BRUCE A. YUNGMAN v. MICHAEL HOWELL and VONNA HOWELL AND MELVA HANEY and OVA HANEY
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RENDERED:
September 18, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
No. 1996-CA-003453-MR
BRUCE A. YUNGMAN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LARUE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LARRY D. RAIKES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-00090
v.
MICHAEL HOWELL and VONNA
HOWELL
APPELLEES
AND
MELVA HANEY and OVA HANEY
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * *
BEFORE:
ABRAMSON, DYCHE, and HUDDLESTON, Judges.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE:
Bruce Yungman appeals from a November 27, 1996,
summary judgment of LaRue Circuit Court dismissing with prejudice
his complaint against Michael and Vonna Howell and Melva and Ova
Haney.
Yungman's complaint alleged that in August 1994 he was
injured during a party at the Howells’ residence when a wooden
sundeck on which he and about ten other guests were standing
collapsed.
He claimed that the Howells, as possessors of the
property, and the Haneys, as owners and lessors thereof, had
breached their duty either to make the deck safe or to warn him
that it posed a hazard.
The trial court ruled that the collapse,
by itself, was not sufficient evidence (under the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur) to impose liability on the defendants.
The court
also found that Yungman had failed to proffer sufficient
additional evidence to warrant a finding of liability.
Yungman
contends that the trial court understated the defendants' duty of
care in these circumstances.
He also contends that, even if the
court correctly stated the law, it erred by summarily dismissing
his complaint because there is a factual issue concerning the
defendants' awareness of the deck's unsafe condition.
Having
concluded that the trial court correctly stated and properly
applied the law, we affirm.
As Yungman notes, this Court reviews summary judgments
de novo, asking, as did the trial court, whether there exists any
genuine issue of material fact, and, if not, whether the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
All reasonable
doubts are to be resolved in favor of the non-movant.
Summary
judgment is inappropriate unless it appears impossible for the
non-movant to prove facts at trial which would justify a verdict
in his or her favor.
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service
Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476 (1991).
In Perry v. Williamson, Ky., 824 S.W.2d 869, 875
(1992), our Supreme Court reviewed the law concerning "[t]he duty
owed by the person in possession of land to others whose presence
might reasonably be anticipated . . . ."
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Acknowledging the
traditional distinction between those present on the premises as
business invitees and those licensees whose presence is permitted
for other purposes, the Court described as follows the
possessor's duty to licensees with respect to unsafe conditions
on the land of which the possessor has knowledge:
If such condition exists and is known to the
person in possession, it is his duty to a
licensee to forewarn of the danger if he has
not corrected it. . . .
[T]he possessor has no duty to provide safe
premises for a licensee. Making the premises
safe is merely an option on his part as a
means to obviate what otherwise is . . . the
duty to warn. . . .
[I]f the possessor of premises has knowledge
of a condition that a properly instructed
jury finds unreasonably hazardous to a
licensee exercising ordinary care for is own
safety, then it does not make any difference
whether the possessor had actual cognizance
of the danger. It is enough that he was
aware of the condition itself. The law holds
him to that which an ordinarily prudent
person with the same knowledge would have
anticipated.
824 S.W.2d at 873 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Contrasted with this is the somewhat broader duty a
possessor of premises owes to a business invitee:
the only difference between the duty which
would have been owed to [the plaintiff] had
she been a business invitee . . . [instead
of] a licensee, is that [the defendants] were
under no duty of reasonable care to discover
the existence on their premises of a
dangerous condition as would be the case with
a business invitee.
824 S.W.2d at 875.
(Emphasis supplied.)
-3-
Yungman concedes that as a social guest of the Howells
he was a licensee for purposes of the rules just summarized.
Under Perry, therefore, the Howells owed him a duty either to
eliminate or to warn against hazards on the premises of which
they were aware but which were apt not to be apparent to others.
The trial court found that the defendants were not aware of the
deck's latent hazard and thus that no duty to Yungman arose.
Yungman advances three objections to the trial court's
ruling.
He argues that the trial court should have disregarded
as outmoded the distinction observed in Perry between licensees
and invitees and should have applied instead the more general
principle that the defendants owed Yungman "the duty to exercise
reasonable care in the circumstances."
834 S.W.2d at 875.
He
claims that because the deck was nearly twenty years old and had
shown signs of deterioration (wooden stairs had partially rotted
and required replacing), reasonable care required the defendants
to look for further decay.
Had they done so, he maintains, they
would have discovered the deck's susceptibility to collapse.
Neither the trial court nor this Court, however, has the
authority to disregard Perry.
Thus, even were we inclined to
adopt the approach Yungman recommends we could not do so.
As the
Perry Court noted, moreover, the traditional distinction between
invitees and licensees incorporates and helps to clarify
important aspects of the circumstances presented by this type of
case.
824 S.W.2d at 875.
We disagree, therefore, that these
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distinctions have grown outmoded or are at odds with the general
principle on which Yungman relies.
Yungman next argues that the collapse of the deck
itself so strongly entails negligence as to invoke the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur.
According to that doctrine the defendant's
negligence may be presumed whenever the following elements are
shown:
1) the instrumentality [causing the injury]
must be under the control or management of
the [defendant]; 2) the circumstances,
according to common knowledge and experience,
must create a clear inference that the
accident would not have happened if the
defendant had not been negligent; and 3) the
[plaintiff's] injury must have resulted from
the accident.
Helton v. Forest Park Baptist Church, Ky. App., 589 S.W.2d 219
(1979) (citation omitted).
The trial court observed that the deck had not been
under the defendants' exclusive control.
It had been built years
prior to the defendants' involvement, and its location outdoors
meant that any number of people could have had access to it.
The
trial court also noted that reasons other than the defendants'
negligence, including poor construction, could account for the
deck's collapse.
Res ipsa loquitur, therefore, does not apply.
Yungman also argues that a jury question exists
concerning the defendants' awareness of a hazardous condition.
This argument has some force.
The deck's age, the fact that a
set of partially decayed steps had been replaced, photographs
showing what may have been signs of decay along the wall from
-5-
which the deck detached, and the fact that more people than usual
were to be on the deck during the party is sufficient evidence,
Yungman insists, to permit a jury to infer that the defendants
were aware of conditions that an ordinarily prudent person would
have regarded as dangerous and would either have corrected or
made known to the defendants' guests.1
The trial court disagreed. It found that Yungman had
failed to present evidence showing that the defendants were aware
of conditions they should have recognized as dangerous.
The
court observed that the deck's only defect, apparently, had been
its manner of attachment to the house; it had been nailed but not
bolted.
The defendants all disclaimed any knowledge of this fact
until after the collapse.
Because neither the need for bolts nor
the lack of bolts would have been obvious to the defendants,
because there was no evidence that any of them had discovered
this fact prior to the accident, and because otherwise the deck
appeared to be sound to everyone involved, including Yungman, who
has advanced training in structural and mechanical engineering,
the trial court ruled that no duty to repair or to warn had
arisen.
1
Yungman also complains that the defendants' dismanteling of
the deck within about a month of the accident prevented him from
discovering additional signs of the deck's defectiveness and
amounts to spoliation of evidence. Such misconduct, he insists,
should at least give rise to a presumption in his favor on this
question of an apparent hazard. Yungman failed to address this
issue to the trial court, however, and that failure precludes
this Court's review. CR 59.06; Payne v. Hall, Ky., 423 S.W.2d
530 (1968).
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Given our strict summary judgment standard, this
question is a close one, but we are persuaded that the trial
court did not err by refusing to submit this case to a jury.
The
circumstantial evidence Yungman relies upon as implying the
defendants' awareness of a hazardous condition is not sufficient.
It permits no more than speculation on this issue.
As a matter
of law, therefore, it does not provide an adequate basis for a
judgment in Yungman's favor.
Gross v. Barrett, Ky., 350 S.W.2d
457 (1961).
For these reasons, we affirm the November 27, 1996,
summary judgment of LaRue Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES, MICHAEL
HOWELL and VONDA HOWELL:
Gregg Y. Neal
Shelbyville, Kentucky
Redford H. Coleman
Russell S. Sizemore
Elizabethtown, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES, MELVA
HANEY and OVA HANEY:
Armer H. Mahan, Jr.
Petersen S. Thomas
Louisville, Kentucky
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