.
At the intersection of 34th Street and Broadway the
Buick again ran a right light, almost collided with two cars, and
turned east onto Broadway.
By the time Officer Colbert reached
the intersection, the Buick had ran a red light at Broadway and
32nd Street.
Officer Colbert also turned onto Broadway.
As Officer Colbert proceeded down Broadway, he observed
the Buick attempting to turn left across the westbound lanes of
Broadway onto northbound 30th Street. The Buick had to maneuver
-3-
around several cars to make the turn, and Officer Colbert was
able to close in to two or three car lengths of the Buick.
By the time Officer Colbert was able to maneuver around
the two cars, the Buick was once again one to two blocks ahead of
him.
The Buick ran a stop sign at Magazine and 30th Street.
At
that point Officer Colbert stopped because the Buick had entered
the Second District and he wanted them to take over the pursuit.
The Buick continued north on 30th Street, disregarding
several traffic control devices. The Buick then ran a red light
at 30th and Muhammad Ali and collided with vehicles driven by
Lois Royles and Jill Hall.
As a result of the accident, Lois
Royles was killed and Jill Hall sustained severe injuries.
Officer Colbert and Det. Anthony saw the collision,
called it in, and sped to the scene of the accident.
At this
time Officer Colbert realized that the occupants of the Buick
were juveniles.
Officer Colbert testified that he did not exceed
40 m.p.h. during the incident and that he was not trying to
overtake the Buick.
An accident reconstructionist estimated that
the Buick was traveling 65 to 70 m.p.h. at the time of the
accident.
Appellants brought separate negligence actions against
the City of Louisville, the City of Louisville Police Department,
and Officer Colbert.
In identical language, the appellants
alleged that “the negligence of Defendant Colbert in the
operation of his motor vehicle, independently and/or concurrently
with the negligence of the other Defendants named herein, caused
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and brought about the damages complained of herein.”
Appellants
sought to hold the City liable under the theory of respondent
superior and inadequate training.
Appellants further alleged
that Officer Colbert violated written policy regarding motor
vehicle pursuits which was in effect at the time of the accident.
The trial of this manner began on February 4, 1997.
Appellants completed their case in chief on February 6, 1997.
Appellees then moved for a directed verdict.
Appellees’ motion
was thoroughly briefed, as was Appellants’ response, and oral
arguments on Appellees’ motion were held.
The trial court indicated on February 7, 1997, that it
was entering summary judgment in favor of Appellees.
The trial
court made no findings of fact on the record, but indicated that
Chambers v. Ideal Pure Milk Co., Ky., 245 S.W.2d 589 (1952),
controlled its decision and read the following language from
Chambers into the record:
Charged as they were with the obligation to
enforce the law, the traffic laws included,
they would have been derelict in their duty
had they not pursued him. The police were
performing their duty when Shearer, in gross
violation of his duty to obey the speed laws,
crashed into the milk wagon. To argue that
the officers’ pursuit caused Shearer to speed
may be factually true, but it does not follow
that the officers are liable at law for the
results of Shearer’s negligent speed. Police
cannot be made insurer’s of the conduct of
the culprits they chase. It is our
conclusion that the action of the police was
not the legal proximate cause of the
accident, and that the jury should have been
instructed to find for the appellants.
-5-
Chambers, 245 S.W.2d at 590-91.
The trial court further stated
that it was bound by the precedent set in Chambers, and that any
change would have to come from the Kentucky Supreme Court.
The trial court entered its formal memorandum opinion
and order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees on
March 25, 1997.
In its conclusion of law, the trial court found
that Appellants failed to produce sufficient evidence which would
permit a reasonable person to find in their favor.
The trial
court further found the Appellants failed to bring forth any
evidence which would tend to show that Officer Colbert
negligently operated his vehicle, and that the evidence showed
that the Buick was the actual cause of the damages.
The trial
court pointed out that Officer Colbert’s vehicle was parked at
the time of the accident.
The trial court stated
“On these
undisputed facts, the Court holds that a reasonable person could
not find Officer Colbert negligently operated his vehicle.
This
is an independent ground justifying a directed verdict[.]” The
trial court also found that Officer Colbert did not violate the
pursuit policy because he was merely following the Buick as
opposed to trying to overtake it.
Finally, the trial court held
that based on the above-quoted language of Chambers, it was
obliged to find that the driver of the Buick was the legal cause
of Appellants’ injuries.
In support of its decision, the trial
court noted that Officer Colbert had a duty to apprehend the
Buick’s driver and a right to follow or pursue the car.
trial court found this to also be an independent ground
-6-
The
justifying entry of a directed verdict.
Finally, the trial court
found that there was no special relationship between the
Appellants and Appellees which would justify holding the
Appellees liable.
On appeal, Appellants urge us to find that Chambers is
no longer the law in Kentucky and reverse entry of the directed
verdict.
This is the only argument Appellants make on appeal.
When ruling on a motion for directed verdict, the trial
court is required to review the evidence in the strongest
possible light in favor of the party opposing the motion, and
must also give the opposing party the advantage of every
reasonable inference which can be drawn from the evidence.
Taylor v. Kennedy, Ky. App., 700 S.W.2d 415, 416 (1985).
A
directed verdict is improper “unless there is a complete absence
of proof on a material issue in the action, or if no disputed
issue of fact exists upon which reasonable men could differ.”
Taylor, 700 S.W.2d at 416.
evidence in the same light.
On appeal, we are to consider the
Lovins v. Napier, Ky., 814 S.W.2d
921, 922 (1991).
In grounding their argument on appeal on the Chambers
issue only, Appellants lose sight of the fact that the trial
court indicated that there were several independent grounds which
supported its entry of directed verdict in favor of Appellees.
Even if, as Appellants argue, Chambers is no longer the law,
entry of directed verdict would still be proper if any of the
other grounds set forth in the trial court’s order are
-7-
applicable.
See Clark v. Young, Ky. App., 692 S.W.2d 285 (1985)
(holding that judgment of trial court may be affirmed if right
despite fact that reasoning of trial court was erroneous).
Before any of the Appellees can be found liable for the
damages which occurred as a result of this tragic chain of
events, it must first be shown that Officer Colbert was
negligent.
In order to show negligence, Appellants must show
that Officer Colbert (1) owed a duty to Appellants; (2) breached
that duty; and (3) as a result of that breach caused damage to
the Appellants.
M & T Chemicals, Inc. v. Westrick, Ky. App., 525
S.W.2d 740, 741 (1974).
Appellants contend that Article 59 of the Louisville
Police Department’s Policy and Procedures Manual (Article 59)
provides the requisite duty and standard of care in this action.
Appellees deny that Article 59 applied in this situation on the
ground that Officer Colbert was not pursuing the Buick.
Article 59 defines “pursuit” as “an active attempt, by
a law enforcement officer(s) operating a marked police vehicle,
utilizing emergency equipment, to apprehend the operator of a
fleeing vehicle who is attempting to avoid arrest by using speed
or other evasive tactics.”
Four conditions of a vehicle pursuit
are listed:
a.
The violator knows that the officer
wants him/her to stop;
b.
The violator intentionally takes action
in an attempt to evade the officer;
-8-
c.
The officer attempts to overtake and
stop the violator; and
d.
The officer must have reasonable
suspicion to believe that the violator
being pursued is a felon or a supported
felon. [Emphasis added].
Article 59 further indicates that any pursuit is to be conducted
“with due regard to the safety of others.”
In the event a
pursuit occurs, Article 59 also enumerates the procedures to be
followed during the course of the pursuit.
Appellees maintain that Article 59 does not apply
because Officer Colbert was merely following the Buick and was
not pursuing it.
In support of their argument, Appellees point
to the fact that Officer Colbert made no attempt to overtake or
stop the Buick.
Appellees further state that Officer Colbert
never went faster than 40 m.p.h., stopped for red lights and stop
signs during the course of the chase, and stopped following the
Buick completely shortly before the accident occurred.
Having reviewed the record on appeal, we find that
Article 59 does not apply to this case.
Appellants brought forth
no evidence to show that Officer Colbert attempted to overtake
and stop the vehicle, and we agree with Appellees that under the
facts presented it appears that Officer Colbert was merely
following the vehicle as opposed to pursuing it.
Even if we
believed Article 59 applied, we feel a directed verdict would
still be proper because Appellants failed to show that Officer
Colbert failed to act with due regard for the safety of others.
-9-
Even in the absence of Article 59, Appellants’ claims
against Appellees must fail.
As Appellees point out, in enacting
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 189.940, the Kentucky General
Assembly has provided that police vehicles are exempt from the
strictures of traffic regulations regarding speed limits, traffic
control devices, and lane restrictions when in pursuit of an
actual or suspected violator of the law.
Although KRS 189.940
specifically states that it “does not relieve the driver of any
emergency or public safety vehicle from the duty to drive with
due regard for the safety of all persons and property upon the
highway,” Appellants did not offer any proof which would tend to
show that Officer Colbert was negligent.
Because Appellants failed to show that Officer Colbert
was negligent in following the Buick, entry of a directed verdict
in favor of Appellees was proper.
Having held that entry of the
directed verdict was proper on other grounds, we need not reach
Appellants’ arguments regarding the continued validity of the
Chambers decision.
The opinion of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANTS:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEES:
Harry B. O’Donnell, IV
Louisville, KY
Steven L. Snyder
J. Michael Brown
Louisville, KY
Thomas E. Schwietz
Louisville, KY
William C. Stone
Director of Law
Louisivlle, KY
Harold L. Storment
Louisville, KY
-10-
Charles C. Hagan
Louisville, KY
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