SCOTTSDALE INSURANCE COMPANY V. WILLIAM GRAY; JOHN M. CLARK WILLIAM GRAY V. JOHN M. CLARK and MARY C. CLARK, Individually and d/b/a GREYSTONE APARTMENTS
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RENDERED:
October 9, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-000653-MR
SCOTTSDALE INSURANCE COMPANY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ELLEN B. EWING, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 94-CI-216
V.
WILLIAM GRAY; JOHN M. CLARK
and MARY C. CLARK, Individually
and d/b/a GREYSTONE APARTMENTS
AND
NO.
APPELLEES
1997-CA-000994-MR
WILLIAM GRAY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BENJAMIN F. SHOBE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 94-CI-216
V.
JOHN M. CLARK and MARY C.
CLARK, Individually and
d/b/a GREYSTONE APARTMENTS
APPELLEES
OPINION AND ORDER AFFIRMING IN APPEAL NO. 1997-CA-000994-MR,
AND DISMISSING IN APPEAL NO. 1997-CA-000653-MR
* * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, Chief Judge; ABRAMSON and COMBS, Judges.
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE:
These consolidated appeals stem from a
summary judgment and a directed verdict granted by the Jefferson
Circuit Court in a tort action for damages filed by a tenant
against his landlords.
Although the court first adjudged that
appellant Scottsdale Insurance Company (Scottsdale) was obligated
to provide the landlords with liability insurance coverage
regarding the tenant’s claim, at the conclusion of a jury trial
it directed a verdict in favor of the landlords.
In Appeal No.
1997-CA-000653-MR, Scottsdale contends that the court erred by
finding that it was obligated to provide the landlords with
coverage respecting the tenant’s claim.
In Appeal No.
1997-CA-000994-MR, the tenant contends that the court erred by
directing a verdict in favor of the landlords.
As we disagree
with the tenant’s contentions and affirm the judgment in Appeal
No. 1997-CA-000994-MR, Scottsdale’s appeal has been rendered moot
and will be dismissed.
In 1989, appellant William Gray and a roommate leased
from appellees John and Mary Clark a single family residence
located at 104 Boston Court in Louisville.
The property, which
is situated in a high crime area, apparently was burglarized and
damaged at least four times prior to January 1993.
According to
Gray, despite his numerous requests that the Clarks repair the
front door frame, neither the door nor the frame was ever
replaced or completely repaired.
On January 13, 1993, an unidentified person kicked the
front door numerous times in an apparent attempt to break in.
The door frame eventually gave way, and the person was able to
insert a shotgun and fire a shot through the partially open front
door.
Gray, who was sitting in the living room, was struck and
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seriously injured, eventually resulting in the amputation of his
leg.
This action followed.
Gray alleged in his complaint that the Clarks owed him
a legal duty “to take reasonable steps to avoid injury” to him
stemming from “reasonably foreseeable criminal acts,” and that
they failed to do so.
Specifically, Gray alleged that the
Clarks’ general duty was breached in the following respects:
a)
Failure to act upon numerous
requests and warnings by the tenants of 104
Boston Court regarding assaults and threats
by Unknown Defendants toward plaintiff
William Gray and other tenants of 104 Boston
Court; and
b)
Failure to act upon numerous
requests and warnings by the tenants of 104
Boston Court regarding burglaries of 104
Boston Court; and,
c)
Failure to act upon numerous
requests by the tenants of 104 Boston Court,
including but not limited to the Plaintiff,
to provide and repair security locks and
framing on entrances and exits to and from
104 Boston Court; and,
d)
Failure to provide reasonable
security for the tenants of 104 Boston Court,
including but no [sic] limited to Plaintiff.
Before trial the Clarks’ liability insurer, Scottsdale,
was allowed to intervene and prosecute a declaratory judgment
action respecting the issue of whether the Clarks’ liability
policy provided them coverage in regard to Gray’s claim.
The
court determined that the assault and battery exclusion in
Scottsdale’s policy was capable of two different interpretations,
and that it therefore was ambiguous and must be construed in
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favor of the Clarks.
Thus, the court concluded that the policy
provided coverage to the Clarks respecting Gray’s claim, and it
granted the Clarks a summary judgment as to coverage.
However,
on the sixth day of a jury trial, the court granted the Clarks a
directed verdict as to liability on the ground that they owed
Gray no legal duty which was breached.
Scottsdale and Gray filed
separate appeals from the court’s rulings, and we ordered those
appeals to be consolidated.
First, we will address the two-pronged argument raised
in Gray’s appeal.
He urges that the court erred by concluding
that the Clarks owed him no legal duty which they breached in the
circumstances herein, and that the court erred by denying him a
right to pursue both a claim for negligence per se and a private
cause of action for certain alleged violations of the Louisville
Existing Structures Code (Structures Code).
We find no merit in
either prong of Gray’s argument.
In Waldon v. Housing Authority of Paducah, Ky. App.,
854 S.W.2d 777 (1991), this court recognized that a landlord is
not a guarantor of a tenant’s safety.
Nevertheless, for the
first time we allowed a landlord, who had failed to take
reasonable steps to avoid injury to a tenant stemming from a
reasonably foreseeable criminal act of a third party, to be
adjudged liable to the tenant.
Our adoption of that view appears
to comport with the modern trend.
See generally Gary D. Spivey,
Annotation, Landlord’s Obligation to Protect Tenant Against
Criminal Activities of Third Persons, 43 A.L.R.3d 331 (1972).
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Contrary to the Clarks’ contention, Waldon is not
inconsistent with the supreme court’s recent reaffirmation of the
principle of caveat emptor in Adams v. Miller, Ky., 908 S.W.2d
112 (1995), overruled on other grounds, 951 S.W.2d 318 (1997).
In Adams, the court refused to hold that a landlord had a common
law duty to use reasonable care to protect tenants from injury by
a fire which allegedly was proximately caused by a defect in the
premises.
In the instant proceeding, by contrast, we are
concerned with the issue of whether the Clarks should be adjudged
liable to Gray for failing to take reasonable steps to protect
him from injury stemming from a third party’s reasonably
foreseeable criminal acts.
Thus, the Clarks’ potential liability
turns upon an application of the principles discussed in Waldon,
rather than upon the concepts and issues addressed in Adams.
Although Waldon recognizes that landlords can be liable
for the reasonably foreseeable criminal acts of third persons, we
believe that Gray has read the opinion as having a much broader
application than was intended or is warranted.
Waldon involved a
multi-unit public housing project which had significant indoor
and outdoor common areas under a public agency’s exclusive
control.
Moreover, although the agency’s employees knew that a
person who was living in an apartment without permission had
threatened a particular tenant, they made no effort to evict the
offender or to discourage his presence.
Further, even though
crimes frequently occurred at the complex, the agency employed no
security guards to patrol the common areas and protect its
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tenants.
The court concluded that the agency was subject to
liability based on both its inaction in removing the offender
from the complex, and its failure to provide security guards for
the common areas thereof.
Obviously, in a case involving a landlord’s rental of
premises which include common areas which the landlord maintains
and controls, it is not unfair to impose a legal duty on the
landlord to protect the tenants from the reasonably foreseeable
commission of criminal acts in those areas.
It would be
ludicrous, however, to impose such a legal duty in regard to a
single-family residential unit, such as the one herein, which
includes no significant common areas under the landlord’s
control.
Indeed, as we view the matter, the Waldon rule clearly
was intended to apply only to larger rental properties which
include common areas under the landlord’s control.
To conclude
otherwise, we believe, would impose duties and obligations upon
the owners of single-family residential properties which would be
cost prohibitive and which would unfairly impact numerous
persons, including not only those landlords who rent multiple
units, but also those individuals who are not engaged in the real
estate business but who happen to rent their personal residences
to other persons.
This is especially true since the owners of
such properties have no practical or realistic way of protecting
against the commission of criminal acts by persons, using public
highways and sidewalks, who choose to burglarize or commit other
criminal acts at particular residences.
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We hold, therefore, that
the Waldon rule simply does not apply to single-family residences
such as the one involved herein.
It follows, therefore, that the
Clarks owed Gray no legal duty to protect him from the reasonably
foreseeable criminal acts of others, and that the court did not
err by granting the Clarks a directed verdict.
Moreover, even if
we had found that the Clarks owed Gray such a duty, we are of the
opinion that in any event, reasonable minds could not differ and
the Clarks’ negligence, if any, was not a substantial factor in
causing Gray’s injury.
We also find no merit in Gray’s contention that he was
entitled to maintain a private cause of action based upon the
Clarks’ alleged violations of the Structures Code.
There is
nothing in the code’s language which even remotely suggests that
the city’s legislative body intended to create the right to file
a private cause of action for violations of the code.
such language, no such cause of action may be implied.
Shauntee, Ky., 664 S.W.2d 512 (1983).
Absent
Miles v.
Thus, even if the Clarks
did violate certain provisions of the code, Gray was not entitled
to assert a private cause of action for damages respecting those
violations.
Further, the code clearly was not intended to
provide and includes no language providing protection for tenants
against the reasonably foreseeable criminal acts of others, and
no civil action may be maintained based upon the doctrine of
negligence per se stemming from the Clarks’ alleged violations of
the code.
See Carmichael v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County
Government, Ky., 608 S.W.2d 66 (1980).
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Because we have determined that the court did not err
by granting a directed verdict in favor of the Clarks, Scottsdale
is not obligated to provide any insurance coverage herein and its
appeal is rendered moot.
Hence, Scottsdale’s appeal must be
dismissed.
The court’s judgment in Appeal No. 1997-CA-000994-MR is
affirmed, while Appeal No. 1997-CA-000653-MR is hereby ORDERED
dismissed as moot.
ALL CONCUR.
ENTERED:
October 9, 1998
/s/
Paul D. Gudgel
CHIEF JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR SCOTTSDALE INSURANCE
COMPANY:
BRIEFS FOR JOHN M. CLARK
and MARY C. CLARK,
Individually and d/b/a
GREYSTONE APARTMENTS:
William G. Crabtree
London, KY
Dan E. Siebert
Terrence L. McCoy
Louisville, KY
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR WILLIAM GRAY:
R. Kent Westberry
Courtney T. Baxter
Louisville, KY
Karl Price
Louisville, KY
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR JOHN M.
CLARK and MARY C. CLARK,
Individually and d/b/a
GREYSTONE APARTMENTS:
Dan E. Siebert
Louisville, KY
R. Kent Westberry
Louisville, KY
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