LUCINDA K. GRAY V. MADISONVILLE COUNTRY CLUB; ROBERT E. SPURLIN, DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL FUND; RONALD W. MAY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; and WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
February 20, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 96-CA-003266-WC
LUCINDA K. GRAY
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
CLAIM NOS. WC-90-45939 & WC-93-28017
MADISONVILLE COUNTRY CLUB;
ROBERT E. SPURLIN,
DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL FUND;
RONALD W. MAY, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE; and WORKERS' COMPENSATION
BOARD
AND
CROSS-APPEAL NO. 96-CA-3442-WC
ROBERT E. SPURLIN,
DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL FUND
v.
CROSS-APPELLEES
CROSS-APPEAL NO. 96-CA-003484-WC
MADISONVILLE COUNTRY CLUB
v.
CROSS-APPELLANT
CROSS-PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
CLAIM NOS. WC-90-45939 & WC-93-28017
LUCINDA K. GRAY;
MADISONVILLE COUNTRY CLUB;
RONALD W. MAY, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE; and WORKERS' COMPENSATION
BOARD
AND
APPELLEES
CROSS-APPELLANT
CROSS-PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
CLAIM NOS. WC-90-45939 & WC-93-28017
LUCINDA K. GRAY;
ROBERT E. SPURLIN,
DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL FUND;
RONALD W. MAY, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE; and WORKERS' COMPENSATION
BOARD
CROSS-APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
*
BEFORE:
*
*
*
*
ABRAMSON, GARDNER and JOHNSON, Judges.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Lucinda Gray (Gray) petitions for review of an
opinion by the Workers' Compensation Board (Board) rendered on
November 8, 1996, which affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).
The
ALJ had found Gray to be totally and permanently occupationally
disabled with the disability consisting of a 25% prior active
occupational disability, a 55% occupational disability from a workrelated motor vehicle accident and a 20% disability from a nonwork-related fall at home.
The Board reversed as to the lifetime
disability benefits based on the rule of law that a post-injury
disability may not be added to a work-related disability to enhance
the percentage of disability and consequent duration of payments.
Johnson v. Scotts Branch Coal Co., Ky.App., 754 S.W.2d 555 (1988).
Gray argues to this Court that the Board erred in not reversing the
ALJ's finding that 20% of the disability was noncompensable because
the
finding
was
clearly
erroneous.
Madisonville
Country
Club
(Country Club) and the Special Fund, in their cross-petitions for
review, argue that the Board erred in affirming the ALJ's finding
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that Gray's prior active disability was 25%. We affirm the Board's
decision.
We adopt the Board's concise factual description of the
three injuries.
Gray, born April 24, 1955, was employed as
a
bookkeeper
and
general
laborer
for
Madisonville.
Gray has a high school
education but no specialized or additional
vocational training.
On October 25, 1990,
Gray sustained a work-related back injury
resulting in a discectomy to Gray's low back.
A claim for this work-related injury resulted
in
a
settlement
for
25%
occupational
disability. Gray was off work for a lengthy
period of time but ultimately returned to
employment with Madisonville. Thereafter, on
June 17, 1993, Gray sustained injury to her
low back in a work-related motor vehicle
accident. She was able to return to work but
subsequently in May of 1994, Gray underwent a
lumbar laminectomy at the L5-S1 level and
discectomy on the left. She did not return to
work following this second surgical procedure.
Further, in late July or early August 1994,[1]
Gray was in a squatting position at her
refrigerator at home putting away either
canned drinks or ice tea and in the process of
getting up from the squatting position either
her foot turned or her leg went out and she
fell back landing on her buttocks.
Gray filed a second compensation claim on
the June 1993 work-related injury. However,
she did not file a reopening for the 1990
injury and agreement but that claim was
consolidated herein.
Six days before the June 1993 work-related automobile accident, an
MRI study was performed on Gray's lower back.
The MRI did not show
any herniation at L5-S1 level or any need for surgery.
However, an
MRI study on April 25, 1994, showed a disc herniation at the L5-S1
1
A close reading of the record reveals that Gray's fall at
her home occurred on the Saturday preceding her examination on
August 3, 1994. The correct date is July 30, 1994.
-3-
level
with
a
marked
compression
of
the
left
S1
nerve
root.
Following her second surgery on May 16, 1994, her condition did not
improve much, if at all.
After her fall at home on July 30, 1994,
another MRI was performed on August 2, 1994.
This MRI revealed a
large left-sided disc herniated interspace with some overlying scar
tissue.
A third surgery was performed on August 9, 1994.
After
that surgery, her condition improved some, but not to the extent
that she could return to work.
At
the
hearing
on
May
1,
1996,
all
matters
were
stipulated except the extent and duration of her disability,
whether Gray had any prior active disability and whether the
impairment was due in part to non-work-related incidents.
Gray
introduced into evidence the depositions of Dr. James Donley,
Gray's treating physician; Dr. Joel Dill, a vocational expert; and
Dr. Pearson Auerbach, the Country Club's evaluating physician.
Dr. Auerbach found Gray to have a 10% impairment rating
using the Diagnosed Related Estimates method and a 16% impairment
rating using the loss of motion method.
He stated that it was
reasonable to assume that there would be some weakness in the
extremities and even some numbness.
Regarding his examination of
Gray, he stated that he objectively found a bit of weakness in the
dorsiflexion strength of the lateral part of the left foot and some
diminished sensation in the leg on the left side.
He opined that
Gray might be able to do some sedentary work, but that she could
not do any lifting or perform manual labor.
Dr. Auerbach did not
state that Gray's fall at home in July 1994 was the result of
weakness from her work-related injury.
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Dr. Donley stated that he found Gray to have an 18%
permanent partial disability rating to the body as a whole.
While
Dr. Donley noted that Gray had numbness in her left leg, he did not
detect any weakness in her left leg.
He stated that Gray's pain
was the disabling factor and that her ability to perform labor on
a regular basis was extremely limited.
When asked about the July
1994 fall at Gray's home, Dr. Donley stated that a physician's
assistant had taken Gray's medical history on August 3, 1994, when
Gray was admitted for surgery.
The statement revealed that Gray
had explained that she had fallen while at home in a squatting
position putting away ice tea in the refrigerator.
Gray had
explained
from
that
while
in
the
process
of
getting
up
the
squatting position, "my foot turned on me and I landed on my butt."
When asked which of Gray's feet turned, Dr. Donley stated that the
note "[a]lludes to the left foot.
It doesn't say specifically to
the left foot, but then she experienced low back pain and left leg
pain radiating down to the foot, with some numbness of the leg."
However, Dr. Donley did not state that Gray's fall was caused by
her prior work-related injury.
Dr. Dill's opinion was that Gray
could perform no work in the labor market.
The ALJ, by opinion dated July 2, 1996, awarded Gray
total permanent occupational disability and stated that 25% of the
disability was prior active disability that had resulted from the
October 25, 1990 injury, 55% of her disability was from the 1993
work-related automobile accident and 20% of her disability was from
the fall at her home which he determined to be noncompensable.
In
discussing the law pertaining to prior active disability, the ALJ
-5-
stated that, in the absence of a reopening, the parties are bound
by the percentage of impairment agreed to in the settlement of the
1990 case.
The ALJ also made the following finding of fact:
"The
ALJ is persuaded that one-fourth of plaintiff's total-permanent
vocational impairment (25%) was prior active and resulted from the
injury of October 25, 1990."
On
July
15,
1996,
Gray
filed
a
petition
for
reconsideration which contended that the ALJ had erred in finding
the 1994 fall at Gray's home to be noncompensable.
Gray argued
that she had presented "undisputed and uncontradicted" evidence in
her testimony that the injury related to her fall at home was
caused by the effects of injuries resulting from the work-related
automobile accident.
On July 29, 1996, the ALJ overruled the
petition and stated that the medical history did not show that
Gray's left foot turned or that numbness or weakness caused the
foot to turn.
The ALJ emphasized that Gray did not mention the
fall at her home in her discovery deposition and that Gray did not
claim that the fall was connected to the prior work-related injury
until the May 1, 1996 hearing.
The ALJ went on to point out that
even when questioned about the fall, Dr. Donley never stated that
the fall was caused by the earlier work-related injury.
Gray, the Country Club, and the Special Fund appealed to
the Board.
The Board, by opinion dated November 8, 1996, affirmed
the
determination
ALJ's
that
the
fall
at
Gray's
home
was
noncompensable and that Gray's prior active occupational disability
was 25%; but the Board reversed the ALJ's determination that Gray's
post-injury 20% disability could be added to her work-related
-6-
disability. Thus, Gray was denied lifetime benefits and limited to
425 weeks of disability. The Board stated that, contrary to Gray's
argument, the evidence regarding the cause of the fall at her home
was controverted and that the evidence did not compel a different
result.
The Board also stated that while the ALJ was not bound by
the prior settlement as to the issue of prior active disability,
the
ALJ's
disability
independent
was
based
factual
upon
finding
sufficient
of
25%
evidence.
prior
active
Thus,
any
misstatement of the law by the ALJ concerning him being bound by
the
prior
settlement
percentage
was
harmless
error.
Gray's
petition for review and the Country Club's and the Special Fund's
cross-petitions for review followed.
Our function in reviewing a Board opinion "is to correct
the Board only where the . . . Court perceives the Board has
overlooked or misconstrued controlling statutes or precedent, or
committed an error in assessing the evidence so flagrant as to
cause gross injustice."
Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, Ky.,
827 S.W.2d 685, 687-688 (1992).
Additionally, in Special Fund v.
Francis, Ky., 708 S.W.2d 641, 643 (1986), the Court held as
follows:
If the fact-finder finds against the person
with the burden of proof, his burden on appeal
is infinitely greater. It is of no avail in
such a case to show that there was some
evidence of substance which would have
justified a finding in his favor.
He must
show that the evidence was such that the
finding against him was unreasonable because
the finding cannot be labeled "clearly
erroneous" if it reasonably could have been
made.
-7-
Francis went on to state that a "ruling of the Board can be
reversed only if the evidence for claimant was so strong as to
reasonably compel a finding in his favor."
Id.
We will first address Gray's argument that the ALJ erred
in finding that her 1994 fall at her home was noncompensable.
She argues that there is uncontradicted proof that she
fell because of weakness associated with her work-related injury
following necessary medical and/or surgical treatment.
Gray has
the burden of proving that her disability was related to her
employment.
Jones v. Newberg, Ky., 890 S.W.2d 284, 285 (1994).
Having failed to met her burden with the ALJ, the burden on appeal
is great.
Gray must show that the record contains evidence which
would compel a finding in her favor.
McCloud v. Beth-Elkhorn
Corp., Ky., 514 S.W.2d 46, 47 (1974).
Gray
argues
that
a
fact-finder
cannot
reject
uncontradicted evidence placed in the record absent a sufficient
explanation of reasons for its rejection.
Gray relies on Collins
v. Castleton Farms, Inc., Ky.App., 560 S.W. 2d 830 (1978), and more
particularly, 3 A. Larson, Workers Compensation Law, ยง 80.20 (9th
ed. 1976), quoted in Collins, which states as follows:
The Commission [the ALJ in Kentucky] may even
refuse to follow the uncontradicted evidence
in the record, but when it does so, its
reasons for rejecting the only evidence in the
record should appear--e.g., that the testimony
was inherently improbable, or so inconsistent
as to be incredible, that the witness was
interested, or that his testimony on the point
at issue was impeached by falsity and his
statements on other matters.
Unless some
explanation is furnished of the disregard of
all uncontradicted testimony in the record,
the Commission [ALJ] may find its award
reversed as arbitrary and unsupported.
-8-
In this case, Gray testified at the hearing that the fall
at her home was related to the numbness and weakness that she
experienced in her left leg and foot as a result of surgery.
Gray
attempted to connect the fall at her home with the surgery from the
work-related injury by asking Dr. Auerbach and Dr. Donley questions
about post-operative weakness and numbness in Gray's leg.
While
this medical evidence was available for the ALJ to consider, it was
not clear, uncontradicted evidence that he was required to accept.
The fact is that Gray may have fallen at her home because of
weakness and numbness caused by the second surgery, which would be
work-related;
or
she
may
have
fallen
for
some
unrelated to her problems caused by the surgery.
other
It was most
definitely a close call for the fact-finder to make.
might
have
decided
otherwise,
this
is
the
type
reason
of
While we
factual
determination that is solely within the purview of the ALJ.
An ALJ may believe some parts of the evidence and
disbelieve other parts even if it comes from the same witness or
the same party's total proof.
Caudill v. Maloney's Discount
Stores, Ky., 560 S.W.2d 15, 16 (1977).
The ALJ indicated that he
was influenced by the fact that Gray had omitted mentioning the
fall in her discovery deposition, taken in December 1995. While we
agree with Gray that there was no inconsistency in the mere fact
that she did not volunteer information that was not asked her
during a discovery deposition, it is within the purview of the
fact-finder to weigh such factors.
The ALJ also indicated that he
was influenced by the fact that the medical history Gray gave to
the physician's assistant prior to the 1994 surgery did not mention
-9-
that she suffered from weakness and numbness in her left leg due to
the earlier surgery.
The ALJ is entitled to consider such matters
when judging a witness' credibility and drawing inferences from the
evidence.
When more than one reasonable inference can be drawn
from the evidence, the ALJ is free to choose which inference to
draw and this Court has no authority to second-guess his decision.
Jackson v. General Refractories Co., Ky., 581 S.W.2d 10 (1979).
The Country Club and the Special Fund argue in their
cross-petitions that the ALJ erred as a matter of law in holding
that the parties were bound by the prior active disability figure
of 25% contained in a settlement agreement.
The parties request
that the matter be remanded to the ALJ for a determination of prior
active disability. In Beale v. Faultless Hardware, Ky., 837 S.W.2d
893 (1992), the Supreme Court of Kentucky in addressing the issue
of settlements and the doctrine of res judicata stated as follows:
In addition to being contrary to KRS
342.125(3), the application of res judicata by
the Court of Appeals would undermine the
policy of encouraging settlements in workers'
compensation cases. Accordingly, Parson is
overruled to the extent that in the litigation
of a claim for a subsequent injury, it would
make res judicata a fact contained in an
agreement
to
settle
a
prior
workers'
compensation claim. This decision in no way
affects the rule that absent a re-opening or
the litigation of a claim for a subsequent
injury, an approved settlement of workers'
compensation claim is final and binding on the
parties to the agreement.
Id. at 896.
Therefore, the ALJ did err in stating that he was
bound by the prior active disability percentage provided for in the
settlement of the prior claim.
-10-
The
occupational
proper
disability
test
is
for
"'how
determining
much,
if
prior
any,
active
occupational
disability, by the standards employed in determining allowance for
workmen's compensation benefits, the employee's condition evidenced
immediately before he received the second injury.'"
Wells v.
Bunch, Ky., 692 S.W.2d 806, 808 (1985), quoting Griffin v. Booth
Memorial Hospital, Ky., 467 S.W.2d 789 (1971) (emphasis original).
In the case of a second injury, the ALJ must determine what the
claimant's actual disability was immediately before the latest
compensable injury, which will translate into pre-existing active
disability.
Melton v. General Tire, Inc., Ky.App., 905 S.W.2d 81
(1995).
In his findings, the ALJ noted that Dr. Donley assessed
a 10% whole body impairment for the 1990 injury.
It is the
function of the fact-finder to translate functional impairment to
occupational disability.
166 (1992).
almost
a
Newberg v. Davis, Ky., 841 S.W.2d 164,
The ALJ further noted that Gray did not work for
year
after
the
surgery,
that
Gray
had
been
seen
periodically by Dr. Donley for pain flare-ups, and that Gray had
undergone an MRI six days before the automobile accident. In fact,
the ALJ stated that "[c]ertainly plaintiff's treatment records
would indicate she was suffering from a significant prior active
impairment before the 1993 injury . . . .
There is no evidence of
any other occurrence prior to the 1993 injury that would have
caused plaintiff to suffer additional disability from a back
condition."
Further, the ALJ made the following finding of fact:
"The
persuaded
ALJ
is
that
one-fourth
-11-
of
plaintiff's
total-
permanent vocational impairment (25%) was prior active and resulted
from the injury of October 25, 1990."
Since the ALJ made an
independent finding of fact that the prior active disability was
one-fourth of the total impairment and because that finding is
supported by substantial evidence, we agree with the Board that any
misstatement of the law by the ALJ was harmless error.
The decision of the Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR GRAY:
BRIEF FOR MADISONVILLE
COUNTRY CLUB:
Hon. Dick Adams
Madisonville, KY
Hon. Kimberly Lemmons Garrison
Lexington, KY
BRIEF FOR SPECIAL FUND:
Hon. Joel D. Zakem
Louisville, KY
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