TIMOTHY SARGENT V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: July 2, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 96-CA-2998-MR
TIMOTHY SARGENT
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARY D. PAYNE, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 96-CR-0647
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
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BEFORE:
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DYCHE, JOHNSON, and KNOPF, Judges.
DYCHE, JUDGE.
Timothy Sargent was convicted of three counts of
first-degree sexual abuse in Fayette Circuit Court on September 10,
1996.
He appeals from that conviction, alleging two errors.
First, he claims that the trial court improperly excluded testimony
concerning other instances of sexual abuse against the victim
perpetrated by another person while the family was living in West
Virginia.
Second, he claims that the trial court erred by not
allowing him to testify that he was sexually abused as a child.
disagree with appellant's assertions, and affirm.
We
Appellant had been living with Sally Sargent since 1987,
and they were married in 1993.
daughter
from
stepdaughter.
a
previous
The victim, R.G., was Sally's
marriage,
and
was
appellant's
R.G. was nine years old at the time of the offenses.
Appellant and Sally also had one daughter together.
The family moved from West Virginia to Lexington in
November, 1995.
On April 27, 1996, the victim told her mother that
appellant had made "bad touches" on her.
When Sally confronted
appellant with the information that evening, he was angry at first
but eventually confirmed that the touchings had occurred, but only
three times.
That night, Sally and her two daughters slept behind
a locked door away from appellant. The following day, Sally called
the Child Abuse Hotline, and received a visit from an officer who
suggested that Sally and the girls leave the home.
That night they
stayed with Sally's sister.
The following day, Sally and R.G. met with Detective
Stella Plunkett.
Because appellant had been calling Sally, Det.
Plunkett suggested that Sally attempt to record a conversation with
appellant during which he might discuss the allegations. Appellant
would not discuss the allegations on the phone, except to say that
"I ain't like that no more," and that he did not need counseling
since "I helped myself because I realized what I was doing."
After Det. Plunkett interviewed R.G., appellant was taken
to police headquarters for questioning.
Appellant was advised of
his rights and admitted to touching his stepdaughter on three
occasions. The first instance occurred when the victim was sitting
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on appellant's lap reading a book.
The second and third instances
involved appellant asking the victim to undress, then rubbing his
penis
across
the
victim's
buttocks.
After
giving
his
taped
statement, appellant was arrested on four counts of sexual abuse.
Prior to trial, the prosecutor made a motion in limine to
exclude all reference to abuse that R.G. had suffered at the hands
of another while in West Virginia.
The prosecutor stated that the
allegations occurred when R.G. was four years old, that discussions
with prosecutors in West Virginia had not yielded conclusive
information
therefore
about
the
irrelevant.
allegations,
Appellant
and
the
countered
information
that
the
was
earlier
incident was relevant to show that the victim had learned that such
statements
might
successfully
remove
an
offender
from
the
household.
Because of the child's age at the time of the earlier
alleged offense, and because of the uncertainty of what exactly had
transpired in West Virginia at that time, the trial court sustained
the Commonwealth's motion.
Appellant offered no avowal testimony
on the matter.
The prosecutor also made a motion in limine to prevent
appellant from testifying about any sexual abuse he had been
subjected to as a child.
Counsel for appellant stated that he had
no plans to offer such testimony, and the motion was granted.
Defendant's motions for directed verdict were denied by
the trial court, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty on three
counts of first-degree sexual abuse, and a verdict of not guilty on
one count.
The jury then recommended a sentence of three years on
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each count, the time to be served consecutively.
was
entered
on
recommendation.
October
28,
1996,
consistent
Final judgment
with
the
jury's
This appeal followed.
Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 401 defines relevant
evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence."
KRE 403 provides that even if evidence is relevant, it
"may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
A trial court's
decision on admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed absent
an abuse of discretion.
Partin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 918 S.W.2d
219, 222 (1996).
The trial court granted the Commonwealth's motion to
exclude evidence of a prior incident of sexual abuse perpetrated on
R.G. by another person in West Virginia because of the victim's age
at the time of the earlier alleged offense, and because the
information available from West Virginia authorities was unclear as
to the extent of the allegations.
Appellant offered nothing
further in the form of an avowal to establish what the testimony
would have been, or whether the testimony would have been helpful
to the court in its ruling on admissibility.
As stated in Cain v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 554 S.W.2d 369, 375 (1977), "without an avowal
to show what a witness would have said an appellate court has no
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basis for determining whether an error in excluding his proffered
testimony was prejudicial."
We cannot speculate about what West Virginia authorities
might have said concerning an earlier instance of abuse, or even if
they could have substantiated the claim of abuse.
Such evidence,
if proven, may have satisfied the definition of relevance set forth
in KRE 401.
However, due to the absence of an avowal, it is not
possible to determine from the record whether the evidence could
have survived the balancing test prescribed by KRE 403.
Counsel's
version of the testimony is insufficient; the testimony of the
witness must be in the record for appellate review.
S.W.2d at 223.
Partin, 918
The issue is not preserved, and the record does not
indicate that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the
Commonwealth's motion.
Appellant's second assignment of error -- that he should
have been allowed to testify about abuse he suffered as a child -is likewise not preserved for review.
When the Commonwealth made
its motion in limine to exclude this evidence, appellant's counsel
indicated
that
he
did
not
intend
to
offer
such
testimony.
Appellant did not object to this ruling until he reached this
Court.
"Until the trial court's attention is directed to a matter
and he has the opportunity to rule on it, there is no error."
Green v. Commonwealth, Ky., 556 S.W.2d 684, 686 (1977).
Further, we cannot say that appellant's grievances amount
to palpable error affecting his substantial rights, and thus
subject
to
appellate
review
in
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spite
of
their
insufficient
preservation.
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 10.26.
The evidence of appellant's guilt was overwhelming, including not
only a taped confession given to the police, but also appellant's
admission at trial that he had committed the offenses charged.
There is no "substantial possibility" that the result of the trial
would have been any different had the alleged errors not occurred;
the errors cannot therefore be considered prejudicial.
Jackson v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 717 S.W.2d 511, 514 (1986).
The judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURS.
JOHNSON, JUDGE, CONCURS AND WRITES A SEPARATE OPINION.
JOHNSON, JUDGE, CONCURRING.
I concur with the Majority
Opinion, but since I believe this appeal is frivolous I write
separately. The appellant has failed to comply with Kentucky Rules
of Civil Procedure (CR) 76.12(4)(c)(iv) which requires that each
argument
in
his
brief
preservation of error.
contain
a
statement
concerning
the
See Elwell v. Stone, Ky. App., 799 S.W.2d
46 (1990); and Hollingsworth v. Hollingsworth, Ky. App., 798 S.W.2d
145 (1990).
The two alleged errors were not preserved; and in
light of the appellant admitting these offenses before and during
trial, a good faith argument cannot be made that relief should be
granted under the palpable error rule.
RCr 10.26.
appellant makes no reference to RCr 10.26.
In fact, the
Further, the appellant
has not filed a reply brief to refute the Commonwealth's arguments
that the alleged errors have not been preserved for review.
This
appeal is frivolous; and if the Commonwealth had sought sanctions,
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I would have voted for them.
It is unfortunate that the limited
resources of the Fayette County Legal Aid have been wasted on this
appeal.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
Herbert T. West
Fayette County Legal Aid
Lexington, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Carol C. Ullerich
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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