KENNETH SETTLES v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: September 11, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
No. 1997-CA-000801-MR
KENNETH SETTLES
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM McCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RON DANIELS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CR-00129
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * *
BEFORE:
ABRAMSON, GARDNER, and GUIDUGLI, Judges.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE:
Kenneth Settles appeals from a March 25, 1997,
judgment of McCracken Circuit Court sentencing him to five years
in prison for having flagrantly failed to support his son (KRS
530.050(2)).
Settles maintains that his trial was rendered
unfair by the court's refusal to grant a continuance, by its
exclusion of evidence, and by its denial of Settles's motions for
a directed verdict.
Convinced that Settles's trial was
fundamentally fair, we affirm.
Settles married Laura Wagner in April 1988.
year the couple had a child.
The next
By late 1991, however, the
relationship had deteriorated; Settles and Wagner separated, and
in the spring of 1993 they divorced.
Incorporated in the divorce
decree was Settles's agreement to pay $500 per month, beginning
as of April 1, 1993, for child support.
Shortly after the
agreement went into effect, Settles's support payments lapsed.
In 1994 Wagner instituted a civil action against
Settles, who was then living in West Virginia, to enforce their
separation agreement.
In that action Settles's support
obligation was reduced, as of November 1, 1994, to $225 per
month.
Still, only one reduced payment was forthcoming.
On
April 5, 1995, the McCracken County grand jury indicted Settles,
charging that from June 1993 to the date of the indictment he had
fallen more than $1,000 behind on his support payments and/or had
failed during that period to make payments for each of six
consecutive months.
The Commonwealth's first Bill of Particulars
alleged that at the time of the indictment Settles was
approximately $9,000 in arrears.
The grand jury issued a
superseding indictment on June 14, 1995, amending the charges to
include the period from April 5 through June 14.
At that point
activity in the case abated, apparently to allow for settlement
negotiations.
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No settlement could be reached, so the case was
reopened in April 1996.
A pretrial conference was scheduled for
June 28, 1996, but for reasons not appearing in the record was
continued until October.
Another continuance, this one owing to
the trial court's busy docket, ultimately delayed trial until
February 27, 1997.
On February 26, 1997, the Commonwealth moved
to amend the indictment to include the period from June 14, 1995
through February 27, 1997.
Claiming that he was unprepared to
defend against the expanded charges, Settles objected to this
last minute amendment of the indictment and, alternatively,
sought a continuance to reassess his defense and to adjust.
The
trial court concluded that Settles's defense would not be
prejudiced by the amendment and so granted the Commonwealth's
motion to amend and denied a continuance.
The trial took place
as scheduled on February 27, 1997.
At trial Settles conceded that from the commencement of
his child support obligation in April 1993 he had made cash
payments of only about $1,300 toward a total obligation, as of
June 1995, of more than $10,000.
He claimed, however, to have
given Wagner, in lieu of cash, antique furniture he had inherited
from relatives.
He also claimed that business setbacks had
prevented him from doing more.
Settles explained that during the
marriage he had organized a business for refurbishing large
industrial storage tanks.
This business had required extensive
capital investment and had involved large start-up costs.
a promising first year, the business had failed.
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In 1994,
After
Settles underwent both personal and corporate bankruptcies.
Since then he had worked briefly as a truck driver and had
pursued storage tank jobs, although the tank jobs, he maintained,
had been on too small a scale to be profitable.
He persisted in
them, he said, because he anticipated a pronounced change in the
market for storage tank maintenance within a year or two and
planned to keep himself in a position to capitalize.
In sum, although he claimed to have provided more child
support in the form of antique furniture than Wagner
acknowledged, Settles's defense essentially was that he had done
the best he could and was pursuing a business opportunity which
was promising enough for the future to justify the present
cessation of support payments for his son.
The jury was not
persuaded, and now Settles has appealed.
Two of the issues Settles raises require little
discussion.
First, he claims that the trial court erred by
denying his motions for a directed verdict because the
Commonwealth failed to prove that he was capable of providing
more child support than he did provide.
He bases this contention
on KRS 530.050(2) which provides in part as follows:
(2) A person is guilty of flagrant nonsupport
when he persistently fails to provide support
which he can reasonably provide and which he
knows he has a duty to provide by virtue of a
court or administrative order to a minor or
to a child adjudged mentally disabled,
indigent spouse or indigent parent and the
failure results in:
(a) An arrearage of not less than one
thousand dollars ($1,000); or
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(b) Six (6) consecutive months without
payment of support; . . .
Settles contends that, because this statute makes the
defendant's ability to provide support an element of the offense,
the Commonwealth must prove that ability beyond a reasonable
doubt.
He claims that the Commonwealth failed to prove that his
financial situation, both his setbacks and his business venture,
had not genuinely and reasonably prevented him from meeting his
support obligation.
The Commonwealth’s alleged failure, Settles
insists, entitled him to a directed verdict.
We believe that Settles has overstated the
Commonwealth's burden under KRS 530.050(2).
That statute
requires initial proof only of a defendant's financial resources
or of his ability to earn income such that the support obligation
being enforced is not clearly unreasonable.
Beyond that initial
showing, the defendant's inability to provide support is an
affirmative defense which it is the defendant's burden to prove.
Rogers v. Commonwealth, Ky., 321 S.W.2d 779 (1959); Turner v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 315 S.W.2d 619 (1958).1
Here the Commonwealth introduced evidence that Settles
was of sound mind and body, that he had extensive business
experience and technical expertise, and that he had inherited
from relatives (albeit prior to his bankruptcy) in excess of
1
Both of these cases construe the law as it existed prior to
1974 when KRS 530.050 was first adopted. However, not only do we
find the reasoning of these cases persuasive, but we believe the
pertinent holdings are still controlling because KRS 530.050 did
not significantly alter this aspect of the earlier law.
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$600,000.
This evidence more than satisfied the Commonwealth's
initial burden and was adequate, even in light of Settles's
excuses, to lead a rational juror to conclude that Settles could
reasonably have met his support obligation.
The trial court did
not err, therefore, by denying Settles's motions for a directed
verdict.
Commonwealth v. Benham, Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186 (1991).
Settles also claims that the trial court erred by
excluding evidence of the parties' settlement negotiations.
Apparently Settles offered to pay Wagner $7,500 in exchange for a
dismissal of the charges.
He maintains that Wagner’s rejection
of this offer is evidence of bad faith and an ulterior motive,
the ulterior motive being to pressure Settles to relinquish his
parental rights by threatening him with imprisonment.2
The trial
court relied upon KRE 410 to exclude the purported negotiation
evidence.
KRE 410 provides generally for the inadmissibility of
evidence relating to guilty plea negotiations.
that KRE 408 is controlling.
Settles maintains
That rule addresses the
admissibility of evidence concerning compromises and offers to
compromise and provides that such evidence, although generally
inadmissible, need not be excluded when offered not to establish
a claim or the amount of a claim, but to prove other facts such
as the bias and prejudice of a witness.
2
Apparently Settles did relinquish his parental rights as a
condition of his successful motion for shock probation. He does
not claim, however, that those rights were an issue in the
purported settlement negotiations.
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We need not decide whether KRE 408 applies only to
civil cases, as the Commonwealth insists, for even if it applies
to criminal cases as well and is pertinent here, the trial court
did not err by excluding evidence of Settles's offer of a
compromise.
Wagner's alleged bias is relevant only to cast doubt
upon her credibility.
Her credibility is relevant only with
respect to disputed aspects of her testimony.
The only factual
dispute at trial concerned the furniture Settles claimed to have
given Wagner in lieu of support payments.
He claimed she
accepted the furniture for that purpose and that the furniture
was valuable enough to have satisfied a significant portion of
his debt.
She denied having accepted the furniture as child
support and claimed to have received only $5,000 when she sold
it.
Beyond his general assertion that the furniture included
"antiques," Settles did not dispute this sale price or attempt to
prove a higher value.
Thus, although Settles may have had a
legitimate reason to attack Wagner's credibility on this issue,
the tenuous connection between this issue and the settlement
negotiations, which makes the relevance of the negotiation
evidence doubtful (KRE 401), and the apparent futility of even a
successful impeachment,3 justified the trial court's decision to
exclude this evidence.
KRE 403.
3
Even if the jury did not believe Wagner and thought Settles
was entitled to a $5,000 credit on his arrearage, he would still
have been more that $3,000 in arrears and in violation of KRS
530.050(2).
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More problematic are the trial court's decisions to
permit amendment of the indictment the day before trial and not
to provide Settles additional time to adjust his defense.
The
trial court explained its decisions by noting that an amendment
to bring the indictment up to date would spare the parties and
the court the costs of a subsequent proceeding, and it deemed the
amendment non-prejudicial, apparently relying on the
Commonwealth's assurance that it would not use evidence from the
added period.
Settles complains that he was improperly denied an
opportunity to examine his records relating to the new charges
and was not allowed sufficient time to reconsider his defense.
RCR 6.16, on amendments, provides as follows:
The court may permit an indictment,
information, complaint or citation to be
amended any time before verdict or finding if
no additional or different offense is charged
and if substantial rights of the defendant
are not prejudiced. If justice requires,
however, the court shall grant the defendant
a continuance when such an amendment is
permitted.
We agree with Settles that the last minute amendment of his
indictment goes beyond what is contemplated by RCr 6.16.
That
rule approves formal, clerical changes to the indictment;
clarifications of the crime charged; and, in some instances,
changes to bring about conformity with the proof.
Yarnell v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 833 S.W.2d 834 (1992); Gilbert v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 838 S.W.2d 367 (1991); Schambon v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 821 S.W.2d 804 (1991).
It does not approve
amendments broadening the alleged offense or charging additional
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offenses.
Wolbrecht v. Commonwealth, Ky., 955 S.W.2d 533 (1997).
Here the amendment patently broadens the crime alleged against
Settles and adds considerably to the evidence with which he might
be confronted.
amendment.
The trial court erred by allowing such an
The trial court also erred by denying Settles a
continuance, for the substantial change in the charges he faced
entitled him to a reasonable opportunity to analyze his case
anew.
The twenty hours or so Settles was allowed was not
sufficient.
Wolbrecht, supra; Eldred v. Commonwealth, Ky., 906
S.W.2d 699 (1994).
Despite these errors, we are not persuaded that Settles
is entitled to a new trial.
trial court's discretion.
These rulings were entrusted to the
To be entitled to relief on appeal
from such a ruling, an appellant must show not only that the
trial court abused its discretion, but also that the abuse was
prejudicial.
Yarnell, supra.
latter showing.
Settles has failed to make this
As it assured the trial court it would do, the
Commonwealth limited its proof to Settles's arrearage accrued
prior to the amendment period.
Settles thus had ample notice of
all the evidence introduced against him and was not deprived of
the defense he had prepared.
Furthermore, the evidence against
Settles was formidable, and he has specified no additional
evidence or argument that the trial court’s errors prevented him
from introducing.
There is simply no reason to think that the
outcome would have been different, had the indictment not been
amended or had Settles been granted a continuance.
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Indeed, the
consequences for Settles could have been far worse had he been
indicted and tried separately for his additional non-support.
We
conclude that the trial court's errors were harmless in allowing
the indictment to be substantially amended and in denying Settles
a continuance.
For this reason and those discussed above, we affirm
the March 25, 1997, judgment of McCracken Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Tod D. Megibow
Megibow & Edwards
Paducah, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Suzanne Baker Hite
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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