ISLAND CREEK COAL CO., OHIO NO. 11 v. DENNIS GOODLOE; HON. DONNA H. TERRY, Chief Administrative Law Judge; and KENTUCKY WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
April 10, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
97-CA-0384-WC
ISLAND CREEK COAL CO.,
OHIO NO. 11
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION OF
THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
WC-93-42810
DENNIS GOODLOE;
HON. DONNA H. TERRY,
Chief Administrative Law Judge;
and KENTUCKY WORKERS'
COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, KNOPF, and SCHRODER, Judges.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE.
Island Creek Coal Company, Ohio No. 11
(Island Creek) petitions for review of an opinion by the Workers'
Compensation Board (Board) which reversed an order of an
administrative law judge (ALJ) terminating the payment of
retraining incentive benefits (RIB) to Dennis Goodloe and
allowing Island Creek to recoup RIB paid from February 6, 1996,
to the date of the ALJ's order from any future RIB to which
Goodloe is entitled.
For the reasons set forth hereinafter, we
affirm.
While employed by Island Creek, Goodloe filed an
application for RIB on October 20, 1993.
On June 7, 1994, the
ALJ awarded Goodloe RIB to be paid directly to him.
No appeal
was taken from the award, and it became final thirty days
thereafter.
Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 342.732(1)(a) was
amended effective April 4, 1994, while Goodloe's claim for RIB
was pending, to prohibit the direct payment of RIB to claimants
still employed in the coal mining industry.
Island Creek did not
raise the issue of possible retroactive application of this
amendment to Goodloe's claim.
However, in September 1995, the
Kentucky Supreme Court held in Thornsbury v. Aero Energy, Ky.,
908 S.W.2d 109, 112 (1995), that this amendment to the statute
applied retroactively to all claims pending as of its effective
date.
Island Creek alleges that at the time Thornsbury was
rendered, Goodloe had been laid off from his job in the coal
mining industry and thus was properly entitled to direct payment
of RIB at that time.
However, Island Creek further alleges that
on February 6, 1996, it recalled Goodloe to work, and it disputes
Goodloe's entitlement to direct payment of RIB from this point
forward.
On June 11, 1996, Island Creek filed a Motion to Recoup
Overpayment and Terminate Payment of RIB Award.
2
No sworn
affidavit was attached to the motion nor was any further proof
produced before the ALJ entered an order granting Island Creek's
motion on July 17, 1996.1
Under the terms of the order, payment
of RIB terminated and Island Creek was allowed to recoup from any
future RIB award any RIB paid from February 6, 1996, through July
17, 1996.
Goodloe appealed to the Board which reversed the order
of the ALJ.
The Board noted in its opinion that final awards
could not be reopened or reviewed except pursuant to KRS 342.125
and further noted that, contrary to the requirements for a motion
to reopen, no proof had been presented regarding Island Creek's
motion.
The Board found that the ALJ's order violated KRS
342.125(1), which prohibits the alteration of benefits previously
paid.2
The Board stated that any benefits paid prior to June 11,
1996 (the date of Island Creek's motion), could not be recouped
from future RIB awards pursuant to KRS 342.125(1).
Furthermore,
applying Keefe v. O.K. Precision Tool & Die Co., Ky. App., 566
S.W.2d 804, 806-07 (1978), the Board held that a final award may
be reopened only upon a showing that the ALJ misapplied the law
as it stood at the time of the award and that subsequent
interpretations of the law did not warrant reopening of awards
1
All references to statutes relating to Island Creek's
motion and the ALJ's order are to statutes as amended in 1994, as
the 1996 amendments did not become effective until December 12,
1996--after the ALJ's order was rendered.
2
This same prohibition now appears at KRS 342.125(4)
(1996).
3
made final under the doctrine of res judicata.
The Board found
that the ALJ's award of direct payment of RIB to Goodloe was
proper under the law at the time the award was rendered, and
noted that Island Creek had not raised the issue of retroactive
application of KRS 342.732(1)(a).
Thus, the Board reversed the
ALJ's order, and Island Creek now petitions for review of the
Board's opinion.
We agree with the Board's opinion reversing the ALJ's
order.
Island Creek's Motion to Recoup Overpayment and Terminate
Payment of RIB Award was actually a motion to reopen the original
award pursuant to KRS 342.125(1), which states in pertinent part
that "[r]eopening and review under this section shall be had upon
notice to the parties and in the same manner as provided for an
initial proceeding hereunder but shall not affect the previous
order or award as to any sums already paid thereunder."
First,
the ALJ's order affected sums already paid under the previous
order and, therefore, violated the statute.
Second, since the
statute required reopening and review "in the same manner as
provided for an initial proceeding hereunder," the ALJ's order
granting Island Creek's motion was erroneously entered since
Island Creek produced no proof to support the reopening.
The
ALJ's decision was, therefore, not supported by substantial
evidence and was properly reversed by the Board.
See Special
Fund v. Francis, Ky., 708 S.W.2d 641, 643 (1986) (holding that
where the fact finder's decision favors the party with the burden
of proof, that party must show that "evidence of substance"
4
supports the decision to prevail upon appeal).
The opinion of the Board reversing the order of the ALJ
is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
5
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE GOODLOE:
Natalie D. Brown
Lexington, KY
Rebecca Baylous
Lexington, KY
6
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