KEVIN COSBY v. BILLY ASHLEY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
February 13, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 97-CA-0751-MR
KEVIN COSBY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LYON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BILL CUNNINGHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-0151
BILLY ASHLEY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
ABRAMSON, BUCKINGHAM AND EMBERTON, JUDGES.
EMBERTON, JUDGE.
Kevin Cosby, pro se, appeals an order of the
Lyon Circuit Court entered on February 20, 1997, dismissing his
petition for a declaration of rights brought pursuant to KRS
418.040.
We affirm.
In May 1996, Cosby was an inmate at Paducah Community
Service Center (PCSC).
On May 24, 1996, Cosby was granted a two
day furlough to visit with his family.
As part of the furlough
procedure, Cosby was required to remain in his sister's residence
between 9:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m., and periodic telephone inquiries
by prison personnel were conducted to verify compliance.
At 2:25
a.m. on May 25, 1996, a prison employee made a telephone
compliance check and was informed by Cosby's sister that he was
not at the residence.
Cosby telephoned the PCSC monitoring
employee a short time later to report, and the monitor ordered
Cosby to return to PCSC by 5:00 a.m. on May 26, 1996.
After
Cosby had not returned to PCSC as ordered, an warrant charging
him with escape was issued.
At approximately 11:30 a.m. on May
25, 1996, Cosby notified PCSC that he was en route to the
Henderson County Jail to turn himself in to the authorities.
Cosby was charged with violating prison Corrections Policies and
Procedures and transferred to the Western Kentucky Correctional
Complex.
On July 3, 1996, after a disciplinary hearing, the
prison Adjustment Committee found Cosby guilty of escape and
assessed a penalty of sixty (60) days disciplinary segregation
and a loss of ninety (90) days good time.
Upon administrative
appeal, the prison warden concurred in the guilty finding.
On
October 2, 1996, Cosby filed a petition for declaratory judgment
alleging the Adjustment Committee's decision was based on
insufficient evidence to support the charge of escape and that
there were inadequate findings of fact.
On February 20, 1997,
the circuit court dismissed the petition stating the findings of
-2-
the Adjustment Committee satisfied due process.
This appeal
followed.
As with most inmate actions alleging violation of due
process, we begin with the seminal case of Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974), in which
the United States Supreme Court held that prison inmates may not
be deprived of statutory good time without a meaningful
opportunity to challenge the deprivation.
The Supreme Court held
that the due process clause protects an inmate's liberty interest
in good-time credits, and that inmates were entitled to certain
minimum requirements of procedural due process.
The Court held
that a disciplinary committee must provide the inmate with the
following:
(1) advance written notice of the disciplinary
charges; (2) the opportunity when consistent with institutional
safety and correctional goals to call witnesses and present
documentary evidence in his defense; (3) a written statement of
the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary
actions; and, (4) an impartial decision-making tribunal.
Wolff,
418 U.S. at 563-567, 94 S. Ct. at 2978-2982; Hewitt v. Helms, 459
U.S. 460, 465 n.3, 103 S. Ct. 864, 868 n.3, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935
(1983).
While the Court in Wolff outlined certain minimal
procedures required by due process before revocation of an
inmate's good-time credit, the Court in Superintendent,
Massachusetts Correctional Institution v. Hill, Walpole, 472 U.S.
445, 105 S. Ct. 2768, 86 L. Ed. 2d 356 (1985), articulated the
-3-
quantum of evidence required to support a decision in a prison
disciplinary proceeding.
The Court held that due process
required that the revocation of good-time credits must be
supported only by "some evidence in the record."
Id. at 454, 105
S. Ct. at 2773.
In the case sub judice, Cosby's primary argument is
that the Adjustment Committee failed to make adequate findings of
fact.
The function of written findings is to protect the inmate
against collateral consequences based on a misunderstanding of
the nature of the original proceeding and to help insure that
administrators act fairly.
2979.
Wolff, 418 U.S. at 565, 94 S. Ct. at
The written statement of findings may be brief and this
Court generally will not interfere with the prison officials'
wide discretion in their enforcement of prison discipline.
See
Gilhaus v. Wilson, Ky. App., 734 S.W.2d 808, 810 (1987)(citing
Ivey v. Wilson, 577 F. Supp. 169, 172-73 (W.D. Ky. 1983)).
The
disciplinary report explicitly states the Adjustment Committee
relied on the reports by the PCSC security monitor and the
probation and parole officer.
During his investigation, the
probation and parole officer interviewed two PCSC security
monitors who made telephone accountability checks on Cosby's
activity.
The probation and parole officer also spoke with the
PCSC caseworker who Cosby notified before turning himself in at
the Henderson County Jail.
The investigative report included
evidence from the various PCSC employees, Cosby's wife and the
-4-
Henderson County deputy jailer.
Cosby's claim that the
Adjustment Committee merely adopted the report of the PCSC
security monitor rather than conducting independent fact finding
is without merit.
The written reports of the investigator and
prison employees were sufficient to support the Adjustment
Committee's decision.
Furthermore, the Adjustment Committee's
written factual findings in the disciplinary report were
sufficient to satisfy the minimal due process requirements
associated with prison disciplinary proceedings.
In addition, a review of the record clearly
demonstrates that there was "some" evidence to support the
Adjustment Committee's decision.
Cosby admits that he violated
the conditions of his furlough.
The furlough authorization form
signed by Cosby states that failure to remain "within the
extended limits of this confinement, . . . shall be deemed as
escape from the custody of the Corrections Department."
See also
KRS 520.010(5)("Escape" means departure from custody . . . with
the knowledge that the departure is unpermitted, or failure to
return to custody or detention following a temporary leave
granted for a specific purpose or for a limited period."); KRS
520.030; Commonwealth v. Johnson, Ky. App., 615 S.W.2d 1 (1981);
Stroud v. Commonwealth, Ky., 922 S.W.2d 382 (1996)(prisoner's
custody status defined by conditions of participation in
unsupervised program).
-5-
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the
Lyon Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
-6-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
No brief filed for appellee.
Kevin Cosby
Eddyville, Kentucky
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.