MELVIN GREG SLONE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
April 10, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO.
97-CA-1064-MR
MELVIN GREG SLONE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LEE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM W. TRUDE, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 79-CR-006(2)
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
**
BEFORE:
**
**
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DYCHE, MILLER and SCHRODER, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE.
Melvin Slone brings this pro se appeal from a
July 25, 1997 order of the Lee Circuit Court denying in part and
granting in part his motion to alter, amend or vacate sentence
brought pursuant to Ky. R. Crim. P. (RCr) 11.42.
We affirm.
In May 1979, the Lee County Grand Jury indicted Slone
and a second person on one count of capital murder (Ky. Rev.
Stat. (KRS) 507.020(1)(b)), one count of first-degree burglary
(KRS 511.020(1)(a)), one count of first-degree robbery (KRS
515.020(1)(a)), and one count of theft by unlawful taking over
$100 (KRS 514.030).
A charge of complicity was included in each
of the substantive offenses.
Slone originally pled not guilty
and was tried before a jury in March 1980.
The jury returned a
verdict finding Slone guilty of murder, burglary, and robbery,
and fixed a sentence of ten years for burglary and twenty years
for robbery.
At that time, the trial was recessed before
proceeding on the bifurcated sentencing procedure associated with
the murder offense.
During the recess, Slone reached an
agreement with the Commonwealth to accept its offer to recommend
a life sentence on the murder charge and waive sentencing by the
jury.
The jury was discharged when Slone appeared in court with
counsel on April 1, 1980, and entered a guilty plea to murder,
first-degree burglary, and first-degree robbery with the
Commonwealth recommending a life sentence on the murder charge,
ten years on the burglary charge, and twenty years on the robbery
charge.
The trial court postponed final sentencing for
preparation of a Presentence Investigation Report.
On May 9,
1980, the trial court entered a final judgment on the guilty plea
to the offenses, sentenced Slone consistent with the
Commonwealth's recommendation, but ordered the sentences to run
consecutively.
On July 30, 1980, the trial court amended the
final judgment by ordering the sentences to run concurrently
rather than consecutively.
On February 11, 1997, Slone filed an RCr 11.42 motion
to vacate the conviction based on ineffective assistance of
counsel, double jeopardy, and improper sentencing.
On April 25,
1997, the circuit court issued an opinion and order without an
evidentiary hearing granting the motion to the extent that the
sentences for first-degree robbery and first-degree burglary were
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to run concurrently with the life sentence for murder, but
denying the motion in all other respects.
This appeal followed.
RCr 11.42 provides persons in custody under sentence a
procedure for raising collateral objections to the judgments
entered against them.
RCr 11.42(2) permits the trial judge to
summarily dismiss the motion without a hearing for movant's
failure to make a substantial showing of entitlement to relief.
Stanford v. Commonwealth, Ky., 854 S.W.2d 742 (1993).
Our review
involves whether the record refutes appellant's allegations and
whether his unrefuted allegations, if true, would invalidate his
conviction.
Hopewell v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 687 S.W.2d 153
(1985).
Slone argues that his conviction violated the
prohibition against double jeopardy.
This argument is predicated
on the description of the offenses in the indictment.
Count One
states that Slone committed murder "by shooting Herman McIntosh
with a pistol during the course of robbing the said Herman
McIntosh . . . ."
Count Two states that Slone "committed
burglary in the first degree by unlawfully entering the dwelling
house of Herman McIntosh . . . ."
Count Three states that Slone
"committed the offense of theft by taking a 1977 Chevrolet pickup owned by Herman McIntosh, of the value of $100.00 or more . .
. ."
Count Four states that Slone "committed first degree
robbery by using physical force upon and causing physical injury
to Herman McIntosh while in the course of committing a theft at
the dwelling house of Herman McIntosh . . . ."
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Slone contends
the descriptions of the offenses are so vague that it is unclear
whether the murder and robbery convictions involved the same
physical force and whether the robbery conviction involved the
same property identified in the burglary or theft count.
In
addition, he argues that the incident involved a single course of
conduct as defined in KRS 505.020.
Slone concludes that his
robbery conviction was invalid because it may have been included
in either the murder or burglary offense.
Slone's double jeopardy argument represents a
misperception of the law of double jeopardy and the law relative
to the indictment.
Under the old Criminal Code, the indictment
had to contain every essential element of the crime charged.
See
Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, Ky., 403 S.W.2d 21 (1966); Duncan v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 330 S.W.2d 419 (1959).
Promulgation of the
new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1963, however, substantially
liberalized the traditional requirements applicable to
indictments by adoption of a notice pleading approach.
See Wylie
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 556 S.W.2d 1 (1977), and Finch v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 419 S.W.2d 146 (1967).
As stated by the Court
in Thomas v. Commonwealth, Ky., 931 S.W.2d 446, 449 (1996):
The notice pleading of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, unlike the fact pleading it
replaced, does not require exact, precise
details. It is unnecessary under RCr 6.10
"to restate all the technical requisites of
the crime of which a defendant is accused, if
the language of the indictment, coupled with
the applicable statute, unmistakably
accomplishes this end result." Runyon v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 393 S.W.2d 877, 880
(1965). An indictment is sufficient if it
fairly informs the accused of the nature of
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the charged crime, without detailing the
formerly "essential" factual elements.
Finch, supra, 419 S.W.2d at 147, and "if it
informs the accused of the specific offense
with which he is charged and does not mislead
him." Wylie, supra, 556 S.W.2d at 2.
The indictment is an initiating document designed to establish
jurisdiction in the circuit court and charge an offense.
See
Nicholas v. Thomas, 382 S.W.2d 871 (1964); RCr 6.02 and 6.10.
With notice pleading, if the defense needs details to prepare
adequately, the defendant should request them through a bill of
particulars.
Thomas, supra, at 450; RCr 6.22.
Slone's assertion that Count Four involving the robbery
offense violated double jeopardy because it fails to state a
charge is without merit.
All that is required to "charge an
offense," as required by RCr 8.18, is to name the offense.
Thomas, supra, at 449.
On the other hand, double jeopardy
involves conviction or punishment for two offenses with the same
essential elements.
762 (1995).
See Commonwealth v. Black, Ky., 907 S.W.2d
In Commonwealth v. Burge, Ky., 947 S.W.2d 805
(1997), the Kentucky Supreme Court abandoned the "single impulse"
test for double jeopardy adopted in Ingram v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
801 S.W.2d 321 (1990), in favor of the "same elements" test
established in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.
Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1932).
Under the Blockburger
approach, double jeopardy does not occur when a person is
convicted of two crimes arising from the same course of conduct,
as long as each statute "requires proof of an additional fact
which the other does not."
284 U.S. at 304, 52 S. Ct. at 182.
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Consequently, the focus is on the statutory elements of the
offenses and the evidence used to prove those elements.
A review of the statutory elements of murder, burglary
and robbery, and of the evidence in the case indicates that Slone
was not subjected to double jeopardy.
Under KRS 507.020, murder
requires an element different from burglary and robbery, that
being the death of the victim.
Under KRS 511.020, first-degree
burglary contains an element distinct from murder or robbery:
unlawful entry into a building with the intent to commit a crime.
Under KRS 515.020, first-degree robbery requires proof of an
element different from murder or burglary: the commission of a
theft against a person.
See Jordan v. Commonwealth, Ky., 703
S.W.2d 870 (1986) (holding that robbery and burglary are
different offenses for purposes of double jeopardy);
Kinser v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 741 S.W.2d 648 (1987) (holding that murder,
first-degree robbery, and first-degree burglary are separate
offenses for purposes of double jeopardy).
The record indicates
that Slone was convicted of killing Herman McIntosh after
unlawfully entering his residence and threatening the use of
force to steal money from him.
Slone's focus on the language of
the indictment ignores the actual evidence and the reference in
the jury instruction on robbery that required the jury to find
that Slone stole money from Herman McIntosh.
Slone's attempt to
create a double jeopardy violation based on an ambiguity or
failure of the indictment to specifically identify the item taken
in the robbery is without merit.
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Slone contends that he received ineffective assistance
of counsel because his attorney allowed him to enter a guilty
plea without first determining if he fully understood the nature
of the charges and the consequences of pleading guilty.
Slone
relies on Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 C. Ct. 1709, 23 L.
Ed. 2d 274 (1969), in maintaining that it cannot be assumed that
he entered the guilty plea knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently because there is no record of the guilty plea
proceeding.
Slone argues that counsel's error substantially
prejudiced him in violation of the federal constitution.
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists in order to
protect the fundamental right to a fair trial, so this right
focuses on whether the proceeding at issue was fundamentally
unfair or unreliable.
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 113 S.
Ct. 838, 112 L. Ed. 2d 180 (1993).
A court must indulge in a
strong presumption that counsel is competent, and the burden
rests upon the appellant to overcome the presumption by
demonstrating a constitutional violation.
Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674
(1984); accord, Gall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W.2d 37 (1985),
cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S. Ct. 3311, 92 L. Ed. 2d 724
(1986); and Brewster v. Commonwealth, Ky., 723 S.W.2d 863, 865
(1986).
Similarly, the appellant bears the burden of showing
that he suffered actual prejudice in that there is a reasonable
probability that absent counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.
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Strickland,
supra, and Commonwealth v. Gilpin, Ky., 777 S.W.2d 603 (1989).
Absent extreme circumstances evidencing a virtual breakdown in
the adversarial process, an appellant can prevail upon a claim of
ineffective assistance only by pointing to specific errors made
by counsel.
See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.
Ct. 2039, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1984).
In addition, RCr 11.42(2) requires that the movant:
state specifically the grounds on which the
sentence is being challenged and the facts on
which the movant relies in support of such
grounds. Failure to comply with this section
shall warrant a summary dismissal of the
motion.
It is well-established that conclusory allegations of ineffective
assistance of counsel are insufficient to justify post-conviction
relief.
See, e.g., Bartley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 463 S.W.2d 321
(1970), and Brooks v. Commonwealth, Ky., 447 S.W.2d 614 (1969).
The courts have repeatedly held that an allegation of ineffective
assistance of counsel does not state grounds for relief under RCr
11.42 unless the petition presents sufficient facts to show the
representation was inadequate.
Thomas v. Commonwealth, Ky., 459
S.W.2d 72 (1970), and Mullins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 454 S.W.2d
689 (1970).
Under the circumstances of the case sub judice, Slone's
allegation that counsel failed to advise him of the nature of the
charges and consequences of pleading guilty are simply too vague.
Slone had received a full trial on the merits and a jury had
found him guilty of murder, burglary and robbery.
Slone has not
presented any information that counsel failed to provide.
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Moreover, Slone has not described any misperception he may have
had regarding the guilty plea.
The nature of the charges was
fully explored during the trial, and the consequences of pleading
guilty did not differ significantly from a conviction on a jury
verdict.
Slone's conclusory allegation simply does not
sufficiently identify how counsel's conduct was deficient.
Similarly, Slone has not demonstrated prejudice because
of any failure by counsel to explain the nature of the charges or
consequences of pleading guilty.
He cannot assert that he would
have gone to trial on the merits rather than having pled guilty
because of counsel's errors.
Slone did waive his statutory right
to have his sentence for capital murder set by the jury.
See
Wilson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 765 S.W.2d 23 (1989) (holding that a
defendant may waive statutory right to have sentence for capital
murder set by jury); Bevins v. Commonwealth, 712 S.W.2d 932
(1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070, 107 S. Ct. 963, 93 L. Ed. 2d
1010 (1987); KRS 29A.270(1); and RCr 9.84(2).
There is, however,
no federal or state constitutional right to jury sentencing as
opposed to a jury trial on guilt or innocence.
Commonwealth v.
Johnson, Ky., 910 S.W.2d 229 (1995); Ky. Const. ยง 7.
The only
available sentences for capital murder in 1980 were death or life
imprisonment.
To avoid the death penalty, Slone waived jury
sentencing on the murder charge pursuant to an agreement with the
Commonwealth to recommend life imprisonment.
He has not
identified any errors of counsel during the trial nor has he
presented any facts to suggest that the jury verdicts and
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accompanying sentences would have been different because of
errors made by defense counsel.
In addition, Slone received the
minimum sentence on the capital murder offense.
Consequently, he
has not demonstrated actual prejudice.
Slone's reliance on Boykin, supra, is misplaced.
The
test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is whether it
represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the
alternative courses of action available to a defendant.
North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 163
(1970), and Kiser v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 829 S.W.2d 432
(1992).
Because a guilty plea involves the waiver of several
constitutional rights--including the privilege against selfincrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to
confront one's accusers--a waiver of these rights cannot be
presumed from a silent record.
Boykin, supra.
The validity of a
guilty plea, however, is determined from the totality of the
circumstances surrounding it rather than by reference to some
magical incantation of specific key words recited at the time it
was taken.
Kotas v. Commonwealth, Ky., 565 S.W.2d 445 (1978),
and Centers v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 799 S.W. 2d 51, 54 (1990).
"Boykin, supra, did not hold that a defendant who fully
understood his constitutional rights before entry of a plea of
guilty is entitled to have his judgment vacated solely because
the record fails to show that a proper colloquy occurred."
Conklin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 799 S.W.2d 582, 584 (1990).
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The record in this case indicates that Slone entered
his guilty plea only after the jury had returned a guilty verdict
for murder, first-degree burglary, and first-degree robbery, and
after the jury had fixed sentences of ten years on the burglary
offense and twenty years on the robbery offense.
At that time,
the trial was recessed before conducting the sentencing
proceeding on the capital murder charge.
guilty plea several days later.
Slone entered his
In effect, Slone had already
received the constitutional right to a jury trial, the right not
to incriminate himself, and the right to confront his accusers.
As discussed earlier, he waived the statutory right to jury
sentencing, but the jury had already convicted him of murder and
of the aggravating factors of burglary and robbery.
He received
the minimum sentence of life by plea agreement with the
prosecution.
Under these circumstances, we believe Slone's
guilty plea was made freely with an intelligent, knowing
understanding of the consequences thereof.
See Sparks v.
Commonwealth, Ky., App., 721 S.W.2d 726 (1986) (holding that the
record revealed a valid guilty plea after a partial trial).
Slone's final argument concerns a claim of ineffective
assistance because counsel failed to object to the consecutive
sentences of life for murder, ten years for burglary and twenty
years for robbery.
He asserts that the consecutive sentencing
was illegal in May 1980 when final sentencing occurred and that
counsel's failure to challenge the sentences constituted
deficient performance.
He also alleges that the erroneous
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sentencing had an adverse effect on prison classification, prison
program participation, and the potential granting of parole
during his incarceration.
In July 1980, after Slone filed a
motion to modify or amend the sentence, the trial judge issued an
amended final judgment and sentence ordering that the sentences
run concurrently.
Slone maintains that this amendment order was
improper because the circuit court had no jurisdiction to issue
same.
Even assuming that failure to object to the consecutive
sentencing constituted ineffective assistance, Slone has not
demonstrated any resulting injury.
The circuit court granted the
RCr 11.42 motion to the extent of ordering the sentences to run
concurrently.
The court agreed with Slone that the original
trial judge lacked jurisdiction to amend the judgment in July
1980 because it occurred several months after the initial final
judgment.
See Commonwealth v. Marcum, Ky., 873 S.W.2d 207 (1994)
(holding that circuit court retains jurisdiction to amend
judgment for only ten days following entry of final judgment).
Slone has not presented evidence to support his claim of an
adverse impact from the sentencing on his prison status,
especially given that the original trial judge issued an order
amending the sentences only three months after the judgment.
In
any event, Slone has received all the relief to which he is
entitled under RCr 11.42.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the
Lee Circuit Court.
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ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Melvin G. Slone, Pro Se
LaGrange, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Amy F. Howard
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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