SUSAN BOYD MAHMOUD V. MOHAMED MAHMOUD and ROBERT D. MEREDITH, Commissioner
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RENDERED: July 10, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO.
96-CA-3152-MR
SUSAN BOYD MAHMOUD
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MEADE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SAM MONARCH, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 91-CI-0244
V.
MOHAMED MAHMOUD and ROBERT D.
MEREDITH, Commissioner
APPELLEES
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
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BEFORE:
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COMBS, GUIDUGLI, and JOHNSON, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE:
The appellant, Susan Boyd Mahmoud (Susan), appeals
from the order of the Meade Circuit Court adopting the Domestic
Relations Commissioner's report, which recommended that the
appellee, Mohamed Mohey-Eldin ABD Elkawy Mahmoud, be allowed
full, unrestricted visitation with the parties' minor daughter.
The appellant argues that the court erroneously excluded the
testimony of several of her witnesses and that the allocation of
the DRC's fees was inequitable.
When the parties' marriage was dissolved in June, 1993,
Susan was awarded sole custody of their three-year old daughter,
S.M., and Mohamed was granted visitation rights.
Shortly after
the dissolution of the marriage, Susan claims that S.M. started
exhibiting behavioral problems, such as wetting her bed, having
nightmares, and crying uncontrollably.
Susan initially
attributed these changed in S.M.'s behavior to the parties'
divorce and sought counseling for S.M.
However, despite
counseling, S.M. continued to behave in an odd manner.
In
October 1993, a particularly bizarre incident with S.M. prompted
Susan to schedule an appointment for S.M. at Children's First in
Louisville.1
S.M. was seen by Dr. Sugarman, who performed a
gynecological exam on her.
Dr. Sugarman found no physical
evidence of the abuse; but she told Susan to watch S.M. for
certain behaviors which are generally indicative of sexual abuse.
Susan claims that on March 31, 1994, S.M. told her that
her daddy had touched her "pee-pee hole."
Susan immediately
sought an emergency order to stop S.M.'s visitation with her
father that was scheduled for the upcoming weekend.
She also
took S.M. to Children's First for another examination.
Sugarman again examined S.M.
Dr.
Although she found no physical
evidence of abuse, Dr. Sugarman testified in her deposition that
1
Children's First is an agency in Louisville which
specializes in evaluating allegations of sexual abuse.
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during the examination S.M. made statements that her father had
sexually abused her.
Based upon S.M.'s statements and the
changes her in behavior that her mother reported, Dr. Sugarman
made the diagnosis that S.M. had been sexually abused and
referred her to Dr. Abbott, a psychologist, for further
treatment.
Mohamed's visitation with S.M. was ordered to be
supervised until the DRC could conduct a hearing as to the
allegations of sexual abuse.
Prior to the hearing, the parties
agreed to be evaluated by Lane Veltkamp, the director of the
Family Mediation and Evaluation Clinic at the University of
Kentucky College of Medicine; Veltkamp has a master's degree in
clinical social work.
He met with the parties individually and
jointly with S.M. for a total of nine sessions.
However, the DRC
found that Mr. Veltkamp's testimony as to out-of-court statements
made by S.M. was inadmissible.
The court ruled that Mr. Veltkamp
could testify as an expert pursuant to KRS 403.290(2).
After conducting a hearing, the DRC issued his report
and found no evidence that Mohamed had abused S.M.
He
recommended that Mohamed be allowed full, unrestricted visitation
with S.M.
Susan filed exceptions to the DRC's report, contending
that he had failed to properly consider the testimony of Dr.
Sugarman, Dr. Abbott, and Mr. Veltkamp.
On November 18, 1996,
the court entered its order overruling her exceptions and
approving and adopting the DRC's report.
The court agreed with
the DRC that there was no evidence of sexual abuse and set out a
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visitation schedule, gradually allowing for the restoration of
Mohamed's full, unsupervised visitation rights.
This appeal
followed.2
Susan contends on appeal that the court erred in
excluding the testimony of Dr. Sugarman and Dr. Abbott as to
S.M.'s out-of-court declarations about her father.
The court
found that Dr. Sugarman was not a treating physician but an
evaluating physician and excluded her testimony on the basis that
its prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value.
As to Dr.
Abbott, the court stated that it could not determine whether she
was a treating or nontreating physician; nonetheless, as in the
case of Dr. Sugarman's testimony, the court ruled that the
prejudicial effect of her testimony outweighed its probative
value.
Susan argues that the testimony of both Dr. Sugarman and
Dr. Abbott is admissible pursuant to the hearsay exception set
out in KRE 803(4).
In the alternative, she maintains that the
probative value of their testimonies far outweighs any arguably
prejudicial impact.
In Drumm v. Commonwealth, Ky., 783 S.W.2d 380 (1990),
the Supreme Court of Kentucky adopted the exception to the
hearsay rule set out in the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE)
2
On November 22, 1996, Judge William Knopf of this Court
entered an order granting Susan's motion for emergency relief
pursuant to CR 76.33, staying the circuit court's order granting
unsupervised visits to Mohamed. Susan's motion was then passed
to a panel of this Court for a hearing. On December 12, 1996,
the panel entered an order denying Susan's motion and setting
aside the order entered by Judge Knopf on November 22, 1996.
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803(4), which has since been codified in KRE 803(4).
KRE 803
provides in pertinent part:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay
rules, even though the declarant is available
as a witness:
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(4) Statements for purposes of medical
treatment or diagnosis. Statements made for
purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis
and describing medical history, for past or
present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the
inception or general character of the cause
or external source thereof insofar as
reasonably pertinent to treatment or
diagnosis.
Prior to the adoption of KRE 803(4), the distinction between a
treating versus a nontreating physician served as a bright-line
rule for determining admissibility of medical evidence as an
exception to the hearsay rule.
The rationale for such a
distinction was based upon the assumption that statements made to
a physician consulted for a purpose other than treatment might
tend to have less inherent reliability than similar statements
made to a treating physician whose correct diagnosis and
treatment were directly dependent upon the veracity of the
patient.
KRE 803(4) is not a per se bar to the admission of
hearsay medical evidence from nontreating physicians.
However,
in cases involving nontreating physicians, the court is required
to take one extra step and perform a probative-value versus
prejudicial-effect analysis.
After examining the totality of the
circumstances, the court must determine whether the probative
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value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.
Sharp v.
Commonwealth Ky., 849 S.W.2d 542 (1993).
We will first examine the excluded testimony of Dr.
Sugarman.
The record does not support the court's finding that
Dr. Sugarman was a nontreating physician; in fact, it supports a
finding to the contrary.
S.M. was examined by Dr. Sugarman twice
over a period of a couple of months.
It was during the second
examination that S.M. told Dr. Sugarman that her father had put
objects in her "pee-pee hole."
These statements were made to
Dr. Sugarman in the course of her examination and evaluation of
S.M.
Significantly, Susan took S.M. to Children's First
approximately twelve hours after she claims that S.M. made
statements that caused her to believe that the child had been
sexually abused.
Dr. Sugarman performed her examination in the
normal course of her professional duties as a physician -- not as
a preparation for testimony in court.
On both occasions when Dr.
Sugarman saw S.M., she was "treating" the child solely for the
purpose of making a diagnosis as to whether she had been sexually
abused.
Dr. Sugarman diagnosed that abuse had indeed occurred
and referred S.M. to Dr. Abbott for further treatment.
Dr.
Sugarman's testimony as to S.M.'s out-of-court statements was
clearly admissible under the exception in KRE 803(4) as these
declarations were made for the purpose of obtaining treatment or
diagnosis.
We hold that the court's exclusion of this evidence
was clearly erroneous.
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We now turn to Dr. Abbott's testimony.
S.M. was
referred to Dr. Abbott as a follow-up to Dr. Sugarman's diagnosis
that abuse had occurred.
At the time of her first deposition,
Dr. Abbott had met with S.M. once and had a scheduled appointment
for the next week with her; by the time of her second deposition,
she had had several sessions with S.M.
Presently, Dr. Abbott
continues to see S.M. on weekly basis.
Dr. Abbott testified
that during her sessions with S.M., the child made statements
that her father had touched and put various objects in her "peepee and poo-poo hole."
Dr. Abbott's testimony as to these
statements was found to be inadmissible.
In Edwards v. Commonwealth, Ky., 833 S.W.2d 842
(1992), the Supreme Court held that statements made to a licensed
clinical psychologist for the purpose of treatment for sexual
abuse were admissible under the hearsay exception as to
statements made for the purpose of medical treatment or diagnosis
(KRS 803(4)).
That precise situation exists in this case.
S.M.
was referred to Dr. Abbott for psychological treatment related to
sexual abuse.
April 1994.
She had been treating S.M. on a weekly basis since
The record substantiates that Dr. Abbott is a
treating physician.
In fact, even the appellee refers to her as
S.M.'s "treating physician" in his brief.
As Dr. Abbott is
treating S.M. for sexual abuse and for behavioral problems,
S.M.'s declarations were made in the course of her treatment and
are clearly admissible pursuant to KRE 803(4).
this evidence was, therefore, erroneous as well.
The exclusion of
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As the testimonies of both Dr. Sugarman and Dr. Abbott
constituted a substantial portion of the appellant's evidence,
expulsion of this evidence was reversible error.
We therefore
vacate the court's order and remand on this issue with directions
for the court to consider this evidence.
Susan next argues on appeal that the court erroneously
excluded the expert testimony of Lane Veltkamp.
Veltkamp became
involved in the case (with the approval of both the DRC and the
parties) as an expert to evaluate the parties and S.M. and to
make recommendations in the case.
However, after Veltkamp had
evaluated the parties and S.M. and had made his recommendations,
the DRC raised the question of his ability to testify as an
expert.
Although the court found that Veltkamp could testify as
an expert under KRS 403.290(2)3, the DRC nonetheless held his
testimony incompetent as to certain issues.
It appears that the
parties initially presumed that Mr. Veltkamp was either a
psychologist or a psychiatrist when instead he is actually a
clinical social worker.
In its order, the court correctly found
that the DRC had given appropriate consideration to the
admissible portions of Veltkamp's testimony, that his testimony
regarding out-of-court statements by S.M. was inadmissible, and
that he could not testify as an expert with regard to the
3
KRS 403.290(2) provides as follows:
The court may seek the advice of professional
personnel, whether or not employed by the court on a
regular basis. The advice shall be given in writing
and made available by the Court to counsel upon
request.
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allegation that Mohamed had sexually abused S.M -- the ultimate
issue in the case.
The Kentucky Supreme Court has expressed its
"discomfort for convictions for child abuse based upon the
hearsay testimony and ultimate fact opinion given by social
workers."
Sharp, supra at 546.
The Supreme Court has stated on
several occasions that "[t]here is no recognized exception to the
hearsay rule for social workers or the results of their
investigations."
Furthermore, in Hellstrom v. Commonwealth, KY.,
825 S.W.2d 612 (1992), the Supreme Court held inadmissible the
testimony of a clinical social worker, stating that he did not
qualify as an expert on the credibility and the reliability of
the statements of the child made while he was evaluating her and
that his testimony invaded the province of the jury by
determining witness credibility and expressing his unqualified
opinion on the ultimate issue.
Hellstrom, supra.
We have reviewed Veltkamp's testimony and agree that
much of it is inadmissible pursuant to the highly restrictive
mandate of Hellstrom with regard to social workers.
Throughout
his deposition, Veltkamp testified as to hearsay statements made
by the parties and by S.M. in the course of his evaluation.
He
also expressed his opinion as to S.M.'s credibility and as to the
ultimate issue of whether sexual abuse had occurred -- all in
contravention of Hellstrom.
The court was incorrect in its Order of November 30,
1995, in holding that Hellstrom did not apply.
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However, it was
correct in determining that Veltkamp could testify pursuant to
KRS 403.290(2) -- to the limited extent that that statute permits
in light of the severe (if not contradictory) strictures placed
upon it by Hellstrom.
In its later (and final) Order of November
18, 1996, the court corrected the earlier error and found that
Hellstrom did apply and thus served as a bar to much of
Veltkamp's testimony.
Appellant correctly points out the ambivalence in this
area of the law.
KRS 403.290(2) permits consultation with
experts; KRE 702 and 703(a) both would seem to permit admission
of the kind of opinion evidence offered by Veltkamp.
However,
Hellstrom cases a pall and imposes a ban specifically on social
workers, singling them out and severely limiting their testimony
in the area of child sexual abuse.
Under that rule (which we are
powerless to alter), we hold that the court was, all in all,
correct in its treatment of Veltkamp's testimony.
Upon remand,
we direct that Veltkamp's testimony is admissible but highly
limited under Hellstrom.
When Susan first suspected that sexual abuse had been
perpetrated upon S.M., she correctly sought a variety of
professional assistance.
We note that both parties agreed to an
evaluation by Veltkamp and that the DRC himself approved his
involvement.
The fact that the evaluation provided by Veltkamp
ultimately translated into inadmissible evidence for testimonial
purposes was not foreseeable -- nor was it the result of any
machinations or otherwise wrongful behavior on the part of Susan.
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Therefore, to allocate to her a disproportionately heavy share of
costs for Veltkamp essentially constitutes a punitive measure -amounting to a "fine" for failing to foresee that his testimony
would be largely incompetent.
We agree with appellant that this
assessment was inequitable and arbitrary.
We therefore vacate
the court's order adopting this portion of the DRC's report and
direct the court to allocate these fees more equitably upon
remand.
In summary, we find that the court erred in excluding
the testimony of Dr. Abbott and Dr. Sugarman.
Both of their
testimonies fall under the hearsay exception set out in KRE
803(4).
The DRC improperly allocated 75% of his fees to the
appellant because he found that her case was based upon mostly
incompetent evidence.
As we have discussed, this allocation was
arbitrary and inequitable.
Upon remand, we direct the court to
consider the testimony of both Dr. Sugarman and Dr. Abbott and to
apportion the DRC's fees between the parties in a more equitable
manner.
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the order of the
Meade Circuit Court and remand for additional proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT.
JOHNSON, JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART, DISSENTS IN PART, AND
FILES A SEPARATE OPINION.
JOHNSON, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN
PART:
I concur with the result reached by the Majority Opinion
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as to the admissibility of the testimony of Dr. Sugarman and Dr.
Abbott and as to the issue of the DRC's fees.
As to the Majority
Opinion's discussion of the admissibility of Mr. Veltkamp's
testimony, I respectfully dissent.
In my opinion, Susan and the Majority Opinion correctly
discuss the applicability of KRS 403.290(2).1
However, KRE 706
is also applicable since it provides for court appointment of an
expert such as Mr. Veltkamp.
As to the admissibility of Dr.
Sugarman’s, Dr. Abbott’s and Mr. Veltkamp’s testimony, a thorough
discussion of the current state of the law in Kentucky on the
issues of admissibility of the victim’s hearsay statements that
were made for purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis and
whether opinion evidence concerns the ultimate issue, is provided
in the Supreme Court’s most recent opinion on these issues,
Stringer v. Commonwealth, Ky., 956 S.W.2d 883 (1997) (cert.
denied 118 S.Ct. 1374, 140 L.Ed.2d 522).
It is my opinion that
pursuant to Stringer Mr. Veltkamp’s testimony is admissible.
This case is very disturbing.
Obviously, it is very
disturbing that a father may have sexually abused his daughter;
and it is very disturbing that the father claims that he is
“being egregiously and falsely accused by his paranoid, hypervigilant ex-wife of a crime that he simply did not commit.”
It
is also very disturbing that Mohamed’s counsel, in his brief, has
accused Susan’s counsel of advising Susan “that the only way to
1
Surprisingly, the trial court did not interview the child
pursuant to KRS 403.290(1).
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restrict visitation was if abuse occurred on the child.”
Not to
be outdone, Susan’s counsel, in her reply brief, vehemently
denies this accusation and assails Mohamed’s counsel for
referring to statements made by the trial judge, and then
proceeds to attack the trial judge herself for “allow[ing] his
impressions from outside the record to influence his decision.”
On remand, and for the remainder of their lives spent
with their daughter, it is imperative for the child’s sake that
Susan and Mahmoud conduct themselves properly.
It is also
critical that counsel and all others who enter into this dispute
maintain the highest ethical standards and remember the welfare
of this innocent child.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Christina R. L. Norris
Louisville, KY
Christopher J. Gohman
Radcliff, KY
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